AID EFFECTIVENESS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BUSAN PRINCIPLES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE EU AND TURKEY IN ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA, NIGERIA AND NIGER*

Samiratou DIPAMA**

Abstract

This paper focuses on a comparative empirical analysis of the degree of implementation of the four Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles (BEDCPs), namely ownership, focus on results, inclusiveness, transparency and accountability and some of its related indicators by Turkey and the EU in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, as well as on the critical assessment of the plausible explanatory factors drawn from three core IR theories (neorealism, constructivism, and neoliberalism) behind eventual differences in the performance by the EU and Turkey of the BEDCPs in the four sub-Saharan African countries. The first main finding is that in comparison to the EU and except Indicator 6 and to a certain extent Indicators 1a and 9b (especially in Somalia and Nigeria), Turkey has shown a lower performance against the remaining five indicators, namely Indicators 5a,10, 2, and 4, in Nigeria, Somalia, Niger, and Ethiopia. Second, regarding the explanatory factors behind unevenness in the implementation of BEDCPs by the EU and Turkey, the results of our investigation show that in most of the cases, it was a combination of self-interest with norms or the level of interdependency that explained the different behavior of Turkey and the EU vis-à-vis BEDCPs in our four country case studies, although identity-related factors prevail.

Keywords: *Turkey, European Union, Sub-Saharan Africa, development cooperation, Busan Partnership, aid effectiveness, realism, liberalism, constructivism.*

---

* This article builds on the author's Ph.D. dissertation entitled "Aid Effectiveness and The Implementation of The Busan Principles by The EU and Turkey in Sub-Saharan Africa".

** Dr., e-mail: dipamamis@yahoo.fr.

YARDIM ETKİNLİĞİ VE BUSAN İLKELERİNİN UYGULANMASI: AB VE TÜRKİYE'NİN ETİYOPYA, SOMALİ, NİJERYA VE NİJER'DE KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ÇALIŞMASI

Öz

Bu makale, Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) Busan Etkili Kalkınma İşbirliği'nin (BEDCP) dört ilkesinin, sahiplik, sonuç odaklılık, kapsayıcılık, şeffaflık ve hesap verilebilirlik ile bununla ilgili göstergelerinin (gösterge 5a, 9b, 10, 2, 1a, 4 ve 6) Etiyopya, Nijer, Nijerya ve Somali'de karşılıklı deneysel analizi ile Türkiye ve AB'nin bu dört Sahra Altı Afrika ülkesindeki BEDCP performanslarının nihai farklarının üç temel Uluslararası İlişkiler kuramının (Neorealizm, Konstrüktivizm ve Neoliberalizm) makul açıklayıcı faktörleriyle eleştirel olarak değerlendirmesine odaklanmaktadır. İlk temel bulgu Nijerya, Somali, Nijer ve Etiyopya'da gösterge 6 ve bir ölçüde gösterge 1a ve 9b(özellikle Somali ve Nijerya'da) dışında Türkiye'nin AB'ye göre daha kalan göstergelerde, gösterge 5a, 10, 2 ve 4, daha düşük bir performans sergilediğidir. İkinci olarak, tek bir açıklayıcı faktörü belirlemek mümkün olmasa da, araştırmamız Türkiye ve AB'nin içselleştirdiği değerler, normlar, kimlikler, fikirler ve ideolojiler gibi maddi olmayan unsurlarının Etiyopya, Nijer, Nijerya ve Somali'de Busan Etkili Kalkınma İşbirliği İlkeleri'ne ve onun ilgili göstergelerine yakınlık konusundaki tutumlarını şekillendirmede daha önemli olduğu hususunda baskın bir varsayım taşımaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği, Sahra-Altı Afrika, kalkınma işbirliği, Busan Ortaklığı, yardım etkinliği, realizm, liberalizm, konstrüktivizm.*

Introduction

At the international level, a series of conferences have been organized to discuss on how to improve aid practices and make aid more effective in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). These conferences have culminated in the 2002 Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, the 2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonization, the 2005 Paris Declaration (PD) on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the Busan Partnership (BP) for Effective Development Cooperation (2011). Debates on the effectiveness of foreign aid in general and in SSA particularly have gained further attention with the entrance of new emerging actors in the SSA's development aid pace. This emergence of new donors clearly means that the EU should share its development aid interventions with these actors and that the exclusive competence the EU has enjoyed for long in this sphere is fading. In this vague of entrance of new emerging donors, the latest entrance of Turkey in SSA's development aid architecture adds more to the aid and development effectiveness debate. The steady increase in the volume of Turkey's development aid to SSA in the last ten years clearly shows that Turkey can no longer be marginalized as an important 'rising' aid donor in SSA.

In the light of this, this article aims to offer a modest, but hopefully distinctive contribution to these debates on aid and development effectiveness by including the EU and Turkey as development cooperation providers in SSA, with a special reference to some principles derived from the Busan partnership on Effective Development Cooperation, which include Ownership, Inclusive Partnerships, Focus on Results, and Transparency and Accountability (and their associated indicators). In this vein, this study aims to refocus the debates on development cooperation effectiveness by first examining the extent of donors' (the EU and Turkey) compliance with the Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles (BEDCPs) in four sub-Saharan African countries, namely Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, and then by closely elaborating on the external and internal factors that could influence the degree of implementation to these principles by each donor.

The Normative framework of the Busan Partnership: An Overview of the principles and selected indicators

This section provides a brief overview of the four Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles and the relevant indicators, namely principles of country ownership (with related indicators 5a, 9b, and 10), inclusiveness (with related indicator 2), focus on results (with related indicator 1a), transparency and accountability (with related indicator 4 on transparency and indicator 6 on accountability).

The Country Ownership principle and related indicator(s)

The ownership principle refers to the idea that donors should rely on the national development strategies and priorities of the recipient countries in the formulation and implementation of their development aid programs. Three main indicators are associated with this principle:

Indicator 5a measures the annual predictability of development aid, which consists of measuring the yearly gap (positive or negative) between committed and disbursed funds by the donors in a year by using DEVCO-Statistics and interviews. Indicator 9b requires donor countries to use the recipient country's Public Financial Management (PFM) and procurement systems to increase the recipient country's ownership of the development projects. Indicator 9b will then measure the proportion of development aid using the recipient country's PFM and procurement based on OECD-Credit reporting system and interviews.

Indicator 10 which is about untying aid requires donor governments not to tie the disbursement of funds and implementation of development projects to geographical limitations on the procurement or to any restriction on the origins of goods and services provided or to any restrictions on the nationality of the suppliers (OECD-DAC Website, ‘Untied Aid’).The assessment of indicator 10 will make use of donors’ procurement laws and interviews.

Inclusive Partnership Principle and related indicator(s)

This principle requires the active involvement of all stakeholders including states, CSOs, Private sector, NGOs in the formulation and implementation of development projects. Indicator 2, which is the only indicator related to this principle assesses whether and how development cooperation providers involve CSOs into the project’s formulation and implementation cycle and make efforts to create an enabling environment for CSOs in their countries. This analysis builds on interviews and official documents.

Focus on results Principle and related indicator(s)

Based on the idea that development projects should have sustainable impact upon the recipient country, Indicator 1a assesses the extent to which donors’ development cooperation programs align with the objectives and results defined by countries themselves (country-owned results frameworks such as national development plans, sectoral plans, ministerial or institutional plan, or development strategy agreed with the government). This analysis builds on interviews, academic articles and official documents.

Transparency and Accountability Principle and related indicator(s)

This principle means that development co-operation must be transparent and accountable to all citizens (from both providing and receiving country). Two indicators are associated with this principle. Indicator 4 on transparency assesses the extent to which development partners are making information on development co-operation publicly accessible, and in line with the Busan transparency requirements (timeliness, accuracy, and comprehensiveness of the current and forward-looking information). Indicator 6 on accountability measures the share of development co-operation funding for the public sector recorded in annual budgets that are approved by the national legislatures of partner countries. The analysis is based upon data taken from existing government budgets and self-reporting by the EU and Turkish government.

Having provided a detailed analysis of the Busan aid effectiveness principles and relevant indicators as well as the methodology that will be used here to measure the EU’s and Turkey’s performance of each of the selected indicators, the next part will focus on an empirical analysis of the implementation of these principles and indicators by the EU and Turkey in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

A comparative analysis of Turkey and EU's performance in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia

This part comparatively assesses the global performance of Turkey and the EU in the context of BEDCPs (namely ownership, inclusiveness, focus on results, transparency and accountability) and the related indicators in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia, with the aim of highlighting eventual unevenness between the two donors' performance.

Analysis for Indicator 5

For the indicator 5a on "annual aid predictability", it stems from the Table 1 below that with respect to Official Development Assistance (ODA) in general, except the case of Nigeria, EU aid is quite predictable. For instance, in Ethiopia and Somalia, EU disbursed respectively 92.04 % and 98.01 % of the committed funds for the period 2010-15. In the case of Niger, between 2010 and 2015, the EU disbursed actually 1.37% more than the total amount it initially planned to fund to Niger. In contrast, in Nigeria, between 2010 and 2015, the EU disbursed 43.07% less than the initially committed funds to Nigeria.

Yet, this predictability comes under significant challenges when it comes to the specific European Development Fund (EDF) instrument which represents about more than half of the EU total ODA in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia[1]. The Table 1 below showcases that in all the selected four countries, the EU mostly over-disbursed the ODA on annual basis. In average, between 2010 and 2015, Niger ranks as the top country where the rate of over-disbursement is the highest (+1093.60%). Niger is followed by Ethiopia (+286.46%), Nigeria (+96.25%), and Somalia (+89.26%). The gap between committed and disbursed allocations under EDF is attributed mainly to the regular mid-term reviews foreseen by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), which can result in an increase or decrease in the disbursement of the initially allocated amount depending on the general performance of the recipient country.

[1] According to EU DEVCO intradata, for the period 2014-20, the ratio of EDF as a percentage of total EU ODA programming in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, is 61.89%.

Table 1: Ratio Commitments/Disbursements of EU ODA and EDF (%),2010-15 Average

	ODA (2010-15)	ODA Predictability (over 100%)	EDF (2010-15)	EDF Predictability (over 100%)
Ethiopia	94.41	-5.59	386.46	+286.46
Niger	101.37	+1.37	1193.60	+1093.6
Nigeria	56.93	-43.07	196.25	+96.25
Somalia	98.01	-1.99	189.26	+89.26

Source: Self-prepared based on DEVCO Statistical data

Whereas in the case of the EU, there is a multi-year development cooperation plan under the CPA, which contributes to ensure a certain level of predictability of its development aid programs in the four country case studies, the situation is totally different in the case of Turkey because of the absence of a comprehensive development cooperation strategies or country programs with multi-year plans detailing individual projects and objectives. This considerably limits the annual predictability of Turkey's development cooperation in the four countries, because decisions to fund development projects in a country are taken on a case-by-case basis by the relevant Turkish authorities. In the specific case of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) for instance, one anonymous interviewee (TK1) mentions that TIKA representative offices in the SSA countries do not have financial resources at their disposal in advance, but rather get the funds after their elaborated projects are approved at TIKA headquarters in Ankara (Interviewee TK1 , 2017). In other words, although the Turkish parliament does vote an annual budget for Turkish development cooperation, the amount is not distributed in advance by specific recipient regions and countries but is later allocated to fund projects approved by TIKA authorities in Ankara, which approval is based on the quality of the project presented by TIKA coordinator, on the implementation capacity of TIKA coordination office, and on the urgent needs of the recipient countries (Interviewee TK1, 2017).

Thus, the EU performance in the four countries seems to be higher than Turkey's performance, with respect to general ODA, although the predictability of EU EDF significantly weakens in the four countries due to mid-term reviews' influence.

Assessment for Indicator 9b

The empirical analysis of Indicator 9b is mainly based upon some generally accepted views related to the use or non-use of country systems by type of development cooperation. Indeed, it is generally argued that General Budget Support (GBS) uses country systems (Public Financial Management and procurement systems) in full, while Sector Budget Support (SBS) only uses country systems when aid is provided as sector budget support (or sector reform contracts) and that Project-Type Interventions (PTI) uses in principle donor countries' systems.

Table 2: EU's GBS, SBS and PTI Gross disbursement as a % of total ODA, (2015-16 Average)

	GBS as a % of Total ODA	SBS as a % of Total ODA	PTI as a % of Total ODA
Ethiopia	0	9.03	78.65
Niger	27.83	18.16	45.42
Nigeria	0	0	93.82
Somalia	0	0	94.76

Source: Self-prepared based on OECD Credit Reporting System

Table 3: Average of EU's GBS, SBS and PTI Gross Disbursement as a % of total ODA, 2015-16.

	GBS as a % of Total ODA	SBS as a % of Total ODA	PTI as a % of Total ODA
Ethiopia	0	0	68.08
Niger	0	0	88.565
Nigeria	0	0	82.88
Somalia	0	0	52.387

Source: Self-prepared based on OECD Credit Reporting System

Regarding indicator 9b on “the use of country systems”, the Table 2 above shows that between 2015 and 2016, the EU did not use country systems in Nigeria and Somalia, and that the use of country systems in Ethiopia is weak since almost 78.65% of EU ODA is based on projects which rarely uses the recipient country’s PFM and procurement systems (see Table 2 above).Indeed, a critical analysis of EU texts indicates that the use of the recipient country’s PFM and procurement systems is restricted in the case of project approach because specific EU rules apply to the use of procurement systems for the grants, supplies or contracts awarded under EU project aid approach (European Commission, 2014:18). The table 2 above further indicates that between 2015 and 2016, about half of EU ODA towards Niger is made up of budget support (45.99%) which is a type of aid predominantly using the recipient country’s systems. This article deducts from this data that between 2015 and 2016, about 45.99% of EU development aid interventions in Niger used Niger’s country systems.

In Turkey’s case, the Table 3 above indicates that the bulk of Turkish development aid interventions in Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Somalia focused on project-type interventions between 2015 and 2016 and that neither general budget support nor sector budget support was used by Turkey in these four SSA countries. For project-type interventions, the Turkish Public Procurement Law (TPPL) is applicable to all procurement of goods, services, and contracts funded by Turkish contracting authorities (Turkish Public Procurement Authority, 2012). Hence, procurement systems of the recipient countries are not used in the implementation of Turkish development projects in the recipient countries. Thus, the paper deducts that Turkey did not use country systems in either of the four countries between 2015 and 2016.In the specific case of Somalia, although some sources indicate the use of budget support in favor of Somalia by Turkey in 2013, the same sources highlighted that Somalia’s PFM system was not used and that the money was given hand in hand to the Somali authorities by the Turkish Ambassador in Mogadishu, due to the lack of operational central bank in Somalia (TIKA, 2013:12).

In sum, regarding indicator 9b, although EU’s and Turkey’s performances appears to be equally very low in the cases of Nigeria and Somalia, in the cases of Niger and Ethiopia, the EU performed far better than Turkey.

Analysis for Indicator 10

With respect to the indicator 10 on “untying aid”, on papers, EU regulations and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement foresee the untying of EU development aid towards SSA, by allowing both EU and African partners to compete on equal feet in procurement procedure. The regulations even went further by positing under certain circumstances a preference for ACP partners in the grant of contracts to ensure the large participation of ACP contractors in the execution of contracts performed under EDF[2]. Yet, even if aid is reported as untied in principle, some interviewees have pointed out the existence of informal barriers mostly pertaining to the lack of technical and financial capacity of African competitors, which generally leads to the hiring of European contractors in large infrastructural projects (Interviewee ACPB, 2018; Interviewee EUB1, 2018; Interviewee ENgB, 2018; Interviewee EEB, 2018).

In Turkey's case, given that cash grants are rarely used in most of the selected country case studies (except for Somalia to a certain extent), and that most of Turkish development cooperation projects in these countries are rather aid-in nature (such as supplying desks, computers and other school and medical materials, etc..), this paper concludes that Turkish ODA in the four countries appears at first glance to be mostly tied. In fact, aid-in-kind is generally considered as tied by nature because most of the donated materials are bought from the donor country. This tying nature of in-kind grant is even mentioned in TIKA's 2016 report in the following terms: "Except for material donations, Turkish ODA is untied" (TIKA, 2016:47).

On papers, Turkish aid projects seem to be untied because Turkish tendering procedure is opened to all natural or legal persons without any geographical restriction and the award or contract is granted to the best economically offer[3]. Yet, the fact that all procurement announcements are generally published in Turkish and that a price advantage up to 15% is granted to domestic tenderers in procurement procedures (Turkish Public Procurement Authority, 2012) constitutes some informal ways of tying Turkish aid , which are likely to limit the participation of and granting of contracts to foreign legal or natural persons.

Both in Turkey's and EU's cases, interviewees have demonstrated that due to the lack of material and technical capacity of local companies, contracts for large infrastructural projects are generally awarded to Turkish and EU Companies Yet, in both cases, local labor forces are used extensively in the execution of the projects (Interviewee EST 2018; Interviewee ACPB, 2018; Interviewee ENgB, 2018; Interviewee ENeB 2018; Interviewee EEB, 2018; Interviewee EUB1, 2018; Interviewee EUB2, 2018).

Yet, this paper concludes that overall EU's performance against indicator 10 seems to be better than Turkey's performance because of the predominance of grants-in-nature in Turkey's aid projects.

---

[2] See Regulation Establishing the Common Rules and Procedures for the Implementation of the Union's Instruments for External Action (CIR), adopted In March 2014.
[3] See article 40 of the Turkish Public Procurement Law (TPPL).

Analysis for Indicator 2

As for the indicator 2 on "CSOs enabling environment", on papers, the importance of the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) has been recognized in many EU-SSA partnership framework, of which the CPA. The Article 2 of annex III of the CPA stipulates that the country strategy paper (CSP) shall be concomitantly prepared by the ACP (African Caribbean and Pacific) state and the EU ''with prior consultation with a wide range of actors including non-state actors, local authorities and, where relevant, ACP Parliaments "[4]. Yet, the involvement of CSOs and local actors in the project cycle is not mentioned in the EDF Implementing Regulation and the pace of CSOs is being restricted by many partner countries' government [5] (European Commission, 2017). In Turkey's case, consultations with local CSOs in the formulation and implementation of development projects is not explicitly included in Turkey's development cooperation policies. Only consultation with Turkish CSOs is encouraged for TIKA Coordinators, but it is not mandatory (Interviewee TK1, 2017). Whereas in the EU case, there is a fund allocated to CSOs under the 11th EDF[6], in Turkey's case there is no such specific funds that will be used to support local CSOs in the recipient countries.

Thus, on paper the EU seems to have better implemented the indicator 2 of the BEDCPs than Turkey because the inclusion of CSOs in the formulation and implementation of development projects is explicitly mentioned in some documents.

Analysis for Indicator 1a

Regarding indicator 1a on "the use of country results-framework", funds under EDF are in principle allocated taking into account the national priorities of the recipient country as elaborated in its national development plan (ECDPM, 2003).In practice however, many interviewees from African Embassies have criticized the fact the asymmetrical nature of their relations with the EU constrain them to abide by the sectoral priorities chosen by the EU (Interviewee ENgB, 2018; Interviewee ENeB, 2018). For the monitoring and evaluation of development projects, the EU rarely uses national statistics in the evaluation of project implementation and in the formulation of new projects, arguing they are not often reliable (Interviewee EUB2, 2018).

[4] See Article 2 of Annex III of Cotonou Partnership Agreement.

[5] Yet, the EU has other means to work with CSOs autonomously through the EIDHR (European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights) and other instruments.

[6] In illustration, in terms of sectoral breakdown of 11th EDF, 7% in Ethiopia, 2.7% in Niger, 3% in Nigeria and 5% in Somalia are EDF's share dedicated to fund measures in support to civil society.

Unlike the EU case, the fact that most of the development projects carried out by Turkey in the recipient countries originates from official request from recipient countries' national governments and constituencies to respond to certain needs, Turkey's aid is generally hailed to be demand-oriented and responsive to the priorities and needs of the recipient countries. This view is explicitly mentioned in one of TIKA's reports, which underlines that TIKA's program coordination offices in the recipient countries "provide specialized inputs regarding monitoring and evaluation as well as cooperation requests from LDC governments and civil society'' and that ''this helps to ensure that development assistance is demand driven and, hopefully, based on strategies set by the recipient countries themselves" (TIKA, 2016).

However, some critics to the praised recipient-focused of Turkey's development projects argue that executing projects based on official request from national governments may not respond to the real needs of the population because of the possible prioritization of political interests of the governing authorities (Maiza, 2014). Moreover, although Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia have all elaborated a national development strategy, there is no mention or evidence of the use by Turkey's development aid policy-makers of these countries' national documents in the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of development projects.

For the monitoring and evaluation, Turkey lacks a strong and comprehensive monitoring and evaluation framework and the monitoring of its development projects are generally done through site visit and discussion with local population by TIKA coordinators. As such, there is little chance that Turkey uses the result-frameworks (if any) of the recipient countries.

Thus, although on papers, the EU's performance appears to be equally higher than Turkey's performance in the four countries, the practical implementation of indicator 1a by the Turkey and the EU can be considered as equal due to the observed practical limits on both sides.

Assessment for Indicators 4 and 6

With respect to indicator 4 on "Transparency", the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) Monitoring Survey results graded the EU's reporting to the OECD Creditor Reporting System(CRS), to the OECD Forward Spending Survey (FSS), and to the International Aid Transparency Initiative(IATI) as respectively "Good", "Excellent", and "Good" (GPEDC Monitoring Survey results,2016). Turkey does not publish its ODA to the OECD CRS, the OECD FSS and to the IATI as an IATI report on Somalia underlines that Turkey is the only one of the top 10 providers of development cooperation in Somalia which is not yet publishing in IATI (IATI, 2019). Thus, this study argues that the EU largely performed better than Turkey with respect to Indicator 4.

Regarding Indicator 6 on "Accountability", this paper stresses out that Turkey performed better than the EU because the EDF, the major EU financial instrument in our four country case studies (61.89% of EU total ODA programming to each of these four countries is comprised of EDF funds according to statistics) is mainly funded by EU member states and is outside the EU budget and as such is not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. In Turkey's case however, almost-if-not all of its development projects executed in the developing countries and in our four country case studies are funded directly from the Turkish national budget voted annually by the Turkish Parliament. Therefore, Turkey's performance in the context of indicator 6 seems to be relatively higher than EU's performance in the four countries.

In summary, in comparison to the EU and except Indicator 6 and to a certain extent Indicators 1a and 9b (in the cases of Nigeria and Somalia), Turkey has shown a lower performance against the remaining five indicators, namely Indicators 5a,10, 2, and 4, in Nigeria, Somalia, Niger, and Ethiopia.

Decoding the Explanatory factors behind 'uneven' implementation of the BEDCPs by the EU and Turkey in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Somalia: Theoretical Foundations

Although many factors such as donor self-interests, political commitment of donors, political and socio-economic situation in the recipient country, donor aid cultures and history, domestic conditions of the donor countries and aid management system, can intervene to explain the differing level of performance of the Busan principles by the EU and Turkey, this study relies on three most relevant factors that are drawn from neorealist, neoliberal and constructivist theories. Therefore, this part investigates the three key driving factors of donor performance: donors' political identity and norms, donors' self-interests, and the level of donor-recipient relationship.

Explanatory factor 1: Positive compliance depends on the level of convergence between donors' political identity and Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles.

Stemming from the constructivist theoretical assumption that identity and norms define states' foreign policy and that states' role conceptions and prescriptions shape states' policy behaviors, including their attitudes, decisions, responses, functions, and commitments in the international arena (Holsti, 1970: 245), this explanatory factor assumes that in case of compatibility between a donor identity and the global norms on effective development cooperation (here the Busan principles and related indicators), the donor is likely to perform better in the implementation of the Busan principles. In contrast, lower level of compatibility between a donor identity and the Busan principles will eventually lead to lower implementation of these principles by the donor.

Based on this argument, this part assesses whether EU and Turkey's identities are compatible with the BEDCPs. Being a member of the OECD-DAC, the EU has actively been involved in all international discussions on aid and development cooperation effectiveness ranging from Monterrey, to Rome, Paris, Accra, and Busan. Evidences of this active involvement include among others the common positions adopted by the EU in view of each international discussions, its firm commitment and several initiatives and strategies adopted by the EU to ensure effective implementation of the principles adopted during these discussions. For instance, the Barcelona eight Commitments were adopted by the EU on 14 March 2002 to implement the commitments made during the Monterrey conference (Commission of the EC, 2004:4) and a Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labor was adopted by the Council on 15 May 2007 to respond to the 2005 Paris agenda's call for donor harmonization (Council of the EU, 2007). The creation of the department of International cooperation effectiveness at DEVCO headquarters in Brussels is another initiative taken to ensure active participation of the EU in the Paris Declaration and GPEDC's monitoring surveys.

To reinforce the follow-up of the commitments made by the EU and its member states to implement the Busan principles, the EU has further taken several initiatives such as the establishment of the EU Joint Programming to reduce donor fragmentation and to strengthen the coherence, transparency, predictability and visibility of EU external assistance (European Commission-DEVCO, ‘‘Development Effectiveness’’). These are few illustrations of the several steps taken by the EU to implement internationally-agreed norms on aid and development cooperation effectiveness.

All these show that there is a higher degree of compatibility between EU identity and the aid and development effectiveness principles and norms, at least on papers. Given its active participation in the Busan forum, this article argues that the EU has significantly contributed to the formulation of the Busan principles and as such appears as a norm-maker with higher commitment to effectively implement the adopted principles as a norm-taker. In other words, the perceived compatibility between EU identity and norms with the Busan aid effectiveness principles is meant to strengthen the EU's willingness to implement and to ease the process of implementation of these principles by the EU.

Coming to Turkey, this paper contends that Turkey has also been active in international fora on aid effectiveness, although it has been less active in adopting formal steps towards implementing the outcomes of each of these fora. In this vein, Turkey has endorsed the 2005 Paris Declaration and its subsequent 2008 Accra Agenda for Action as well as the 2011 Busan Partnership and it has participated to the foundation of the GPEDC (de Renzio and Seifert, 2014: 1868). Turkey was also a member of the Working Party on aid effectiveness and has taken part to the monitoring surveys conducted by the Working party on aid effectiveness under the Paris Declaration as well as to the 2014-2015 monitoring survey conducted by the GPEDC under Busan agenda. Moreover, the first Global Assembly of the Open forum for CSO Development Effectiveness in 2010 that led to the adoption of the CSO Development Effectiveness Principles was held in Istanbul. The Statement by Turkey during the mid-term review of the Istanbul Program of Action (IPoA) held in Antalya that: "TIKA has taken action in 29 LDCs in line with Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and has implemented projects on social, economic, administrative and physical infrastructure and services"(LDC Watch, 2016) is another evidence that Turkey is not totally disconnected with the global aid effectiveness norms.

The fact that Turkey failed to adopt strategies aiming to effectively implement the principles adopted during the Busan forum and previous fora reveals that Turkey tends to distance itself from these global aid effectiveness norms. This distance might be grounded on eventual incompatibility between Turkey's identity and the Busan principles. Turkey's identity seems to be a reformist identity, which is not willing to conform to west-centric established norms, but rather seeks to follow its own path and model of development cooperation.

Thus, this explanatory factor assumes that the EU, whose identity is closed to global aid effectiveness norms is likely to better implement all Busan principles and indicators than Turkey in each recipient country. This argument stemming from the constructivist theory is relevant for explaining the overall higher performance of the EU with respect to the implementation of the Busan principles in general, which higher performance is grounded on the observed higher proximity between the EU identity and the Busan principles and easier internationalization of these norms by the EU.

Nevertheless, this explanatory factor presents some limits when considering the equal or sometimes lower performance of the EU (compared to Turkey) with respect to some indicators. To illustrate this, the EU and Turkey similarly have lower performance of indicator 9b due to the non-use of country systems in Nigeria and Somalia, and the practical implementation of indicator 1a faces the same challenges in the EU and Turkey's cases, and Turkey even implemented indicator 6 better than the EU. In sum, the relative proximity of the EU identity with the Busan principles did not result in a better implementation by the EU of indicators 9b, 6 and to some extent indicator 1a.

Explanatory Factor 2: Positive compliance depends on the level of convergence between donors 's aid motives and interest and development cooperation effectiveness norms.

This explanatory factor takes as its basis the neorealist argument that due the anarchical nature of the international system, the driving motive behind donor development cooperation policy is primarily to promote and protect its self-interests. This argument assumes that donor countries will only comply with the Busan principles when they are compatible with their pursued goals and interests. In other words, it is only those international norms on effective development cooperation that are congruent with national motives for aid provision that will influence outcomes (De Renzio and Seifert, 2011).

So, do donors' self-interests play an important role in explaining uneven implementation between the EU and Turkey in the context of BEDCPs in Nigeria, Somalia, Niger, and Ethiopia? This paper argues that both the EU and Turkey use development aid as an instrument of foreign economic policy, namely to serve as an entry point for their business groups into the sub-Saharan African markets. The implication of economic and commercial interests is particularly more pronounced in the EU case because, unlike the Turkish aid projects, EU's development projects are mostly large-scale projects with huge financial implications. Yet, whatever the size of the projects, the fact that most of EU and Turkish large-scale aid projects are generally tied and executed by European and Turkish firms is an evidence of the prevalence of economic interests over norms in both donor countries. In this context, indicator 10 of the BEDCPs has constantly been traded off with hidden economic interests by Turkey and the EU, especially regarding large projects.

Furthermore, the persisting refusal of EU member states to reduce the intergovernmental character of the EDF instrument through including EDF into EU budget further provides room to this causal factor because the most important financial contributors to the EDF are former colonial powers of the selected case studies(with important commercial, security and political interests) .Thus, and following neorealist argument, compared to Turkey, the EU did not implement well the indicator 6 on accountability because of the prevalence of its Member states' interests over Busan norms. Connected to the intergovernmental nature of the EDF is the decreasing predictability of EDF in the four countries compared to the higher predictability of EU ODA in the four countries. In this sense, this explanatory factor can be used to justify EU's poor performance of the indicator 5a with respect to EDF (in comparison to ODA), especially in Ethiopia, and Niger because Ethiopia and Niger are certainly one of the key security partners of the EU in the fight against insecurity (migration, maritime piracy, terrorism) in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel region.

In the same manner, in comparison to the EU, Turkey's relative lower performance of the indicator 5a on annual predictability can be explained by the fact that indicator 5a of the Busan principle is not compatible with Turkey's development aid motivations, objectives and interests, as some Turkish Officials defend that unpredictable aid is more efficient because the money will be used for the countries that are the most in need.

Likewise, realpolitik considerations have also undermined the practical implementation of indicator 2 on CSOs by the EU and Turkey in the four countries because both Turkey and the EU seem to prefer government-to-government aid relationship than a more inclusive partnership including CSOs. This is certainly due to the fact that the protection of their existing economic, political and security interests in the recipient country lays into the hands of the recipient country government, with which they need to cultivate and nurture friendly relationship. This has been acknowledged by one interviewee (EEB) with respect to the Ethiopian case (Interviewee EEB, 2018). Hence, the pursuit of self-interests has resulted in a mediocre performance on the ground of indicator 2 of BEDCPs by Turkey and the EU in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia.

With respect to the indicator 1a on focus on results and alignment with national priorities, interviews conducted with several officials at the embassies of the four African countries in Brussels have revealed that development aid priorities are mainly defined in advance by the EU according to its own ideas and interests, and that in case of disagreement between the EU and its African partners over one sectoral line, the EU is the one which holds the last word due to the existing asymmetrical relationship. Turkey seems to have performed relatively better on this indicator on the ground because its aid policy is mostly based on a demand-driven strategy, although there is no formal evidence of the use of the recipient countries 'national strategies.

Regarding the performance against indicator 9b, the assessment has shown that the linkage between the quality of a country's PFM and procurement systems and their use by donors is weak, meaning that greater use of these systems by donors no longer depends principally on technical improvements, but rather on political considerations, as neorealist would argue. This explains why despite Nigeria's rate of improvement of its Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)[7] 's score from 2005 to 2016 is relatively higher than Niger's and Ethiopia's (from 3.3 in 2005 to 3.4 in 2016 for Niger,

[7] The CPIA is an indicator used by the World Bank to assess the overall quality of countries' Public Finance Management (PFM)'s systems, on a scale of 1-low to 6-high.

from 3.4 in 2005 to 3.5 in 2016 for Ethiopia and from 3.1 in 2005 to 3.3 in 2016 for Nigeria), the EU did use country systems in Niger and Ethiopia while it did not use country system in Nigeria. Likewise, compared to Niger, the relatively higher ranking of Ethiopia in terms of CPIA score from 2005 to 2016 did not result in higher use of country systems by the EU in Ethiopia (between 2015 and 2016, only about 20% of EU ODA used country systems in Ethiopia against almost half of EU ODA using country PFM and procurement system in Niger). Considering that Somalia has the lowest CPIA score (1.8%), which reflects the poor PFM system of Somalia, this article argues that self-interest calculations have played a very minimal role in explaining the non-use of country systems in Somalia by the EU and Turkey[8].

Compared to the EU, Turkey performed poorly on indicator 4 because Turkey holds its information on development cooperation as confidential and is not willing to share and publish its aid data according to the Busan aid transparency lines. As such, the eventual incompatibility between Turkey's ideology and interests has apparently led to the lower performance of indicator 4 by Turkey.

Explanatory factor 3: Positive compliance depends on the level of dependency and cooperation between development cooperation providers and recipients.

This explanatory factor is derived from the neoliberal theory's assumption that anarchy does not impede cooperation because increasing interdependence between states is likely to foster likelihood for cooperation. Cooperation between states through international institutions is the most rational choice to protect common interests. In this vein, this causal factor puts forward the argument that a higher level of interdependence between the donor and recipient country is likely to result in better implementation of the Busan principles by the donor because this interdependency will harmonize donor and recipient country's interests which in turn will be better protected under mutually beneficial, and long-term cooperation and in stable and prosperous environments. What are the implications of neoliberalism for EU and Turkey's behavior vis-à-vis the BEDCPs?

This paper argues that due to existing strong historical and institutional ties as well as to geographical proximity between the EU and the selected four SSA countries, the EU seems to have more economic, political, and security interests than Turkey has in these selected countries. As such, this study considers that the interdependency between the EU and each of the four country case studies (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Niger and Somalia) is stronger than the interdependency

[8] This is the first CPIA score of Somalia which dates back to the year 2017.

between Turkey and each of the four SSA countries. Keeping in mind that increasing aid effectiveness would lead to the socio-economic, security and political development of the recipient countries, which in turn would protect and secure donors' interests in these countries, the paper argues that the donor with higher interests and level of interdependency in each of the four countries is more likely to perform better against the Busan principles and indicators.

Thus, what are the interests of the EU and Turkey in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia? According to statistics, in 2016 Nigeria ranked as the 2nd, Ethiopia as the 9th, Niger as the 32nd and Somalia as the 40th largest trading partner of the EU in SSA (European Commission-Directorate for Trade Statistics, 2018). The French Group Areva is one of the oldest and largest exploiters of uranium in Niger, which ranks as the world's fourth-ranking producer of uranium. Niger is also a migration route to Europe from African countries and a new arena for terrorist activities in the Sahel and is part of the EU Security Strategy for the Sahel launched in March 2011 to support Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali, and Chad in overcoming their security challenges (illegal migration, human trafficking, terrorism) in the Sahel. The strategic importance of the Sahel in general and Niger most particularly is mentioned in several EU documents in the followings terms: "the Sahel has a prominent place in European union policy. Europe has numerous interests in the region, ranging from combating security threats, terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration to assuring energy security" (EEAS, 2016a).

Ranking as Africa's largest producer of oil and the sixth largest oil producing country in the world (website of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation), Nigeria is one of the largest economies of Africa and is the soil of terrorist groups, namely Boko Haram. The EU remains the top destination for Nigeria's oil and non-oil exports with trade volumes at €39.6 billion in 2014 and Nigeria is one of the main destinations of EU Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in SSA with FDI stock growing from €25.3 billion in 2011 to €29.6 billion in 2013. Nigeria ranks as the 2nd largest EU trading partners in the world in 2016 and accounts for around half of the EU exports to the region and nearly 70 per cent of the imports (EEAS, 2016b).

According to African Development Bank statistics, in 2017 Ethiopia ranks as the first GDP growing country with almost 10% of annual growth (African Development Bank, 2018) and constitutes a fertile soil for foreign investments. Ethiopia is also one of the largest trading partners of the EU in SSA (9th largest trading partner of the EU in the world in 2016) and a key EU partner for the securitization of the horn of Sahel.

The EU also collaborates with Somalia in the fight against maritime piracy and terrorism and is one of the main contributors to AMISOM, the African

Union's peace mission to Somalia. Other instruments of cooperation between the EU and Somalia in the security realm include the Military Training Mission (EUTM) supporting Somali security forces, the EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) fighting piracy and EUCAP aiming to improve regional maritime security. Economically however, the EU does not have a lot of formal or direct trade with Somalia (40th trading partner of the EU in SSA out of 49 countries) whose main trading partners are the Gulf States and Yemen (EEAS, 2016c).

It stems from official TUİK (Turkish Statistical Institute) statistics that in 2015 Nigeria ranked as the 2nd largest trading partner of Turkey in SSA and that Ethiopia occupied the 3rd place among the largest trading partners of Turkey in SSA. Somalia and Niger ranked respectively as the 20th and 32nd trading partner of Turkey in SSA in 2015.

Although Turkish interests in the four countries (Ethiopia, Somalia, Niger and Nigeria) seem to be lesser than EU's interests, there do exist some non-negligible interests. Since Nigeria and Ethiopia constitute on the main trading partners of Turkey in SSA, Turkey's relations with Ethiopia and Nigeria mainly focus on trade and investment with development aid standing at the lower level. In contrast, the bulk of Turkey's relations with Niger and Somalia is constituted of development and humanitarian aid with economic relations ranking in second position.

Due to geographical distance, Turkey does not have direct security interests in the four countries although increasing Turkish investments in these countries could push Turkey to start engaging itself in security cooperation to protect its economic interests against growing security threats. With respect to the "scramble of Africa" paradigm, some authors claim that unlike the EU, Turkey does not seem to extensively run after natural resources in SSA but rather seem to prioritize expanding its markets in SSA (Ozkan, 2010:93-105; Ozkan and Birol, 2010:525-546).

Following the neoliberal stance, the lower level of interdependency between Turkey and the four countries suggests that compared to the EU, Turkey's implementation of the Busan principles is likely to be lower. The fact that the EU better performed than Turkey with respect to indicators 5a, 2, 10 and 4 in the four countries gives strengths to the neoliberal hypothesis. Yet, in terms of implementation of indicators 6, 9b and 1a, this explanatory factor is refuted by the fact that like Turkey, the EU also failed to implement correctly the indicators in most of the countries (except Niger and Ethiopia for indicator 9b), despite its perceived huge interests in these countries. The explanatory factor is proven by the case of Turkey with respect to indicators 5a, 9b, 10, 2, 1a, and 4 because Turkey does not have strategic interests in these countries that would eventually compels actions in favor of effective implementation of the Busan principles. The relative higher performance of indicators 6 by the Turkey and equal performance in practice of indicator 1a by the EU and Turkey significantly challenge the validity of this explanatory factor because the observed stronger level of interdependency between the EU and each of the four SSA countries did not result in a better implementation of indicators 6 and 1a by the EU.

To summarize, this study argues that although the three explanatory factors of donor behavioral change (namely donors' identity, self-interest, and level of dependency between donor and recipient countries, which are drawn from respectively from constructivism, neorealism, and liberalism), are inter-related and complementary, the hypothesis drawn from constructivism constitutes by far the dominant factor explaining the different attitudes of Turkey and the EU regarding convergence to the Busan effective development cooperation principles and its related indicators in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia because norms and identities are playing an important role in shaping both donors' attitudes towards the Busan principles.

Conclusion

This study first comparatively assessed the degree of implementation of the Busan Effective Development Cooperation Principles (BEDCPs) and some of its related indicators by the EU and Turkey in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia and then examined the underlying factors behind unevenness between the EU and Turkey regarding the degree of implementation of these principles.

With respect to the first main question, this study contends that in comparison to the EU and except Indicator 6 (on Accountability) and to a certain extent Indicator 1a (on Focus on Results) and indicator 9b (on use of country systems), Turkey has shown a lower performance against the remaining four indicators, namely Indicator 5a (on annual aid predictability),indicator 10 (on untied aid), indicator 2 (on CSOs enabling environment) and indicator 4 (on Transparency) in Nigeria, Somalia, Niger, and Ethiopia.

As for the second question, this paper argues that although a combination of the three main explanatory factors , namely norms and identity, self-interests, and level of interdependency between donor and recipient countries (which are respectively drawn from constructivism, neorealism, and neoliberalism) is necessary to understand the uneven implementation of the Busan principles by the EU and Turkey in Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia, normative and identity factors deriving from the constructivist perspective remains by far the most dominant explanatory factor because in comparison to Turkey, the observed proximity of EU identity with the Busan principles seems to have played a significant role in the easy-identification with and implementation of the BEDCPs by the EU in the four country case studies.

Although the conclusions of this study cannot be generalized to all donors due to the limited number of donor selection, advanced research that includes a larger number of donors from different geopolitical and cultural backgrounds may provide new explanations of uneven donor implementation of the BEDCPs in the contexts of the tripartite divide, namely traditional/emerging donors, north-south/ south-south and triangular development cooperation.

References:

African Development Bank (2018) "African Economic Outlook 2018", AfDB 2018, <https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/African_Economic_Outlook_2018_-_EN.pdf> , (8 June 2018).

Commission of the European communities (2004) "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Translating the Monterrey Consensus into practice: the contribution by the European Union," Brussels, 5 March, <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-monterrey-consensus-com2004150-20040305_en.pdf>, (20 November 2017).

Council of the EU (2007) "Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council on EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labor in Development Policy'', EU Council 2007, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209558%202007%20INIT>.

European Commission (2017) "Evaluation of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF)", Draft Final Report: Main Report, European Commission, January 2017.

European Center for Development Policy Management-ECDPM (2003) "The Cotonou Agreement in A Nutshell: A User's Guide for Non-State Actors''. Brussels: ACP Secretariat, <http://Ecdpm.Org/Wp-Content/Uploads/Cotonou-Nsa-Guide-Chapter-2.Pdf>, (5 February 2018).

European Commission- Devco (2014) "Devco Companion to Financial and Contractual Procedures applicable to External Actions Financed from the General Budget of the EU and from the 11th EDF", Version 4.2 - November, <http://Www.Puntosud.Org/Helpdeskeuropeaid/_Media/Resources/Documents_And_Formats/Ecompanion-En-4.2.Pdf>, (7 February 2018).

European Commission-DEVCO ''Development Effectiveness'', <https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/development-effectiveness_en>

European commission-Directorate General for Trade (2018) ''statistics: Top trading partners'', <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122530.04.2018.pdf>.

European External Action Service - EEAS (2016a) ''About EUCAP-Sahel Niger'', EEAS 20 December, <https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eucap-sahel-niger/3875/about-eucap-sahel-niger_en>.

European External Action Service - EEAS (2016b) "Somalia and the EU", EEAS 12 May, <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/1764/somalia-and-eu_lt>.

European External Action Service - EEAS (2016c) “Nigeria and the EU”, EEAS 12 May, <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/1621/nigeria-and-eu_sk>.

Holsti, K. J. (1970) “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 14(3):233-309.

International Aid Transparency Initiative (2019) “Spotlight on IATI Data Use: Somalia”, IATI, <https://www.aidtransparency.net/about/partner-country-perspectives/spotlight-on-iati-data-use-somalia>, (1 June 2018).

LDC Watch (2016) ‘‘Statement by Turkish Deputy Undersecretary at the mid Term Review of the Istanbul Programme of Action (IPoA) held in Antalya’’, <http://ldc4istanbul.org/MTR2016/uploads/Turkey%E2%80%99s%20National%20Statement%20delivered%20by%20Deputy%20Undersecteray%20Ambassador%20Naci%20Koru.pdf>, (18 March 2018).

Maza, C. (2014) “Turkey: Impressive Aid Record mired in bad practices “, *UnitedExplanation*s, 1st December, <http://unitedexplanations.org/english/2014/12/01/8541/>, (2 August 2018).

Maurits van der Veen, A (2011) *Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)-Website ‘‘Oil Production’’, <www.nnpcgroup.com/nnpcbusiness/upstreamventures/oilproduction.aspx>.

OECD-DAC website. “Untied Aid”, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/untied-aid.htm>.

Ozkan, M. (2010) “Turkey’s Rising Role in Africa”, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 9 (4): 93–105.

Ozkan, M. and Birol, A. (2010) “Turkey’s Opening to Africa”, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 48 (4): 525-46.

de Renzio, P. and Seifert, J. (2014) “South–South cooperation and the future of development assistance: mapping actors and options”, *Third World Quarterly,* 35(10):1860-75.

TIKA (2013) “Turkish Development assistance report 2013”, <http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/KYR_FRAE_2013_uyg9.pdf>, (1 May 2018).

TIKA (2016) “Turkey’s Development Cooperation with the Least Developed Countries: a report on the Turkey’s economic and technical cooperation package for the LDCs”, TIKA Department of external affairs and partnerships 2016.

Turkish Public procurement authority (2012). ‘‘Turkish Public Procurement Law’’ (English version), January 2012), <http://www2.ihale.gov.tr/english/4734_English.pdf>, (12 July 2018).

Interviewee TK1 (2017), Development Cooperation of Turkey in SSA and aid effectiveness, 20 October 2017, Istanbul, Turkey.

Interviewee ACPB (2018), EU Development cooperation in SSA, 31 January 2018, ACP Secretariat, Brussels, Belgium.

Interviewee ENgB (2018), EU Development Cooperation in Nigeria and Aid effectiveness, 17 January 2018, Embassy of Nigeria in Brussels, Brussels, Belgium.

Interviewee ENeB (2018), EU Development Cooperation in Niger and Aid effectiveness 22 January 2018, Embassy of Niger in Brussels, Brussels, Belgium.

Interviewee EEB (2018), EU Development Cooperation in Ethiopia and Aid effectiveness, 21 February 2018, Embassy of Ethiopia in Brussels, Brussels, Belgium.

Interviewee EST (2018), Turkey's Development Cooperation in Somalia and Aid effectiveness, 12 May 2018, Phone Interview, Turkey.

Interviewee EUB1 (2018), EU Development Cooperation in SSA and Aid effectiveness, 31 January 2018, DEVCO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.

Interviewee EUB2 (2018), EU Development Cooperation in SSA and Aid effectiveness, 21 February 2018, DEVCO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.