

THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION: DESIGNING THE SETTING OF THE PLAY *ODYSSEY*

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Özet - Görüşümüzce, bütünleşmede dışsal değişkenlere ilişkin bir çalışmanın öncelikle Neumann'ınki türünden bir süreklilik üzerindeki yerini saptaması gerekir (bu, yaklaşımda ne ölçüde içsel ne ölçüde de dışsal değişkenlere yer verileceğinin kararlaştırılması demektir). Ardından, içsel ve dışsal değişkenlerin geçerliğini güvenceye almak için Wæver'in Avrupa tanımlarından birine ya da görece güncelleştirilmiş diğer bir Avrupa tanımına gönderme yoluyla Avrupa'nın sınırları kararlaştırılmalıdır.

Dışsal değişkenler alanına girilmesinin ardından bu alanda bir bölütleme gerçekleştirilmelidir. Şimdiki durumda hazır bir bölütleme kalıbı olmadığından kuramcı kendince bir bölütlemeye gitmekte özgür gözükmektedir. Bu aşamada, yazımız, bir seçenek olmak üzere yalın bir bölütleme kalıbı önermektedir: dışsal değişkenler ilkin, işletsel bir benzetmeyle, 'çeken etkenler' ve 'iten etkenler' olarak ikiye ayrılmaktadır. Ardından iten etkenler de kendi içinde 'bölücü' ve 'bütünleştirici' iten etkenler diye yeniden bölütlenmektedir.

INTRODUCTION

I.Theoretical Justification

Homer's peerless work -except its mate fragment *Iliad- Odyssey*, a joyful reading piece, turns to be a problematic text if it is attempted to be converted into a scenic play. 12 ships try to return to Ithaca, their homeland, within an ever-changing, complex and crowded atmosphere: Magical winds that blow to the sails, mysterious islands by which the ships cast anchor, Cyclopes attacking the sailors... all make up a constitutive, yet difficult-to-imitate background which would embarrass the job of the scene designer. Refraining from such a rich stage-setting and reducing the story into a mere company of ships that took a common bearing, on the other hand, would produce a jejune performance.

The same is true for the European political integration studies. In depicting the voyage of the 12 - now 15- Member States to an unascertained destination, theorists have sometimes overemphasized internal variables at the expense of the external ones, depriving their analysis of a bountiful dimension. However, European political integration phenomenon, until now, has proceeded within a rich international and global

milieu, and any comprehensive expression about this phenomenon has anyhow had to refer to these external variables.

Pentland's holistic classification[1], for instance, is one of the most compact and complete expressions of the approaches to integration theory; at least for practical purposes it is followed in several textbooks as well as it is referred by numerous academical texts. Yet, its plight of dealing solely [2] with internal variables draws criticism.

Within the concern of grouping the writings on integration, Pentland "arrive(s) at a two-fold classification" [2;22-23]. Depending on three different criteria [(a)whether integration is an end-product or a process¹, (b)whether the end-product is a state-model or a community-model, and (c)whether the process is direct or indirect] he gives place to the following schematical representation [2; 23]:

END-PRODUCT

STATE MODEL COMMUNITY MODEL

Federalism	Pluralism
Neo-functionalism	Functionalism

I
N
T
P
E
R
G
O
R
C
T
A
E
T
S
I
S
O
N

DIRECT
-Political
Variables
INDIREC
-Socio-
Economic
Variables

¹The same distinction takes part in [21: 4-5], that predates Pentland's work. Although Pentland does not make a reference *in situ*, dispersed references to Lindberg throughout the book inspires a utilisation of either Lindberg's work or a third common source.

A verbal reiteration of the scheme above would be that for some scholars who approach integration teleologically, it is an end-product, a final situation to be achieved. This end-product might be in the form of either state-model or community-model. The state-model contains federalism and neo-functionalism, and the community model is consisted of pluralism and functionalism. On the other hand, studies on integration theory might also be grouped according to their independent variables in explaining the process of change. In this context, integration can be in either direct or indirect form. The direct form, concentrating on political variables, includes federalism and pluralism, whereas indirect form, putting more emphasis on socio-economic variables, comprises neo-functionalism and functionalism. In the state-model, federalist writers stipulate 'a particular type of constitutional arrangement' for integration. Neo-functionalist writers too imagine the existence of a 'supranational' setting though, however, not necessarily in the federalist structure. This so-called 'community-model' focuses on élites and general publics of integrating states, placing less emphasis on emanation of common political institutions. Instead, 'certain common values, perceptions and habits' are regarded more important. Political independent variables (the direct approach to the process of change) include "problems concerning the power, responsiveness and control of political élites, and... the political habits of general public" [2;22], whilst socio-economic variables consist of "economic, social and technological factors which, by much less direct processes, are said to bring about political change" [2;22].

Among the critics of such an approach to integration, Haas for example, states that

Pentland argues that the themes argued by pluralist, functionalist, neo-functionalist and federalist writers, respectively, are neither altogether wrong nor incapable of being combined. Their recombination, however, would result in a discrete theory of regional integration recognising the indeterminate nature of institutional outcomes and a more sophisticated notion of social change, without² dealing with the issue of exogenous variables³ and their salience in throwing doubt on

²Stress belongs to Haas.

³A similar criticism -or rather a confession- comes from Feld, who first proposes "a different perspective on the process of regional integration, centred upon the importance of foreign and domestic policies of member states or potential member states", but then adds that "the task is far from finished" since among other factors that starts an integration process there lay "inputs from... extra-regional national actors and events" [22; 518].

whether the regional focus is worth while. [3; 174]⁴

Archer cites that Haas himself, in the preface added to a later printing of the famous *The Uniting of Europe* in 1968 (the book was originally written in 1958), in enumerating the failures of neo-functionalism to which he contributed much, admits that "factors within the Community had been stressed to the detriment of those coming from the outside world" [4; 97].

The literature bears statements of some other students of integration theory who also point out the importance of the external factors:

In his model where he emphasised the important rôle played by élite-units in integration process, Etzioni points out that "an élite might be completely 'out', encouraging or forcing the merger of two or more units into a union which it does not join, sometimes relinquishing control once unification is initiated" [5; 349].

Though from the specific perspective of the German existence in Europe, Pedersen refers to the importance of the external environment in analysing integration:

Several analysts of European integration, among them Nye (1965)⁵[6] and more recently Sandholtz&Zysman (1989) [7], have argued that the external environment is an important and somewhat overlooked factor in integration processes. Nye thus referred to the 'external catalysts'. The external catalyst may be quite different in nature. The formation of the EC was helped along by US support and the US military presence in Europe reduced the FRG's political rôle, thereby creating a stable balance between the 'big three' in Western Europe. this obviously facilitated West European integration.

The new breakthrough in EC integration in the mid-1980's drew much of its momentum from *perceived external challenges* (EPCs). Studies of EPC show that *positive expectations from third countries* -particularly the Third World- played a major part in propelling the EC towards some sort of global political rôle (Regelsberger, 1988 [8]; Rummel, 1982 [9]). Similarly, the pressure of expectations from Eastern Europe might come to act as a new external catalyst within the EC. This dynamic will affect the EC not least through a more influential Germany. How strong this catalytic effect will be is hard to say. [10; 85]

⁴In fact, the aim of Haas in this article is to evidence his inference which asserts that theories of regional integration are becoming obsolescent.

⁵"Nye argued that 'the functional linkage of tasks has been a less powerful mechanism that was originally believed to be the case' and sought to construct a 'revised neo-functionalist process model' in which deliberate linkages, actions of external actors, élite socialisation, and other factors played comparable role' [23; 249].

Among his 'forces which may either promote or impede integration', as mentioned above, Mikkelsen, gives place Hoffmann's 'external security environment' concept. Mikkelsen concludes that though there seem to be a relationship between this external security environment and the vicissitudes of the EC, this relationship is not a simple and direct one. That one of the two improvement periods of the EC coincides with the 'First Cold War', whereas the other is currently experienced in an atmosphere of *détente* and co-operation evidences this opinion. He also criticises Hoffmann's complete isolation of foreign policy and security issues from the sphere of action of the EC with the evidence of vast EC relief to East European countries [11;17].

II. Foreground and background: Apart or connected?

A reconciliatory adjustment between internal and external factors to integration would be not to draw a decisive categorical line between the two, and to think of them within the context of a spectrum. Indeed, such a continuum has already been devised by Iver B. Neumann, to be employed in any integration analysis⁶. Below is an outline of his model as explained in his pamphlet *Regions in International Relations Theory: The Case for a Region-Building Approach* [12]:

The first end of the continuum where integration is defined solely by internal factors to the region might be best represented by Edmund Burke. For him, 'informal wellsprings of the fellow feeling' is the basis for 'all human collectives':

Men are not tied to one another by papers and seals. They are led to associate by resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies. It is with nations as with individuals. Nothing is so strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as correspondence in laws, customs, manners and habits of life. They have more than the force of the treaties in themselves. They are obligations written in the heart. They approximate men to men, without their knowledge, and sometimes against their intentions. [13]

Complementary to this reasoning, Burke concludes that regions, as in the case of Europe, there are 'natural, culturally defined borders'.

A more diluted approach which but still focuses on internal factors, belongs to Bruce M. Russett. After a quotation from Finch that reads as "(t)he characteristics of a region should be most pronounced in its interior" [14;7], he resumes by stating the arbitrariness of regional

borders. He categorises regions as 'regions of social and cultural homogeneity', 'regions of states which share similar political attitudes or external behaviour', 'regions of political interdependence, where the countries are joined together by a network of supranational or intergovernmental political institutions', 'regions of economic interdependence' and 'regions of geographical proximity' [14;11]. Though geographical factors are generally regarded as external, 'geographical proximity' might be regarded internal since it does not have reference to outside or global system.

Karl Deutsch's 'security community' is built upon a stress on internal factors to a region; the abandonment of the 'war' option by the governments, élites and populations, an approximation in the area of cultural activities, and an inclination of 'mutual attention, communication and responsiveness'... all prerequisites are the description of a formation shaped solely by inner forces.

A similar view is held by Amitai Etzioni who applied the concepts of his field of study, sociology to international phenomena. As outlined above, he is concerned with "unification of political units that previously shared few or no political bonds" [5; 347]. In his view, emphasis is on common cultural 'background variables' and 'internal transaction data about streams of persons, goods, capital and services'.

Close to the middle of the continuum, there lies Bengt Sundelius' approach. Similar to Etzioni, he underlines the importance of the activities of the domestic élites of the region, but he also adds that it is their harmonious apprehension of the external environment and their joint activities which make up their main incentives.

There are three separate views that can be plotted onto the middle of the continuum. The first one is the 'Nordic balance' notion. Conceptualised mainly by Arne Olav Brundtland, it is based on the idea of equilibrium between 'action' and 'reaction'. As a result of the policy orientations of the Nordic countries in aggregate, each superpower realises that, if it interferes in the Nordic region, the other superpower would make no scruples about doing more in the same way. Later on, the internal component in the 'Nordic balance' notion has been further elaborated and, for example, Ole Weaver, instead of harmonious foreign policies in action, stressed the importance of dissuasive political discourse that laid behind that them. In any versions of the 'Nordic balance' the proportion of internal and external factors seem comparably equal, and it is difficult to opt for one of them. The second view, after the one on the specific example of the 'Nordic balance', is Cantori and Spiegel's framework. This conception is also difficult to place onto

⁶A cognate continuum is given by Etzioni in the context of his above cited conception of élites. For him, along this continuum an élite forcing or encouraging 'merger of two or more units into a union can be 'in' or 'out' [5].

the either side of the middle. These scholars divide regions into two sectors: a 'core' and a 'periphery'. The core consists of a state or a group of states that constitute the focal point of the international relations within the region. The peripheral component, or what they call as 'the intrusive system' is made up of the influence of international system to the region and is as important as the internal dynamics themselves. The final view belongs to Bary Buzan. In his model, whereas external influence coming from the global rivalry of great powers is important in delineating a 'region', the amities and enmities between the states that shape a 'security complex' -a network of relations that ties each state's security-concerns to the other- among them, are also important.

On the other half of the continuum where systemic factors, states and geography are seen consequential, internal factors are rather trivial. Most visible of these criteria is geography. For example, according to Johan Jørgen Holst Scandinavian peninsula and Finland together constitute a regional core. In a like manner, Jon Bingen defines the Nordic region referring to the lakes, mountain ranges and rivers surrounding it. These geographical formings might be definitive also when they do not surround but constitute the core area of the region. This latter view is often coupled with military capabilities. Captain Otley from Her Majesty's Committee of Imperial Defence, for instance, focuses on the Nordic region with reference to the Baltic sea within it, and discusses the Russian, German and to some extent British military capabilities in threatening the region via the sea. One of the most extreme approaches leaning on external factors belongs to Russian author Sergey Morgachev. Regions, for him, are defined by the developments at the global level; 'the system-wide confrontations of the great powers' give birth to a number of arenas different from the others and these are perceived as regions⁷.

IN EUROPE

I. Outlining the External

It would be a forced construction if we attempted to find European equivalents for each conception of the concept 'region' prescribed in Neumann's continuum. A wiser effort might be to reverse the method and to try to superimpose already existing definitions of the region Europe back onto the continuum.

⁷To name with Morgachev, though admitting the significance of internal factors as well, Fitzmaurice too, stresses the primary importance of global political shifts of influence in taking shape of regional co-operation efforts in Europe [24].

In economical terms, a common European identity has already been established and spheres of economics internal and external to the region have clearly been delineated. In post-Maastricht period, to imply Community's protectionism as well as its increasing competitiveness, the term 'fortress Europe' has been coined. As the Community advances in political integration⁸, a similar fortress seems to be built around it, that would separate intramural European space from the external world. A cadastre survey seems necessary for the exact borders along which the walls of this castle are to be built [15].

Wæver [16] has argued that in security terms there are four Europes. In ascending order of size they are: one encompassing the European Community (basically Western Europe); one from Poland to Portugal (non-superpower Europe); one from the Atlantic to the Urals ('Gaullist Europe' or Gorbachev's 'Common European House'); and one that stretches effectively from Vancouver to Vladivostock (CSCE Europe). [15; 45]

The region Europe, until 1945 was defined by having recourse to internal factors; amities and enmities within, as well as a common European identity were definitive. The omnipotent European states extended their power all over the world. At the beginning of the century, only two other actors managed to co-exist with Europe: the United States and Japan. The United States could be seen culturally European, but, outside the coherency of Europe, it was left alone in its isolation policy. Japan was both non-European in terms of culture, and was also remote from the continent. Newly emerging Russia, although nearer in geographical terms, was even less European than the United States that is much far away. This picture dominated the world scene until 1945, and corresponds to the non-superpower, from Poland to Portugal Europe.

The termination of the Second World War with the help of the United States marked an intermediary phase in identification of Europe. In fact, the United States did intervene in the First World War as well, but retreated back to its isolated position, restoring the status of Europe. This time, however, it asserted itself as a key factor in Europe's security. The concept security, as we have seen, is rather construed as an external factor. Yet,

⁸Pedersen holds that after 1980's 'a considerable body of academic literature' appeared that accepts 'separate European identity in foreign policy, security, and defence, and presents an exemplary bibliography in [10; 83]; Schouete, de P. *La co-operation politique europeenne*. Ed. Labor, 1986; Regelsberger et al. (ed.s), *European Political Co-operation in the 1980's*, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988; Alford, J. & Hunt, K. (ed.s), *The European Defence Entity*, London, Macmillan, 1988; Tsakaloyannis, P. *The Reactivation of the Western European Union*, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 1985; Ifestos, P., *European Political Co-operation*, Avebury, 1987; Pedersen, T., *EF -en supermagt? Vesteuropæisk sikkerhedspolitik samarbejde udenfor NATO*, København, 1989; Allen & Smith, 'Western Europe's Presence in the Contemporary International Arena', *Review of International Studies* 16, 19-37, 1990; Jørgensen, K. E. *The Western European Union and the Imbroglio of European Security*, (no place and date).

this time Europe was protected against itself; though with the help of a non-European power; the defeat of Germany could not be seen as a global systemic change, but an internal outcome of the region. Taking into consideration that the United States could be regarded culturally European as well, the period that overlaps the end of the Second World War bears the marks of both internal and external factors.

'The Cold War years Europe' was delineated by external factors. Within the context of NATO, Europe, tied to its ally United States, stood aloof towards the Soviet Union and its Eastern associates. This came to be called as 'EC Europe'. However, after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the possibility of enlargement of the EC changed the nature of the term. With the admission of East Germany into the Community, this perception of Europe gets nearer to the 'Europe from Poland to Portugal' image.

Indeed, 'Europe from Poland to Portugal' image reappears nowadays, and a return to internal factors gets discernible. A 'European identity' is assumed to explain the coherency of such a Europe. Within the context of so-called 'multiplication of identities', no matter of which nationality or ethnic origin they are, peoples of Europe are expected to assume the European identity besides their own. But, it is this concept of identity that also poses an ambiguity when Turkey or western components of the ex-Soviet Union define themselves European.

The Gaullist or Gorbachev Europe typically stresses the importance of geographical location as an external factor. Europe, in this view, is the name of the continent that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals. In this view Russia is also admitted to Europe. However, it is often questioned whether Russia is European geographically, culturally and historically.

The largest contemplation of Europe in size, that is the CSCE Europe, designs a Europe stretching between Vancouver and Vladivostock. Since the primordial thrust behind the CSCE has been to ensure an approximation between the two blocs of the Cold War, this view also emphasises global systemic factors in delineating Europe. It seems difficult to conclude that as soon as the superpower rivalry has been terminated, the CSCE Europe view has been discarded. This view is promoted especially by the United States and Russia who strive to continue their influence over Europe.

If the issue remained within the limits of the above clear-cut menu, we would have to simply choose one of them anyway. However, the borderlines between the above options are also blurred by the evidence of intermingling institutions:

The new era in Europe was heralded by a breathtaking proliferation of institutions. New institutions evolved, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Baltic Cooperation Council, and the Black Sea Council. Existing institutions expanded, most notably the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with its indiscriminate and immediate acceptance of the Transcaucasian and Central Asian successor republics of the former Soviet Union and the post-Yugoslavia states, and the long-standing Council of Europe, renewed by its admission of central, eastern and southern European democracies. [17; 124]

II. Classifying the External Factors

Attempting at analysing the external factors to European integration in depth is beyond the limits of this paper. By oversimplification, we resort to a dichotomous classification. European integration, in our opinion, can be thought of as being under the influence of two types of external factors, namely that 'attract' the core of integration and strive to merge with it, and that 'repel' the integrating body causing it either to tend to divide up, or to recede, alienate and cower⁹.

II.1. The Attracting Factors: Some More Ships Try to Join in

The account of the attracting factors is to a large extent confined to the enlargement issue of the Community¹⁰. Pedersen [10;84-85] embarks on an inquiry with the tools of neo-functionalism to see the effects of enlargement over the political integration process. He says that the prevailing opinion is that enlargement is detrimental to political integration. Proponents of this view argue that 'the new Pan-European' and German unification will consume much of the sources previously allocated for Economic Monetary Union and Political Union; deepening process will have to be postponed. Also, as Etzioni argued Pan-Europe "could become the new focal point of identification"[18] diverting attention, which has just begun to shift to the level of 'common policies', to the Pan European level.

Contrary to this view however, Pedersen [10;84-85] himself adds, enlargement may have a constructive

⁹A third category might be concocted composed of 'zero-effect factors'. But, our oversimplification presumes any event in the furthest corner of the world generates an effect of either push or pull.

¹⁰At first sight, one might reach to the conclusion that such an attraction can certainly come only from countries contiguous to Europe. Nevertheless, the situation of Israel and of ACP countries which are far from the periphery of the Community and still transmit a pulling effect, and of countries like Norway, though being on the periphery but casting a rather pushing effect, prove that the research for pulling factors, in its ideal, could better exceed the limits of enlargement issue.

effect to political integration process. He presents three arguments in support of this thesis:

1) Enlargement will increase the possibilities for functional spill-over in economic field. This will possibly lead to another spill-over into political sphere as well,

2) As the EC assumes a more ambitious enlargement policy, this will convince both some other European countries that resist membership and also some Member States that resist political integration,

3) Once the positive expectations from especially Third World countries propelled the EC to agree on European Political Co-operation, the Community seems to welcome a global political role. Today the same scenario might appear if the image of Third World countries is replaced by East European countries.

The Reflection Group that was instructed to prepare the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference holds a view somewhere in between; no assessment, it maintains, can be made on the results of enlargement before the Conference in advance:

The next enlargement represents both a moral imperative and a major opportunity for Europe. At the same time, however, it presents the Union with a major challenge requiring an adequate response both at the Intergovernmental Conference itself, through the reforms designed to improve the Union's functioning in general and institutional reform in particular, and in the margins of that Conference, in view of the impact which enlargement will have on applicant countries and on the Union's policies. The next enlargement will be different from the previous ones because of the large number of applicant countries and the heterogeneity of their political, economic and social situations. To ensure that the next enlargement does not weaken or actually break up the Union, the changes needed to cope with the challenge involved must first be made. Sure though they may be, the benefits deriving from the enlargement cannot be reaped until the 1996 Conference has been concluded satisfactorily. The success of the former thus depends on the success of the latter. [19; 4]

II.2. The Repelling Factors

External environment also sheds certain repelling forces. Some of them engender maleficent effects on the integrative efforts in the Community, and some other lead to further integration.

II.2.1 Divisive Repelling Factors: Instigations for Mutiny

Disagreements among the Member States over the close vicinity of the Community, for example, are magnetic poles of repellency that produce very small yet

measurable tendencies of disintegration in the mass of Community. They can be viewed from outside (as external divisive repelling factors) as well as from within. For example

Around France, countries to the south are looking across the Mediterranean to the Magreb with a growing sense of vulnerability and fear. Countries to the north, around Germany, are giving priority to the enlargement of the EU in east-central Europe¹¹. On Bosnia, Europeans have exposed their divisions (rather than sending them), their lack of political will, and their failure to perceive the moral and symbolic cost of overcautiousness in the face of suffering of other Europeans. They have not been able to count on America to stop the fighting. Worse, the protracted war has strained and divided the Atlantic alliance. Europeans are ultimately the only ones responsible for other Europeans. The cost of nonintervention and indifference is proving higher than that of political and military interference. [17; 125]

II.2.2 Cohesive Repelling Factors: The Attack of the Cyclopes Make the Sailors Snuggle up to Each Other

"The... breakthrough in EC integration in the mid-1980s drew much of its momentum from perceived external challenges (EPCs)" [10; 85]. Buzan *et al.* suggest that "the future of European security hinges on the interplay among three principal actors, the United States, the Soviet Union and Europe itself, and three variables, power¹², fear and interdependence¹³" [15; 166]. A comparison [15; 166-174] then, is possible among the three actors for each variable. In terms of power, Buzan *et al.* regard the United States as 'in a context of mild decline' [15; 173]¹⁴. According to them, the positions of the Soviet Union (the book was first published in 1990) and of the EC will depend on the respective processes of integration or disintegration. After the publishing of the book, the adoption of the Treaty on European Union has

¹¹ Here enlargement appears as a source of friction rather than of attraction.

¹² In accordance with the discourse of interdependence we construe 'power' as "the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor)" [25; 11].

¹³ For Keohane and Nye, interdependence "refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries" [25; 8]. Regarding 'interdependence' as a repelling factor seems difficult by definition. But different from the attracting factors in interdependence, there is still a feeling of rivalry atmosphere of a bargain. Yet, we will quote from Miall who says that, "(h)igh levels of interdependence between societies do not themselves determine either co-operation or conflict, but they increase the stakes of relationships. Sometimes they may foster a sense of common interests, at other times they may lead to a sense of vulnerability and threat. What matters is how, and whether, interdependence is managed" [26; 5].

¹⁴ Mayall and Miall are of the same opinion when saying "The relative decline of the United States compared with its Japanese and EC partners weakened US leadership in monetary and broader economic management of the world economy. The end of the Cold War also raised question marks about whether US leadership will be preserved in security affairs. In a third emergent domain of international politics, the management of global environmental change, the US role has more often been to delay than to initiate co-ordinated international policies" [20; 268].

been an indication for further integration of the EC whereas the components of the ex-Soviet Union continued to move far away from each other.

In terms of fear, the picture is one of all round diminution from the configuration of the Cold War decades. The big reductions in fear between East and West that occurred during the late 1980s look stable, though their final resting point will depend on many things, not least the process of arms reduction and re-configuration towards more defensive military postures on both sides. As military and political fears decline, there is some scope for increase in the economic sector. Between the United States and the EC these should be manageable... Between East and West there will be strong fears of dependence on the Soviet side, and fears of risk both economic and strategic, within the West. [15;173]¹⁵

Slow but steady convergence among the component parts of the former Soviet Union and departures from Russia, the most ambitious claimant on the Soviet heritage alleviates the fears of 'dependence on the Soviet side'. Retrieval of power by ex-communists in former Warsaw Pact countries except Czech Republic, on the other hand, constitutes another focal point onto which to divert attention.

As for interdependence, Buzan *et. al.* regard the US-EC relationship to bid fair to remain 'stable at a high level'. They foresee a rise of interdependence between the EC and the Soviet Union of the time. After the dissolution, however, we may add, interdependence turned into a one sided dependence of the constituent units of the former Soviet Union to the Community.

The words of the Reflection Group ensure that the importance the Union attributes to the external factors of such character has not diminished:

The responses to the challenges posed by the profound changes which have taken place outside the Union, in the political and security context as well as in the economic and commercial sphere, need to be based on reinforcement of the enforcement of the instruments set up to achieve the highest possible levels of external stability and security. The key task here, therefore, is to take all the steps necessary to provide the Union with a genuine external identity that will enable it to become a world force in international relations so that it can promote its values, defend its interests

¹⁵ A few years later, developments justified the fears of the West, in particular the EC): "The controversies over NATO enlargement and the Russian claim to a security role in the space of the former Soviet Union clearly indicate the possibility that Europe may enter a new period of division. The rise of Zhirinovskiy and the setbacks for westernising reformers in Russia opened spectres of a new confrontation between states adhering to 'liberal democracy and market reform' and those which might be tempted to resort to exclusive nationalism, the defence of state industries and eventually militarism as a means of mobilising social support: the mixture pioneered by Slobodan Milosevic. A more cautious view of Russian developments, however, would argue that mainstream 'Eurasianist' policy, emphasising Russian national interests as a national power, which, although they might be formulated in neo-imperialist terms, are not, are not intrinsically incompatible with western (or even east ern) interests" [20; 271-272].

and help shape a new world order. This will clearly only be possible if the Foreign Policy really functions, with full consistency being ensured between the political and economic aspects of the Union's external action. To cope with the new challenges that have arisen with regard to security in Europe, it is also necessary to face up to the question of whether the union should provide itself with a real common defence policy. [19; 4]

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