



Failure of Multiparty Systems Leading to Predominant Party Systems

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Abstract

This study deals with the change of party systems in developing countries with a comparative analysis on the cases of Turkey and Bolivia. I argue that the failure of multiparty systems could be an important factor in forming predominant party systems. This article demonstrates how AK Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*-Justice and Development Party) in Turkey (in 2002-2015) and MAS (*Movimiento al Socialismo*-Movement for Socialism) in Bolivia (in 2006-2019) instrumentalized the failure of multiparty systems to eventually become predominant parties in their political systems. They both inherited political and economic instabilities under multiparty coalition governments and sought to overcome this cycle through economic policies that enhanced the economic opportunities of the poor without sacrificing budgetary discipline and macroeconomic stability. As a result, they could address pressing problems of economic inequality, unemployment, and poverty without causing debt crisis and economic instability. Their success in maintaining political and economic stability under one-party governments enabled MAS and AK Party to persist. Using these cases, this article shows that the failure of multiparty systems in effectively addressing the grievances of most of the population may lay the ground for the establishment of predominant party systems.

Keywords

Party Systems, Political Economy, Dominant Party Systems, Democratization, Development, Turkey, Bolivia, Global South.

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Introduction

Political parties can be defined as political societies that have a steady and stable organizational structure. They seek to seize control of the state mechanism with public support. A party system refers to the arrangement within which political parties operate. A predominant party system emerges when the opposition parties challenge the strongest party in competitive elections but fail to remove the incumbent from power. Giovanni Sartori proposes the most popular classification for the concept of the predominant party system. He suggests that the predominance is established when a party wins three consecutive elections while keeping most of the seats in the parliament (Sartori, 2005: 174).

I draw attention to the fact that the MAS and the AK Party emerged as predominant parties following the failure of multiparty systems. In both cases, multiparty systems relied on a scheme of an elite-level pact, which postponed the solution of pressing economic and political problems. In Bolivia, the traditional parties that dominated the system until the early 2000s did not remedy the issues of the indigenous community. In Turkey, the military's influence over politics kept the system in place, but the securitization of Turkey's ethnically Kurdish people and pious Muslims created significant grievances. In both cases, charismatic leaders using oppositional language successfully led their political parties to victory. Their parties could stay in power for three election periods incessantly.

I start this paper by introducing the concept of the predominant party. Then, I discuss the concept's shortcomings, especially when explaining the evolution of political systems in developing democracies and the emergence of predominant parties. Finally, I explain the cases of Bolivia's MAS and Turkey's AK Party by comparing and contrasting the two cases.

Party Systems

The literature on the party system remains weak because the focus is often on the parties themselves instead of the systems they operate within (Epstein, 1975: 229-278). Thus, most handbooks and readers on the issue treat the subject within the framework of the concept of parties instead of separately focusing on party systems. The complex and unstandardized nature of party systems makes it hard to define, let alone classify them. Even so, there remain numerous attempts to define and classify party systems in the literature.

When it comes to party systems, there are multiple ways to distinguish between different party systems. Accordingly, party systems are classified in accordance with the degree of democratic accountability (Scott, 2014: 1142-1158), positional competition (Stokes, 1963: 368-377), numerical properties (Sartori, 2005), party programs (Barolini & Mair, 1990), and competitiveness (Lijphart, 1990). This article focuses on the classification of party systems based on their numerical properties.

Such classification of party systems is pioneered by French political scientist Maurice Duverger. He categorizes party systems as one-party systems, two-party systems, and multiparty systems (Duverger, 1974: 15-23). According to him, a dominant party emerges when one of the parties in the party system becomes much stronger than the others and remains in power for a very long time (Duverger, 1974: 398). Sartori, whose approach became the standard in the literature, criticizes Duverger's approach as simplistic and offers an alternative typology that classifies party systems using multiple criteria (Sartori, 2005: 110). According to Sartori, there are three kinds of one-party systems: one party, hegemonic party, and predominant party. They differ from one another in terms of to what extent the strongest party allows other parties to exist in the party system (Sartori, 2005: 112).

There are also differences in the ways Duverger and Sartori conceptualize the predominant parties. Duverger classifies this condition as a "dominant" party, but there is not a significant difference between his concept and Sartori's "predominant" party. Regarding how a party becomes a dominant one, he emphasizes the power and influences the dominant party has and points out the citizens' trust in the party (Duverger, 1974: 399). On the other hand, Sartori posits that the strongest party needs not to commit election fraud to be distinguished from a hegemonic party and one-party systems in a predominant party system (Sartori, 2005: 112). According to Sartori, the predominance emerges when a party wins three consecutive elections while keeping the majority of the seats in the parliament (Sartori, 2005: 174).

According to both classifications, AK Party (between at least 2002 and 2015) in Turkey and MAS (between at least 2006 and 2019) in Bolivia were the predominant parties. Both parties maintained their control over the body politics after these dates. MAS ceased to be a predominant party after 2019 because of the election fraud. Similarly, AK Party lost an election in 2015, even though it won the following snap elections, which took place as a result of the failure to form a coalition government. In any case, these parties could gather enough votes to form one-party governments after three consecutive elections. In this article, I focus on the question of how predominant parties in these countries emerged.

Bolivia's Coca Growers and Pacted Democracy

Bolivia's Pacted Democracy

Bolivia was integrated into the global economy with the discovery of silver resources in Potosi Mountain by the Spanish colonizers in the 16th Century. The relations between the colonizers and their business connections in Europe have played a significant role in forming power relations between Bolivia and the European Empires and between different classes in Bolivia. During the mid-20th Century, Bolivia faced severe economic problems stemming from inefficient farming, population increase, and economic and social inequality.

After decades of instability and economic mismanagement, Bolivia's major traditional parties cooperated on a neoliberal democratic agenda and formed a multiparty system. Bolivia's pacted democracy scheme, between 1985 to late 1990s, involved three traditional parties: Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement-MNR), Acción Democrática Nacionalista (Democratic Nationalist Action-ADN), and Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (Leftist Revolutionary Movement-MIR). The political system of Bolivia was designed to insulate political decision-making from the public. The democratic procedures were only nominally present (Salman, 2007: 113).

The neoliberal economic reforms managed by the then Economy Minister Sanchez De Lozada tamed inflation with budgetary discipline. The reforms included the 'relocation' of miners and closure of tin mines, pegging the Bolivian peso to the US dollar, lifting subsidies to the public sector, and the liberalization of the market (Estenssoro, 1985). Besides these structural measures, the reform package included measures intended to help vulnerable lower-income families through social programs and development projects (Petras & Weltmeyer, 2005: 184-185). As a result, Bolivia transformed into a market economy. However, the efforts to incorporate all segments of Bolivian society into the government and bring prosperity for all economic and social classes with a capital-intensive strategy failed. The lack of institutional structures to address the problems of various social segments of Bolivia elevated regional structures such as coca growers' institutions to national significance.

The trust and support of the Bolivian people in this economic program gradually diminished while Bolivia's economy deteriorated. Between 1985 to 1997, the Presidents won elections with anti-neoliberal campaigns but never realized their promised agenda. Once elected, they would extensively use Presidential decrees to rule (Anria, 2016: 100). This process was part of a broader trend observed in other developing countries such as Chile, Argentina, and Turkey that involved a conservative reaction towards the failure of state-led reforms (Anria, 2016: 180). Unable to compete with the cheap import, most enterprises chose to bust the unions and squeeze labor activities to remain profitable (Arze & Kruse, 2004: 23). The farming and herding sectors went

bankrupt as the producers could not compete with cheap imports (Arze & Kruse, 2004: 26). The reforms failed to decrease unemployment and erase poverty. What is more, the inherent clientelism in Bolivia enabled the channeling of perks and spoils to party supporters, which created further resentments among the population (Gamarra, 2007: 9). In the meantime, the weakening of Bolivia's poor strengthened Bolivia's cocaine complex. Many people who lost their jobs or could not afford to live with their wages joined the coca production.

To tame the pressure from below, de Lozada, who became President in 1993, initiated a reform for democratization. The 1994 decentralization law transferred 20% of the state budget to municipalities and enabled grassroots participation in budgetary oversight. The law also recognized indigenous communities as grassroots territorial organizations (Kohl, 2003: 156). With this law, the Bolivian government intended to allow the democratic participation of the excluded portions of the society and empower the indigenous people at the local level (Kohl, 2003: 161). Yet, the attempts worked counterproductively by laying the groundwork for the rise of anti-liberal and socialist MAS (Kohl, 2003: 101). In 2000, a coalition of forces, including trade unions, peasant communities, and indigenous organizations, cooperated to protest the privatization of the water system in Cochabamba (Tapia, 2008: 222). After four months of protests, the government revoked the contract and put the water company under municipal control (Siotos, 2013: 52). The second wave of protests took place against de Lozada's plans to share some of Bolivia's natural gas reserves with the US and build a pipeline through Chile ("Unrest in Bolivia over Gas Deal", 2003). Amid the protests, first President Sanchez de Lozada in 2003, then his predecessor Carlos Mesa in 2005 resigned.

At the point when MAS rose, most Bolivians were already convinced that the political system was filled with incompetent people that have lack of clear and transparent separation of powers and the rule of law (Salman 2007: 121). There was also obstinacy in enabling a peaceful transition of power. For example, the main opposition party refused to collaborate with Morales on widespread constitutional change despite Morales' compromises (Gamarra, 2007: 4). As a result, traditional parties' legitimacy and popularity could not recover from the process.

The Rise of MAS

Amid economic decline, the negative impact of the transition to neoliberal economy and decentralization paved the path for Evo's rise, which could mobilize different segments of society. When he achieved power, the enabling economic conditions and Evo's established leadership over various groups helped Evo's party dominate Bolivia's body politics. As a candidate of MAS, he ran for the congressional representation of El Chapare in 1997. With the support of over 70%, he scored the largest electoral success of any congressional

deputy in Bolivia's lower house (Gamarra, 2007: 10). Evo could represent the three non-exclusionary strong opposition bases: the cocaine complex, the lower-income citizens who were hard hit by the neoliberal reforms, and the indigenous peoples. From the early 1990s, against the backdrop of the US pressure on the Bolivian government to eradicate coca production, coca growers' union dominated the National Peasant Union and Labor Confederation. Evo was elected as the coca growers' union leader, a post he continued to hold even after being elected the President (Farthing & Kohl, 2014: 132).¹ Evo's indigenous roots also play a significant role in his success in a country that has the highest percentage of people with indigenous roots in Latin America. Bolivia's indigenous base has constituted one of the strongest bases that demand greater political incorporation, which was not delivered under pacted democracy scheme (Barr, 2005 :84). Evo's identity has provided him an advantage in securing this base. Third, Evo successfully appealed to the growing dissatisfaction with Bolivia's neoliberal economic model. The protests of the early 2000s have created momentum and produced a political condition that further delegitimized mainstream politics. The association of Morales with Chavez and his cooperation with Cuba and Venezuela helped him dominate the anti-liberal discourse.

At the advent of his first term, Morales received the highest percentage of votes in Bolivia's history and got elected as the President. In one of his speeches at the United Nations in New York in 2008, he suggested that the Andean indigenous values preach renouncing war, imperialism, and colonialism, considering access to natural resources as human rights, and constructing communitarian socialism with the Mother Earth (Postero, 2010: 61). The discourse of Morales addressed the major concerns of the numeric majority of Bolivia and helped him make new friends and allies in domestic and international spheres. Morales appealed to the urban poor, indigenous people, and the political left as a coca-grower with indigenous roots.

MAS played a significant role in Morales' success as well. The party has its roots in the grievances of coca growers in the Cochabamba region against Bolivia's coca policy. The closing of the mines in 1985 led a portion of people to start growing coca to make a living. This development has strengthened the base that is in opposition to the government (Gamarra, 2007: 8). The coca growers of Cochabamba founded MAS to express their interests politically. Initially, the party took an anti-imperialist and anti-neoliberal stance and took a stance against the US involvement in the government's efforts to fight coca (Siotos, 2013: 53). Started as an anti-liberal, pro-coca, and indigenous party, MAS has grown into significance in the early 2000s when the protests consecutively ended two governments. Although Morales had the final say, the policymaking in MAS is conducted with negotiations between MAS and

1 Farthing and Kohl, *Evo's Bolivia*, 132.

various social groups (Anria, 2016: 104). The social base of MAS ensured vertical accountability and achieved a stable base of support through the mobilization of groups ranging from indigenous communities to coca growers (Madrid, 2011: 258).

In 2006, Morales laid out an alternative economic development plan following his election as president. *National Development Plan: Dignified, Sovereign, Productive and Democratic Bolivia to Live Well* was promulgated by the Ministry of Planning in 2006. The plan aimed to shift from a neoliberal economy to a mixed model that would prevent political and social exclusion of the majority of the population (Filho & Gonçalves, 2010: 180). Morales made a case for the inefficiency of neoliberal economic policies in addressing the pressing financial problems such as inequality and poverty. Thus, instead of clinging to neoliberal policies, his administration called for state involvement for ensuring a more just system.

The plan's chief objective was summed up in four categories, and the aims were explained in the official document in a detailed manner (Morales, 2007: 1). The first principle, dignity, comprised eradicating poverty and enabling access to education, health, and public security for all citizens (Morales, 2007: 43). The document used the term sovereignty to reflect previous Bolivian foreign policy and economic policies as submissive to foreign paradigms (Filho & Gonçalves, 2010: 184). Productivity pointed to the requirement of active state involvement in the management of the country's national resources (Filho & Gonçalves, 2010: 183). Lastly, the characterization of the new plan as democratic was to emphasize the need to foster and celebrate the indigenous cultures of Bolivia both economically and politically (Morales, 2007: 101). In short, the program intended to redistribute the national wealth in order to ensure the access of the excluded poor sections of Bolivian society to the national wealth.

Morales' economic program helped increase the living conditions of the poor with the help of the enabling global economic conditions. The rise of soy, metal, and natural gas prices brought about a capital flow to the Bolivian economy. In addition, the favoring economic conditions in Spain increased the remittances sent from the Bolivian migrants to their home country. Morales spent these additional resources on infrastructure projects and social programs. The students in elementary and middle schools were given a stipend to buy their textbooks (Savove, 2009: 65). The public education programs increased the literacy rates, the access to health care and housing was expanded, pensions have risen, and agriculture flourished (Filho & Gonçalves, 2010: 188-189). Morales' success ensured his high approval ratings in his first years in the office and secured his success in the 2008 election (Savove, 2009:65). When the economy deteriorated by the first half of the 2010s,

Morales' popularity and the electoral strength of MAS declined (Anria, 2016: 89). Thus, economic variables played a significant role in his initial success.

In his second term, between 2009-2014, Morales faced protests from indigenous and leftist activists, who were not satisfied with the economic reforms. The main subjects of concern were the rising cost of living in Bolivia, the cutting of subsidies, and a highway project passing through a natural reserve. While these steps were economically viable for Bolivia, they clashed with the promise of Morales and his image as an environment-friendly, indigenous, leftist leader.

Morales' third term

Although the Bolivian constitution limited the consecutive presidential terms to two terms, Morales stood for reelection based on a constitutional ruling that did not count his first election. Despite the controversies surrounding his candidacy, Morales was reelected in 2014 to serve until 2019. At this point, MAS had already become the predominant party. In 2019, Morales attempted to run again and won the elections. However, the independent observers from the Organization of American States (OAS) found the elections fraudulent. As a result of domestic and international pressures, Morales resigned and sought asylum in Mexico. Following his resignation, elections could be held only in October 2020. These elections resulted in another victory of MAS, headed by Luid Arce. Thus, despite Morales' resignation, the domination of MAS in the Parliament continued with a hiatus after the resignation of Morales. Since the 2019 elections resulted in the resignation of Morales over voter fraud issues, this date could be considered the end of the predominant party system in Bolivia.

The rise of MAS and Morales to political significance was based on the combined efforts of various groups long excluded from Bolivia's political system. The losers of economic transition have successfully transformed their grassroots social support into political energy. The high commodity prices initially helped Morales to deliver on his promises. Morales' economic reforms succeeded in redistributing state revenues and increasing the quality of the life of Bolivia's poor. Since the early 2010s, as a result of the economic downturn of Bolivia, Morales struggled to maintain its dominance, but MAS could remain in power. This was largely as a result of its success in building a base in the previous period.

Turkey's Conservative Majority and AK Party's Success

Turkey's Tutelary Regime

Turkey was amalgamated into the world economy with swift market reforms following the 1980 military coup. The ban on the popular political figures paved the path for the victory of Turgut Özal, a former economist of the World Bank with a limited political background. Similar to de Lozada, Özal also

served as the Prime Minister and also as the President of Turkey. With the help of the constitution drafted after the military coup, Özal could run his reform program without significant opposition. The new constitution placed greater emphasis on political leadership rather than participation (Heper & Criss, 2009: 61). It banned all kinds of political activities by civil institutions except for political parties and prohibited the cooperation of the political parties with civil organizations (Özbudun, 2000: 5). In subsequent elections, the coup leader General Kenan Evren became the President, and Turgut Özal, who prepared the program for transition to a neoliberal economy, became the Prime Minister. Turkey's transition to a neoliberal economy ended the endemic polarization and brought about economic stability and prosperity.

However, the failure to build a solid institutional foundation for the reforms caused economic instability in the 1990s. Swift transition to the liberalization of capital took place in an environment where major political parties and their leaders were suspended, and the autocratic government strictly controlled all sorts of political action. Such transition occurred before a regulatory framework was put in place and the stabilization of the economy was realized. This caused speculative money flows that created high-interest rates and inflation (Şenses, 2016: 17).

The lifting of the ban on leading political figures in 1987 started an era of political instabilities in Turkey. In the 1991 elections, Özal's party lost the majority in the parliament, embarking on a period of short-lived coalition governments. Özal's untimely death in 1993 added insult to the injury. In 1996, RP (Welfare Party - *Refah Partisi*) and in 1999, DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti) could lead governments with less than %25 votes. Meanwhile, a series of events laid the groundwork for the AK Party. The success of Islamist RP achieved victory in Turkey's capital Ankara and the biggest city Istanbul in the 1994 elections by appealing to the poor migrants from Anatolian cities living in the slums. The success in municipalities brought about victory in the general elections of 1995. However, the coalition government led by RP was forced to dissolution with the involvement of the military. This incident is recognized as a post-modern coup (Aslan, 2016: 362). The Marmara earthquake of 1999 that demolished tens of thousands of houses in Turkey's industrial Northwestern region, the insistence on solving the Kurdish problem via military measures, and the mismanagement of urbanization played significant roles in the 1990s, becoming Turkey's dark decade (Aslan, 2016).

Military's involvement in politics and the subsequent ban of RP from politics by the judiciary led to a confrontation in the party between the so-called traditionalists and modernists (Hale & Özbudun, 2010: 5). The modernist wing of RP's successor FP (Felicity Party - *Fazilet Partisi*) would later found AK Party. Turkey's Islamist parties during the 1990s were very successful in election campaigns. For instance, RP was the only party that conducted classical

door-to-door propaganda methods with hundreds of thousands of enthusiastic and disciplined members. Moreover, these activities do not preclude election times and continue between the elections. Activists of RP also consist of a large number of women as well. These tactics proved effective, especially when Erdoğan ran for the Mayor of Istanbul and unexpectedly won.

Erdoğan's Success and AK Party's Predominance

Similar to Bolivia's Morales, Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was an anti-establishment figure who sought to redefine the original political arrangements. Although his political career began in Islamist parties, AK Party appealed to more than the traditional base of RP. After forming a single-party government, AK Party used this opportunity well and delivered on its promises regarding the management of the economy and keeping its base satisfied. AK Party's successes in consecutive elections have weakened the opposing political parties and bureaucratic actors, making AK Party a dominant party.

Towards the end of the 1990s, RP's charismatic mayor of Istanbul Recep Tayyip Erdoğan achieved recognition amid tensions between Turkey's political establishment and various segments of Turkish society. His imprisonment due to a poem he recited at a meeting in Southeastern Anatolia, the banking crisis of 2001, and the government's inability to handle the disastrous consequences of the 1999 earthquake delegitimized Turkey's political establishment. At this juncture, AK Party, which Erdoğan founded in 2001, became popular.

AK Party expanded FP's voter base and organizational structure. It ran effective campaigns with the help of professional PR companies. According to a public opinion poll conducted before the 2002 elections, only 27.4% of AK Party voters voted FP in the 1999 elections (TÜSES, 2002: 70-71). From a sociological point of view, the AK Party coalition is based on a significant portion of rural voters, tradesmen and artisans in the cities, the poorer parts of the cities, and the rapidly rising Islamic bourgeoisie. The traditional Islamist parties adopted an anti-capitalist discourse during the 1990s (Yeşilada, 2002: 172-173). On the other hand, AK Party considered democratization and Turkey's EU membership as priority targets and ran a campaign on these principles (AK Parti Seçim Beyannamesi, 2002: 14).

When the AK Party came into power in November 2002, Turkey struggled with one of its worst economic crises. In addition, the insulation of policymaking from free and fair competition brought the rule by a bureaucratic oligarchy that prevailed over weak coalition governments (Öztürk, 2001: 2). In order to cope with the economic crisis, AK Party applied a very strict budgetary policy under the guidance of the IMF (Patton, 2006: 517). The economy, which grew by about seven percent yearly in the 2002-2007 period, stagnated in 2009 with the impact of the global crisis but recovered fast. In 2010

and 2011, the economy grew by nine percent and eight percent, respectively (Jarosiewicz, 2013: 1).

Following a neoliberal agenda in the economy, AK Party also ensured keeping the voters satisfied with social policies as well. In 2006, AK Party initiated a social security reform that ensured citizens' free and fair health services (Aysan, 2013: 148-162). In addition, tuition for public universities has been abolished. AK Party faced its second general elections in 2007. It managed to come to power and formed a one-party-government by significantly increasing its votes. The economic growth and reforms in many areas of governance enabled AK Party's success. Also, in this year, one of the founding members of AK Party, Abdullah Gül was elected as Turkey's President. With the victory in these two elections, AK Party consolidated its power. AK Party's domination of Turkey's body politics continued in 2011 when AK Party received more than half of the votes. In this period, the increasing levels of education have also led to a decrease in income inequality (Öztürk & Kayaoğlu, 2016).

In its third term, however, AK Party began to face a multitude of challenges both at domestic and foreign policy realms. Turkey's economic success entered a turbulent phase. Syrian Civil War significantly challenged Turkey's security and economy. With the Gezi Park protests, secular to AK Party's policies gained a grassroots dimension. Moreover, Erdoğan's becoming a President in 2014 as the first step toward a presidential system weakened AK Party. As a result, AK Party, for the first time in its short history, failed to form a one-party-government in the 2015 elections. This could be considered as the end of AK Party's predominance in Turkey's party politics, even though AK Party could achieve victory in the snap elections held in the same year following unsuccessful attempts to form a coalition government. In 2018, Turkey voted for the presidential system putting an end to the parliamentary system. Erdoğan became the first President under the new system as the head of the AK Party.

Conclusion

Towards the early 1990s, the failure of the Washington Consensus in bringing economic, political, and social stability to the developing countries became apparent after a series of financial crises experienced throughout the global South. From the late 1990s on, the absence of the institutional custodians of liberal democracies and the failure of the party systems to address the pressing social and economic problems brought about the rise of anti-establishment figures.

Bolivia's democracy was based on the consensus of three major parties between 1985 and to early late 1990s. This arrangement could not resist the pressure of coca-growers, indigenous people, and the urban poor and the support of these groups to Morales. In Turkey, the transition to a neoliberal economy happened following the 1980 military coup under the auspices of

the military government and the constitution prepared under military rule. Turkey's tutelary democracy was challenged by the urban poor and the conservative middle class. After securing their base, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey have dominated the body politics. They have built coalitions that allow them to dominate the party system and civil society. Similar reasons played roles in the successes of Morales and Erdoğan.

First, in both Bolivia and Turkey, Morales and Erdoğan could refer to a past period when their constituency was relatively worse off politically and economically. In Bolivia, the pacted democracy scheme excluded large portions of the society from politics. The grievances of cocagrowers and indigenous people did not echo in politics. In Turkey, the notorious secular regime, which denied a significant portion of society public duty, higher education, and even health services because of religious beliefs, has been protected by a bureaucratic oligarchy. Both Erdoğan and Morales could dominate the political system in their countries after an economic decline involving economic crises. In both cases, the citizens at the bottom level were hard hit by the financial situation. Although both Erdoğan and Morales followed neoliberal recipes for monetary discipline, they have been cautious not to upset their voter base.

Second, both Erdoğan and Morales have had very effective and professional political organizations. In Bolivia, MAS relied upon the support of indigenous communities, cocagrowers, and unions. In the context of Bolivian politics, these groups make up of a significant portion of Bolivia's voter base and do not tend to not vote for MAS. In Turkey, AK Party could successfully coalesce Turkey's traditional center-right with Islamists. The economic policies remained neoliberal, as it was the case in center-right governments, but the Islamist base was also satisfied with policies aiming at keeping and developing Turkey's Islamic character at cultural and political realms.

Third, both Morales and Erdoğan are charismatic figures. Their anti-establishment savior figure character has helped mobilize the voter base. In addition, Morales' indigenous background and Erdoğan's pious lifestyle have enabled the voters who share these identities to characterize themselves with and politically trust them. They also relied upon highly professional and efficient political party organizations.

Fourth, the obsolescence of the established actors in Bolivia and Turkey enabled MAS and AK Party to remain in power. In Turkey, the bureaucratic oligarchy, judiciary, and military have repeatedly tried to depose AK Party through undemocratic schemes. AK Party faced an e-memorandum released by the website of General Staff in 2007, had to deal with a closure trial in 2008, and survived a military coup in 2016. As a result of these attempts, AK Party could find grassroots support as it delegitimized the checks and balances and resulted in constitutional referendums that provided more power to the elected

officials in the system. In Bolivia, the opposition parties' uncooperative attitude helped Morales better support his agenda.

Fifth, both MAS and AK Party followed neoliberal market capitalism in the economy while also supporting the poor with social policies. In a global economic climate where the GDPs of developing countries are increasing AK Party and MAS were able to find funds for their reforms as well. They utilized their budget mainly for infrastructure, education, and health. As a result, their political support remained stable.

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