

HOBBS ON THE PROBLEM OF SECULARISM

Aydın MÜFTÜOĞLU*

ABSTRACT

Secularism is one of the major topics in political philosophy in our age. The reason why it's so, is that the secularized religion is still a strong social glue and moral source in our day. Secularism, to say shortly, refers to the religion's abandoning of all its worldly demands, especially its political demands by turning into a cultural body among the others. In fact, the secularism, as a cultural process, had begun in the mid of Medieval Age. But neither reconciliation between religion and science/philosophy nor nominalism were sufficient for secularism; because the relation between culture and religion needed to be reconstructed and the question was how this goal could be achieved without neglecting the religion's autonomy and by holding it as a moral source. The answer requires an effort to create a new morality, a new politics, a new science and of course a new epistemology. Hobbes was the first who made this effort to overcome the problem by using the theoretical equipment told above. This article takes what Hobbes did to achieve the goal and examines his thought in respect of its relation with secularism.

Keywords: Secularism, Religion, Law, Power, Contract, Right, Liberty.

HOBBS VE SEKÜLARİZM SORUNU

ÖZ

Sekülerizm çağımızda politika felsefesinin başlıca konularından biridir. Bunun nedeni sekülerleşmiş dinin hala güçlü bir toplumsal tutkal ve bir ahlaki kaynak olarak hizmet etmeye devam etmesidir. En genel anlamıyla sekülerizm, dinin başka kültürel yapılar gibi bir kültürel yapıya dönüşerek tüm dünyevi taleplerinden, özellikle politik taleplerinden vazgeçmesini ifade eder. Aslında, bir kültürel süreç olarak sekülerizm, Ortaçağ'da başlar. Ancak Ortaçağ'ın din ile felsefeyi uzlaştırma çabası ve nominalist bakış açısı sekülerleşme meselesini tam olarak çözemez. Buradaki esas mesele, kültür ve din arasındaki ilişkiyi yeniden yapılandırmak, yani dinin otonomisini göz ardı etmeden onu sadece bir moral kaynak olarak tesis etmektir. Bu ise yeni bir epistemoloji, yeni bir ahlak ve yeni bir politika anlayışını zorunlu kılmaktaydı. Hobbes, Ortaçağ'dan devraldığı teorik birikimi kullanarak bu sorunu çözmeye çalışan ilk modern filozoftur. Bu çalışmanın amacı Hobbes'un sekülerizm sorununa nasıl bir çözüm getirdiğini incelemek ve onun kendi düşünce sistemiyle sekülerizm arasındaki ilişkiyi ortaya koymaktır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Sekülerizm, Din, Yasa, İktidar, Sözleşme, Hak, Özgürlük.

* Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Ege Üniversitesi Felsefe Bölümü, aydinmuf@hotmail.com,

ORCID: 0000-0001-6727-1188

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The relation between religion and politics turned out to be a battlefield and one of major problems of philosophy especially since the birth of modernity. Philosophers tried to find a permanent solution for the question in favor of modernity. There were two ways to solve the problem: the former is the absolute separation of politics from religion and this was laicization; the latter was to adopt the religion to the demands of modernity and this was secularization. The western tradition depends mostly not on laicization but on secularism of which roots lie in the beginning of modernity. This is the reason why we need to go back to trace and comprehend western tradition in the context of secularism.

What made secularism possible was Descartes's metaphysics of subject which is the initial point of modernity. By cartesian turn, man remained alone in the universe and nature lost its magic. He separated the subject and nature from each other. His attempt included a deep dichotomy between the spirit and the body corresponding to the dichotomy between fact and value. While he wrote on morals, he, in fact, focused his studies especially on methodology and epistemology. He justified the superiority and dominion of human over being and this was the only model for both epistemology and methodology. Although he justified the relation between object and subject, he told or wrote nothing about the relation between the subjects, namely Cogito and others. This is the most important reason why he left his successors with the question of living together. The answer required a new moral basis, that's to say, a new philosophical anthropology which defines what the human being according to new metaphysics.

His successors read his works to find an answer; the first and unavoidable deduction from his thought was "homo homini lupus". Well, how was such a deduction from his metaphysics possible? His successors thought in this way: If I am over and can rule the being or nature, the same reasoning is valid for the relationship between all human beings. This reasoning lead to an anthropology depending on a pessimistic view of human nature. Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, was the first one who read Cartesian metaphysics by this deduction and tried to find an answer of the question which we've mentioned above.

That holding Cartesian view of human's hegemony over nature, Hobbes developed a very detailed pessimistic view of human nature. He deduced that human being with hegemony over all other beings, by nature, could be nothing but egoistic, hedonistic, asocial and amoral. This deduction was all against the

tradition claiming that human, by nature, was a social animal. However he was faithful to Cartesian thought claiming that modern science depended on measuring quantities and the whole universe was quantitative. But in his view, in contrast with Descartes, there was only one substance, the matter. Hobbes, like Descartes, assumed a mathematical methodology which he named as analytical-synthetical.¹ This method provided the measurement of human nature; it was divided into its smallest parts and then gathered together. This measurement demonstrated that the human was an animal living in accordance with his instincts and passions, namely his bio-psychological nature. The reason and will were all dependent upon this bio-psychological nature; they couldn't decide and move without the enforcements of instincts and passions. This deduction lead to the determination of reason and will by instincts and passions. His reasoning concluded that each human being was in the pursuit of power to satisfy his instincts and passions. According to his view, of which roots can be traced back to Machiavelli, human being needs power for his own satisfaction and self-preservation. The self-preservation includes the use of all his natural abilities and assets, that's to say, all his power against all other human beings that are in the same pursuit. This is the ground why each human being is an enemy for an other and all human beings always fight with each other. Hobbes says that " (...) it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man."²

Hobbes deduces from this condition that, for each man has right to do everything, the most important freedom in this condition which all men have is the freedom of killing each other. Naming this state as natural condition of man, Hobbes tries to imply this condition comes from human nature and violent fear of death is the result of unlimited practices of power. Even though he presents his political philosophy as wholly new, it is very surprising that he thinks such a period of humanity is described in some allegories both in Old Testament and Holy Scripture and uses some expressions from it. He also expresses that the misinterpretation of religious texts leads to kingdom of darkness namely satan and this means civil war³. According to him, for the natural condition of man

¹ Rene Descartes, *A Discourse on the Method*, trans. Ian Maclean, GB: Oxford University Press., 2006, 17-18; Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ed. C. B. Macpherson, GB: Penguin Boks, 1968, 110-118.

² Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 185.

³ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, s.185

includes violent fear of death, the essential social problem which makes politics necessary is security. Neither reason nor will itself alone could accomplish this condition; but the pain and suffering will make reason think that this condition can't go on and should be finished. It means, for the reason and will are determined by instincts and passions, they will manage the reason and will. But there's a question to be answered: How could reason accomplish this condition unless there's a common rule or norm for all human beings?

Hobbes is aware that such a rule or a norm can't be obtained directly from nature. On the contrary, the natural condition of man itself, which comes from the demand of power to satisfy instincts and passions and lead to violent fear of death, comes from the nature; so the heuristic principle should come from out of nature. Even though presenting his philosophy as wholly new, by agreeing the Christian tradition, Hobbes finds the solution in Christian theology and human nature.⁴ He claims that there are two basic laws of nature that are written in our hearts by God and this is written in Holy Scripture. It's clear that, as both Glover and Watkins argue, by introducing the laws written in men's hearts by God, Hobbes relates his thought with the Christian tradition of natural law.⁵ Taylor claims that Hobbesian natural law "oblige *in foro interno* ...even before civil society" and establishes the moral ground for political obligation.⁶ Therefore he thinks that Hobbes' law of nature is consistent with Christian tradition of natural law.⁷ That thinking in the same way, Glover argues Hobbes's law of nature is a complementary and compensating part of his anthropology and political philosophy; while Taylor makes Hobbes closer to St. Thomas Glover ratherly makes him closer to St. Augustine⁸. While the first law orders the men in natural condition to protect themselves by all means, the second law orders to make peace if the others are willing too. These laws oblige *in foro interno*, namely, internally or morally. Therefore, even though the men in state of nature believe

⁴ Lawrence Berns, "Thomas Hobbes," *History of Political Philosophy*, Ed. L. Strauss and J. Cropsey, Chicago: Chicago Uni. Press, Rand McNally Political Series, 1972, 375-377.

⁵ Glover, Willis B., "God and Thomas Hobbes", *Hobbes Studies*, Ed. K. C. Brown, pp., GB: Basil Blackwell, 1965, 160-165; J. W. N. Watkins, *Hobbes System of Ideas*, GB: Hutchinson Ltd., 1973, 61-69

⁶ A. E. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes", *Hobbes Studies*, Ed. K. C. Brown, GB: Basil Blackwell, 1965, 55.

⁷ Ibid, 48-53

⁸ Willis B. Glover, "God and Thomas Hobbes", *Hobbes Studies*, Ed. K. C. Brown, pp., GB: Basil Blackwell, 1965, 150-155.

in natural laws which are written in their hearts by God, they keep on fighting with and killing each other to satisfy their instincts and passions; because there's no external power to prevent those aggressions. Paradoxically, the moment which stops this state of nature comes from the state itself. It concludes that the pain and suffering make men in natural condition think they can't go on or survive with these laws prevailing only in moral level. What's required to accomplish such a condition is a power to make these laws oblige all men *in foro externo*, namely, externally or legally and politically. If this could be done, then no one could give harm to an other. It is clear that we may get what we want as much as possible if we accomplish the state of nature. Hobbes wants us to pay attention to the symmetrical relation between the state of nature and the state after the political body constructed and thus think what we lack of in state of nature is what we have in state after the construction of political body.

Turning to his argumentation, Hobbes introduces two terms to in order to establish such a power. These terms are the consent and the contract which, to him, could be found in Holy Scripture by a metaphorical reading. The consent includes abandoning of the power of all men in natural condition in favor of sovereign, that is to say, Leviathan. Since Leviathan has all power which are abandoned by individuals in state of nature, he is the very political body itself. It means the politics and society and also the political body are established or constructed by the abandonment of the power of men. This leads to the modern conception of society and politics that both society and politics, including political body, are man-made, namely, artificial. The roots of this conception are in Hobbes's philosophical anthropology depending on asocial, amoral, egoistic, hedonist nature of man. The contract, which constructs Leviathan, is the agreement on the securing of basic rights and liberties by the constitution which'll be executed by the sovereign power, Leviathan.⁹ Leviathan is the body which "is the Peace and Defence of them all"¹⁰, namely all citizens. A citizen has "the liberty to disobey."¹¹ any command against the basic law of nature and natural right, namely the right to protect himself. Thus, the men get what they want but lack of in the state of nature; all they need are basic rights and liberties which are secured by sovereign [external] power. We should mention that the men want those rights and liberties to satisfy their instincts and passions. Since

⁹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 227-228.

¹⁰ Ibid, 232.

¹¹ Ibid, 268.

the sovereign power will prevent the aggression, there'll be no aggression but only competition; contrary to aggression leading to violent fear of death, competition is legitimate, namely legal form of the use of rights and liberties. Thus we conclude that the individuals compete with each other to satisfy their instincts and passions; this legitimate and legal competition refers to the efforts of the individuals to *get* and *have*, which Macpherson calls as *possessive individualism* and defines as the base of economical liberalism.¹²

In this society of competition, individuals can or should make agreements with others in order to achieve their own goals and this requires that those agreements should be legal too. Therefore, as Gauthier rightly puts forward, all the relations between the individuals should be conceived as if they were contractual.¹³ Besides, since Hobbes holds the contract as rational, the social relations would have a rational character by their contractual nature.¹⁴ The possessive individualism and contractualism are correlative terms and both have religious roots. The sovereign power's function is to control and provide the legal legitimization of contracts and prevent the illegal acts, namely aggressions against them.

The sovereign power is the only one who remains in the natural condition and therefore only one who has the right to use violence to prevent the aggression of basic rights and liberties. It's clear that this will be a society of which members relations with each other will be regulated and controlled by law. The law will be executed by political power and the political power will be limited by the same law. This means, the political power can't use violence arbitrarily. The limitation of the use of sovereign power by law is a modern phenomenon referring to liberal democracies. To sum up, the deduction stemming from the natural laws which are written in men's hearts by God directs to the first modern political theory of liberal democracy.

At this point, we need to ask some questions to access to the deeper structure, that's to say, the source of his thought. What or who is God for Hobbes? What is religion to him? And what is the function of religion in his thought?

¹²C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism Hobbes to Locke*, GB: Oxford University Press, 1965, see. 53-68.

¹³David Gauthier, "The Social Contract as Ideology", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol: 6, No: 176, Spr. (1977): 134-135.

¹⁴Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive*, Ed. Sterling P. Lamprecht, USA: Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc, 1949, 31-32.

Before answering these questions we need to mention two important points. Firstly, Hobbes was an intellectual trying to find solutions for the political problems of his own age. This is the reason why he couldn't neglect the religious problems and the religion as a cultural phenomenon. Secondly, as Greenleaf says, he inherited an important conclusion from the debate on universal-particular which is peculiar to Medieval Age; it was nominalism.¹⁵ Hobbes felt himself obliged to find a place for religion in modern culture and he sought for it by nominalism and methodological materialism. He held that there was nothing as universals; there were only names referring to particular things. In addition to this, as Strauss says, even though he wanted to be materialist intimately, he could only have been materialist in the methodological sense; because he held that the matter itself was substance and there was no other substance.¹⁶ Belief in spirits and miracles and worshipping natural events which make men scared come from ignorance; all of them could be accomplished by materialistic science.¹⁷ As a sum, his materialism is not ontological but only methodological. Even though it is not our subject in this paper, we just need to mention that, alike of this come and go in his epistemology and philosophy of science, his philosophy includes a great and deep tension between the tradition and the his claim to be wholly new. So it can easily be seen that there are so many come and goes in his argumentation. In other words, this condition comes from the use of the old, the traditional elements, in favor of or for the sake of the new, the modern liberal political order.

After the determinations we've mentioned above, we may turn to answer the questions. Hobbes was aware that neither sovereign's absolute power coming from consent nor law alone would be sufficient to secure living together in peace. He knows through his observations on Britain in his own age that demos, that is to say, ordinary men need hope, love, tolerance, belief, respect and faith to live together in peace. Therefore, aiming at eternal peace, he introduced God as a moral support in the beginning of his doctrine to persuade and to make men feel obliged themselves to obey the natural law. His introduction of Christian theology in accordance with his aim, requires the re-conceptualization of traditional terminology. For this reason, he analyses the

¹⁵ W. H. Greenleaf, "Hobbes and The Problem of Interpretation", *Hobbes and Rousseau*, Ed. M. Cranston and R. S. Peters, USA: Anchor Books, 1972, 17-20.

¹⁶ Leo Strauss, "On The Spirit of Hobbes's Political Philosophy," *Hobbes Studies*, Ed. K. C. Brown, GB: Basil Blackwell, 1965, 9

¹⁷ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, see. 168-183.

traditional terms and re-describes them in favor of new political order as we've mentioned above.

He asks what superstition is and he tells that "fear of invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, religion; not allowed superstition."¹⁸ Then religion is something not supernatural or revelational but only conventional, to say, depending on agreement. Hobbes conceives of religion not as revelational truth but as prudential, that's to say, reckoning to move and decide. He rejects the revelation for it doesn't depend on reasoning; the only source of knowledge is true reasoning depending on analytical-synthetical method. Besides, the revelation cannot be empirically demonstrated; therefore it cannot be the subject of reasoning. His conception of religion necessarily gives rise to the view that religion is not natural, revelational but artificial.

This conception of religion is coherent with his conception of religion as an institution. Hobbes is also known as the philosopher of institutionalization. The institution refers to a body depending on covenant, namely an agreement and people in agreement are to obey that body morally or politically. All the bodies force men to act in a certain way. To him, the strongest and most important body is the one which makes people obey externally, namely the state as the political institution. But he also recognizes that political body itself alone is not enough for obedience and to live together in peace; because men couldn't and shouldn't be controlled *in foro interno*, namely morally. Therefore, from his point of view, religion depending on agreement, is an institution. It forces men to act in a certain way; different from the political institution, it's a cultural body or a cultural institution. It means that religion is separated from politics and it is a modern conception for both religion and politics and the relationship between them. Then what is religion as a whole? Religion is only a name of the thoughts, ideas and activities on which men agreed and it has no other reality than that agreement; it's a name of wholly worldly cultural body. In other words, the religion is a common prudence; that's to say common reckoning. The human beings need the principles to act and they act and live in accordance with their hopes, beliefs and faith. This is the unavoidable conclusion of his radical nominalism.

Since Hobbes observed the struggle for power between the Church and Kingdom, he is aware of the fact that the religion as a cultural institution may

¹⁸ Ibid, 124

turn out to be a political power. Therefore, in his political philosophy, he limits the religion through the conception of public peace both practically and theoretically. He holds that political order aims at public peace which includes different goods of the individuals secured by basic rights and liberties.¹⁹ So in his political philosophy, both faith and the worshipping against public peace should be prohibited by the sovereign power. This prohibition refers to the practical border or limits of religion. Thus, it is obvious that the political body will be over the religion and the religion will be in the service of sovereign in the name of public peace as the highest political virtue.

That thinking such a limitation wouldn't be enough to secure the public peace, Hobbes defines the sovereign power as the only reader of Holy Scripture; Leviathan will read it not literally but metaphorically. By this reading, the political body will make Holy Scripture useful for worldly life, namely, for the new political order and declare the true and practically valid interpretation for the public peace and will inhibit the others. Besides, as we have mentioned above, Leviathan should prohibit the illegal forms of worshipping. Therefore Hobbes describes the end and scope of worshipping and holds the rest as illegal.²⁰ Thus, as it is seen in the front cover of book, not only the worldly power but also the religious or divine power will be in Leviathan's hands to secure public peace; the division of power is rejected in the name of [securing] public peace. Thus, Leviathan will be the author and the only authority in political life. To sum up, the modern state is the author of modern culture and this makes it the only and strongest authority in political life. Hobbes's strategy is, in fact, very simple and clear: He tries to supply power to Leviathan in the name of eternal public peace.

Leviathan has two sources for the power; the former is consent and the latter is God. The first one includes the abandoning of individuals powers and the second includes God's providence. This means, for he interprets and executes God's divine laws as God's representative in this world, Leviathan has the power of God; if one obeys the laws Leviathan declares and executes, he will get the providence of Sacred Salvation. Hobbes calls Leviathan as the mortal God; but, different from Christ and Moses, the mortal God has no relation and connection with God. At this point, we need to ask a question to make the case clear: Does

¹⁹ Ibid, 233-235.

²⁰ Hobbes, De Cive, 180-182

God really exist? What Hobbes repeats mostly implicitly and sometimes explicitly in many pages as an answer to this question is interesting but coherent with his nominalism: It's written in Holy Scripture that God exists.²¹ If so, for this expression doesn't depend on reasoning and it's nothing but a name, we should think there's nothing as God. What we have to deduce from his reasoning is that Hobbes wants us to think the citizens ought to obey the law; he tries to prevent the disobedience to secure the public peace, that's to say, the liberal political order depending on basic rights and liberties of individuals.

Hobbes's insistence on providing the support of religion goes further after establishment of political power; he makes a very detailed description of the Leviathan by giving examples from Holy Scripture by analogical method, in the chapter which he allocated to a christian commonwealth. To him, Leviathan is made up of many parts, like counsellorships, ministries, church etc; it's a model metaphorically written in Holy Scripture. After exposing the model he writes explicitly that the model itself comes from the Holy Scripture. Through following his statements in the chapter in question, we comprehend that he model, which Hobbes inspired for his political philosophy and especially for political body, belongs to the early period of Christianity. To express briefly, Leviathan is a body constructed as a church of which roots are in Holy Scripture but radically converted to be wholly worldly.

To him, the first state is the State of God and its structural properties are similar and even approximately the same with Leviathan. He claims that the Church is a body represented by one man. As it's a body made up of priests and represented one man, Leviathan is a body made up of individuals and represented by one man. But, different from the natural beings, neither Church nor Leviathan are real entities; both are nothing but names. This model, coming from Holy Scripture, refers to the relationship between individuals and political body; this relationship has a nominalist character and is purely representational.²² Watkins argues Hobbes is nominalist in politics; in his view, Leviathan is just a name and artificial. The man becomes able to create the political body and make obedience possible by nominalism.²³ Thus, while nominalism lies under and supports the idea of re-presentation, the idea of re-presentation lies under and supports the idea of modern democracy; because, in

²¹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 525-540, see also 610-635.

²² *Ibid*, 498-510.

²³ J. W. N. Watkins, *Hobbes System of Ideas*, GB: Hutchinson Ltd., 1973, 114-118

modern democracies, the political body exists not naturally or necessarily but voluntarily, namely by the will of individuals. Therefore its existence is possible with a substitution for those wills and could only be comprehended by nominalism and re-presentation. In short, all his effort depending nominalism aims at adopting the religion to modernity, namely creating a new and modern ethos.

Well, should it be necessary that Leviathan is Christian? Hobbes's answer is interesting; the monarch's religion shouldn't be necessarily Christianity. Even though Leviathan is an infidel, the citizens ought to obey; because the essential point is, to him, not the religion but the public peace. Not religion itself, but he natural law derived from Christian natural law and legal system derived from natural law is to be executed in order to achieve public peace. If so, Christianity isn't a religion in the traditional sense but a moral source and ethos under the determination and in the service of sovereign for living together in peace. It is clear that Hobbes holds religion not as worthy in itself but as a cultural institution with instrumental value. The religion is no longer substantial and transcendent but an instrument for both social and political life.

As we've seen above, reading Holy Scripture depends upon a reading it by a nominalist epistemology; what is written in Holy Scripture aren't real entities but names and allegories in the need of being interpreted. Such an interpretation in the service of Leviathan's power refers to political atheism; because the essential point is the obedience to Leviathan. Political atheism is, in fact, the result of his reasoning; because, not the religion itself but the sovereign's power is important in politics. Taking a closer look to his work will show that this result isn't surprising; he begins with [the satisfaction of] passions and instincts, namely hedonism to establish a political organization. It means his initial point is political hedonism and as Strauss rightly says, "political hedonism and political atheism exist together and they are always found together."²⁴ This determination on Hobbes's political atheism shows us that the religion allowed by sovereign power, only supports the obedience or in other words an instrument to motivate men to obey the laws which are made by sovereign power in accordance with natural law.

As a conclusion we may say that, stemming from the social problem as security and aiming at eternal peace, what Hobbes wants to do is to justify or

²⁴ Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, USA: The University of Chicago Press, 1953, 169.

construct a wholly new society in or from a Christian society. What he achieves in the end is what Milner calls as “a new theology;”²⁵ but we claim that this is not only a new theology, it is a secularized Christianity as a moral source and ethos for a wholly new political order. This effort will survive through the history of philosophy by opposite terms as natural religion versus historical religion and the religion of reason versus the traditional religion; the terms of natural religion and the religion of reason refers to the efforts of secularism. The secularism, since Hobbes, has the same function; it refers to liberal ethos and this liberal ethos supports the political liberalism.

But if we take the present situation of the liberal ethos, we see that secularism has got a different meaning and function. Because along the history of philosophy, the liberal ethos, which Hobbes constructed at first, has got two and almost opposite meanings, especially concerning the debate of modernity-postmodernity. The first meaning is well-known and modern one; it includes universal values and principles to justify the universal modern liberal democracy. The second one is postmodern and almost opposite to the first one: Secularism is valid only for Christianity and the secularized Christianity is the only convenient one among all religions for liberal democracy. This liberal ethos belongs to only Western civilization and all the rest have only cultures. From the view point of the dichotomy of civilization-culture, which belongs to German Idealists, the world is full of cultures except Western civilization. As Charles Taylor, who is the philosopher of multiculturalism, argues, the civilization depending on liberal ethos isn't universal; it's something peculiar to Western tradition.²⁶ Even though it lasts, the superiority of Western civilization can't be justified. What remains are a plurality of different ethos on the one hand and a civilization of which superiority can't be justified on the other.

In my view, Taylor's thesis has several difficulties. I want to take some of them into consideration. Firstly, such a conception depending hierarchy between the religions cannot be easily demonstrated. Secondly, this argument divides the world into two main parts as liberal-illiberal or democratic-antidemocratic and such a illusory conception may easily lead to a view of an inavoidable and malign war between the civilizations as Huntington, a Hegelian

²⁵ B. Milner, “Hobbes On Religion”, *Political Theory*, 16, Aug, 1988: 422

²⁶ Charles Taylor, “Comments and Replies”, *Inquiry*, No: 34, Vol: 2 (1991): 239-245, see also Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition”, *Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition*, Ed. Gutmann Amy, USA: Princeton University Press, 1992, 62-65.

philosopher like Taylor, argued. Thirdly, Taylorian thesis takes the culture and all kinds of human problems as if they were religious problems. This is a great mistake to take culture and human problems as purely religious. For example, political problems and religious problems are structurally different things and they should be taken according to this difference. Fourth and lastly, stopping the search for and rejecting the universal principles to solve our common problems lead to the death of politics; the politics is the most powerful instrument which make all of us come together to talk, to think and to solve our problems. Talking, thinking and debates on different cultures, as in the case of interreligious studies and emphasizing only this point makes us indifferent to our common political problems.

In the light of these criticisms, I need to emphasize that Hobbes's attempt preserves its importance; because it seeks to establish a ground for political liberalism which is practically most efficient political regime to take and solve common problems. As Vattimo rightly says religion is a source and instrument for getting and developing rights and liberties and contemporary democracy.²⁷ I think there's no doubt that Hobbes was the first who was aware of this fact. The fragmentation we live to-day may be accomplished by a new ethos, which needs a serious attempt as Hobbes did before and includes both plurality and universality. I think, for he witnessed the deadly fight between the different ethos for power, Hobbes's attempt may enlighten the efforts in this way.

²⁷ G. Vattimo, "The Age of Interpretation", *The Future of Religion*, Ed. Santiago Zabala, USA: Columbia University Press, 2005, 46-49.

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