

The Ages of Jihadi Salafism: A Dual Exchange of Ideas and Contexts in Ideological Formation

Cihadi Selefiliğin Evreleri: İdeolojik Oluşumda Olgu-Düşünce İlişkisi

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Abstract

In this study I try to trace the ideological formation of jihadi Salafism through a chronological survey of the foundational texts, which were penned by people, who were regarded as ideologues of jihadi Salafism, in the form of reaction pieces to the conjuncture they were set against. I argue in this article that there is a strong connection between some religious, political, and military developments and facts, internal or external in origin, that influenced the Muslim world and each major theme of jihadi thought that went into circulation over time. The main objective of this article is to demonstrate that the jihadi ideology, generated as an anomaly of the mainstream Islamic movement in the post-independence period, emerged interrelated with the facts and developments aforementioned above, matured, developed, and became a terrorist movement. The study's coverage is the course of jihadism from the 1960s to 2006 when ISIS began to take form.

Keywords: Middle East, Jihadi Salafism, Jihadi Thought, Religious Radicalism, Ideology

Öz

Bu çalışmamızda, altmışlı yıllardan itibaren genelde Müslüman toplumları ve özelde ise Siyasal İslami hareketleri doğrudan etkileyen İslam dünyasında vuku bulmuş bazı dini, siyasi ve askeri gelişmeleri ve olguları ana perspektif olarak; kırılma anlarının yaşandığı bu dönemlerde cihadi ideologlar olarak kabul edilen kimselerin içinde buldukları krizlere reaksiyon olarak ürettiği ve dönemin temsil kabiliyetini haiz ana metinleri kronolojik olarak incelemek suretiyle cihadi selefi ideolojinin oluşumunun izini sürmeye çalıştık. Böylece cihâdi düşünceye dair zaman içinde üretilen temaların her birinin büyük oranda İslam dünyasını ve Müslüman toplumu bir şekilde etkileyen harici veya dahili kaynaklı olgularla bağlantılı olduğunu göstermeye çalıştık. Bu çalışmadaki temel amacımız, ilk kez 19.yüzyılda, İslam dünyasının içinde bulunduğu krize bir reçete olarak sunulan İslamcılık düşüncesinin ve bağımsızlık sonrası dönemde de bu düşünce üzerine aksiyon kazanan İslami hareketin bir sapması olarak üretilen cihâdi düşüncenin, söz konusu olgularla bağlantılı olarak ortaya çıktığını, olgunlaştığını, evrildiğini ve kontrolden çıkmak suretiyle şiddete savrularak terörize olduğunu göstermeye çalışmaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ortadoğu, Cihadi Selefilik, Cihadi Düşünce, Dini Radikalizm, İdeoloji

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1. Introduction

The idea of jihadism, which was conceived first in Egypt in the 1960s as an anomaly of the mainstream Islamism, was blended with Wahhabism in the 90s to take the form of Jihadi-Salafism. I argue that the formation of jihadi Salafism, which congealed on theo-political sensibilities and featured an ideological character by this provision, occurred in tandem with a set of religious, political, and military developments and facts, both internal and external in origin, in the post-independence Muslim world. By the same token, it is possible to relate both the origin of jihadism and its continual escalation to manifold levels with an emergent fact within the Muslim world. For example, each and every event and fact like the subjection of the dominant majority of Muslim societies to colonization almost till the mid-20th century, the foundation of Israel over Muslim land, the adoption of strict, secularist policies in nation-state construction in the post-independence world, the crushing defeat against Israel in 1967 and the signing of Camp David Accords in the aftermath, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets, the bases set up by American military forces at Gulf countries, primarily in Saudi Arabia, during the First Gulf War, US attack on Afghanistan following 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, acted as a milestone in the formation of jihadi Salafism. With this proviso, this set of events and facts led to either the formation or maturation of the jihadist thought and action or its development or sliding into a more aggressive course.

I argue in this article that there is a strong connection between these developments and facts that influenced the Muslim world and each major theme of jihadi thought that went into circulation over time. In fact, the notions and terms like the state of ignorance (*jāhiliyya*), God's sovereignty (*ḥākimiyya*), oppressor (*tāghūt*), divinity (*ulūhiyya*), the abode of Islam (*dār al-islām*), the abode of war (*dār al-ḥarb*), apostasy (*irtidād*), the neglected duty (*al-fariḍah al-ghā'ibah*), the near enemy (*al-'adūw al-qarīb*), and the far enemy (*al-'adūw al-ba'īd*) coined by people like Sayyid Quṭb, Ṣālih Sariyyah, 'Abd al-Salām Faraj, and 'Umar 'Abd al-Raḥman in the formative period of jihadism, were conceived consequent upon the confrontation of the mainstream Islamic movement with Gamal Abdel Nasser regime that was raised over secular ideological foundations, the repressive policies of this regime to suppress the movement, and the Muslims' deteriorating morale following the Six-Day War and Camp David Accords. On the other hand, revamping the practice of *jihad*, which can be proclaimed by means of government authority according to traditional Islamic jurisprudence and was considered to be a collective duty, by 'Abd Allāh

Azzām into an individual duty obliging all Muslims happened over the Afghan *jihad* against the Soviet invasion. Likewise, the long-standing perception of Islamists as the attempts to dominate oil reserves of the policies of Western countries, especially the USA, on the Gulf countries and turning them into satellite regimes, and the military bases planted on this land during the First Gulf War laid a luxuriant environment for many jihadists, prominently Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī, to develop the Wahhabi-inspired idea of loyalty and disavowal (*al-walā' wa-al-barā'*) in strict terms that forms one of the mainstays of jihadism. Furthermore, the perception that the USA has adopted a pro-Israel policy against Palestine since 1948 and assumes guardianship of Israeli interests, and the regional military bases established after the First Gulf War led to

anti-American sentiment in jihadism and eventually burgeoning of the idea of a global jihad. The reintroduction of strict security measures by the alliance of the global fight against terror under the leadership of USA as the only solution in the aftermath of 9/11, which was the most brutal result of the notion of global jihad, facilitated the decentralization of jihadism, the formation of 'small cells' as argued by Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī, another jihadist ideologue, and the realization of terror attacks by these cells at major metropolises as part of a solitary, jihadist action plan. Finally, the emergence of unhinged organizations like ISIS became a foregone conclusion in the chaotic environment formed after Iraq's invasion by the said alliance in the framework of the security measures in the aftermath of 9/11.

In this study I try to trace the ideological formation of jihadi Salafism through a chronological survey of the foundational texts, which were penned by people, who were regarded as ideologues of jihadi Salafism, in the form of reaction pieces to the conjuncture they were set against. In this way I point out the connection between each major theme of jihadism that went into circulation over time, and the facts, internal or external in origin, that influenced the Muslim world and society. The extent of the study's coverage is the course of jihadism supporting armed struggle as a means for Islamization starting from the 1960s to 2006 that marked the formative period of ISIS.

2. The Confrontation with The Nation State and The Initial Formation of Jihadism: The Defining Phase (1954–1967)

The initial impetus, which caused the formation of jihadism as a view and action that regarded armed struggle as a means for change and transformation, was the confrontation of the Islamic movement with the modern nation state that was built on non-religious principles. However, taking this means to actual practice in the way to Islamization certainly required an ideological framework in terms of theo-politics. In this juncture, Egypt, the home of the mainstream Islamic movement, became the country of origin for jihadism. From mid-1950s to early 1980s, it was the country where the foundations of jihadism were laid, which hosted the founding ideologues that were influential on every stripe of jihadism till today.

Even if it took to 1960s for jihadism to be distinct in shape,¹ I would like to mark 1954, as the date of the first extensive security operation in Egypt, where the origins of jihadism can be found, by the establishment under the leadership Abdel Nasser against the Muslim Brotherhood, filling up the prisons with the acolytes of the Islamic movement as a result of the operation (Zollner, 2009, pp.36-37; Mercan, 2019, pp.115-18). For this line of thought originates from the prison environment filled with Islamists by Nasserite rule from mid-50s onwards, such that the latter

1 The maturation of jihadism into a full-scale by the mid-60s is not a finding exclusively reached by external observers and researchers, but an opinion shared by people internal to the jihadist movement who pens articles over the historical course of the movement and whom were received as ideologues by people internal to the movement. For example, Abū Mus'ab al-Sūrī and Ayman al-Zawāhirī stated similar opinions on the birth and development of jihadist view and action (Al-Sūrī, 2004a, pp.690-95; Al-Zawāhirī, 2001, p.9).

was questioned from a religious and political point of view by Islamists who were tortured in prisons,² that in turn led to a discussion of the nature of the current rule and the need to provide a definition for it. For the Nasserite rule's repressive policy against the Islamists presented an unprecedented situation. So, it was considered that the Muslim ruler of a country of Muslim people oppressed the Muslims who demanded Islamization and it became a point of debate how this ruler is to be defined. Sayyid Quṭb, who was an inmate around the same time, became the first person to respond to this need of definition in contradistinction with the mainstream Islamists. In particular the book titled *Milestones (al-Ma'ālim fī al-ṭarīk)*, which he penned during his term in prison, became the pillow book and the basic reference for radicals upon its publication till today. He gave a definition to the current state of affairs with his notions of the state of ignorance and God's sovereignty and laid a groundwork for jihadist terminology with concepts like the oppressor, the abode of Islam, the abode of war, and divinity (Qutb, 1979).

In the said work, Quṭb claimed that the Muslim world in particular and entire humanity in general suffered from deviance and misery and that the main cause for it was the state of ignorance humanity dwelt in. This ignorance sprang from humanity's presumptions concerning "God's sovereignty" which is his authority on earth and one of the most prominent aspects of his divinity (Qutb, 1979, p.8). Quṭb defines ignorance in the following manner: 'In fact, the ignorant society is every society other than the community of Islam. If we would like an objective definition, we would say: it is every society the allegiance of which does not belong to God alone. This subjection is represented in the religious imaginary, the devotional rites, and the legal sanctions' (Qutb, 1979, pp.88-89).

Today all societies that inhabit the world fall under the 'ignorant society' including the Muslim societies (Qutb, 1979, pp.89-91). The reason in Quṭb's opinion is not the issue that they believe in the divinity of one other than God or their worship. The point is that these societies do not conform to their subjection to God when organizing their actual lives. Although no other than God might have been directly deified in these societies, they submit their laws, principles, value judgments, traditions, customs, and all vital issues to one other than God's sovereignty. This amounts to breaching the most distinct feature of divinity (Qutb, 1979, pp.91-92). According to Quṭb, Islam recognizes two types of societies, one of ignorance and one of Islam. The community of Islam is not one consisting of people who bore the 'Muslim' tag even if practiced religious rituals like prayers, fasting, and pilgrimage. The community of Islam is where the religious law is exercised in addition to faith and rituals (Qutb, 1979, p.105).

The first thing to do, according to Quṭb, is avoiding all elements of ignorance listed above, getting cleansed from them, and returning to the pure and clean main source that was taken by the first

2 Al-Zawāhiri also marks the point of heavy torture inflicted on the members of the Islamic movement in prisons in Nasserite era, particularly during the 60s, as a cause for the rise of jihadist currents, in concurrence with many specialists working on Islamic movements in Egypt. In his words, "Most who went through this hideous experience had entered prison demanding a revenge and left it demanding two [...] Indeed, this torture has left deep scars in memory that do not close, bloody wounds in conscience that do not heal, and alive cinders in soul that should only die out with due punishment by God's permission and might" (Al-Zawāhiri, 2001, p.28).

generation as buttress. The goal of return is not only with respect to the subjects of faith and ritual, but at the same time has to aim for all our perceptions, value measures, moral principles, methods that govern politics, administration, and economics that are pertinent to the lives we lead, to be based on it. Qutb put the greater emphasis on Islam as a religion that regulates the everyday life. He views Islam as a 'living regulation' and a basic reference that rules all aspects of life from belief to ritual, morals to thought, politics to law, or economics to education. Therefore, Islam is a way of living (Qutb, 1979, pp.148-52).

Qutb's arrangement of his notion of Islam around praxis can be interpreted as a reckoning with recently-founded Nasserite nation state as an emblem of Western values. His reception of the pursuit of extra-Islamic references in all aspects of life as a contestation of divinity and duly God's sovereignty, I gather, led to the judgment that the state and the statesmen were non-Islamic made by certain groups afterwards, even if he did not explicitly call out names in his work. In other words, Qutb's inclusion of those that were in pursuit of extra-Islamic references for all aspects of life, primarily politics and law, into the class of 'ignorance,' planted the seeds of the issue of infidelity pronouncements that are frequently encountered afterwards.

The thought and notions offered by Sayyid Qutb in the 60s were in fact a result of a need in itself. For the hard prison days of the Islamists, the members of the Muslim Brothers including Qutb, starting from 1954 and gaining in intensity, left a fertile ground for a new questioning like 'how to take a position against an oppressive regime' and 'the state of tyrant, corrupt Muslim ruler' by the young and pious mass. This situation lent a responsibility of offering answers to the people recognized as leaders and caused the appearance of tough and devastating answers on a par with the circumstances.

3. 1967 Defeat by Israel and Targeting The "Near Enemy": The Judgment and Action Phase (1967-1980)

After the defining period, the question of the religious judgment of the established order and its governors and how to take action against those judged became a discussion subject. The Islamic movement entered a period of steep disagreements and divisions in due course. A group inspired by Qutb from within the Islamic movement arrived at the conclusion of 'unbelief' concerning the new regimes, which he identified but refrained from passing a judgment explicitly, through making use of several historical references, and argued for jihad (holy war) as a practical measure against unbelief. Certainly, the crushing defeat of Arabic military forces by Israel in 1967 was a major milestone along the way to a new phase.

The basic reason for the defeat against Israel, in jihadist discourse, is the established order's being governed not along the Islamic rules. Therefore, the way to Israel's downfall passes from the Islamization of the Muslim countries' governments. While the jihad against Israel was a point of consensus for all members of the Islamic movement till the June War of 1967, a group from within the Islamists argued for the prioritization of jihad against the 'near enemy' of local

government instead of the 'far enemy' of Israel. For being victorious over an old enemy, the argument continued, is not possible without the realization of Islamization in the local context.

The Islamic movement's prison experience starting from the mid-50s left a fertile ground for the identification of enemy in ideological terms, this identification fed into judgment and the 1967 defeat tipped the recently formed jihadist thought into action (Mercan, 2019, pp.133-35). After Qutb's contribution of 'definition,' the 'judgment' phase was initiated with Şālih Sariyyah's Tract of Faith (*Risālat al-īmān*). In this work, Sariyyah argued for a redefinition of the criteria of faith that indicated who remained within its boundaries and who fell outside under the new circumstances and expressed that he held himself responsible with the commission of a guiding work. For the Muslims, in his opinion, discussed the terms of belief and unbelief along the same line over the course of history. Yet, the period following the caliphate being abolished as a religious and political authority and the new nation states being set in place heralded a new phase. Therefore, the new 'oppressive regimes' that were oblivious to God's injunctions and their leaders had to be subjected to criticism along belief-unbelief. If neglected, Muslim societies would risk collective apostasy. Hence Sariyyah subjected the said regimes to criticism along new terms that he specified and attempted to do what Qutb did not, that is, to demonstrate that these regimes that did not follow religious law slid to unbelief (Sariyyah, 1991).

When Sariyyah's Tract of Faith is compared to Qutb's Milestones, the most significant difference is the subject of the pronouncement of infidelity. Qutb follows a conceptual discussion of the question avoiding a specific resolution and adopting an ambivalent stance on numerous issues that can be attributed to his confusion. Whereas there is no mental confusion for Sariyyah. He could specifically take the administrators, lawyers, public servants, the police and even the public to task in terms of belief-unbelief. The work concerns who can be pronounced infidel from the beginning to the end.

The Camp David Accords, which was signed between Egypt and Israel in 1979 and declared the official recognition of Israel, was the last drop in the tension between the government and the jihadists and the latter moved to action. The ideological ground of the action was provided with 'Abd al-Salām Faraj's the Neglected Duty (*al-Fariḍat al-ghā'ibah*) printed in 1980. Qutb's writings identified the situation, Sariyyah's work judged it, and Faraj's moved the jihadists to action. It was Faraj who used the notions of 'near enemy' and 'far enemy' for the first time that are quintessential for the jihadists. So that it would be the local government as 'near enemy' that needed to be taken down now instead of the 'far enemy' signaling Israel. What is most necessary for that purpose is to cultivate the neglected notion of jihad among youth. For the jihad was a neglected duty forgotten among the tedious legal discussions of the Islamic jurists. With these concerns in mind, Faraj penned his tract The Neglected Duty (Faraj, 1991).

However, the most distinguishing quality of Faraj is his blending jihadism as a digression from modern Islamic thinking with Salafism for the first time by means of citations from Ibn

Taymiyyah.³ Especially the adaptation of Ibn Taymiyyah's anti-Mongol fatwa, which warrants fighting against rulers that consider themselves Muslim yet refrain from implementing God's ruling, by Faraj to modern Muslim regimes is a milestone that marks the jihadism's moving into action. As a matter of fact, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, with which Faraj had organic ties with, assassinated Anwar al-Sādāt in 1981 based on this fatwa and started a failed uprising that centered around Asyut.

Probably Ibn Taymiyyah's anti-Mongol fatwa and the terms of "near enemy" and "far enemy" were in use by the Islamic milieu in the relevant period, circulating through oral exchange. However, it is my contention that 'Abd al-Salām Faraj was the first person to employ these concepts in written form among the texts I reviewed (Faraj, 1991, p.136). In his brief work that can be regarded as a tract, Faraj treated the topic by making use of the same concepts and provided a single, concise, written piece in this sense that could be worked out by groups that succeeded him from the same fraction.

In the sense of Faraj's use, the "near enemy" determined the enemy definition of jihadism in the 15 or so years that followed the time he wrote the work till the 'global jihad' phase as systematized by Osama Bin Laden and jihad was considered as an activity to be performed against the local regimes. Jihad, which aimed at the 'far enemy' signaling the Western powers and particularly Israel in that period, was put on hold until the cleansing of local governments from oppressive regimes. That is to say, the liberation of Palestine will await the take down of the current governments and the establishment of an Islamic order in their stead. In brief, Faraj had a lasting influence over the jihadists and his contemporaries in particular with his identification of 'near enemy' that was inspired by Ibn Taymiyyah's anti-Mongol fatwa. Moreover, his *The Neglected Duty* served as an operational guide for jihadism during the 80s and the first half of the 90s and affected the jihadist leadership. For instance, al-Zawāhirī, the current leader of al-Qaeda, regarded Faraj's hierarchy of antagonism as a reference point in determining jihad strategy (Gerges, 2005, p.11, 44, 296).

The period from mid-50s to the beginning of 80s is the initial formative period of jihadism. Sayyid Quṭb, Ṣāliḥ Sariyyah and 'Abd al-Salām Faraj were the names that wrote the first texts of jihadist ideas. Certainly, there were other texts that circulated contemporaneously and contributed to the formation of jihadism. Particularly, the defense statement of the 'Blind Sheikh' 'Umar 'Abd al-Raḥman, the permanent and spiritual leader of jihadism, at court after Anwar al-Sādāt's assassination was printed under the title *Kalimah Haqq*, which made another important reference point for jihadists. Furthermore, the writings of 'Abd al-Qādir b. 'Abd al-'Azīz and Sayyid Imām, also known as Doctor Faḍl, had formative influences on jihadism. It was especially noted that *al-'Umdah fi i'dād al-'uddah* served as a manual during the Afghan jihad. Also, the texts that were issued institutionally by jihadist groups like the Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Congress were highly representative for the initial formative phase of jihadist thinking.

3 Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī, a prominent figure and ideologue of jihadism, considered Faraj's induction of the relevant fatwa cited from Ibn Taymiyyah to the jihadist thought to be one of the first examples of the imbrication of Salafi creed and jihadist thought (Al-Sūrī 2004a, p.718).

The jihadism that took form in Egypt, as a digression from the mainstream Islamic movement that confronted the Nasserite regime, remained one of the most notable references for the religious extremists that were spread over different corners of the Muslim world. It was Egyptian jihadism that set the dominant paradigm for the said parties until the conception of “the global jihad” forming in the late 90s under Bin Laden’s leadership.

The jihadist thought and action that took form in mid-60s suffered utter defeat in terms of meeting its goals when reached the 80s. The jihadism could overthrow the local governments defined as the ‘near enemy’ and ‘oppressive regimes’ and replace it with states built on the basis of Islamic law in no Muslim country nor in Egypt, chief among them. Besides the failure of realizing its goals against the nation state, the organizations they set up with zeal underwent devastation. Many jihadists were continuously pursued and investigated by the police force, had long-term convictions and many leaders were executed. While the jihadism, which suffered ruin, lost prestige and sustenance, was thought to be close to being finished, a new development that unfolded during the early 80s became a lifebuoy for the jihadist movement and constituted another milestone for the jihadist theory and practice for further innovations.

4. Jihad as an Individual Duty and Its Transnational Mobilization: The Phase Of “Afghan Jihad” (1980–1992)

In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the declaration of jihad by several religious groups and leaders in the country against both the invading Soviets and the government in power under Soviet auspices, it presented an opportunity for jihadist groups, which were stuck in their respective countries, to be mobilized to this country. Thus, thousands of jihadists from many countries rushed to Afghanistan in the 80s thanks to the Cold War circumstances. The experience of Afghan jihad sets another milestone for jihadist thinking and action letting the movement, which was at the risk of extinction, into a new course. For the jihadi movement exceeded the limits of being a local and regional issue with the Afghan jihad and attained a transnational character. So that the jihadists were able to join regions like Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kashmir in the aftermath of the Afghan jihad thanks to the gains provided by the latter.

Although Afghan jihad as the start of a new era for jihadism was a transnational phenomenon, it did not put an end to the existential question of the jihadist movement contending with the local ‘oppressive’ governments, in other words, it was not a digression from its original course. That is, the jihadist leaders regarded the phase of Afghan jihad a time of regrouping and a preparative step before waging the jihad against the local governments. These leading protagonists expressed their move to Afghanistan to set headquarters where the local governments, against which they failed during 60s and 70s, could not reach them (Al – Zawāhiri, 2001, pp.59-60, 69-70; Al-Sūrī 2004a, p.707). The idea of ‘global jihad’ that signals a sea change in primary enemy definition and strategy occurred at the end of 90s in a different conjuncture. In brief, to identify this period with the notion of ‘transnational jihad’ as Gerges did appears to be apt (Gerges, 2005, p.12).

The experience of Afghan jihad bears a lot of significance for jihadism. In fact, it is in this period that the jihadist groups from various countries met on the same land and the first rings of the great jihadi network were conjoined. Moreover, the foundations of al-Qaeda, which was deemed to be the most important organization in the movement's history, were laid in this period, and the movement struck its greatest victory in this period on Afghan soil by its contribution to purging the Soviets out of the country, as well. On the other hand, they also viewed the Afghan jihad as an opportunity to found the Islamic state that they yearned for a long time. In fact, the thought of the establishment of the 'abode of Islam' as a possibility if the war against the Soviets were won, was an important motivational source for enlisting in the Afghan jihad.⁴

The jihadist medium in Afghanistan in the 80s also led to the exposure of jihadist thought to new ideas. Particularly Saudi Arabia's acting in concert with the Western bloc during the Cold War led to its assumption of a mission to facilitate Muslim societies' participation in Afghan jihad by making use of its material and religious means that it possessed, and this resulted in many young men from Gulf states rushing to Afghanistan for jihad. Despite the influence of the Egyptian jihad thinking on these people in the atmosphere of Afghan jihad, they were able to bring the precepts of their Salafi creed into the aforementioned jihadi thinking. So much so that this interaction led the latter thinking to evolve in the direction of jihadi Salafism. Therefore, the phase of Afghan jihad is salient in the formation of al-Qaeda and its conception of global jihad that will take form in the 90s through its role of fertilizing two strong ideological streaks, the Egyptian jihadist ideas and Saudi Wahhabi thinking. For al-Qaeda results from the intermarriage following the alliance of the Egyptian jihadi movement under the leadership of al-Zawāhirī with the Saudi and Yemeni volunteers led by Osama Bin Laden. The period that this intermarriage originated from is the phase of Afghan jihad (Gerges, 2005, p.82, 86; 2011, p.34)

On the other hand, Afghan jihad could develop its own system of thought. The most notable contribution to the formation of this thought, which can be dubbed the 'idea of transnational jihad,' was certainly made by 'Abd Allāh 'Azzām and in turn was regarded as the most important ideologue of the period. Particularly the fatwa he issued under the title Defence of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after Faith (*al-Difā' 'an arāḍī al-muslimīn ahamm furūḍ al-a'yān*) that was also printed separately as a booklet and his books like Join the Caravan (*Ilḥaq bi-al-qāfilah*) had a great impact in the matter of mobilization for jihad (Azzam, 1989a; 1987). Having founded the Services Office (*Maktab al-khadamāt*) in 1984 that especially took the recruitment for Afghan jihad from the Arab world as its mission, 'Azzām gained a respectable place in the eyes of all the jihadists and even the Islamists thanks to his publications and the organizational effort to support jihad and became the most respectable name for jihadism and the movement after Sayyid al-Qutb.

4 According to al-Sūrī, Afghan jihad is the greatest victory against invaders in the modern period. This remarkable victory with limited means, in his opinion, proved to be the mark of Muslim power against great powers and remedied the mood of defeatism that Muslims were succumbed to (Al-Sūrī, 2004a, pp.707-709).

His most prominent idea in moving jihad beyond the borders is the view that it is an individual duty like prayers and fasting incumbent on all Muslims to defend a Muslim country under attack. Not only he expressed this view many times in all his speeches and books, he also wrote a booklet on it entitled *Defence of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after Faith*. What kind of an echo it found among the Arab youth in particular becomes clear when the number of volunteers in Afghanistan was considered. The vast influence of his books like the aforementioned *Defense of the Muslim Lands* and *The Signs of the Merciful in the Jihad of the Afghan (Āyāt al-Ra mān fī jihād al-Afghān)* on Arab youth for Afghan mobilization was noted. In fact, the compelling ideological reason that he put forth with his statement of 'In case a Muslim country is invaded, its liberation is an individual duty for all Muslims' did not only affect participation at the Afghan jihad but served as a basic argument for participation in the wars of Bosnia, Kashmir and Chechnya that happened later. Because it had a greater potential to charm the pious for the jihad theory presented by 'Azzām stood closer to the notion of holy war in conventional religious perception, compared to what was systematized later on by Osama Bin Laden as the theory of 'global jihad' (Hegghammer, 2010, p.41, pp.57-58).

In 'Azzām's opinion, to wage holy war in the event of a Muslim land's invasion by infidels is a duty with certain proof according to all Islamic scholars, both ancient and modern. This duty first encompasses the people under the invasion. But if the local people prove to be insufficient or indifferent, the extent of this duty grows in circles from the nearest region to the Muslims of other countries. So that this circle of individual duty may encompass the whole world. At that stage, the child without the permission of his guardian, the woman without her husband's, and the debtor without the consent of his creditor has to join jihad. In case a piece of land from a Muslim country remains under the jurisdiction of infidels, the onus is on all Muslims in the world. The duty of jihad is just like it is in prayers and fasting. Just like the requirement of prayers goes defunct when the believer dies, so does the jihad (Azzam, 1989a, pp.20-21, 29; 1989b, pp.167-68).

'Azzām traces the history of jihad as a duty incumbent on all Muslims back to the fall of Andalusia in 1492. According to him, since the capture of Andalusia by Christian until today, jihad is a requirement for all Muslims. Jihad will be individual duty till Bukhara, Samarqand, Caucasia, Andalusia, and Palestine is taken back, purged of infidels, Muscovy, which paid poll tax to Muslims for two centuries, pays it again, and Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Austria, and Yugoslavia return to Muslim rule. Even if these lands are seized by the Muslims today, a group of Muslims has to declare war on Germany, Britain, and USA at least once a year as a measure of deterrence. This is the kind of holy war as a collective duty, the onus reverting to all Muslims if no group carries it out (Azzam, 2007, p.321, pp.627-28). To summarize, the form of thought resulting from the articulation of Wahhabism to Egyptian idea of jihad and the form where 'Azzām presents jihad as a personal decision and an inalienable duty, constitutes another vital source that provided sustenance for extremists later.

5. The First Gulf War and The Idea of Loyalty and Disavowal (*al-walā' wa-al-barā'*)

The debates in the aftermath of the First Gulf War were no doubt marks a salient phase in the evolution of jihadism to jihadi Salafism. For the dual principle of 'loyalty and disavowal' (*al-walā' wa-al-barā'*), which was one of the basic tenets customarily presumed by Wahhabi interpretation of Saudi origin, frequently mentioned in the religious catechism, basically meaning 'to befriend the believers, to avoid the infidels and harbor hostility towards them,' began to be employed by jihadists as an argument for the declaration of infidelity targeting the conventional Wahhabi scholars and the government, since the Saudi government's policies sided with the USA all along and the government stood by it during the First Gulf War as well. By the same token, the principle of loyalty and disavowal subsumed by jihadism were not only leveled to hit Saudi Arabia with the basic tenets of their own creed only, but also functioned like a legitimization instrument for violence-inducing attacks against all Muslim countries that entered alliance with the West afterwards. Furthermore, the principle was in use in 2000s against any group other than certain jihadist circles, expanding the range of parties it applies to. In other words, the basic Wahhabi tenet became one of the major ideological buttresses of jihadi Salafism after the 90s, just like the theory of God's sovereignty. In fact, Ayman al-Zawāhirī, who became the leader of al-Qaeda after Osama Bin Laden was killed, wrote a separate book on this matter (Al-Zawāhirī, 2002), and many jihadist ideologues gave special attention to the subject in their own writing.

In the aforementioned work, al-Zawāhirī presented extensive quotations from Quran, Traditions, statements of the Prophet's companions, and classical Salafi scholars like Ibn Qayyim and Ibn Taymiyyah on themes like the Muslims should not befriend non-Muslims, nor cherish them, leak out Muslims' secrets, appoint them to prominent positions, uphold their mottos and emblems, praise the superstitions and manners of the infidels and apostates, pay respect to them or stay in concord, or side with them against Muslims, that the infidels always retain aversion towards Muslims, would not approve them till the believers subscribe to their faith, and even wished for the believers to apostatize (Al-Zawāhirī, 2002, pp.5-18, 22-23).

Moreover, al-Zawāhirī surmises that it was not just the external enemies that the believers should not befriend and distance themselves from, according to the precept of disavowal, but also pertinent to the leaders of the Muslim world. According to him, the principle should also govern the relations between the said leaders and their supporters among the scholars of the official line, intellectuals, media agents and the journalists. For these people in leadership positions of the Muslim countries and their supporters from all walks of life, in his opinion, aided the infidel invasion of the Muslim lands, kept the believers from observing the duty of holy war incumbent on them, led people to obey individuals going outside the God's law and defamed the mujahidin (Al-Zawāhirī, 2002, pp.26-28).

Although the imbrication of jihadism that started off an Egyptian base from the 60s onwards with Salafism in its Wahhabi streak dated from the period of Afghan jihad, its percolation gained pace with the First Gulf War. Certainly, it was Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī who was the

greatest proponent of this articulation of Salafism with jihadist thinking. Of Palestinian origin, he lived in Kuwait until his 30s and took religious education in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, his religious conception took shape around traditional Salafism and the Wahhabi teachings. Also drawing influences from mainstream Islamic thought, he criticized the pro-U SA policies of the Saudi government with respect to the principle of loyalty and disavowal in many of his works, particularly in *The Religion of Abraham and the Mission of Prophets and Messengers (Milla Ibrāhīm wa da 'wat al-anbiyā' wa-al-mursalīn)* and *The Obvious Proofs of the Infidelity of the Saudi State (al-Kawāshif al-jaliyyah fī kufr al-dawlat al-Su'ūdiyyah)*. This approach earned him the distinction of being the first person who systematically blended jihadism with Wahhabism (Al-Maqdisī, 1985;1988; 2000); so that he began to be received as a prominent ideologue of jihadi Salafism then on. Having perused his work, it is striking that the sources of his thought lie in names like Sayyid Qutb on the one hand, and 'Abd al-Laṭīf b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān, 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Ḥasan, Ḥamd b. 'Atīq, and Ishāq b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān, who were called the Najd scholars and greatly contributed to the grounding of Wahhabi thinking, on the other hand, in addition to Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb. Moreover, his criticism, as from a person who himself followed the Wahhabi teaching, against the traditional Wahhabi scholars and the Saudi government in the context of this teaching, had the added force of offering a reliable intellectual framework for the jihadist mobilization of the Salafist youth from the Gulf.⁵

Throughout the book (*Milla Ibrāhīm*), Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī dwelt on the nature of the relation of what he dubbed the people of Abraham and those outside it and offered suggestions for appropriate stance to be assumed on this point. The “disavowal” forms the gist of the standpoint. Accordingly, the friends of the religion of Abraham will be deemed friendly, the ones who do not follow this true means will be disavowed, the hostility against it will be matched in hostility and even declared infidel. For it would be unthinkable that someone who comprehends the true meaning of God's unity can refrain from enmity to idolaters (Al-Maqdisī, 1985, pp.13-14). Hence, *eo ipso*, enmity, aversion, disavowal, and refutation is a requirement incumbent on all Muslims in all times and places. For it is a necessary requirement of the Islamic injunction, “there is no god but God alone” (Al-Maqdisī, 1985, pp.31-32).

In al-Maqdisī's opinion, the enmity should be public, obvious, open, and unambiguous. For if aversion remains only at heart, and not manifest with indications like enmity and severance of ties, any benefit to be expected from internal rage is unfathomable (Al-Maqdisī 1988, p.103; 1985, pp.18-19). Therefore, what a Muslim has to do is to bear enmity against God's enemies, to manifest this enmity, to avoid them entirely, not to befriend them, nor build relations or associate with them, but to despise them and to wage holy war upon them. All prophets' and Abraham's people's way of invitation necessitates the declaration of the denial of all deities that were worshipped, the open statement of enmity and aversion towards them, the denigration of their powers, the values and credit they had, and the display of their falsity, lack, and shortcomings from the start (Al-Maqdisī, 1985, pp.21-22).

5 For an extended overview of al-Maqdisī's contribution to the conception of loyalty and disavowal within the ideology of jihadi Salafism (see; Wagemakers 2012).

Prior to Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī, the people who were regarded as pioneers of jihadi Salafism and set the stage for its formation attempted to define the new nation state and its statesmen in their works and focused on how to pursue a struggle against them. Even if he also maintained this perspective, he rather showered his attention to ways of taking action by other Islamic circles that he disagrees with, the conventional Salafists in particular, and their relations to the establishment in the framework of the principle of ‘loyalty and disavowal.’ Especially the criticisms targeting the traditionalist Salafist scholars ensconced in Saudi government, in my opinion, quickened the pace of moving towards jihadi Salafism among the Salafist youth from Gulf countries.

6. The Afghanistan Meeting at The Time of Taliban and The “Global Jihad” Phase (1996–2001)

The First Gulf War’s contribution to the articulation of jihadism with Saudi Salafism was not the only significance it bore vis-à-vis the jihadist thought. The war offered the further opportunity to jihadism of forming a new ideological framework centered on anti-Americanism to salvage itself from the ideological void it fell into after the Afghan jihad. In fact, the aforementioned developments in Saudi Arabia took the center stage in the formation of the idea of “global jihad” that dominated the jihadist thinking in Afghanistan of the Taliban era starting from the second half of the 90s. Because the leitmotiv of the ‘invasion of the two holy cities by the Americans’ graced almost all the talks of Osama Bin Laden in this period and it formed the main grounds for the doctrine of global jihad (Hegghammer, 2010, p.104). In this respect, the First Gulf War constitutes yet another milestone in the development of jihadist thought.

Having undergone a precarious time in 1992–1996, the jihadist movement obtained another political power’s backing with the Taliban’s acquisition of Kabul in 1996. Thus, Taliban’s Afghanistan served like a shelter after Sudan for jihadists who were left without a homeland like Bin Laden, such people once again turned to this country, and the period was also called the ‘jihadism’s second Afghan phase.’ Yet, the period is important not only for jihadists’ reaching for a safe harbor. Certainly, more important was the sea change in jihadism. In this regard, the idea of ‘global jihad’ meaning organized attacks against those partaking in the ‘Crusader-Zionist alliance’ all over the world including their homelands, irrespective of targeting civilians or the military, was formulated by Osama Bin Laden at this time (Bin Laden, 2007, pp.66-69). Furthermore, it was declared jihad on the military presence in Saudi Arabia, the unification al-Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and certain jihadist groups under the name “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders” was declared, the idea of “the global jihad” was taken to action for the first time by the bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the culmination point of this phase in the event of 9/11 attacks all occurred around this time.

The adoption of the idea of the global jihad, which was triggered by the First Gulf War and organized around anti-Americanism, was set as a milestone in jihadism because a shift occurred in jihadism’s primary goal of overthrowing the “oppressive” regimes and setting up Islamic states

that was the motive and *raison d'être* of its thinking and action. Now, the primary target was the external enemies (the far enemy) under the leadership of USA, called the “head of the snake” by Bin Laden (Bin Lādin, 1996), that supported the secular local regimes (the near enemy), instead of the latter. Yet, it did not mean that the goal of the local government’s overthrow was discarded. Bin Laden supposed that the realization of this goal followed through fighting against the Western powers, primarily the USA, which he believed to stand behind these regimes, rather than fighting the regimes directly. In his opinion, they were like foam, the main issue was to contend with the currents that carried the foam (Gerges, 2005, pp.144-45).

Although Osama Bin Laden was not an ideologue like the people who constructed jihadism level by level with the works they wrote, he became the most notable architect of the ‘global jihad’ concept from the second half of the 90s onwards. Especially his statements, interviews, press releases and open letters published in certain newspapers drew the frames of this view (Berner 2007). What guided Bin Laden, who was counted among the jihadist leaders since the late 80s, ideologically until then was the Egyptian jihadism. However, around the turn of 90s, he also became in a sense the ideologue of the fraction he headed and could draw notable names of the Egyptian jihadism to his side, primarily al-Zawāhirī. So that Osama Bin Laden and his notion of global jihad became a catalyst for the jihadist movement following the late 90s.

Laden’s statement bearing the title ‘Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places’ dated August 23, 1996, set a milestone for the forty-year-old movement entering a new phase. First published at the London-based newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi, this statement is the first major written text by Bin Laden, who preferred oral communications. For it expresses the jihadism’s new direction towards the ‘far enemy’ and the reckoning with the ‘near enemy’, the national governments that were regarded as oppressive, was deferred. He invited the Muslims to engage in operations not against the local government, Saudi Arabia in particular, but the American forces stationed over all Arabian Peninsula. Having the first noticeable marks of the global jihad concept, this text was printed with the subtitle “Expel the Idolaters from the Arabian Peninsula” (Bin Lādin, 1996).

This statement of 1996 by Laden is the first text that showed traces of the move away from the established conception of jihad in the movement to the global jihad phase. However, the distinguishing mark of the global jihad concept, engaging in organized attacks against those partaking in the ‘Crusader-Zionist alliance’ all over the world including their homelands, irrespective of targeting civilians or the military, was not part and parcel of this text. In this regard, a conception of global jihad in full bloom would be delivered with his statement dated February 23, 1998, published again in al-Quds al-Arabi, with the title ‘Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders.’ This is a quite significant statement breaking from an established and regional jihad concept in force for forty years that appeared in the form of armed struggle against the oppressive governments and non-Muslims invading Muslim countries and transiting to a “global jihad” concept of waging war against USA-led

Western powers not only on Muslims lands under invasion but all over the world including on their own home soil, indifferent to military or civilian status.

After identifying the American goals and objectives point by point in this statement, Bin Laden stated that all these sins and crimes perpetrated by them is a clear war declaration to God, the Prophet, and all Muslims. According to him, in cases like this where the Muslim lands were occupied, the Islamic scholars were in consensus over history that jihad is a duty on all Muslims. Therefore, he reasons, it is proper to issue the following fatwa based on the scholars' precedent:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the sacred mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim (Bin Laden, 2007, p.68).

In the closing section of the statement, Bin Laden invited all Muslims who believe in God and hope for its reward to kill the Americans wherever and whenever they can find and sack their properties. Moreover, he called out the Muslim scholars, leaders, youth, and soldiers to attack the American military and its supporters (Bin Laden, 2007, pp.68-69).

The most important and eventful output of the idea of global jihad that went into full swing with bombing attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 is certainly the 9/11 attacks. From Bin Laden and al-Qaeda's point of view, these attacks had two primary objectives. First, it is to intimidate the American society, in Bin Laden's words, and to secure the withdrawal of American troops from Muslim lands. Second, it is to gather the Muslim sympathies that may have ensued from attacking USA which attracted the Muslim peoples' vituperation for its support of Israel and to restore the jihadist movement's lost credit. Besides, al-Qaeda leaders supposed that, in the event of the American invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11 attacks, there would be public uproar supporting the resistance against the invasion, as it was for the Soviets, youth rushing to Afghanistan to join the jihad. But these attacks did not prove to be popular among the dominant majority of the Muslims and this expectation was not realized (Gerges, 2005, pp.187-188; 2011, 3-6, 91-92).

However, the US-led alliance's attack on Iraq in 2003 after Afghanistan in a period of total exhaustion for al-Qaeda, civilian casualties during these attacks, and the images of prison torture that leaked to media, offered marked chances for al-Qaeda to show the validity of the global jihad concept and to recollect some of its lost credit. Indeed, in contrast to 9/11 attacks, the discourse of the invasion of Muslim lands that was developed by the organization's leaders had purchase among the Muslim youth and the youth hailing from many places were drawn to Iraq to fight. Therefore, the Iraq invasion presented once again a good source of recruitment for al-Qaeda (Hegghammer, 2006).

7. The Idea of Small Cells and Solitary Jihadist Action After 9/11 (2001–2006)

The security measures taken against jihadism following the 9/11 attacks all over the world, led to a decentralized organizational structure and this state of affairs resulted in the flourishing of local al-Qaeda's and prolonged the organization's life. Yet, the improved longevity notwithstanding, it also meant the drifting away from the primary principles of the centralized al-Qaeda. Certainly, the most striking local group that went out of control in this period and carried the seeds of what would turn into ISIS is the Iraqi al-Qaeda that was founded by Abū Muṣ'ab al-Zarqāwī. The organization under his leadership entered into hostility with Shiites, which the central al-Qaeda disfavored and avoided, triggering regional sectarian tensions, straying from targeting the 'far enemy' and foiling Bin Laden's global jihad vision. Furthermore, al-Zarqāwī's actions targeting not only American troops and Shiites but extending to many Sunnite leaders, the suicide attacks at marketplaces causing civilian casualties in line with the 'human shield' (*al-tatarrus*) fatwa,⁶ kidnapping and execution, caused the loss of sympathy Bin Laden initially garnered concerning the Iraq invasion and even the escalation of aversion. (Gerges, 2011, pp.107-08; 2005, pp.256-57).

On the other hand, the strict security regulations after 9/11 against the members of the jihadist movement as part of global anti-terror struggle, brought along the necessity of pursuing a new strategy within the jihadist movement. Accordingly, the idea of the need for smaller cell-type structures (*al-khalāyā' al-ṣaghīrah*) prevailed over the pyramidal organizational pattern that was followed by the jihadists since the 1960s until 2000s. Certainly, the most notable name for this position to gain ground who also emerged as the most distinguished theorist of jihadism in the 2000s, yet able to criticize the movement from within,⁷ was Abī Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī, who actually experienced all the phases of the movement. In his hefty tome titled "The Call for Global Islamic Resistance" that he wrote in seclusion during the alliance forces' Afghanistan operations in the aftermath of 9/11, he stated that the jihadism was at an impasse and needed a new theoretical framework and strategy in order to get out of it, so that he tried to lay the groundwork of this new agenda (Al-Sūrī, 2004b, p.876).

According to al-Sūrī, the jihadist movement pursued different strategies and various styles on the matter of jihadist action from its inception in the 1960s until 2001 when 9/11 attacks occurred.

6 Meaning "to shield," from the root shield (*turs*), the notion expresses the legal opinion given in classical Islamic jurisprudence by certain Islamic jurists concerning the hostiles' shielding themselves with the civilian Muslims or the permissibility of the death of Muslims in case they are present where the hostiles will be attacked with a catapult along the Islamic warfare practices. Particularly in the aftermath of 2003 invasion of Iraq, the jihadists legitimized their actions with this fatwa in the suicide attacks at marketplaces targeting American soldiers with Muslim civilian casualties. Although many leading jihadists mentioned the fatwa in connection with the Muslim civilian deaths, Abū Yahyā al-Libī, a prominent ideologue of al-Qaeda, wrote a separate treatise in 2006 that was held in high esteem within the jihadist movement and tried to demonstrate the applicability of this fatwa, which was given during the classical period, in the modern period too. (Al-Libī, 2006). Also, Ayman al-Zawāhirī reserved a chapter each at his books *al-Tabrī'ah* and *Shifā'* (Al-Zawāhirī n.d., pp.123-129; 1996, pp.49-62). For another work on the topic, see, (Barclay, 2010, pp.6-9).

7 Al-Sūrī presented a thorough critique of the jihadist thought and action from the 1960s to the 2000s and accounted for what he deemed failures. For the exposition of the account of this failure that he attributed to a set of external and internal causes (Al-Sūrī, 2004a, pp.822-58).

After studying these styles, three different lines of action emerge. The first of them is the organizational line based on the principles of ‘regionalism, secrecy, and pyramidism’ and engaged in organized activity. The second is the open battlefield line that involves active engagement with the enemy as exercised in the wars of Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. The last one is the solitary jihadist action (*al-‘amal al-fardī*) line where small-scale cell-type group or individual people takes action (Al-Sūrī, 2004b, pp.1355-57). All these lines out of forty-year-old jihadist has shown us, says al-Sūrī, that the already tried lines like organizational jihadi movement had to be quitted in order to succeed in a post-9/11 global anti-terror environment, and instead, the lines of open battlefield and especially of solitary jihadist action with greater chances of success had to be thoroughly examined and focused on (Al-Sūrī, 2004b, pp.1363-65).

The military doctrine of al-Sūrī’s ‘The Call for Global Islamic Resistance’ relies on the line of solitary jihadist action that performs activities in cell-type organization, which was divided into small, secret units each of which was independent from each other, and the participation in the line of ‘open battlefield’ as the circumstances permit. Because the cellular and solitary jihadist strategy, which is based on guerilla warfare in towns and cities, forms the foundation of tiring out and forcing the enemy to collapse and retreat.⁸ The open battlefield, however, is inevitable for the liberation of lands under invasion and the institution of God’s law. However, says al-Sūrī, the post-9/11 path followed by USA and its allies for the open battlefield in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, showed that the jihadist movement was not ready to engage in open battlefield nor in big-scale guerilla warfare against these forces. For the high monitoring capacity of the invaders by making use of satellites, and their technological superiority in ballistics and aircrafts were the main reasons that kept the jihadist movement unready. Therefore, the main plan of military action against USA and its allies under the current circumstances resides in light guerilla warfare and rather solitary jihadist action that aims to terrorize the enemy and the social life by means of small-scale cellular structures independent from each other (Al-Sūrī, 2004b, pp.1367-69).

The line of solitary jihadist action that is employed to intimidate the enemy, in al-Sūrī’s opinion, is a necessary strategy as responding to attacks on Muslims by internal and external enemies with disproportionate use of force. The adoption of this new mode is necessitated by the established pyramidal organization model letting members be exposed against coordinated national and international security measures and attacks, leading to their failure (Al-Sūrī, 2004b, pp.1378-79).

This method that is based on ‘small cells,’ according to al-Sūrī, has certain features. The first and the most salient, is to be able to act in order without acting in concert (*nizām ‘amal, lā tanzīm li-l-‘amal*), concerning oneself with a centralized organization model.⁹ There shouldn’t be links to tie up these cells that are independent of each other, aside from the ties of ‘common name, means, and goals. The youth have to be guided to educate themselves and to commit actions

8 Al-Sūrī, in Brynjar Lia’s opinion, desired to integrate jihadist doctrine and Marxist guerilla warfare. (Lia 2007, pp.1-4).

9 It has been noted that the vision of al-Sūrī bore striking parallels with the post-9/11 evolution of al-Qaeda. It was deemed highly probable that Madrid and London attacks in particular were perpetrated by people who read his work and were informed of his vision. (Cruickshank and Hage Ali, 2007).

proportionate to their means and capabilities. The independent units consisting of one or a few individuals has to conduct their business without being linked to another center, has to choose their targets and engage in action (Al-Sūrī, 2004b, pp.1395-96).

There are certain benefits, in the eyes of al-Sūrī, of adopting this new mode. That is, it allows for the formation of small cells and fractions and taking action individually or by a few likeminded for people who do not wish to have organic ties with any group, nor have the opportunity to join organizations far away from them yet carry the desire to perform jihadist action. Also, this mode presents the right to its own name that will facilitate belongingness to all the units under the movement's general name of "Global Islamic Resistance" but make a name for itself with its actions as well, and drive competition among the cells. Moreover, it allows for a high-security structuring since remains entirely independent of cells and fractions consolidated in the same manner. So that, a cell being exposed in this mode will not lead to others being exposed as it was in previous modes. What is at play here is commission to the thinking (*tanẓīm al-fikr*) rather than the committee's thinking (*fikrat al-tanẓīm*). However, this mode, al-Sūrī supposes, will light the fuse of an uncontrollable, global uprising when it spreads among the Muslim youth of the world, and each cell commits at least a single jihadist action per year (Al-Sūrī, 2004b, pp.1396-99).

What distinguishes al-Sūrī is certainly his criticism of the pyramidal, hierarchical organizational model that is connected to a center, and instead, his proposition of solitary jihadist action and small cellular structuring that comprises independent but pervasive networks at the grassroots level, and the implementation of his proposition. He argued against the model of a strongman's centralized organization including al-Qaeda, and for the main mission of jihadism, that is, resounding a clarion call, a reference point, a model of operation for the purpose of an Islamist uprising in the Muslim world and the spread of resistance at the grassroots (Lia, 2009, p.7). In other words, the main goal of the jihadist movement is to serve the function of indoctrination, in a sense, for the spread of jihadist thinking and teaching at the grassroots level to the best of ability, and to facilitate the commission of attacks individually or at the scale of small groups.

Al-Sūrī also supports the idea of global jihad that became identified with the name of Bin Laden meaning engaging in organized attacks against those partaking in the 'Crusader-Zionist alliance' all over the world including their homelands, irrespective of targeting civilians or the military. However, the scope of his vision over al-Qaeda, according to Brynjar Lia, who wrote a meticulous biography of him, has been much wider (Lia, 2009, 7-8). Indeed, it is important to note how the perpetration of attacks on Bali Island (2002), Casablanca (2003), Istanbul (2003), Madrid (2004), and London (2005) by small cells, in parallel with the new jihadist strategy that he stated, represented the reflection of his vision at the jihadist circles.¹⁰

10 For a detailed analysis of as-Sūrī's post-2001 influence on al-Qaeda, see, (Cruickshank and Hage Ali, 2007).

8. Conclusion

This study demonstrates that jihadist Salafist thought, which flourished in the 60s as an anomaly of mainstream Islamic movement, grew in the 70s and 80s, and gained a transnational character from 90s onwards in continuous evolution, took form gradually in connection with a set of religious, political, and military realities unfolding in Muslim countries in the said period, external and internal in provenance, consequent upon the articulation of Egyptian jihadist thought and Saudi Salafism (Wahhabism). At the end of the survey, I conclude that the main factors that stimulated the formation of jihadi Salafism are facts like the pursuit of secular policies among the dominant majority of post-independence nation states in the Muslim world, the suppression of Islamic movements that wished to take part in politics with an Islamic idiom, the torture of the members of the Islamic movement, social and economic problems, the Palestinian question, and the invasion of Muslim lands by foreign powers. By the same token, I argue that there is a strong connection between these facts that influenced the Muslim world and each major theme of jihadi thought that went into circulation over time.

However, it is salient that the jihadi Salafist thought sprung from the articulation of Egyptian jihadism between 60s and 80s, and Saudi Salafism towards the end of the 80s. I argue that the Salafist elements within the Islamism, where the jihadist movement in turn drew its inspiration from on the matter of the cultivation of political consciousness, facilitated this articulation. Having started with the members of Muslim Brotherhood moving to Saudi Arabia in the 70s and 80s, this interaction picked up pace in the late 80s during the Afghan jihad and reached its peak by the emergence of Saudi jihadist movement following the First Gulf War in the 90s, and the representation of the movement with al-Qaeda under the leadership Osama Bin Laden.

For the greater part, jihadi Salafist intellectual output was provided by people who were either from within the mainstream Islamic movement or were in disagreement with the movement in matters of means, while remaining under the influence of Islamism as the mainstream movement's theo-political framework, and who experienced the problems of the Muslim community in the post-independence world at first hand. Even though the intellectual sources of their thought resided in the main sources of the religion and some classical Islamic scholars, their output carries the features of a response to the aforementioned realities they were exposed to in the world. Therefore, the jihadi ideas produced by these people between 1960s and 2006 have historical validity for their times.

It should also be noted that jihadism, which formed as an anomaly of the Islamic movement with political sensibilities, was always represented by a tiny minority, not only in Muslim societies but in all Islamic movements as well and remained a radical phenomenon from its inception till today. The frequent resorting to violence as a means, in the end, might give damage not only to non-Muslim societies but also to the Muslim societies. Therefore, what is required is the removal of the elements that led these people to resort to violence. So long as the dictatorships in the Muslim world, their anti-democratic measures, the isolation and repression of parties that wish

to speak a religious idiom in the field of politics, the social and economic problems in Muslim countries, the lack of resolution in the Palestinian question, the perception of the exploitation of Muslim countries' natural resources and the institution and protection of satellite regimes for that purpose, and to top it all off, the issues like the actual invasion of the Muslim lands persist, the jihadist movement will continue to thrive in thought and action.

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