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The Causes of Failure Greek Minority Army in the Battle of Sakarya

Yunan Küçük Asya Ordusu'nun Sakarya Muharebesi'ndeki Başarısızlık Nedenleri

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ÖZ

Yunan Ordusu, Ankara Hükümeti'ne Sevr Antlaşması'nın imzalatılması, işgallere karşı şiddetli direnişin kırılmasını sağlamak amacıyla İtilaf Devletleri'nin desteği ile başlattığı Ankara Harekâtı, Sakarya mevzilerinde amacına ulaşmadan büyük bir yenilgiyle sonlanmıştır. Yenilgiyle Yunan Küçük Asya Ordusunun Anadolu macerasının seyri değişmiş, o güne kadar sürekli taarruzu düşünen Yunanlı Komutanlar, Sakarya Muharebesi'nden sonra savunma harekâtına geçmişlerdir. Başarısızlığın nedenleri dönemin askerî uzmanları tarafından savaş sonrası yazdıkları anılarda detaylı bir şekilde anlatılmışlardır. Savaş sonunda Yunanistan'da başlayan bir ayaklanma ile Sakarya Savaşı'nda başarısız olan siyasetçi ve askerler dâhil birçok kişi yargılanmış ve başta dönemin başbakanı Gunaris olmak üzere altı Yunan Bakan ve Komutan idam edilmiştir. Bu anlamda Sakarya Muharebeleri her iki ülke yöneticileri için bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Emperyalist devletlerin çıkarları uğruna ülkelerinin geleceğini feda eden Yunan hükümetleri, yaptıkları hataların bedelini çok ağır ödemişlerdir. Diğer taraftan Türk Milleti için ise istiklalini ve istikbalini kendi azim ve kararıyla ve mücadelesiyle kurtarması sonucu, modern bir ulusun inşasında en önemli kazanımı olmuştur. Çalışmanın amacı, Yunan Ordusu'nun Sakarya Muharebelerindeki yenilgisinin nedenlerini analiz etmektir. Çalışmanın konusu, Millî Mücadele döneminin en önemli muharebelerinden biri olan Sakarya Muharebesi'nin kaybedilmesinin Yunan Tarihi açısından önemidir. Çalışmada Türk ve Yunan Askeri Tarih birinci el kaynaklar kullanılarak söz konusu vaka sebep-sonuç ilişkisi içinde analiz edilmiştir. Çalışma Sakarya Muharebesi dönemini kapsamaktadır.

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ABSTRACT

Ankara Operation launched by the Greek Army with the support of the Entente Stateshad ended with a great defeat in the Sakarya regions without achieving its goal for signing of the Sevres Treaty by the Ankara Government and break the violent resistance against the invasions. With the defeat, the course of the Greek Asia Minor Army's Anatolian adventure had changed, Greek commanders, who had been thinking about the attack until that day, started defensive operations after the Battle of Sakarya. The reasons for the failure had explained in detail by the military experts of the period in their post-war memoirs. At the end of the war, with a rebellion that started in Greece, many people including politicians and soldiers who failed in the Sakarya War were tried and six Greek Ministers and Commanders, including the prime minister of the period Gunaris, were executed. In this sense, the Battle of Sakarya has been a turning point for the rulers of both countries. The Greek governments, who sacrificed the future of their countries for the sake of the interests of the imperialist states, paid a heavy price for the mistakes they had made. On the other hand, for the Turkish Nation, it has been the most important gain in the construction of a modern nation as a result of saving its independence and future with its own determination, decision, and struggle. The aim of the work is to analyze the causes of the defeat in the Greek Army's Sakarya Battle. In the subject of the work is one of the most important battles of the National Struggle period the Battle of Sakarya is emphasized the importance of the loss of the Battle of Sakarya Greek History. In the study, Turkish and Greek Military History was analyzed using first-hand sources, in the context of the case-event relationship. The study covers the period of Sakarya battle.

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Introduction

The Turks did not demand a ceasefire or peace as a result of the gains of the Greek Army in the Battles of Kütahya and Eskişehir, and although the Turkish Army lost power in this battle, it retreated regularly without losing its main forces to the enemy. On the Greek side, the Hellenic Army maintained its momentum and had pushed the Turkish army onward Ankara on the other hand the prolongation of the promised victory had been started to cause discomfort among the Greek`s soldiers. The soldiers wanted to end the battles as soon as possible and return home after being discharged. The delay of victory, the strengthening of the Turks by getting stronger, the inability to achieve results due to the prolongation of the battles, and the possibility of being armed for another winter in the Greek Army, the troubles to be experienced and the concerns increased.

On the other hand, it had express clearly by the Ankara Government that the peace proposals that the Greeks will offer against the Turks will not be accepted as long as the Anatolian occupation continues. British Prime Minister Lloyd George after the victory of the Kutahya and Eskişehir Wars; He said that “*Greece can no longer be content with what will be given to him as a result of the Sevres Treaty, but must make a greater concession on top*”. Against this promise, it was necessary to continue the operation and solve the problem with weapons. If the operation was delayed, the Turks could reinforce their army by taking ammunition and force from the Caucasus, Cilicia and Black Sea regions.

On the other hand, the Greek Army could no longer maintain its initial speed. Army needed more supply vehicles and animals that could carry bullets and supplies for a long time. Even if they did not fight, the presence of more than one hundred thousand soldiers in the Anatolian steppes was a huge logistical burden.

Study, the background and reasons for the failure of the Greek Army in the Sakarya Battles had tried to be explained through the work of the Greek Commanders of the period.

The Operation Plan and Preparations of The Greek Army

The Greek Army Staff paid great attention to the battles that would take place around the Sakarya River. On July 28, 1921, the War Council was convened in Kutahya under the chairmanship of King Constantine. In addition to the King, Prime Minister Gunaris, War Minister Theotokis, Commander-in-Chief Papoulas, Chief of General Staff Dusmanis, Chief of General Staff Pallis and Military Adviser Gen. Stratigos were also present. Agenda of the meeting: “*To decide on the destruction plans to be made to prevent the strengthening and organization of the Turkish army (GGSIMH, 1967, p. 4)*”.

Prime Minister Gunaris was the first to speak and after explaining the purpose of the meeting, he wanted the military side to clarify three points since he has to think about the problem politically:

Will the situation that has occurred that provide a solid foundation for the government performance in the future? In other words, was the Greek Army strong enough to easily secure itself in the lands occupied? Does the military situation allow the government to gradually discharge the oldest soldiers? If the first two of questions were answered negatively, what should be done next (Pallis, 1997, p. 24)?

The Commander-in-Chief answered these questions directed to him through Chief of Staff Pallis. It had said that the Turkish Army suffered great losses and was close to disintegration, but could not be destroyed by breaking the resistance yet. To the question of what should be done to reach the final result? Prime Minister was given response that the Turks were followed towards Ankara (Pallis, 1997, p. 24).

According to the opinion of the war council; with the occupation of Ankara, there would be riots in Anatolia and Turks would not be able to succeed for transport all the ammunition since there was no railway from Ankara to the east. As a result, the Turkish Army, which was warned financially and morally, would be thrown into Kayseri, Sivas or Harput as dispersed. Turks would be stuck between Pontus from the north, Armenia from the east, Kurdish tribes in the south, Konya rebels (Delibas Mehmet), and the Greek army in the west.

Participants of the meeting reached a consensus on the advance of the Greek Army towards Ankara. The attack of the army towards Ankara had not hear a single negative voice against the proposal, nor was any objection or criticism expressed. In the continuation of the decision, the available possibilities and the duration of the operation were discussed, and it had calculated that a period of would be needed 20 days for the preparation phase and 20 to 40 days the implementation phase. Towards the end of the meeting, the memorandum prepared by the Greek Army and signed by General Papoulas containing opinions on the operation was published (Papoulas, 1969, p. 230-231).

“July 28, 1921, Kutahya

- a. The first phase of the campaign was concluded with the occupation of Eskisehir and the defeat of the Turkish army on the Eskisehir-Afyon front.
- b. The aim of the second period was to defeat the forces of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and drive them away from Eskisehir without allowing them to gather in front of Eskisehir again (Eskisehir-Afyon line has also been accepted as the main line of defense).
- c. To achieve this aim, the army must raid Ankara. If contact with the Greek army is to be made during these raids, these forces must be crushed and the Turkish army supplies accumulated in Ankara must be destroyed.
- d. Although it is not possible for Kemal to have a great power after this raid expedition, the railway line will not be abandoned and the forces will not be able to approach the Eskisehir front because the army has no means of transportation.
- e. Due to the size of the distance to be covered over Ankara (more than 265 kilometers from Eskisehir to Ankara via Sivrihisar road and 300 kilometers by Çifteler-Inler road), there are no bridges due to the impossibility of crossing where the Sakarya and Porsuk rivers are. The harsh rainy season starting in September will cause major supply difficulties, among other obstacles.
- f. The research and thoughts of the Army Commander-in-Chief on this subject led the Command to the conclusion that it would be possible to advance to the eastern region of Sakarya, namely the Beylikköprü-Kavak line.
- g. If, during this march, the army clashes with the Greek army and crushes it, it will not be difficult to follow Ankara with some force.
- h. However, on the contrary, if the Greek army retreats beyond Sakarya, the army will naturally advance or stop according to the situation and conditions that will occur at that time. The meaning of this is as follows; If the rail is intact and the roads are motor vehicles, etc. If found by good condition, forward operations can continue; otherwise, the army will have to retreat to Eskisehir after destroying the part of the railway from Beylikköprü to a point 100 kilometers east of Eskisehir.

Army Commander-in-Chief in Asia Minor

A.Papoulas”

According to Retired Lieutenant General Baki Vandemir, one of the officers who participated in the Sakarya War:

“This memorandum that General Papoulas gave to the Military Council in Kutahya for the Sakarya forward operation on July 28, 1921, shows how wrong the Commander-in-Chief had accepted the movement before starting a major operation. So, the army will go, die, return! ... This is just a gesture to save the image in the face of the failure of the work to be done. Waiting for the victory of a movement whose goal and success was doubtful otherwise was nothing but complete despair for the command” (Vandemir, 2006, p. 4).

After the Kutahya and Eskisehir Wars, the Turkish Army had disintegrated and a significant amount of all kinds of war materials had captured in Eskisehir. Although the situation did not show that the Turkish Army was broken, it did show that it was seriously injured. After all these evaluations, the Greek Command had hoped the operation would be successful. On the other hand, the supply centers of the Turks in Ankara had left untouched. On the other hand, Turkish supply centers in Ankara were intact. In addition, the supply routes coming from the Caucasus, Black Sea and Southern Anatolia (Cilicia) regions also suggested that the Turkish Army had could get stronger over time. At that same time Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the leader of a revolutionary Turkish government, was struggling with many difficulties inside. According to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, if the Turkish Army and its determination to resist move away from Ankara, it causes an incurable moral injury and a large amount of combat equipment and supplies are get carried away to the enemy. Because it had not possible to quickly move all the collected materials out of the battlefield with preparation.

Operation Plan and Preparations of The Turkish Army

Upon the order of the Western Front Commander Ismet Pasha to withdraw into the Turkish Army on July 22, the Turkish Army retreated to the east of Sakarya on the evening of July 25, 1921, protecting most of the fighting force. During this withdraw, almost nothing had left to the Greeks. Mustafa Kemal Pasha explains the reasons for this withdrawal in "Speech" as follows (Kemal, 2016, p.430):

"... With this in mind, I went to Ismet Pasha headquarters in Karacahisar, southwest of Eskisehir, on July 18, 1921, and after examining the situation closely, I gave the following instruction generally to Ismet Pasha: "After gathering the army in the north and south of Eskisehir, it is necessary to leave a great distance between us and the enemy army for organize and strengthen the army. For this, it is able to withdrawn to the east of Sakarya. If the enemy advances without stopping, it will move away from the base of movement and will have to re-establish support lines; anyway, it will face many unexpected difficulties. On the other hand, our army will be found together and under more favorable conditions. The main disadvantage of doing this is a demoralization that can occur in public because we left important places such as Eskisehir and our vast lands. However, these disadvantages will be eliminated automatically with the successful results we have achieved in a short time".

However, this decision had caused great controversy in the Grand National Assembly. As a result, it was decided that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had would head the Turkish Army even though albeit with different approaches. Mustafa Kemal Pasha in Speech (Kemal, 2016, p. 434): "... According to their estimates, they wanted my personality to be beaten with at the head of the dispersed and defeated army! In another majority sincerely wished me to act at the head of the army out of their trust and belief in me".

Knowing the difficulties from the very beginning, Mustafa Kemal Pasha asked for broad powers from the Grand National Assembly (Kemal, 2016: 434-435). The relevant law was passed on August 5, 1921. Commander-in-Chief Mustafa Kemal Pasha immediately put the needs in order and had declared mobilization. While the soldiers were gathering, on the other hand Mustafa Kemal Pasha's had requested support from the people to created opportunities for feed, dress and equip the mobilized army. In a short time, the Turkish Army behind Sakarya was equipped with all kinds of equipment and facilities found in large armies, soldier needs had met, it had become an army that had no shortage of food and equipment. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, as the Commander-in-Chief, gave the following short order to the army, which was very important (Kemal, 2016, p. 435):

1. Our strength and position are suitable for defeating the Greek army. We will also take advantage of the difficulties faced by the Greek army.
2. There may be back and forth fluctuations at some points on our war front. This should be seen naturally by the troopships. While any troopship retreats for whatever reason, the adjacent troopship must firmly maintain its position and assist the retreating troopship with artillery and infantry.

3. I strongly remind that in places and moments where war intensifies, commanders of troopship must act calmly and coldly to fulfill their duties, not make decisions that may violate the general situation with personal thoughts and feelings.

According to Papoulas, the preparations that Mustafa Kemal Pasha made to prepare for the war had unlikely to even dream by the Greek commanders of the period. Papoulas was of the opinion that the Greek commanders did not make the necessary sacrifice (Papoulas, 1969, p. 230).

Comparison of Turkish and Greek Forces

The Greek Army consisted of 120 thousand soldiers and had 38 thousand animals. This force required 150 tons of food and 115 tons of grass a day. The Greek Army had quite a few load vehicles, 600 heavy and 240 light. The light ones had a carrying capacity of 1 ton, the heavy ones 3 tones. This required the Greek Army to use ox chariots and camel caravans (Grigoriadis, 1971, p. 42-44). Mobile depots created to carry ammunition followed the Greek corps from afar one day and they frequently encountered obstacles of Turkish cavalry. Fahrettin (Altay) Pasha the Commander of the Turkish Cavalry Corps mentions in his book that, The Turkish cavalry alarmed the Greeks and forced them to spend their ammunition and captured ammunition and prisoners from the Greeks (Altay, 1970, p.295-301).

The supply center of the Greek Army was Eskisehir. The materials were transported to Mudanya by freight ships departing from Izmir every day. The materials traveling on dirt roads for miles were loaded on loan wagons at Karaköy Station, 50 kilometers from Eskisehir and transported to Eskisehir (Canakaris, 2007, p. 332-333).

According to Turkish sources, the Greek Army left two of its 11 divisions in Lake Iznik and Afyon for protection. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Greek Corps would participate in the main operation with three divisions each. A cavalry brigade, an infantry regiment from the 11th Division, and an artillery regiment were also to participate. There were 16 divisions of the Turks compared to 9 divisions of the Greeks. However, some divisions of the Turks were newly formed and some of them had remained weak in strength. During this period, the general force of the Western Front Command was 6,855 officers, 122,186 infantry, 63,416 rifles, 344 light machine guns, 524 heavy machine guns, 181 cannons, 1,309 swords and 2 aircraft. During the Sakarya War, the strength of the Greek Army in Anatolia was 5,500 officers and 178,000 infantry. The situation of the mutual forces participating in the Battle of Sakarya was as follows (Erendil, 1987, p. 59-71):

| | Officer | Infantry | Rifle Mac. | Gun Artillery | Plane | |
|--------------|---------|----------|------------|---------------|-------|----|
| Turkish Army | 5.401 | 96.326 | 54.572 | 825 | 169 | 2 |
| Greek Army | 3.780 | 120.000 | 75.900 | 2.768 | 286 | 18 |

When the numbers are examined, it is seen that the Turkish Army is weak in terms of infantry, firepower and aircraft, except for officers.

Causes of Failure of the Greek Army

In Greece, after the defeat of Sakarya, a heavy nightmare had fallen on the Greek government in power. Two possibilities were spoken: Immediate withdrawal from Asia Minor or stay in the territory they occupy until the territories they occupy are guaranteed by an international agreement and both possibilities were terrifying and frightening choices that left them without enough sleep (Stratigos, 1925, p. 45). It was time to bid farewell to the dream of "Asia Minor Greek" and these dreams were killed by the Turkish Army and buried in Sakarya River. The King and Venizelos supporters caused violence that to interfere with the ranks of the military and even cause political weakness in the world caused violence. This situation had

become bad enough to disturb the order and trust on the front and it had paralyzed the Greek national forces and ideals (Stratigos, 1925, p. 45).

The most important factor that dragged Greece to the Anatolian adventure is the Turkish-Greek War of 1897. After this war was the Greek National awakening and as a result the most energetic “National Macedonian Policy” was born. After that, the Army and Navy were reorganized and strengthened. The victorious Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the vitality and resourcefulness they had donated to the Greek Nation naturally convinced her belief that they could achieve their dreams in a short time (Stratigos, 1925, p. 46).

However, until 1915, Greece did not have a policy on Asia Minor. It had been growing, spreading, advancing and developing every year as a power in its inner center and coasts since 1830. There were being slow and paced transfers and joins from Europe and Greece to indigenous Greeks in Asia Minor. For example; In Izmir, the Greeks had been living in groups of 60 thousand in 1812s, at distances from each other. Wherever they lived, Greek Groups had mixed with Muslims. But by 1915 this population had become 450 thousand Greeks (Stratigos, 1925, p. 9).

The main reasons for the great defeat were briefly summarizing by the Greek Head of Military History (GGSIMH, 1967: 6); “Many people ask the reasons for the defeat of the Greek Army in the Asia Minor Campaign. Why such a wide front opened in 1920? Why did the enemy (the Turkish army) not receive a fatal blow, although some victories were initially achieved?

One of these reasons was the morale of the Greek soldier. It's morale was very high until he attempted to attack Ankara in 1921 (Sakarya War). There had a drop in their morale, and they had become more and more demoralized. To this depressing that insufficiency of forces at hand, disregard for enemy forces, great casualties, difficulties in supplies, lack of communication and vehicles, lack of food and clothing, the extension of the war beyond human patience and increased mood among soldiers that the notion that the sacrifices do not serve any purpose had caused.

The biggest factor affecting the demoralization of the soldier was the effects of the separation of the Greeks into two separate groups that enmity each other and harbor grudges against each other have reached the military since 1915.

The biggest other one factor affecting that divergence between major country was own interests in the situation arising after the signing of the Serv Agreement due to the situation it created in the Middle East. In the changed situation, although Great Britain supposedly supported Greece, it did not actually provide any assistance. France and Italy not only took a hostile attitude towards Greece, but also all kinds of war materials had been provided to support to Mustafa Kemal.

Greece felt weak and poor in its long struggle. It was abandoned by allies in critical times. The result of internal fragmentation, activity and weakness began to show itself. Although he fought heroically whatever the economic loss, defeat was inevitable in the face of many disadvantages (Major General Konstantinos Kanelopoulos, Greek Gen. Board. Deputy Head of History)”.

It would be correct to examine the reasons for the failure of the Greek Asia Minor Army in the Battles of Sakarya under two headings.

Political Causes

By the Greek Army after 1910 was intensive preparation has been made to reach the strength to face the great Balkan crisis with Venizelos, strong and rational leadership. These efforts saw their reward for success in the two Balkan wars in 1912-1913. Greece achieved territorial gain that far exceeded even those hoped for by the darkest supporters of the Greek cause. Difficult and weary Crete and Macedonia problems finally resolved and Bulgaria, Greece's most feared rival in the Balkans, had stayed out of the war.

This positive result; with a powerful statesman who has gained the full trust of the people of the country it was possible thanks to the cooperation of an intelligent King who

supported the prime minister and followed his advice. What was achieved with the cooperation of Vittorio Emanuele and Cavour in Italy, Wilhelm I and Bismarck in Germany, seemed to be achieved through the happy cooperation of King Georgios I and Venizelos in Greece.

After King Georgios after being bitten and died with timelessness by a monkey while playing in the garden of the palace in 1913, the sincere hope and belief of the majority of the Greek people was that the same close cooperation between the new king and the prime minister continued with Georgios' successor Konstantinos. His military victories in the Balkan wars gave Constantine a reputation and public affection almost equivalent to Venizelos' reputation (Pallis, 1997, p. 44).

However, in the most depressed period of the fate of the country, a very important disagreement arose between these two people regarding the politics to be followed. It was a misfortune for Greece that, in the face of the great depression that emerged with the outbreak of the European war in 1914, there was no alternative but neutrality or intervention, with good and bad sides. One of these two powerful figures, loved and held by the public, wanted one and the other wanted the other one. Political cooperation between the king and prime minister in foreign affairs had disappeared.

Failing to agree on a common national policy, the country fell into violent party strife and disagreement. The unity of effort and effort, which was happily achieved in the Balkan wars and seemed to lead Greece to higher successes in the near future, has disappeared. Throughout the entire war, from 1915 to 1922, Greece found itself torn between two hostile parties that harbored a lethal grudge and hatred towards each other and were trying to mutually destroy each other (Pallis, 1997, p. 44).

It is understood that the idea of Asia Minor first started to form in the mind of Venizelos from January 1915. If the Entente States were victorious, it meant the final end of the Ottoman Empire. At the end of 1914, it had begun to be talk of a possible division of Turkey's land where is into the European and Asian. This idea had seemed to have matured in Venizelos' head on January 9, 1915. That day Venizelos had a meeting with British Ambassador Sir Francis Elliot about sending Greek soldiers to aid Serbia. During this meeting Venizelos assured the British Ambassador to go to war immediately. He assured that although Bulgaria is quite risky due to its ambiguous attitude to send troops to Serbia, it can easily break the opposition of the King and the Greek General Staff when sending troops to Serbia (GGSIMH, 1967, p.389-390).

As a matter of fact, the British Government must have accepted Venizelos's opinion regarding Izmir, fifteen days later, on January 23, 1915, British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Gray offered Greece important land concessions on the coast of Asia Minor. From that moment on, Venizelos' idea was completely finalized.

The Sir Edward Gray's note was received on the morning of January 24. In the afternoon of the same day, Venizelos sent a secret memorandum to the King. In this memorandum, Venizelos was the first to elaborate on his policy of expanding into Asia and establishing a great overseas Greece. In this memorandum Venizelos said that:

"I would not hesitate to sacrifice Kavala on this aim, no matter how painful it may be, with the aim of saving the Ottoman Greeks and ensuring that a truly great Greece is built to include regions where Hellenism has lived through the ages" (GGSIMH, 1967, p.390).

On the day he presented his memorandum to the King, he also informed the Chief of General Staff of his opinion on participating in the operation. At the same time, he wanted to prepare militarily necessary plans. Metaxas who was Chief of General Staff immediately resigned instead of taking responsibility for this operation, which he found stupid. After the

King accepted the opinion of his military advisors, Venizelos had to left from government on 21 February.

After this date, the struggle between those who wanted to go to war in Greece and those who did not (Royalists and Venizelos fans) would turn into an even more tragic form. This situation continued until Venizelos founded a revolutionary government in Salonika in September 1916 under the auspices of the Entente States (the Allies had landed soldiers in this sector in October 1915 for the purpose of helping the Serbs). In June 1917, when the Entente States expelled King Constantine from the homeland and the re-establishment of a Venizelos government in Athens, the politics of going to war had been successful. On 30 June 1917, Greece declared war on the Allied Powers. The mobilization, which had been declared only in the area under the control of the military revolutionary government in Thessaloniki until then, began to be applied to the whole country.

The first crisis started in November, 1920. Venizelos` s Party suffered a complete defeat in the General Elections of 1-14 November 1920. After a popular vote in December, King Constantine was re-enthroned. The return of the King, who absolutely refused to go to war on the side of the Allies in 1915, badly affected the popular vote in England and France and led to an attitude towards the Greeks. The French government embraced this incident in order to break off its disturbing relations with the Greeks and to avoid responsibility.

Meanwhile, the Entente governments were pressuring to persuade the Greek government to withdraw from Anatolia. However, such pressure from the British government was somewhat sloppy. The British, until made the definitive peace with Turkey as saw it beneficial for the Greek army to be on Turkish land for the defense of the occupying forces in Istanbul.

On the other hand, the Greek government were not withdrawing from Anatolia to avoid the reaction of the Greek people. Everything was uncertain. Everyone was waiting for something to happen or the British government to change its opinion. Meanwhile, Lloyd George was continuing to encourage the Greeks informally.

As a result, despite Venizelos implementing the plans set up by Britain in 1915, the allied subsequently discontinued political and military support. Greek army dragged into political conflict. The clash of the King and Venizelos fans inevitably turned into an internal conflict since 1915. All of these constitute the political reasons for the defeat of the Greek Army with the Anatolian campaign that ended in Sakarya.

Military Causes

At the beginning of the operation, the Greek Army had tried to be strengthened as much as possible. According to Stratigos, before this major operation the Greek Government had turned to its people and demanded new made sacrifices from them in blood and money. This sacrifice is so great that it is not possible for the Hellenes to show another one equivalent from the moment they exist on earth as a nation.

During this period, Greece made great efforts to increase the number of weapons. Mannlicher guns found in Epirus, Thrace and other regions of Ancient Greece had been shipped to Anatolia. In a short time, with a few exceptions, all divisions were armed with the same weapons and new weapons and ammunition were purchased. From mid-April until mid-June, 1000 heavy, 500 light and 250 ambulance vehicles were supplied to the army, and other means of transport were also tried to be increased. Railway transportation improvement and repair of damaged roads and bridges were carried out. Had not been neglected in aviation services, so that planes took photos with their daily flights and had provided important information to intelligence services. Meanwhile, cartographers scattered across regions under Greek

occupation and drew maps of this unknown country. Health services have been improved and new hospitals have been established. Stratigos which was boasting about the preparations made, were saying that hills of food and materials were formed on the Izmir and Mudanya docks and that they were distributed using all means of transportation. A bakery was established in each supply center, the largest and most perfect of them was in İzmir.

The Wars of Kutahya and Eskisehir positively affected the morale of the Greeks, and the government had ignored some violations related for this. In this operation, the Greek Army had not lose much compared to the result obtained. Of course, it should been rest and provide some war supplies. However, its morale was decent, and its assertiveness rose with the victory. Moreover, as the headquarters stated, the operation had not over yet. Despite the victories achieved, even gradual demobilize cannot be achieved and the Turks was not proposing a ceasefire or peace. On the contrary, England had been encouraging the expansion of the operation full of victories that started. Considering the developments up to that time, it was not possible for Greece, who had a superior position, to want for peace from Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Moreover, it was known that Mustafa Kemal Pasha's attitude was unchangeable.

After the Battle of Eskisehir, the Greek Army announced from Kutahya through the Minister of War Theotokis, who was in Anatolia, which the first phase of the operation was over and asked for an opinion on the continuation of it. According to Stratigos, the news about the end of the first phase of the operation caused the Government to think that the struggle turned in favor of Greece. Even if the idea of continuing the movement in the direction of Ankara has not been put forward for the first time; understanding the scale and responsibility of the operation, Prime Minister Gunaris felt that he could not send a telegram from Athens stating whether he would approve it and should meet with the army face to face. Gunaris said, "Should the operation continue? What is the applicability of this? What result can be obtained from this operation? Had would search for answers of these questions first? Therefore, as soon as he received the telegram of the Minister of War Theotokis, he had decided to go to Anatolia (Stratigos, 1925, p.241-242).

Due to the situation that emerged after the Sakarya War, the Greek leaders who took part in the decision-making mechanism had been blame each other. According to Stratigos, *"none of those who thought about this operation and decided to do so ... were neither blood drinkers, lost their minds, nor traitors. They acted with military and political necessities..."* (Stratigos, 1925, p.241-246)

The operation had been decided due to the extreme optimism of Stratigos, in which managed to convince the political leaders that this operation would be successful and that the Kemalist danger would be completely eliminated. On the other hand, Papoulas had accused Stratigos of dragging some political leaders to his own opinion and preparing the first defeat to the Anatolian cause.

In the same period, 1st Greek Corps Commander Kondulis declared to Prime Minister Gunaris in Eskisehir on July 31, 1921 that the army was not strong enough and explained the difficulties and dangers of the operation to Ankara (Papoulas, 1969, p. 13-16). On that day, Constantine inspected the Greek soldier and distributed medals to the officers and soldiers with the flags of the regiments that stood out with their success in the operation. Although it was a hot day, the ceremony took place with grandiose. Still, from the ranks of the soldiers, *"Discharge! Discharge!"* their voices were heard (Canakaris, 2007, p. 329).

Conclusion

There are many reasons why the Greeks were defeated by the Turks in the Battle of Sakarya. The most important of these was that there were mistakes in their plans and strategies,

and the biggest was that they saw the Turkish Army as inadequate and weak. Despite, all the warnings of the experienced soldiers, it is understood that they are chasing a great adventure. No one can say that the Greek soldier did not fight bravely. However, they had been very poorly managed.

The Turkish army was managed uninterruptedly by the Commander-in-Chief Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who did not leave the front even for a moment even though he was sick, and the developing situations were intervened without delay. However, unlike the Turkish Army, there was never complete harmony and coordination between the corps commanders or the Commander-in-Chief Papulas in the battles, and when the Greek divisions could not find help in their demands and desperate calls to their commanders, the divisions had to fight alone

As a result, the Greek Government; With the Battles of Sakarya and the Ankara Operation, the British mobilized the Greek Army to force the Ankara Government to sign the Sevres Treaty, but left it alone during the war. With the morale of the Kutahya- Eskisehir Battles, a war was entered in which the inadequacies of the vital military facilities (such as supply, transportation, personnel, land and reconnaissance intelligence) were ignored despite all the warnings of the responsible unit commanders. On the other hand, the management and management ability of the Ankara Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, with his strategic and tactical intelligence, the sacrifice, courage and strength of the Turkish army and people in defending their homeland had been the most important factor in the failure of the Greek Asia Minor Army.

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