


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## Understanding the US and China Rivalry through Modelski's Model & Offensive Realism Theory (The Past, Present & Future)

Harun Abubakar SIDDIQUE\*

### Abstract

*While the impact of the US-Chinese rivalry on the global political system has led to considerable literature, there are some discussions on the possible strategies that the USA and China can follow in this rivalry. On the one hand, it is wondered what kind of road map the USA and China will follow, on the other hand, Modelski's Long Cycle Model can offer an explanation and prediction opportunity in this regard. This model produces an explanation that includes the past, present, and future within the framework of the enormous increase in the interdependence of states at the global level. In this study, the explanation model developed by Modelski is used to understand the political and economic order that has emerged around China's evolving role in the global political system.*

**Keywords;** *US, China Rivalry, Modelski Model, Offensive Realism*

### 1. Introduction

Thought-provokingly George Modelski presents a theory or model that cyclically explains the historical events which brought to the international political scene an active dominant power phrased as 'world leader', in whose leadership the agenda for global politics is aligned. According to Modelski, spanning from the 1500s, there have been four world leaders but five rounds, to name, Portugal from 1494–1516, then the Netherlands from the year 1580–1609, next was Great Britain, that lasted for two rounds, firstly from 1688–1713, and second from 1792–1815, then came the United States spanning from 1914/ 45 to date. Modelski's model divides the cycle of events into four phases; the first is the Phase of Global War, the second, is the Phase of World Power, the third, is the Phase of Delegation, and the last, is the Phase of Deconcentration. These phases last for about 25-30 years making the whole cycle a 100 or 120-year lifespan before the next cycle begins all over again.<sup>1</sup>

If the 1970s/1975 with the events of the Oil embargo, end of dollar convertibility, and end of the Vietnam war was the end of the world power phase i.e., the second phase of the four phases of Modelski's model, then it is first preceded by the macro decision phase (under the learning mode) and then the next is implementation phase which coincides with the World

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<sup>1</sup> George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987), 40.



power phase (under the systemic mode) as Modelski mentions.<sup>2</sup> Considering all its capabilities, China could be considered to assume the world power thus rivaling the current world power, the US. This paper has three main parts, first, the past thus it describes Modelski Model, phase after phase, considering the events after the Global war Phase i.e., the two world wars. It considers two great powers, the USA and China since the former is considered the world leader after the world wars and the latter a burgeoning world power. The second, the present thus describes the problems facing China which makes it difficult for the country to assume the seat of world leader even if the moment is ripe. And the last part is the future thus the paper turns toward looking into the future. In doing so, John Mearsheimer's Offensive Realism Theory is considered, which posits at its core, that to be secure from all aggression a country must maximize power and seek hegemony at all costs, thus China cannot rise peacefully through its seeking hegemony, at least regional hegemony. In this part, the flaws and the inconsistencies of the theory will be discussed and argued that China will not behave in the likeness of the theory henceforth the 'containment' policy that the theory of offensive realism advocates for the US to take is misguided. Then the recommendations and conclusion close the paper.

## 2. Methodology

This paper uses a mixed approach in terms of research methodology. It largely employs the use of a qualitative research style and grounds some of the findings on a quantitative research approach. In using a qualitative approach, it analyzes Modelski's Model. The paper thus centers on the masterpiece of George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics*. Although the work of Modelski has a significant portion of quantitative expositions, this paper largely considers the qualitative nature of the model. The descriptive analysis of the historical events is encapsulated in smaller bits called phases and in the larger context called Cycles or Rounds. The paper also uses the theory of John Mearsheimer in understanding the future of the political atmosphere vis-a-vis the US-China divide. This theory from a qualitative approach is used to investigate whether China will be aggressive or not and if there is a need for China to be aggressive. In its contextual analysis, the inconsistencies and flaws of the theory become clear which makes it quite a weak candidate for assisting in postulating the events of the future as far as US-China relation is concerned. Surveys provided by the Pew Research Center are used to

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<sup>2</sup> Modelski, *Long Cycle of World Politics*, 67.



discuss the challenges faced by China. Data provided by Statista outlining the US and China's engagement both nationally and internationally is used. The surveys and data are used from these institutions because of the institution's meticulous attention to detail and research which their standing in the database industry is a testament. Finally, one obvious limitation of the paper is, that it does not spend much time grappling with too many details when it mentions technological, information, or digital might. It considers rather the significant point which has a bearing on this paper since an in-depth and critical investigation into the technological might or prowess is beyond the scope of this paper.

### **3. The Past–Capturing the Last Century (1914 to date) Within Modelski's Model**

Modelski's Model of Long Cycles in World Politics runs or begins it first and on course till the last phase for approximately a hundred years (or hundred and twenty). That is, each phase takes about twenty-five years to conclude, although it sometimes lasts more or less than twenty-five. Like the Netherlands' round of world power, the global war spanning from 1580 to 1609 i.e., the Spanish-Dutch war lasted for about twenty-nine years. However, Britain's second round of world power had its global war period spanning from 1792 to 1815 i.e., Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon for about twenty-three years.<sup>3</sup>

#### **3.1. Phase One (1914–1945) Global Wars or Chaos**

Modelski's model has phase one to be the period of Global Chaos of War, consequently, through the stratagem of a particular State, it emerges world leader. The first and second world wars of 1914 and 1945 are the depiction of this phase. This phase is mostly borne out of the struggle for dominance between the new emerging powers and hitherto the hegemonic power which is going through the final phase thus the Deconcentration of power, and thanks to exhausting its material strength in responding to challenges it falls from the world leader. Portugal's fall from grace was orchestrated by the primary challenger, Spain. The exploration expeditions forced the then-dominant power into a Treaty where the whole world was divided into two parts, one for Portugal and the other for Spain in the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494). Great Britain also suffered major blows during its double cycle of leadership by challengers such as France and Germany. Significantly, Modelski did not discard the idea that Seapower played a major role in creating dominance, in projecting into the future then, it's imperative to

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<sup>3</sup> Modelski, Long Cycles, 80.



consider the current trends of events that heavily play an important role in the global scene. These include the power of information acquisition, Intel, space exploration, robust internet accessibility i.e., the innovation of 5G, technological might, and advancements. Chinese company Huawei quite recently topped the world in the innovation of the 5G internet. Such advancement is tied to the financial prospects such that, the SWIFT network, for example, speeds up money transactions, the logistics network links the manufacturing of the local sector to the global supply chain, and information and opinions travel across the globe almost instantaneously.<sup>4</sup> The United States having realized sooner or later the carpet will be dragged under its feet quickly issued an ultimatum to countries preparing to patronize the new technology and banned its domestic market from using it as well.<sup>5</sup> China in the last days of 2020 launched a space mission to bring back Lunar rock samples from the moon, such a mission has only been undertaken by two states, the US and the Soviets in the '70s, which quite did not sit well with the US. “China wants to seize the lunar strategic high ground and become the world's pre-eminent spacefaring nation” the vice president of the USA, Mike Pence, stated, in a speech where he iterated that the US would return to the moon by 2024.<sup>6</sup>

The significant impact of the information age after the 1970s due to the efforts of the US government and Silicon Valley (not only but also others) changed the structuring and interaction of societies on the globe. Although the information was shared before, it is nowhere near how fast it is shared now across the globe. It has increased exponentially.<sup>7</sup> The information or digital age has ushered in a society where social practices occur without the necessity of territorial proximity.<sup>8</sup> Events are taken live; political authorities have live conferences with their fellow political leaders from other countries via the internet. This phenomenon has further been strengthened with the coming of the Covid-19 pandemic. The banking system the economic powerhouse of most countries is beholden to the strength of the accessibility of strong networks

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<sup>4</sup> Gokhan Tekir, “Huawei, 5G Networks, and Digital Geopolitics”. *International Journal of Politics and Security* 2, no.4 (2020): 115.

<sup>5</sup> Farrell Henry and Newman Abraham. “Weaponized Globalization: Huawei and the Emerging Battle over 5G Networks”, *Global Asia*, 2021, [https://www.globalasia.org/v14no3/cover/weaponized-globalization-huawei-and-the-emerging-battle-over-5g-networks\\_henry-farrellabraham-newman](https://www.globalasia.org/v14no3/cover/weaponized-globalization-huawei-and-the-emerging-battle-over-5g-networks_henry-farrellabraham-newman) (12.08.2021)

<sup>6</sup> Steven Lee Myers and Kenneth Chang. China Brings Moon Rocks to Earth, and a New Era of Competition to Space. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/science/china-moon-mission-rocks.html> (12.08.2021)

<sup>7</sup> Manuel Castells, *The Rise of The Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010)

<sup>8</sup> Manuel Castells. “Grassrooting the Space of Flows,” *Urban Geography* 20, no. 4 (1999): 295.



and information. The first-comer advantage in a business setting is also applicable and much direr in the setting up and improvement of network systems. Those who create new means and forms of networking in the information or digital age often could restrict either intentionally or by setting up barriers for the newcomers. The first comers or actors affect the rules of adopting the new technology.<sup>9</sup>

About 80% of the world use smartphones and the influence of networking and social media being prevalent has influenced the speed of sharing information.<sup>10</sup> It has created platforms for discussion, pointing out the wrongs of political leaders, sometimes said to indirectly influence elections through the spread of misinformation, perhaps, the so-called domino effect of geopoliticians is seen on social media, given the widespread protests after the gruesome murder of George Floyd in the US, spreading of hate, people being conscientize about their ancestry among others have had a significant contribution on society.

This appears like the age where Sea power was a significant threat to the world power or a means to be a world power.<sup>11</sup> All the world powers in Modelski's Model have had a splendid feature in terms of sea power. This buttresses the point that the mastery or dominance of the prevalent technology in a particular epoch is much needed to assist any country or state that seeks world leadership. Henceforth, dominance in the field of networking or the internet cannot be underestimated. It's a necessity for being a world leader (This is implied by President Xi when he mentioned that 'there is no way that China can ask for or rely on buying the key and core technology from foreign countries'<sup>12</sup>). Some might even say since territorial proximity is in decline in terms of societal activities, the conventional way of the battle for world leadership i.e., through the military might (the global wars or chaos) could be replaced or metamorphosed into global network chaos or war. In this case, the infighting between countries

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<sup>9</sup> Walter Powell, "Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization," *Research in Organizational Behavior* 12, (1990): 304.

<sup>10</sup> Mark Leonard, "Introduction: Connectivity Wars," in *Connectivity Wars Why Migration, Finance and Trade Are The Geo-Economic Battlegrounds of The Future*, ed. Mark Leonard (London: The European Council on Foreign Relations, 2016), 15.

<sup>11</sup> Modelski, Long Cycles, 45


<sup>12</sup> Xi Jinping's Sept. 2020 Speech on Science and Technology Development <https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translation-xi-jinpings-sept-2020-speech-science-and-technology/>. (27.03.2020)



will be predominantly getting hold of the internet or networking. Interestingly, military Intel and the information of spies are shared across the network.<sup>13</sup>

The divide between China and the US in terms of technology is seen in the Top500, an annual chart detailing the five hundred supercomputers in the world. China 2019 has led the US with the number of Supercomputers it has. The fight for the creation of the new technology 5G has been between, unsurprisingly, China and the US. This struggle in the sphere of gaining significant access in the internet age is borne out of the hubris to dominate and take the mantle of world power. This could eventually breed severe confrontation amongst states which will perhaps make the conventional military confrontation obsolete. According to the Nikkei survey, Chinese companies have expanded their dominance in the global high technology market, having outstripped Japan, it is chasing the United States in the number of sectors in which it leads in terms of market shares.<sup>14</sup> More so, China is on a trajectory to overtake the US in Artificial Intelligence supremacy according to former CEO of Google Eric Schmidt.<sup>15</sup>

**Figure 1.** Distribution of the 500 most powerful supercomputers in the world from 2019 to 2021, by country



Source: Statista<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Annegret Bendiek, Nadine Godehardt, and David Schulze, “The Age of Digital Geopolitics,” *International Politics and Society*, <https://www.ips-journal.eu/in-focus/chinas-new-power/article/show/the-age-of-digital-geopolitics-3593/> (10.10.2021).

<sup>14</sup> Staff writers, ‘Chinese tech companies topple Japan, chase US in market share’, Nikkei, 2020, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/Chinese-tech-companies-topple-Japan-chase-US-in-market-share>. (12.08.2020)

<sup>15</sup> Eric Schmidt and Graham Allison, ‘Is China Winning the AI Race?’ Project Syndicate, 2020, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-versus-america-ai-race-pandemic-by-eric-schmidt-and-graham-allison-2020-08> (4.08.2020)

<sup>16</sup> Statista. “Distribution of the 500 most powerful supercomputers in the world 2019 to 2021, by country” <https://www.statista.com/statistics/264445/number-of-supercomputers-worldwide-by-country/> (22.09.2021)



### 3.2. Phase Two (1945–1975) World Power

Consequently, the next phase is the phase of World Power, that is, the second phase where the victor from the global chaos (the first phase) emerges as the world leader. This new world leader enacts new projects, in the form of institutions and sets the global political scene in order. As in the case of the United States, it institutionalized the United Nations, and several significant financial institutions like the World Trade Organization after the world war ended. These institutions are put in place to cement the world leader's position and set the global agenda. Not only does the United Nations sometimes undermine the sovereignty of the state through its UNSC decisions but also, institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization sometimes undermine the economic sovereignty of States in its directives. Here in this phase, most often the country that emerges victorious engages in the global wars rather late and so doesn't exhaust its material strength. After the end of World War II, the USA was arguably the only world power that was not "structurally affected by the conflict" and was able to set a global agenda around the twin themes of National Self determinism and development that established its position as a world leader.<sup>17</sup> Through the 1948 Marshall Plan aid was provided to European countries due to the devastation resulting from the world war. It provided more than \$15 billion in aid to help reconstruct the heavily affected countries. The Marshall Plan is considered a key catalyst to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949.<sup>18</sup> However, considering future events, it posits China to emerge as the dominant power, because of the difference in events in the first phase (i.e., a shift away from the conventional military confrontation to undercutting in the technological, space, and informational domain) the involvement, or the demeanor of the rising world leader will also change. To overtake rivals in this information age, there is fierce development in technology, although, economic and military will be resorted to when need be.

### 3.3. Phase Three (1975–2000) Delegitimation

The Phase of Delegitimation follows the third phase in the four phases of Modelski's Model. This is the period where the benevolence of the world leader starts to be questioned, the order which has been set and running begins now to receive scrutiny, and dissent grows stronger

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<sup>17</sup> History, "Marshall Plan.", 2009, <https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/marshall-plan-1> (05.06.2020)

<sup>18</sup> Colin Flint. Introduction to geopolitics. (New York: Routledge, 2016.)





meanwhile the world leader is relatively strong. In the case of the United States, the burgeoning dissents from both states and non-governmental organizations can't be underestimated, the likes of Iran, Al Qaeda, etc. The ideological basis on which the US promotes international peace and security is in high disrepute i.e., the promotion of liberal democracy and human rights. This began after the campaign war on terror championed by the Bush Administration. People's rights were trampled upon through the preemptive strike initiative, Guantanamo Bay especially was the facility used to molest unjustified tagged criminals, and continued help granted to the Israeli state by the USA at the detriment of the Palestinians also caused a lot of dissent from countries, Iran for example. On a recent note, the way the Trump Administration maltreated immigrants at the border drew international concern, where mothers were separated from their babies, and during his last days how the Capitol was raided by Trump supporters marked a low moment in the institutionalization of democratic principles across the globe which the United States have forever preached. This caused a lot more dissent from outsiders to chastise the double standards of the United States. Brewing dissent caused both the US and Iran to come close to a brink of war when Iran's Solemani was killed by a USA drone strike. China has nonetheless questioned the democratic tenets of the United States as well when the USA sought to infringe on the sovereignty of other countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, China was on abstention when the vote was cast in the United Nations Security Council to intervene in Iraq in the last 90s thus falling within the third phase of delegitimation. In plain words, "the Delegitimation phase coincides with the Clarification phase of the new emerging dominant power", in this projection being China.<sup>19</sup> China has also strengthened its relations with Iran, this relationship can be understood as strategic because of the confrontations Iran has had with the US during the Trump Administration.

What has been obvious is the Monroe Doctrine style of address that the Premier of China, Xi, has issued severally. Xi reiterated that there should be no "bossing and meddling" in the affairs of other countries especially Beijing since it came under pressure for its treatment of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Xinjiang.<sup>20</sup> China's top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, equally, warned the

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<sup>19</sup> Pop, A. and Grigoras, R. Long Cycles: A Bridge between Past and Futures. 6th International Conference on Future-Oriented Technology Analysis (FTA) – Future in the Making Brussels. 2018, <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/fta2018-paper-b5-pop.pdf> (20.03.2021)

<sup>20</sup> Business Standard, "China's Xi launches veiled attack on US, warns against unilateralism", 2021, [https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/china-s-xi-launches-veiled-attack-on-us-warns-against-unilateralism-121042000775\\_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/china-s-xi-launches-veiled-attack-on-us-warns-against-unilateralism-121042000775_1.html) (11.10.2021)



Biden Administration against meddling in the affairs of China in its region.<sup>21</sup> Even Chinese scholars have debated whether China should adopt a full-blown Monroe Doctrine or kick America out of Asia, to the extent that De-Americanization has become a popular term in the political parlance of the Chinese.<sup>22</sup> The recent pullout of US troops from Afghanistan sparked a lot of criticism from different countries. Russia's Putin chided the US in a joint speech with Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel, saying— “it is necessary to stop the irresponsible policy of imposing other people’s values from outside, the desire to build democracy in other countries, not taking into account either historical, national or religious characteristics, and completely ignoring the traditions by which people live”.<sup>23</sup> Gorbachev commented saying America's presence in Afghanistan was a failed enterprise from the start.<sup>24</sup> China has had its share of criticisms against the US as far as the Afghanistan crisis is concerned. There has been significant questioning of the US's principles, especially in the aspects of Human Rights, State self-determinism, etc. due to the posture the US exudes across the globe. It is important to note that sometimes or even most times the sentiments of delegitimation continue till the manifestation of the fourth phase.

### 3.4. Phase Four (2000–2025/30) Deconcentration

The final phase of the model is the Deconcentration phase; this is where the dominant power finally is overwhelmed with a series of confrontations that exhausts its material strength. In reacting to the challenges, the actions and its rhetoric tend to contradict thus highlighting the inefficiency of the world leader. Modelski’s choice of wording is important, he refers to the dominant power as World Leader which denotes the presents of followership, in other words, some countries choose to follow the trend of events willingly whilst others are coerced to do so. In the event of a reaction on the part of the world leader, the followership he gained will be

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<sup>21</sup> James Areddy, “China’s Top Diplomat Warns Biden Against Meddling in Hong Kong, Xinjiang”. The Wall Street Journal, 2021, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-top-diplomat-warns-biden-against-meddling-in-hong-kong-xinjiang-11612243592> (11.10.2021)

<sup>22</sup> Suisheng Zhao. “A New Model of Big Power Relations? China–US strategic rivalry and balance of power in the Asia–Pacific, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 24, 93 (2015): 377-397

<sup>23</sup> Robyn Dixon. “Putin chides U.S. on its actions in Afghanistan — and warns of the risk of terrorism”. Washington Post, 2021, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/afghan-putin-merkel-us1990-failure/2021/08/20/c22cbd54-01d8-11ec-ba7e-2cf966e88e93\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/afghan-putin-merkel-us1990-failure/2021/08/20/c22cbd54-01d8-11ec-ba7e-2cf966e88e93_story.html) (15.11.2021)

<sup>24</sup> Erin Snodgrass. “Mikhail Gorbachev, who withdrew Russian troops from Afghanistan in 1989, said the American campaign was a 'failed enterprise from the start'.” Business Insider, 2021, <https://www.businessinsider.com/mikhail-gorbachev-calls-us-presence-in-afghanistan-failed-enterprise-2021-8> (15.11.2021)



lost because of the contradiction between his rhetoric and actions. Pop & Brinza points out, that although there's the tendency for the West and US to cooperate with China because of the important role China has assumed on the economic front, the globalization role seen in the Belt and Road Initiative and the economic interdependence of China and USA, there's also the tendency of a confrontation between China and the USA because of trade war temptations and military escalation of tensions connected with the status of Taiwan or the traditional disputes over the land of the South China Sea and the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands.<sup>25</sup>

#### 4. The Cold War and Modelski Model

The cold war began shortly after the end of the second war, a covert war between the US and the Soviet Union in 1947. Unlike what the model presages, the world power phase of the US round was confronted with challenges from the Soviet Union. These challenges could be interpreted through the lens of Delegitimation which should have occurred after twenty to thirty years when the world power phase was in session. The cold war is not considered part of the global war or chaos in phase one because first, it involved predominantly two superpowers fighting to impose their understanding of state structuring, one favoring the Liberal capitalist model and the other Communism in the guise of Marxism-Leninism. Second, it was a covert confrontation, which is why it has its name 'Cold' War. The Cold War appears to be inconsistent with the Model because, as represented by the model, there must be one world leader coming out of the global wars or chaos and so, all challenges are squashed through the global war i.e., the first phase. However, at the end of the first phase, that is after the second world war, there seems to have been still a challenger lurking around, the Soviet Union. Unless the world power maintains its innovativeness, and advanced knowledge and creates institutions it will not survive through to the end of its round. The introduction of graduate education, research, and grants into the university system paid off. Between 1903 and 1973, one-third of the Nobel Prizes were awarded to Americans and the significant scientific project, the Manhattan Project (conducting the nuclear weapon) was completed in the United States. These helped to keep the US as the world leader and later the collapse of the Soviet Union. The advent of this incident is rather an exception to the model. This exception was caused because the global political system which the model based on rigorously to devise its interpretation had

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<sup>25</sup> Adrian Pop and Andreea Brînză. "Power Transition and Balance of Power: Comprehending the Power Dynamics of the 21st Century. *Public Administration & Regional Studies* 1, no.19, (2017).



somewhat a different turn in the 1820s. The oceanic voyages at about 1500 created that global layer of interdependence that should be called the global system.<sup>26</sup> This system was a complex system that tend to problem-solving global security etc. through the diverse introduction of innovation.

The Monroe Doctrine kept the western hemisphere from external interference and in return, the US will not interfere in the external affairs of other countries. If the global political system had lacked such an incident (Monroe doctrine), there would have been the test of powers till the global war revealed the ultimate single world power as it did, considering the previous cycles. However, the United States entered the global wars quite late, the Soviet Union was allowed to grow in strength henceforth it was until the inevitable breakaway from the doctrine occurred that finally the US and the Soviet Union experienced some severe confrontations. The breakaway from the Monroe doctrine could be seen in US involvement in the Second World War. Thus, if the Monroe doctrine was implemented the US wouldn't have entered the war at all.

## **5. The Present–The Challenges China Faces**

Before mentioning the challenges, China is virtually ranked the number one country rigorously involved with artificial intelligence with a whopping sum of \$150 billion worth of AI global superpower. The country has benefited immensely from the circa 750 million people using the internet that help with digital data to process.<sup>27</sup> The innovativeness of China is seen through its initiative of the Belt and Road Project, which grants connectivity as of January 2021 through 140 countries that have signed the memorandum of understanding. These countries are forty in Sub-Saharan Africa, 34 countries in Europe (18 EU members) and Central Asia, 25 In East Asia & Pacific, 17 in the middle east and north Africa, 18 in Latin America & Caribbean, and 6 in Southeast Asia.<sup>28</sup> It goes without saying; that China's aforementioned initiative is a significant innovation that puts China at the center stage of steering the helm of affairs. Another important project is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), headquartered in Beijing, China. The creation of the bank was in alignment with the Belt and Road initiative, it also has,

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<sup>26</sup> Modelski, Long Cycles, 25

<sup>27</sup> Smriti Srivastava. "Top 10 Countries Leading The Artificial Intelligence Race." Analytics Insight, 2019, <https://www.analyticsinsight.net/top-10-countries-leading-the-artificial-intelligence-race/> (11.11.2021)

<sup>28</sup> Christoph Nedopil. "Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative"; Beijing, IIGF Green BRI Center, 2021, <https://green-bri.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/> (15.11.2021)



as of January 2021, 103 countries encompassing several countries across the globe. Corporate Finance Institute states, “as a China-led enterprise, the AIIB also serves the purpose of strengthening China’s position as a world economic power”.<sup>29</sup>

The foremost challenge China faces is the distrust that has been created around the name China, through diverse efforts some for political and economic scores. A damning job was done by Trump when he was running for the Republican presidential candidate, he touted the goods and services of China as low standards, and that China involves in malicious economic tactics and technological undercutting to boost their global standing. A detailed example is the incident of 5G. The introduction of the so-called ‘Clean Network Program’ (echoes the Long Telegraph and its eventual policy structure i.e., the Containment of the Soviet Union) was announced in August 2020 by the then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in addition to the announced initiative in April of ‘5G Clean Path’ which was to secure a 5G network for US diplomatic facilities. Mike Pompeo described the initiative as “the Trump administration’s comprehensive approach to guarding our citizens’ privacy and our companies’ most sensitive information from aggressive intrusions by malign actors, such as the Chinese Communist Party”.<sup>30</sup> Prior to the Clean Network Initiative, Huawei in its report said it operated in 170 countries and built over 1500 networks.<sup>31</sup> Close to 80% of the global 5G market was dominated by three companies, Huawei 30%, Ericsson 26%, and Nokia 22%. Huawei led in the development of 5G technology, 35% of the patent related to 5G was owned by Huawei, and the US companies owned less than 5% of the patent. The combined investment of Ericsson and Nokia and other companies in Research and Development lagged that of Huawei.<sup>32</sup> Huawei began also getting a foothold in the EU due to partly the lack of coordination among members to create a common 5G deployment etc. Out of 91 contracts with Huawei 47 of them were in Europe.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Corporate Finance Institute. “What is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)?”, 2020, <https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank-aiib/#:~:text=The%20creation%20of%20the%20AIIB,with%20%24100%20billion%20in%20capital> (15.11.2021)

<sup>30</sup> David Fidler. “The Clean Network Program: Digital Age Echoes of the “Long Telegram”? Council on Foreign Relations, 2020, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/clean-network-program-digital-age-echoes-long-telegram> (15.10.2021)

<sup>31</sup> Huawei Investment & Holding Co., Ltd. 2019 Annual Report, Huawei, 2020, 1. (14.08.2021)

<sup>32</sup> Lorenzo Mariani, and Micol Bertolini. “The US–China 5G Contest: Options for Europe.” Istituto Affari Internazionali, 14, 2019. <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/us-china-5g-contest-options-europe> (12.10.2021)

<sup>33</sup> Dephne Ringuet. “5G: Huawei unveils new infrastructure products aimed at Europe.” 2020, <https://www.zdnet.com/article/5g-huawei-unveils-new-infrastructure-products-aimed-at-europe/> (10.11.2021)



In an address by the undersecretary for Economic Growth, Energy of the Environment, Keith Krach, mentioned, that as of January 1, has launched the Clean Network Initiative already, 26 out of 27 EU members joined, the total of countries that signed unto the initiative was 60 and over 200 telecommunication companies joined. This tanked the burgeoning influence of Huawei's 5G, the company lost its first-year revenue in the fourth quarter of 2020, the sales of smartphones also tanked, and it was forced to launch its brand-new smartphones with 4G instead of 5G.<sup>34</sup> The United Kingdom followed suit in barring the operations of Huawei after some time since it was hesitant to give in to the warnings the US churned out.<sup>35</sup> The choice of wording is very important as the US chose to give the initiative 5G Clean Network, clean gives the understanding that Huawei's choice of 5G is malicious. It reiterates claims that Chinese products should not be trusted. Huawei which is believed to be beholden to the Chinese government suffers then from the China-US rivalry. The ban that was signed by the Trump Administration was later in June 2021 expanded by the new Biden administration.<sup>36</sup>

According to research, due to the pandemic and how the Chinese government is blamed to have watched the virus spread widely, there has been a significant increase in negative evaluations of China across the globe. The data shows (see fig. 1.2) people have grown tremendously unfavorable views toward China. This is a significant challenge to overcome, when views are unfavorable it becomes difficult for China to engage in strategic alliances and coalitions with other countries. Countries will be hesitant to engage with China when they distrust its intentions of China. Under the Modelski model, if China is to succeed in the US it needs a strong coalition and countries to follow the agenda it sets.

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
<sup>34</sup> Lorenzo and Micol, The US-China 5G Contest, 13-15

<sup>35</sup> US Department of State. The Clean Network. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/index.html> (12.11.2021)

<sup>36</sup> David Sanger and David McCabe. "Biden Expands Trump-Era Ban on Investment in Chinese Firms Linked to Military." New York Times, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/03/us/politics/biden-ban-chinese-firms-trump.html> (15.11.2021)



**Figure 2.** Increasingly Negative Evaluations of China



Source: Pew Research Center<sup>37</sup>

Domestically, according to the University of San Diego study, the average level of Chinese faith in the government rose from 8.23 in June 2019 to 8.65 in February 2020 and 8.87 in May 2020. Average ratings (1 to 5 Likert scale) on whether they prefer living under China's political system over others climbed from 3.89 in June 2019 to 4.14 in February 2020, and 4.28 in May 2020. This depicts a significant trust of the populace in the central government although the outside countries see it differently.<sup>38</sup>

Another noteworthy challenge is America seems to be nowhere close to waning in terms of military might if conventional military confrontation is the norm or if technological, information, or internet might is considered the new norm. First, in the past decade, the military expenditure of the USA has tripled that of China. In 2020, according to data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the USA spent 778232 million dollars whilst China spent 252304 million dollars<sup>39</sup>, this is beside China's inability to match the

<sup>37</sup> Pew Research Center. "Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries, 2020, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/> (14.11.2021)

<sup>38</sup> Lei Guang, Margaret Roberts, Yiqing Xu and Jiannan Zhao, 'Pandemic Sees Increase In Chinese Support For Regime, Decrease In Views Towards The US', UC San Diego China Data Lab, 2020, <http://chinadatalab.ucsd.edu/viz-blog /pandemic-sees-increase-in-chinese-support-for-regime-decrease-in-views-towards-us/> (14.10.2021)

<sup>39</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database. 2020 <https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932020%20in%20constant%20%282019%29%20USD%20%28pdf%29.pdf> (11.11.2021)



modernized military of the US after enormous expenditure.<sup>40</sup> On the other side, although China leads, according to the recent data, the USA in terms of Supercomputers, the first top ten supercomputers out of the top500 have five of them from the USA. This signifies that the USA has much quality and faster processing supercomputers than China although in terms of quantity China leads.<sup>41</sup>

## 6. The Future; Theory of Offensive Realism and China's Rise.

In examining the past and current, the models model explains the events between the global power (here the US) and the contender for world leadership (China), however, offensive realism theory much more explains the future events according to China's rise. Modelski's model makes inevitable the decay of global power and the rise of the contender due to exhaustion of material strength and inconsistencies in the demeanor and beliefs of world power.

“The uneven growth of power among states is the driving force of international relations” according to one considered to be the greatest realist, Thucydides.<sup>42</sup> This has also been the inspiration of all realist writers, including Waltz, etc., however, this section discusses Mearsheimer's offensive realism theory. Like all realist writings, offensive realism has similar departing points to Waltz's defensive realism. With Waltz, the balance of power is inevitable and suitable, the utmost priority of States is to seek security in a global political system where there is no hierarchy of power or umpire to seek the welfare of all.<sup>43</sup> It is an “each one for himself” environment. So, weaker states will ally with each other to balance the stronger state. In this way, the stronger state's aspiration of seeking hegemony will be tremendously difficult to attain. With offensive realism, it rejects the notion of the state being security maximizers because no amount of security will satisfy states, henceforth, States are rather power maximizing since that's the only way to ensure their survival in a global system bereft of no umpire. Since balancing power is cost-bearing and a desire to challenge strong states through an alliance with weaker states is a hefty task, Mearsheimer, mentions, that states will buck pass,

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<sup>40</sup> Suisheng Zhao. The US–China Rivalry in the Emerging Bipolar World: Hostility, Alignment, and Power Balance, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 31, no.134, (2022) 169-185,

<sup>41</sup> Top500 List. <https://www.top500.org/news/fugaku-holds-top-spot-exascale-remains-elusive/> (08.11.2021)

<sup>42</sup> Thucydides (1972) *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Warner

<sup>43</sup> Kenneth Waltz. “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory.” in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, edited by Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb, 39-52. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).





that is, they will transfer the responsibility of balancing power to other states until they are in grave danger.<sup>44</sup>

Offensive realism theory to Mearsheimer (2001, 30) is the more accurate situation and plausible solution for states, thus if states want to survive, they should always act like a good offensive realist. It stands on five assumptions, first, *anarchy*, the global political system lacks hierarchy in authority i.e., each one for himself, second, States possess offensive capabilities thereby making them potential threats to other states, third, uncertainty of intentions, fourth, survival goal i.e. every state's goal is to survive, in Mearsheimer's words, to maintain territorial integrity and autonomy of domestic political order, fifth, rationality i.e. States calculate the benefits, risks and act accordingly. Based on these assumptions, Mearsheimer concludes that States are motivated to chase regional hegemony since it's the safest way to ensure their security.<sup>45</sup> Global hegemony is the safest (compared to regional and others), however, it is essentially unattainable, and so states turn to regional hegemony.<sup>46</sup>

### 6.1. The Flaws and Inconsistencies

First and foremost, Mearsheimer conflates means with ends, that is, he does not differentiate between bidding for hegemony and being a hegemon. There is a difference between going through the pain and risking it all for hegemony and being a hegemon.<sup>47</sup> Bidding for hegemony is a risky venture. The question that will be lingering in the minds of States that bid for hegemony will be the chances of surviving the bid to attain the end goal, that is, regional hegemony. The rationality assumption predicts that no state will risk it all for a venture which is likely to crash their survival. "Most great powers are extremely likely to survive, most great powers that bid for hegemony do not".<sup>48</sup>

Second, in the analysis of Mearsheimer, five states have ventured such bid, they are; Imperial Japan, Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the United States. Surprisingly enough, out of the five bidders who attempted only one survived i.e., the United States. However, Mearsheimer is confident other states will imitate Uncle Sam, i.e., take

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<sup>44</sup> Mearsheimer. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), 39-40

<sup>45</sup> Mearsheimer. *Tragedy of Great Powers*, 30

<sup>46</sup> John Lukacs. *George Kennan: A Study of Character*. (New Haven; Yale University Press, 2007), 48

<sup>47</sup> Jonathan Kirshner. "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China." *European Journal of International Relations* 18, no.1, (2010): 53-75

<sup>48</sup> Kirshner, *The Tragedy of Offensive Realism*, 61



after the United States successful bid for regional hegemony, seeing the hopes for success too. Owing to their survival and rationality, States will consider bidding for hegemony through inspiration from the success of the United States and will assess its current situation. The pressing question is, what are the estimates of survival of great powers in absence of a bid? The conservative answer would be 98%, after a successful bid the survival estimate will be 99.99%. However, if the bid has an unsuccessful estimate rate of 50%, then as rational and survival-oriented as States are, will refrain from such a bid.<sup>49</sup>

Finally, to imitate the USA for regional hegemony in hopes that a state will succeed is to presuppose the conditions that allowed the USA such success in their regional hegemony bid applies to all-state. In other words, the environment that allowed the United States to thrive in its quest for hegemony is not similar, not even close to the one presently existing for States who plan on bidding for regional hegemony. The United had weaker neighbors in its backyard and the Western countries who could have been adversaries were also weak. In the presence of a country like the United States currently, a more formidable and stronger state with a plethora of alliances, it will be almost impossible for any other state to thrive in its quest to bid for regional hegemony.

## **6.2. The US-China Rivalry, the Offensive Realism Theory, and Modelski's Model.**

China as a great power, if it decides to bid for hegemony will be rational and consider the goal of survival as a priority, at least according to the theory of offensive realism. Already, China is seated as one of the significant players in the global economy, it is a beneficiary of the global system, as well as a benefactor, i.e., other states, rely on China's huge market size due to its population for exporting goods and services and China also export goods and services to a significant number of States. In just 2008, China was the second-largest export market for States like Argentina, Chile, Iran, Kazakhstan, Taiwan, and South Korea (exported twice as much to China as it did to the United States), amongst others.<sup>50</sup> Thucydides mentions a significant moment in the Hellenistic age, where “indignation was felt against Athens, rooted in apprehension about its imperial aims, which pushed men to favor Sparta”.<sup>51</sup> Not only does

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<sup>49</sup> Kirshner, *The Tragedy of Offensive Realism*, 63

<sup>50</sup> Kirshner, *The Tragedy of Offensive Realism*, 70

<sup>51</sup> Robert Strassler, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War* (New York: Free Press, 1996), 93-4



China lose its close ties with states it exports its goods and services, but also, it pushes states through the indignation they feel about China's hegemonic aims, so, they will ally themselves with other states, conservatively with the United States i.e., when China's hegemonic aspirations are written on the wall. How about when it is unsuccessful in its hegemonic quest? On top of losing close ties, it risks its survival priority, which according to offensive realism theory, it is a candy every state cherishes. What if China's hubris makes it think that since the United States was successful in its bid for regional hegemony there is room for it too? Imitating Uncle Sam, Mearsheimer puts it. First, in the backyard of China is Russia, a state with nuclear weapons that possibly share similar aspirations of regional hegemony, Japan, India, Taiwan, and the Korean state. These are states that could build nuclear weapons in just a jiffy if need be. They have significant market sizes such as India and are significant players in the technological space. Unlike the United States bidding regional hegemony close to a weak now Mexico and Canada states alongside relatively weak external adversaries. France could not handle Louisiana till it sold it to the United States, according to the documents on the Louisiana Purchase.<sup>52</sup> That is indicative of how weak and internally driven European states were (i.e., maximizing power in Europe). Putting a check on or containing the United States in the western hemisphere was not their priority. Most importantly, unlike now, when the United States considered bidding for hegemony in its time there was no United States (or a similar state significant as it) to contain it. This will be a vital consideration for China when it considers bidding for regional hegemony given that the United States can project its military capabilities across the continent or put checks on China as far as its technological or networking might is concerned. Imperatively, "just as containment is not a viable option for the US, regional dominance cannot be a viable objective for China. Neither the US nor China can be the single dominant power" in the Asian region or its sub-region although "many Chinese have seen containment as not just one of many arguments in the US-China policy debate, but the real US policy".<sup>53</sup>

The model of Modelski predicts that, far from what offensive realism theory mentions based on the postulated assumptions that states are power-thirsty and security is their priority

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<sup>52</sup> Colin Elman, Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America's Rise to Regional Hegemony. *American Political Science Review* 98, no4 (2004): 563-70.

<sup>53</sup> Suisheng, The US-China Rivalry in the Emerging Bipolar World, 378



and no amount of power is satisfying to them, go the extreme lengths of maximizing power which seems in their quest for regional hegemony. First and foremost, Modelski's model having its beginning of the cycle in the 1500s due to the rapid and intensive interaction between States after the opening of a direct sea route between Europe, India, and China as well as the discovery of America recognizes the significance of the global political and economic system and how it functions. This global system culminated in the creation of an interdependent globe. The global system generates demand for global leadership. All social systems thrive on two sets of mechanisms, regulation, and development, according to Laszlo.<sup>54</sup> Thus, it appears, above all else, that, innovation is the pathway to world leadership. Innovation is what propels states to the seat of world leadership. It is what has done it for the past five rounds for four states, Portugal, Netherlands, Britain (twice), and the United States vis-a-vis Modelski's model. The global system is a system that cannot go unchecked, it needs repairs to problems, politically, economically, technologically, etc. "A power greater than any hitherto known might be subject to a general law of decay" Thucydides quotes Pericles.<sup>55</sup> Like the global system and world leadership, it decays, and it is the state with the necessary innovation that takes the baton. Portugal's policy of exploration, development, and intercontinental trade, its oceanic navy might (nothing like it had ever seen before until its time) was the innovation that got it the seat of world leadership and kept it there for some time until the Netherlands outstripped it of such authority. After Portugal was plagued with catastrophic sea disasters (*Storia tragico-maritima-tales of catastrophe at sea*), the Netherland by developing a large navy, a shipping industry, building ships, developing land drainage and agriculture, the blend of early nationalism and flourishing capitalism, the effective solution devised in response to the need for integration, (a problem the wars of religion had brought to the fore of the global stage) propelled it to world leadership. Britain's innovativeness such as its political development solved much of the Dutch's problems, the Puritan revolution among others, and the King and Parliament struggle which gave birth to the Act of Settlement in favor of the parliament gave a huge impetus to parliament rule, propelled it to take the world leadership. Most of these problems solved were by learning from the troubles plaguing the Dutch. Britain's second round was also a result of its industrial revolution which was monumental in shaping the cause of history. Simply put, the

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<sup>54</sup> Ervin Laszlo, *Introduction to systems philosophy; toward a new paradigm of contemporary thought*. (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1972).

<sup>55</sup> Thucydides (1972) *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Warner, 64



first round was the innovation in politics i.e., the procedural basis for democracy and the stabilization and delimitation of the political systems, and the second round was the innovation in the economic and industrial sectors. The grounds were much smoother for the advent of markets of continental dimensions which undercuts the influence of sea power and favored continental states. America's innovation was distinct in its production of aircraft, communications (press and movies, the first motion in 1908 were completed in Hollywood), and petroleum. An educational revolution or knowledge revolution was what broke the grounds for America's bid for world leadership.<sup>56</sup>

As far as the US-China rivalry is concerned, it is the introduction of innovative ways and means that will tip the scale (after four modernization (industry, agriculture, science & technology, and defense)<sup>57</sup> efforts there have been significant efforts toward the initiative of innovativeness & ingenuity given how China has become the only country that has all the industrial categories listed by the UN Industrial Classification i.e., it possesses all 39 industrials categories, 191 intermediate categories, and 525 subcategories thus the system could independently produce all its industrial needs).<sup>58</sup> These innovations should be problem-solving in nature. Unlike, offensive realism theory, it's China's ability to solve problems in its innovativeness that will win it a ticket for world leadership or regional hegemony, so to speak. Some problems plaguing this round or century are Climate change, the inequalities experienced or worsened by capitalist machinations, and the menace of disinformation and misinformation, among others. (After WWII, the United States produced about half of the world's GDP, one-quarter towards the conclusion of the Cold War, and just one-seventh today. Once-universal enthusiasm for the United States has waned as a result of recurrent demonstrations of bigotry, political venality, and xenophobia.)<sup>59</sup> The Chinese could have a clear shot at world leadership if its innovativeness could surmount these troubles plaguing the current phase or round. Societal inequalities which some believe to be springing from capitalism could be corrected by economic and political innovations. China, unlike the United States, is not a hardcore capitalist state i.e., it could present an economic model that solves much of the problems faced by the world leader.

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<sup>56</sup> Modelski, Long Cycles, 92

<sup>57</sup> Yan Xuetong, The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 10, 26 (2001), 33-39.

<sup>58</sup> 我国是全世界唯一拥有全部工业门类的国家' ['China is the only country in the world with all industrial categories'], *Xinhua*, 2019, [http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-09/20/c\\_1125020250.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-09/20/c_1125020250.htm). (15.11.2021)

<sup>59</sup> Suisheng, The US-China Rivalry in the Emerging Bipolar World, 183



In terms of Climate change, technological innovations, as well as politics, could give China the impetus to outstrip the United States in its world leadership. China, unlike the United States, is not torn between whether climate change is a facade or a reality. It is making significant moves towards reducing its carbon emissions. It has pledged to be carbon neutral in 2060. China has the largest installed renewable energy capacity, in 2020 renewable energy consumption in China reached 7.8 exajoules which surpasses any other country in the world, and it is the world's largest solar market.<sup>60</sup> In its handling of society, though highly open to criticism, China was applauded by the WHO for its handling of the covid-19 pandemic.<sup>61</sup> China's not too welcoming attitude towards diverse or polarizing speeches kept society under strict check for the so-called betterment of all.<sup>62</sup> China recovered from the epidemic the fastest of any major country, and it was the only large economy to have positive GDP growth of 2.3 percent in 2020.<sup>63</sup>

Although quite early enough, Chinese tech companies have already applied for a patent for the development of 6G technology. According to the current data, 40% of the global application for the patent of the 6G technology is China's against the US's 35%. China leads the 6G charge.<sup>64</sup>

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
<sup>60</sup> Statista. "Leading countries by renewable energy consumption worldwide in 2020", 2021, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/237090/renewable-energy-consumption-of-the-top-15-countries/> (10.05.2021)

<sup>61</sup> Stephanie Nebehay and Emma Farage, "WHO lauds Chinese response to virus, says world 'at important juncture'." Reuters, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-who-idUSKBN1ZS2EE> (15.10.2020)

<sup>62</sup> Elanah Uretsky. "What China did right in handling Covid-19 pandemic – and the United States did not", 2020, <https://scroll.in/article/979357/what-china-did-right-in-handling-covid-19-pandemic-and-the-united-states-did-not> (15.11.2020)

<sup>63</sup> Suisheng, *The US–China Rivalry in the Emerging Bipolar World*, 182

<sup>64</sup> Statista. "China Leads the 6G Charge", 2021, <https://www.statista.com/chart/25794/6g-patents-by-country-region/> (20.05.2021)

**Fig.3** Distribution of 6G Patent Application in 2021

Moreover, in using the Probabilistic Modified Trends School, one of the three approaches in the current state of the art of scenario construction, the following scenarios are mentioned;<sup>65</sup>

a. Under the Grand Entente Scenario, NATO and EU will strengthen their cohesion and reinforce the notion of the West, just like how the Second round of Britain's dominance witnessed a peaceful transition to the USA, there'll be the same transition of hegemonic power, China will take an increased role in the Korean Peninsula which will lead to Korean reunification only after Northern side has denuclearized, from 2040 onwards, China and USA will have a GPI indicator of 15% and 24% respectively.

b. Under the China Teapot Scenario, it posits, that the USA and China will have a GPI indicator of 14% and 23% respectively, the economies of both countries as it'll be in decline the new norm will be a zero-sum game, which will further heighten the competition for resources and dominance, the US will not accept China's desire to expand its market, the two countries will send military forces to strategic areas to test them, there will be no agreement concluded between both countries on the subject of the job market.

<sup>65</sup> Pop, A. & Grigoras, R. Long Cycles: A Bridge between Past and Futures. 6th International Conference on Future-Oriented Technology Analysis (FTA) – Future in the Making Brussels. 2018



c. Under the Back to the Future Scenario, China will prepare itself to become the new hegemonic power and the dispute with the US will reach its height, China's tactics of string pearls of taking control of key ports gradually will lead it into conflict with the US and the EU, China allies itself with Iran, Russia, possibly Turkey after it has left NATO and other non-state actors to challenge US and EU thus the alliance of the West. In 2040, politics will be characterized by open antagonism concerning China's burgeoning dominance, where China will be acting in the same fashion and there'll be frequent disputes in the United Nations.

In economic growth thus 2030 onwards or even closer China is projected to outstrip the US for the biggest economy title.<sup>66</sup> As is seen under both scenarios Grand Entente and China Teapot, the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) that is the measurement of the performance of the economy, China outranks the USA. The GPI differs from GDP because the GPI considers the negative effects the economy has had whilst the GDP centers on the growth of the economy without adding to it the negative sides such as climate change. The GPI indicators put China above the US, in addition, China also gained numerous strategic allies such as Russia, Iran, and Turkey.

## 7. Conclusion

With the Modelski Model in mind, the current time is the phase of deconcentration which means sooner or later the US will be outstripped of the world leadership role. The paper highlighted two significant points among other things, first, China is considered the favorable contender that faces obstacles it needs to deal with, and second, the US's plans of containment are misguided. Another important point is that global wars could take the form of technological warfare be they biological or chemical warfare. Changes in times due to the innovations of the US (as the world leader) could affect the phase of global wars as well. Moreover, China's rise is considered threatening to global peace as far as offensive realism is concerned. The global political system according to the Modelski model produces leadership, therefore China's rise could be considered inevitable meaning reversing course is almost impossible. This is clearly at odds with the cycle's description of the historical events. Venice could not reverse the course when Portugal was on the move because of her vested interest in the existing system, her limited

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<sup>66</sup> Lizzy Burden., "China's Economy Set to Overtake U.S. Earlier Due to Covid Fallout". Bloomberg, 2020, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-26/covid-fallout-means-china-to-overtake-u-s-economy-earlier> (19.12.2021)





natural resources, and her lack of access to the ocean and this trend could be seen in how leaders are being replaced.

“To rule over the whole of the inhabited world regards it as a matter that scarcely requires proof that all existing things are subject to decay”<sup>67</sup>, this round could be extended in the United States' favor when, first, it looks at itself in the mirror, second, determine the woes it faces, third, seek to provide innovation to solve the problems faced largely by this round or cycle and finally, it should have the political will, determination, and courage to accept its wrongs and implement the corrections. These will in turn help the United States in affecting decisions, debating, coalition, administering, welcoming innovations, and being innovative, and these are the qualities to be taken up by the world leader.<sup>68</sup> China has a good shot at the seat when it does not follow the hubris of vague conceptualization of its capabilities and strengths. Although it is a favorable candidate, it is far from easy to materialize. In fact, Modelski in his foresight predicted the Soviet Union as a tough challenger during the deconcentration phase. Hindsight 2022, the Soviet Union did not even make it to the twenty-first century. As the United States is dealing with its problems, the concern of China should be on improving its ingenuity to provide innovative means to walk past the problems of the current round. China must desist from suspicious behavior, trust in the global system is paramount. In 2010 it changed the name of its strategic move from “Peaceful Rise” to “Peaceful Development” which the ex-ambassador of China to France commented saying, “they are essentially the same concept; We changed the terms because some think the word “rise” sounds a bit aggressive, but the phrase “peaceful development” is more peaceable” a depiction of China's concern about the way it portrays itself.<sup>69</sup> Cooperation between the two states is essential, hostilities will result in indignation felt by other states towards the state that flexes its muscles around. And rightly as Pan Wei, a professor at Beijing University, suggested “Nobody can destroy China if China does not destroy itself first”.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Polybius (1979) *The Rise of the Roman Empire* (Introduction by F. W. Walbank)

<sup>68</sup> Modelski, *Long Cycles*, 16

<sup>69</sup> Suisheng, *The US–China Rivalry in the Emerging Bipolar World*, 379

<sup>70</sup> 潘维 [Pan Wei], ‘中华不自乱·无人可乱华’ [‘Nobody can destroy China if China does not destroy itself first’], *环球时报* [Global Times], (25.04.2013)



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