



Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi/Journal of Atatürk Yolu, 71 (2022), 337-373.

Received/Geliş: 17.08.2022

Accepted/Kabul: 21.09.2022

DOI: 10.46955/ankuayd.1163352

(Research Article/Araştırma Makalesi)

BEHIND CLOSED DOORS

The Paris Meetings of the Allies on the Turco-Greek War (20-23 September 1922)

KAPALI KAPILAR ARDINDA

Müttefiklerin Türk-Yunan Savaşı Üzerine Paris'te Yaptığı Toplantılar (20-23 September 1922)

BEHÇET KEMAL YEŞİLBURSA*

ABSTRACT

The Mudanya Armistice and the Lausanne Peace Treaty undoubtedly hold a prominent place in the history of the Turkish National Struggle. Consequently, many studies and publications have dealt with the Armistice and Treaty. However, the current study will deal with the Allies' meetings in Paris on the Turco-Greek War on 20-23 September 1922, rather than the Armistice or Treaty in general. More specifically, it will investigate how the British, French, and Italian politicians (such as Lord Curzon, Poincaré, and Kont Sforza) evaluated the Turco-Greek War, the Armistice and the peace conference. On 20 September, Lord Curzon went to Paris to discuss the matters with the French Prime Minister, Poincaré and his Italian counterpart. The aim of the conference between the Allied generals and İsmet Pasha was to bring an end to the hostilities between Nationalist Turkey and Greece by fixing a line in Eastern Thrace behind which the Greek army would remain. Negotiations came to a deadlock on the third day due to the Turks' demand that Eastern Thrace be given back to Turkish sovereignty in its entirety before the Peace Treaty went into force. The text of a final protocol was prepared by the Allied generals and presented to İsmet Pasha on 9 October with the statement that this was their last word and the limit to their concessions. İsmet Pasha, while impressed at the Allied unity, expressed his reservations over certain points in the protocol and expressed surprise that the French and Italian generals had led him to believe that they would agree to less. Thus, he requested an adjournment to the following day on order for him to consult his government. The final form of the convention was signed early in the morning of 11 October, after a 12-hour long session. The Greek military delegates abstained from signing the protocol, because their instructions required that they did not accept any arrangement which did not treat the borders of Eastern Thrace as being those of 1915. However, three days later on 14 October, the Greek government did adhere to the convention by means of a written declaration handed to the three Allied Commissioners who in turn communicated it to Hamid Bey, the representative of the Ankara government in Istanbul.

Keywords: Kont Sforza, Lord Curzon, Paris, Poincaré, Signor Galli.

ÖZET

Mudanya Mütarekesi ve Lozan Barış Antlaşması'nın Türk Milli Mücadele tarihinde kuşkusuz önemli bir yeri vardır. Dolayısıyla bugüne kadar Mütareke ve Lozan'ı tüm yönleriyle ele alan pek çok çalışma ve yayın yapılmıştır. Bu nedenledir ki mevcut çalışmada ateşkes ve Lozan'ın kendisi ele alınmayacaktır. Daha ziyade, başlıkta belirtildiği gibi, çalışma Müttefiklerin Paris'te 20-23 Eylül 1922'de Türk-Yunan Savaşı ile ilgili toplantılarına bakacak. Daha spesifik olarak, İngiliz, Fransız ve İtalyan devlet adamlarının (Lord Curzon, Poincaré ve Kont Sforza gibi) Türk-Yunan Savaşı, ateşkes ve barış konferansını nasıl değerlendirdiği araştırılacaktır. 20 Eylül'de Lord Curzon, meseleleri Fransa Başbakanı Poincaré ve İtalyan mevkidaşı Kont Sforza ile görüşmek üzere Paris'e gitti. Müttefik generaller ile İsmet Paşa arasındaki konferansın amacı, Doğu Trakya'da Yunan ordusunun geride kalacağı bir hat belirleyerek Milliyetçi Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasındaki düşmanlıklara son vermektir. Barış Antlaşması'nın yürürlüğe girmesinden önce Türklerin Doğu Trakya'nın tamamının Türk egemenliğine geri verilmesi talebi üzerine müzakereler üçüncü gün çıkmaza girdi. Müttefik generaller tarafından hazırlanan nihai protokol metni 9 Ekim'de İsmet Paşa'ya, bunun onların son sözleri ve tavizlerinin sınırı olduğu ifadesiyle sunuldu. İsmet Paşa, Müttefiklerin birliğinden etkilenmekle birlikte, protokoldeki bazı hususlarda çekincelerini dile getirerek, Fransız ve İtalyan generallerinin kendisini daha az anlaşmaya varacaklarına inandırmasına şaşırıldığını ifade etti. Bu nedenle, hükümetine danışmak için ertesi güne bir erteleme talep etti. Sözleşmenin son hali, 12 saatlik bir oturumun ardından, 11 Ekim sabahı erken saatlerde imzalandı. Yunan askeri delegeleri, Doğu Trakya sınırlarını 1915'in sınırları olarak kabul etmeyen hiçbir düzenlemeyi kabul etmemelerini gerektirdiği için protokolü imzalamaktan çekindi. Ancak, üç gün sonra 14 Ekim'de Yunan hükümeti anlaşmaya uydu. üç Müttefik Komiser'e verilen yazılı bir beyanla sözleşmeye kabul etti ve onlar da anlaşmayı Ankara hükümetinin İstanbul'daki temsilcisi Hamid Bey'e iletti.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kont Sforza, Lord Curzon, Paris, Poincaré, Signor Galli.

* Prof. Dr., Bursa Uludağ Üniversitesi, bkyesilbursa@uludag.edu.tr. ORCID: 0000-0001-6309-5703.

Introduction

After the Victory of 30 August, and the capture of Izmir on 9 September 1922, the Turkish forces' turned towards the Straits and Thrace. This made the British Government, who was trying to get out of its crisis, uneasy. The decisions it had taken regarding the crisis had been inconclusive; thus, receiving bad news from all directions, the British Government began to search for ways to deal with the French. On the other hand, France announced that a meeting would be held between the three Allied states (Britain, France, and Italy) in Paris on September 20. This meeting would consider the protection of the freedom of the Straits and prevent the passage of Turkish forces through them. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a statement before the Paris talks, stated that the freedom of the Straits was also of vital importance. However, if the convening of the Peace Conference were unjustly prolonged, Italy would not participate in a military operation. The solution proposed by Italy was as follows: Eastern Thrace should be given back to Turkey, and Western Thrace to Bulgaria, which should be provided with an exit to the Mediterranean, and the freedom of the Straits would thus be preserved.¹

Britain insisted on staying in the neutral zone (Bosphorus). It made it a matter of prestige. However, the fact that Britain held talks to solve the Eastern problem was accepted as an essential step for peace in the eyes of the Allies and the public. The British Government, unable to find the necessary support from its Dominions, sent Foreign Minister Lord Curzon to Paris to determine the terms of the armistice with the Turks and to reach a joint decision with its allies. Curzon left for Paris on 19 September. On the same day, there was a meeting between French Prime Minister Poincaré and British Ambassador Hardinge. In this meeting, Hardinge criticized France for withdrawing its soldiers from the Anatolian coast. He said that this incident had encouraged Mustafa Kemal, and he stressed that the positions in Çanakkale were under threat. Poincaré, on the other hand, accused Britain of pursuing a policy of war. He said that Mustafa Kemal did not recognize the neutral zones, that he would not endanger a single French soldier, that the Turks would not attend the peace conference if their territorial demands were not met, and that there was Turkish sovereignty over Edirne and the Straits. In his speech at the French parliament on the same day, he emphasized that France would not go to war with Turkey.²

Before starting the negotiations, Lord Curzon had wanted to learn Poincaré's opinion through Hardinge. However, France and Italy had clearly expressed their attitude towards Britain. During the difficult negotiations held in Paris between 20 and 23 September, France and Italy's constructive policies positively affected the region's future.

On 20 September, the Paris negotiations began with the participation of Lord Curzon, Poincaré and Count Sforza. During the talks, the issue of British forces in the Straits, the freedom of the Straits and the terms of peace with Turkey were to be discussed. On the morning of 20 September, Lord Curzon and Ambassador Hardinge went to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had a bilateral meeting with Poincaré. Poincaré stated that Mustafa Kemal would not withdraw his armies without taking the places shown in the National Pact and would take action before winter came. Curzon said that the solution to the problems related to Thrace, the Straits and Istanbul could not be left to Mustafa Kemal. Poincaré retorted that they had a victorious army against them, that it was their duty to keep the peace, which he would be promised on the Straits and Thrace issues before inviting Mustafa Kemal to the peace conference, and that France would not participate in a forced operation in Anatolia. According to Curzon, the Turks should be told that Istanbul would be returned, but the Allies should be left free on sensitive issues such as the Straits and the Gallipoli peninsula.³ At the end of this visit, which lasted about two and a half hours, Curzon was unable to persuade Poincaré.

The second meeting was held at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 16:00 on the same day. This time, Ambassador Count Sforza attended the meeting on behalf of Italy. Curzon criticized the French and Italian troops withdrawing from Çanakkale at this meeting. He sought the support of France and Italy. After that, British (Admiral Beatty) and French (Grasset) admirals were accepted into the hall. The admirals were consulted regarding measures that could be taken to prevent the Allied forces from keeping the Dardanelles, and to prevent the Turks from seizing the Straits and crossing to the European coast. No progress was made

¹ İsmail Eyyupoğlu, *Mudanya Mütarekesi*, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2002, 95-97.

² Eyyupoğlu, *Mudanya Mütarekesi*, 95-97.

³ Bilal N. Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk (1919-1938)*, Cilt: 4 (Ekim 1921-Ekim 1922), Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1984. (Belge no. 215), 450-460. Eyyupoğlu, Op. Cit., 95-97.

regarding the Straits.⁴ Poincaré said that he would not send troops to Anatolia, that the Greeks should withdraw to the west of the the Meriç River, and that the Islamic feelings in the French colonies should be considered. Count Sforza also argued that convening a peace conference would be beneficial, Venice was a suitable place for the conference, and that Thrace was occupied by Allied forces instead of Greek soldiers.⁵ Curzon said that he would apply to the government regarding Thrace. He informed London and Istanbul of the decisions taken on the first day, wanting to ensure the situation in the Straits. In the message he sent to London, Curzon stated that he could accept the Meriç border, provided that the Straits remained in British hands and the government approved.⁶ This was because France and Italy continued their policies along the Ankara line and insisted that the Greek Army should withdraw to the west of the Meriç.

The Paris negotiations were the scene of great debates. Therefore, the meeting could not be held on 21 September. Before the second talks on 22 September, the French cabinet assessed the situation and decided to take a tough stance to persuade Britain.⁷ The meeting started at 2 p.m. Curzon stated that Britain did not want war but wanted peace like other states. It did not wish the gains of the 1918 victory to be lost only because of the defeat of Greece. He argued that the Thrace issue should be left to the peace conference, which should be held in a place other than Anatolia.⁸

Poincaré and Sforza responded rather harshly to Curzon. Poincaré repeated that a conference should be held in Mudanya and that Eastern Thrace should be given to the Turks as far as Maritsa. He also added that Mustafa Kemal was not bluffing. Sforza, on the other hand, upon Curzon's criticism of the withdrawal of French and Italian troops from Çanakkale, said that Britain, France and Italy are countries with Muslim peoples, that France and Italy took such an initiative considering this situation, and that he recommended the same way to Britain.⁹

Poincaré was pressing Curzon about the text of the note to be prepared, and the latter started to experience somewhat troubled times. Count Sforza described that moment in his memoirs:

“... During the first half of the session, Curzon came and walked with me in Hologe Hall and suddenly burst into sobs. (Later I learned from Curzon's close friends that he was a greedy person.) He called me: -Don't you find it horrible to be treated like this? I have never been exposed to such a conversation in my life. Curzon took a silver drink from his jacket and took a swig of brandy. I felt so disconcerted that, to appease him, I said that I was also subjected to such negative actions by Poincaré. The work I did was the act of a parent who lied and deceived children who were having a tantrum. At that moment, I explained to him what Curzon's personality meant to me. This former regent and Foreign Secretary of the British Empire seemed like someone who controlled everything, and in many ways, he was. However, his spirit remained as that of a desperate Oxford student who had not won first place. I told him that Britain was a strong country.”¹⁰

Half an hour later, Poincaré apologized, leaving the meeting room. The incident was settled, and the negotiations continued from where they had left off. However, there was no change in Curzon's attitude. Thus, the second meeting held on 22 September ended inconclusively. Curzon sought instructions from London in light of recent developments. The Cabinet agreed to hand over Eastern Thrace and Istanbul to Turkey. On the other hand, he declared that the Turkish forces should not be allowed to cross into Europe and that the Straits should remain in the hands of the Entente Powers until the end of the peace conference.

In the third round of negotiations, which started on 23 September, Poincaré stated that bargaining could be made on anything other than the Thrace border and that a joint note would mean nothing unless the Meriç and

⁴ Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Mondros ve Mudanya Mütarekelerinin Tarihi*, Ankara, 1948, 153.

⁵ Zeki Sarıhan, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlüğü*, IV, Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1996, 688; Eyyupoğlu, Op. Cit., 98-99.

⁶ Şimşir, Op. Cit., 479-480.

⁷ Sarıhan, Op. Cit., 604.

⁸ Şimşir, Op. Cit., 507.

⁹ Şimşir, Op. Cit., 502-503.

¹⁰ Comte Sforza, *Les Batisseurs De L'Europe Moderne*, Paris, 1931, 87-88.

Edirne were mentioned. To Curzon, he said that he agreed to leave the Meriç and Edirne to Turkey as per the instructions he had received from London.¹¹ However, the discussions went on for hours.

First Meeting¹²

The first Meeting was held French, with President Poincaré and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Lord Curzon at the Quai d'Orsay, 11 am, Wednesday, September 20, 1922.¹³

Poincaré began by asking Lord Curzon to open the conversation. Lord Curzon said he would begin by summarising the situation and presenting the British Government's justification for its attitude. He did not refer to past history, except to remind Poincaré that all attempts to bring Mustafa Kemal to a conference after the Allied meeting in Paris the previous March had failed. After a long exchange of notes between the French and British Governments, they agreed on Venice as the conference venue. Mustafa Kemal had then, however, decided to attack, and the Greek defence of Anatolia had collapsed. It became apparent from that moment that the territorial question in Anatolia had been liquidated. However, the problem of protecting the racial and religious minorities, which the French and British Governments were equally pledged to provide for, remained.

On the other hand, the European question (Thrace, the Straits and İstanbul) was left to be decided. Nothing, however, had occurred to modify here the broad principles of agreement reached the previous March, and in so far as modification would be required, it ought to be arrived at in friendly consultation between the Powers, either by themselves, or preferably in a full peace conference. The British Government was unable to admit the view that a decision on these questions could be taken out of their hands by Mustafa Kemal. It was not for him to settle such questions as those of the Straits or Thrace, or even to prejudge them in any way by a military occupation. Nor could he be allowed to rush the position at İstanbul and thus set the whole of the Balkans aflame. These questions must be settled by conference and not by force - by negotiation and not by invasion. They were emphatically matters for the Allies; and there would be nothing more disastrous than a failure to settle them by agreement and co-operation between the Powers. The question would arise later how far other Powers were involved in the question of the Straits; for the moment, it was a matter primarily for the Great Powers alone. Meanwhile, action had been taken in two directions - at İstanbul by the three High Commissioners and generals, and in Europe by the Allied Governments. It was satisfactory to know that when danger threatened at İstanbul General Sir Charles Harington had acted in complete accord with his French and Italian colleagues, who had agreed with him as to the dispositions necessary to represent the Allied flags on the İzmit peninsula and on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles. He had already reported the actual steps taken to

¹¹ Şimşir, Op. Cit., 517-524. The Ankara Government was also trying to obtain information from these meetings in Paris as much as they could. Paris Representative Ferit Bey, in a telegram he sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 20 September; Stating that Britain was in retreat, he suggested increasing the pressure on Çanakkale. See Salahi Sonyel, "Fiftieth Anniversary of Mudanya Ceasefire", *Bellekten*, XXXVII, Year: 1973, 95-111.

¹² British Secretary's Notes of Conference between the French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay, 11 am, Wednesday, September 20, 1922.

Present: France: M. Poincaré; M. Laroche; Secretary, M. Massigli. Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston; Lord Hardinge of Penhurst; Secretary, Mr. Forbes Adam. TNA/FO/424/254 (No. 523), 278-285. See DBFP-I/ XVIII, (No. 41), 38-50.

See *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVII, Greece and Turkey, January 1, 1921-September 2, 1922, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1970. (Here after DBFP-I/XVII).

See *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

See Bilal N. Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk (1919-1938)*, Cilt 4 (Ekim 1921-Ekim 1922), Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1984. (Belge no. 215), 450-460.

¹³ British Secretary's Notes of Conference between the French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay, 11 am, Wednesday, September 20, 1922.

Present: France: M. Poincaré; M. Laroche; Secretary, M. Massigli. Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston; Lord Hardinge of Penhurst; Secretary, Mr. Forbes Adam. TNA/FO/424/254 (No. 523), 278-285. See DBFP-I/ XVIII, (No. 41), 38-50.

See *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVII, Greece and Turkey, January 1, 1921-September 2, 1922, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1970. (Here after DBFP-I/XVII).

See *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

See Bilal N. Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk (1919-1938)*, Cilt 4 (Ekim 1921-Ekim 1922), Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1984. (Belge no. 215), 450-460.

place detachments of the Powers in both places. Meanwhile, the British Government had asked the French Government what was their point of view regarding the defence of the neutral zones around İstanbul, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles: and Lord Curzon had received with much satisfaction Poincaré's note of the 14th September stating that the French Government thought it most desirable, in agreement with the British Government, to maintain the neutrality of the zones occupied by the Allies, without, however, prejudging the future peace, and that they were ready, in concert with the British and Italian Governments, to inform the Ankara Government that the Allied Governments expected that these zones would be respected by the Turkish troops.¹⁴

Sir Horace Rumbold had immediately been instructed to make a communication to the Ankara Government in conjunction with his Allied colleagues. There was some doubt as to whether these instructions had been acted upon at once; but Lord Curzon had received a telegram that day reporting that the communication to the representatives of the Ankara Government at İstanbul had been formally made by the High Commissioners on 19 September 1922.

The British Government naturally drew the only possible conclusion from the terms of Poincaré's above-mentioned note - that the Allied forces were prepared to defend both zones, and that they would never permit Mustafa Kemal to violate them. The British Government had thought and hoped that the declaration of the Allies would be itself sufficient to deter Mustafa Kemal from any attempt to violate either zone. At the same time, they had continued to receive from their representatives at İstanbul and in the Straits zone alarming information as to Mustafa Kemal's intentions. His forces were reported to be advancing northwards from İzmir, and already actually to have reached the borders of the neutral zone. The British Government had heard further that Mustafa Kemal had announced his intention of settling the question of Thrace by crossing to Europe and deciding it by force of arms. They also heard that he was threatening the İzmit position. Meanwhile, advice was said to be reaching Mustafa Kemal from many quarters to settle the whole question at once, without a conference, behind the backs of the Great Powers. With this object he was counselled to provoke a rising at İstanbul, and to encourage the military bands that were already said to be active in Eastern and Western Thrace. In consequence of these reports, and in pursuance of a policy which they firmly believed to be that of the Allies as a whole, the British government had resolved to reinforce the Allied positions at Çanakkale and İstanbul. At Çanakkale, up to the time of that decision, there had only been one British battalion, the garrison at Gallipoli comprising a French Senegalese battalion, but with the establishment of the three flags at Çanakkale, and relying on their presence there, the British Government had proceeded to order all available reinforcements to that place. There was already a considerable British force there (one squadron of cavalry, two battalions of infantry and a battalion of field artillery). Further, the British Government had decided to send as large naval reinforcements as could be obtained from the neighbouring waters, and had no intention of allowing Kemal to take the position out of the hands of the Allies, or to cross the Straits at any point. All the available British forces were ready to support this decision, and Admiral Beatty, who had come to Paris specially for the purpose, would explain to Poincaré the precise steps which had been taken by the British navy, and the naval reasons which justified the British Government in confidently believing that Mustafa Kemal could not attack or cross the Straits.¹⁵

Lord Curzon wished here to recall to Poincaré the fact, of which he had already reminded him in March that Gallipoli was a sacred and imperial interest of the British Empire; and the recent appeal of the British Government to the Dominions and their response showed their ready recognition of this fact.

The attitude of the British Government was similar in regard to the positions at Scutari and İzmit. Again, in pursuance of what they believed to be the Allied policy, the British Government had reinforced, with all the means at their disposal, the positions there, and were ready, with their Allies, to prevent an invasion of Europe across the Bosphorus by the Kemalists. It had been stated in some quarters that the whole situation could have

¹⁴ See Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa. "The Armistice of Mudanya according to British Documents", Selcan Koçaslan (Yay. Haz.) *Mudanya Mütarekesi'nden Günümüze Bursa Uluslararası Sempozyumu 26-28 Eylül 2013, Bildiriler*. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayını, 2015.

¹⁵ See Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa. "İngiliz Yıllık Raporlarına Göre Mudanya Mütarekesi (3-11 Ekim 1922)", *Mondros Mütarekesi'nin 100. Yılı: I. Dünya Savaşı'nın Sonu Mütarekeler Ve Barış Antlaşmaları Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, 24-26 Ekim 2018. Kahramanmaraş, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2019, 1009-1032.

been easily liquidated by diplomacy, and that the forcible measures of precaution taken by the British Government were unnecessary and even dangerous. It would be well, however, to remember that diplomacy was not always effective in checking an Asian army flushed with victory, and any weakness on the part of the Allies would simply have been an invitation to Mustafa Kemal to cut the Gordian knot by force of arms. The British Government had therefore thought it necessary to act promptly. Had Mustafa Kemal been permitted to advance to both the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles he could at any moment during the conference have decided to break up the peace discussions and dictate his own terms by throwing his sword into the scale. For the rest, the British action in sending reinforcements was identical in procedure with the recent French action in bringing forces from Syria to Chatalja (Çatalca) when the Greeks were threatening those lines. Both had been perfectly legitimate actions. Indeed, up to the present the British Government had believed that the steps they had taken had the full sympathy of the French Government, since they were in pursuance of an agreed policy. It was therefore with considerable surprise that Lord Curzon had heard that the French Government had given orders the previous day to withdraw the French contingent from Çanakkale. This step seemed a direct invitation to Mustafa Kemal to pursue his designs, relying on France and on the fact that the British forces were faced with the alternative of either defending alone the neutral zone (which the other Allies recognised), or of withdrawing and allowing Mustafa Kemal to settle matters in his own way.¹⁶

As regards the position at İzmit, there was still some doubt as to whether the French troops had equally been withdrawn from the Allied position in front of Üsküdar, but on this point, as well as on the question of the withdrawal from Çanakkale, Lord Curzon sought the fullest explanations which Poincaré was prepared to give him. At the same time, it was his duty to point out that if the French Government took the pointed action of withdrawing their forces in one or both of these areas, it was a clear indication to Mustafa Kemal that France was not ready to support Britain, who would have to act alone. Lord Curzon thought it unnecessary to indicate to Poincaré the grave consequences to the alliance and, indeed, to the future of Europe of this step. For the moment, he would only ask for the fullest explanation of French policy. The British Government had been carrying out an Allied policy, and had applied it in practice with sincerity, courage and promptitude. There was no new factor necessitating a breach of this Allied unity. In Lord Curzon's opinion, it would be disastrous and deplorable to allow it to be broken by the victorious Kemalist forces. To permit Mustafa Kemal not only to beat the Greeks, which was a comparatively easy task, but also to overcome the Allies, would have consequences, the range of which it would be impossible to forecast. Lord Curzon had come to Paris to concert urgent steps with his Allies had to save the situation, while it was still possible, and to insist on an immediate conference to settle the political issues. He would not now trouble Poincaré with the question of the place and form of the conference, and the Powers who should be represented at it. These were points which he would be ready to discuss later. For the present he would only confine his statement to the full account which he had just given of the naval and military; steps taken by Great Britain, and their desire to maintain the Allied position in the Straits area in the interests of a continued alliance and of the peace of Europe.¹⁷

Poincaré began by thanking Lord Curzon for his full and lucid statement. He was unable, however, to accept the explanation which Lord Curzon had given of the failure since The previous March to bring Mustafa Kemal to a conference. He would recall that he had explained on several occasions during the March discussions that he feared the Turks would not accept the proposals upon which they were agreeing and would only become more and more exacting. A time would soon come when the Allies would find themselves powerless to impose any terms at all. In his opinion, events had proved his forecast to be perhaps too optimistic. In his talks with Fethi Bey and Ferid Bey, Poincaré had repeated how deplorable it would be if Ankara were to take the offensive when an Allied conference had been practically decided upon at Venice. His advice had, however, not been taken, and the Turks had been too well informed about the state of the Greek forces not to resist the temptation to attack. Incidentally, Romanos had told him the day before that the Greek commanders had been deceived by the information given to them by alleged deserters and refugees from the Kemalist army to the effect that the latter was demoralised. Be that as it may, the position today was that the Allies could no longer maintain the position

¹⁶ See Seçil Akgün. "Mudanya Silah Bırakışmasında Yabancı Temsilciler". *70.Yılında Mudanya Mütarekesi ve Uluslararası Sonuçları, Bildiriler*. Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1993, 49-65.

¹⁷ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

which they had taken up in The previous March. They were now confronted with a nation of fanatics flushed with victory, and it had become a question of saving the general peace of Europe and Asia.¹⁸

At this point Poincaré read a telegram which he had received from General Pellé from İzmir that morning. The general reported that he had just had a long conversation with Mustafa Kemal to whom he had intimated as clearly as possible the exact nature of the Allied note as to respecting the neutral zones. He had urged Mustafa Kemal not to abuse his victory and to show Europe that the Turkish State, of which he was the head, was a modern civilised organism. Mustafa Kemal had protested his friendship with France and his desire to avoid conflict with the Allies, but he had frankly stated that he could not stop his troops now from occupying all the territory covered by the national pact. It was for the Allies to realise the situation and to allow his troops to occupy İstanbul and Thrace. The Greeks could not defend the latter and he, Mustafa Kemal, had no intention of occupying more territory than the national pact contemplated. For the rest he was only sending the minimum of troops and men necessary to maintain order in Thrace, but he must finish the campaign before the winter. Delay would be fatal. He also feared the Allies had no real intention of abandoning İstanbul. He concluded by stating that he was summoning his Government to İzmir and expected them the next evening. He would ask General Pellé and the French Government to await the full reply of his Government.

Poincaré suggested that in these circumstances, it was essential to have a conference as soon as possible. To this the Turks must come, but if the Allies told them now that they were not to be allowed to pass the Straits or to occupy the zones they would simply refuse to come to the conference, and meanwhile attack. France, for her part, could not defend herself against such an attack. On the one hand there was a moral impossibility. France was a Muslim Power and could not neglect the serious situation which was arising in all her Muslim colonies. Poincaré here quoted a telegram from Tunis explaining the numerous telegrams of congratulation sent by the natives to Mustafa Kemal on his victory. These telegrams have been held up by the French authorities, but would eventually have to go forward. Again the Governor of Indo-China had told him only the previous day that a war between France and Turkey would be completely misunderstood in that colony. The community of feeling between Asiatics was so strong there, and the Governor said that the Annamite troops sent to Syria had told him before their departure that they would only go when they were assured that they would not have to fight against Turkey. Poincaré felt that Lord Curzon, as perhaps the only British statesman who had ever visited the colony of Indo-China, would appreciate the force of these facts.¹⁹

In addition to the moral question France was faced with the material impossibility. It had no forces to send there. Only recently the Commission of Finance of the Chamber of Deputies had expressed their anxiety regarding the small credit with which the French Government wished to cover the expenditure on additional forces to be sent to the East. It was only when Poincaré explained to the commission that the forces were intended to defend İstanbul against the Greeks, and in no circumstances for an attack upon Turkey, that they had voted the required sum. To prevent the passage of the Straits it was not enough for the Allies to make declarations. Either they must have sufficient strength to prevent the passage of the Straits, or they must persuade the Turks to come to a conference. If the Allies stuck to the March proposals there was no hope of a successful step in the latter direction. Poincaré did not believe that they would accept the March proposals regarding either Thrace or Gallipoli.²⁰

Regarding the action of the Allied commanders at İstanbul in establishing the three flags at Çanakkale and İzmit, Poincaré emphasised that the only step to which the French Government (as distinct from the French Government's subordinates) had agreed to was to send to the Ankara Government the Allied note asking them to respect the neutrality of the two States in İstanbul. The French Government, however, had never agreed to send troops to force Turkey to accept the neutrality of these zones. They never even agreed to send French troops to the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. It was true that General Pellé had acted on the spot in a spirit of camaraderie, but as soon as Poincaré had learnt it, he had thought the step dangerous and had sent contrary instructions. It must be remembered that there were Turkish irregulars in the

¹⁸ See Selahattin Tansel. *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya*. Cilt: IV. Ankara, 1974.

¹⁹ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

²⁰ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

neighbourhood who might attack quite apart from regular troops. Once a shot had been fired, the outbreak would extend. It was not a question of France favouring the Turks. All France desired was an honourable peace. At the same time, to secure that peace, France was not prepared to defend the Greeks. It was true that Greece had been an ally of France for a time during and since the war, but it had then elected to bring back King Constantine who was responsible for shooting of French troops in the streets of Athens. There was here for France a question of sentiment like that of Gallipoli for the British Empire.²¹

Poincaré here recorded that Ferid Bey had come to him the previous day officially to inform the French Government that Mustafa Kemal would not cross the Straits immediately, but that he had among his followers extremists elated by victory who might drive him to precipitate action.

In these circumstances Poincaré considered that there could only be one answer to the question, whether Allied troops were to stop the advance of the Turks. It was a material impossibility and the only action which they could take was to persuade the Kemalists to come to a conference. For this purpose they must tell him plainly that he was to obtain İstanbul, and that the Allies would offer him an acceptable settlement in Thrace and Gallipoli. Hitherto France had refrained from giving any such assurance alone without her allies to Kemal.

As for precautionary measures, Poincaré recognised the prompt answer given by the Dominion Governments to the Mother Country, but before such reinforcements could arrive on the scene something irreparable might take place. In the opinion of the French Government there were not sufficient naval forces on the spot to stop the Turks crossing the Straits or the Sea of Marmara, especially in isolated packets of men. He therefore repeated that France's only wish was to obtain peace and that she only disagreed with Britain on the question of means for this purpose. It felt that the Turks would not be stopped now merely by the arrival of Allied reinforcements, and feared that a Turkish attack would be followed by a Bulgarian attack on Serbia and by a Russian attack on Poland and Romania.²²

To bring the Turks to a conference, it was essential to tell them openly in the invitation which of their wishes would be met. They must even be given promises as to terms of peace, and if Britain thought that it could not do this alone nor join in such an Allied communication, France must do it alone. Otherwise, Poincaré felt sure that the Turks would never come.

Lord Curzon said that he would like to answer some, at any rate, of the points raised by Poincaré. He would begin with the various issues involved in the explanation just given as to the withdrawal of the French troops from the southern shore of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. When the French Government suggested the Allied declaration as to defending neutral zones and had agreed to the French signature being put to the communication to the Ankara representative at İstanbul, the British Government had thought the latter a serious action taken to support its application. The British Government had hoped for some act of Allied solidarity similar to that taken by the British in the defence of the Çatalca line against the Greek threat upon İstanbul. If General Harington had answered General Charpy's appeal as the latter had been instructed by the French Government to answer General Harington's, and if General Harington had then excused himself by saying that the British were the friends of the Greeks and could not risk having to fire upon them, the French would have been shocked, and would have thought such action inconsistent with the alliance. It now appeared that the French general on the spot had been only too anxious to help General Harington, but that his action had been disavowed, and in consequence the French forces had been withdrawn both from Çanakkale and apparently, although this was not quite clear, from İzmit.²³

If, as appeared to be the case, Mustafa Kemal was now to be allowed to violate the neutral zones and to remain in unrestricted control of the shores of the Marmara and the Straits opposite Gallipoli and İstanbul, a very serious position for Britain would arise.

²¹ See Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı. *Türk İstiklal Harbi, Batı Cephesi 6'ncı kısım 3'ncü kitap Büyük Taarruzda Takip Harekâtı*. Cilt: II. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 1969.

²² *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

²³ See Hasan Köni. "1922 Yılı ve Mudanya Ateşkes Anlaşması". *70.Yılında Mudanya Mütarekesi ve Uluslararası Sonuçları, Bildiriler*. Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi, Bursa, 1993.

Poincaré had offered in return as slender encouragement of Ferid's assurances that Kemal would not cross the Straits at once. As a matter of fact, the latter could not and would not be allowed to cross them. For the rest, the British Foreign Office knew in fact from their own sources of information that Ferid had actually advised Mustafa Kemal to cross the Straits and attack the Allies.

Lord Curzon had understood Poincaré to say that it was impossible for the Allied military forces to prevent Kemal from crossing the Straits and the Sea of Marmara, and in consequence his advice was that the Allies should abandon the game and accede Mustafa Kemal all his demands in advance of the conference. He would therefore ask Poincaré to hear Admiral Beatty's opinion on this subject. He would be in a position to explain that the British naval forces on the spot would soon be quite sufficient to prevent Kemal from crossing the waters between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Lord Curzon would ask Poincaré to consider seriously what value a conference would have if Kemal were to be allowed to advance and take possession of Thrace, İstanbul and Gallipoli. The British Government wanted a conference, but it must be a conference with reasonable chances of success.

He could not understand the French view that to induce Mustafa Kemal to come to the conference the Allies must concede him in advance all the terms of the national pact. Lord Curzon saw no reason why the terms of the March conference must be torn up simply because 70,000 Turks had driven the Greek forces into the sea. There was, of course, the question of Muslim opinion to be considered. It was a factor with which the British Government had to deal in Egypt, India and Mesopotamia, just as the French Government had to deal with it in Indo-China, Morocco and Tunis. Still, it was not a factor that compelled the British to surrender the fruits of victory and agree to set up a State of militant Turks in Europe. He fully agreed with Poincaré that the sooner the conference was held the better, but there was no reason to bribe Mustafa Kemal in advance by conceding the full national pact. The main point was that the Allies should not enter the conference divided. It would therefore be necessary to consider before the conference, questions such as the future of Gallipoli. Here Poincaré had spoken as if it were quite enough to trust the word of Mustafa Kemal but the British Government could not take such risks. Then there was the question of İstanbul. Lord Curzon had been surprised to hear doubts expressed in certain quarters as to the Allied attitude in this matter. So far as the British Government was concerned, the March proposals stood in this respect, and as soon as peace was ratified the Allied troops would be withdrawn. Thirdly there was the question of the frontier in Thrace. Many lines had already been discussed, but there was no need to say before the future conference that such and such a frontier was the final decision of the British Government and of the Allied Governments. On this point the Turks, Greeks, Romanians and Serbs must all be heard. As to the fears expressed by Poincaré of Bulgarian and Russian action, Lord Curzon had seen Ninchitch, the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs, in London, and he was seriously alarmed concerning Mustafa Kemal's advance in Thrace. The British Government had already consulted the Romanians Government. From recent communications, Lord Curzon understood that they were also very anxious about the situation and were prepared to resist Mustafa Kemal's attack by military measures.²⁴

Meanwhile Lord Curzon would urge Poincaré to reassure the Turks that all points which he had stated would be taken into grave and sympathetic consideration by the Allies. Moreover, the Allies were perfectly willing to give up İstanbul after peace was established and that an acceptable frontier would be found in Thrace. However, regarding the Straits and Gallipoli, their freedom must be clearly defined. For the rest, it was essential that the Allies should stand together, and in this respect France needed to realise the dangerous position which would be created if Great Britain were to be left to stand alone while Turkey was given every assurance by the French Government that all its demands would be conceded. He could not sufficiently emphasise that the British action in this matter was not one of bluster and bravado. He hoped Poincaré would be convinced of this by the statement which Admiral Beatty was to make that afternoon.²⁵

Poincaré asked for permission to explain further the French attitude toward the note on the neutral zones. He recalled that he had refused to send any ultimatum to Ankara during the March discussions, and Lord Curzon and Signor Schanzer had yielded to his point of view. Nevertheless, Poincaré had regarded the note that the

²⁴ See Yusuf Hikmet Bayur. *Türk İnkılap Tarihi*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991.

²⁵ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

Allied Foreign Ministers had then sent to İstanbul, Ankara and Athens as serious, just as the present note about the neutrality of the Straits was serious. France could not take any forcible action in Anatolia. In the previous March, the idea that Allied troops were to be established on the southern shores of the Straits was never considered. As regards Çatalca, the French had had a battalion there already when the Greeks threatened the Allies, and they had only reinforced it. They had never had any troops south of the Straits. It would be physically possible to stop the Greek advance, but it would not be so to stop the Turkish advance. If their true intention was to prevent the Turks from reaching the Straits, rather than adopting a threatening stance, the Allies needed to do all in their power to bring Mustafa Kemal to a conference. For the rest, Poincaré did not wish to give up everything to the Kemalists. There were many points, for example, minorities, the Allied garrison at Gallipoli, and the military provisions of the future treaty, which would have to be debated at length with the Turks. Regarding the Straits, their problem would have to be settled one way or another. The League of Nations could have found the best solution, but as regards the territorial provisions of the national pact, the Allies must be prepared to meet the Turks in advance in some measure. Even supposing, as Lord Curzon seemed to think, that the Allies would be capable of preventing the Turks from reaching Europe, the Turks would turn again to Syria and Mesopotamia. In turn, Bulgaria would attack Yugoslavia, and Russia, Poland and Romania. In these circumstances, it seemed to him an act of blindness to invite the Turks to a conference based on the March proposals. This did not mean that he wished to take the Turkish word as a sufficient guarantee for Gallipoli. Serious safeguards would have to be provided, even if the Allies were to accept nominal Turkish sovereignty. As for Thrace, the Yugoslavian Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that he would accept a common Turco-Bulgarian frontier and had stated so publicly in the press in Paris. He could only repeat that it was useless to tell the Turks to come to a conference and simply to rely on Allied justice while, in the meantime, barring their route to Europe by military measures. The Turks must be promised a settlement on certain points in advance, even if others were left for examination and discussion at a future conference. This was the only way to persuade them to come to a conference.²⁶

Lord Curzon proposed to discuss the question of the conference later, but desired first to return to a point about the seriousness of the document intimating to Mustafa Kemal the Allied intention to defend the neutral zone. The question of its seriousness could be measured by the fact that it was immediately followed by the French and Italian withdrawal of troops from the two vital places in the zones. Poincaré was correct in saying the Allied occupation had been confined under the March proposals to Gallipoli and the northern shore of the Sea of Marmara as far as Rodosto. However, those were provisions for the final peace settlement. Meanwhile, under the Armistice, Allied action had fixed neutral zones for the safety of the Straits and İstanbul. A number of questions arose. Were these safeguards now to be overthrown by one-sided French action? How were the Allies to convince Turkey to accept demilitarised zones south of the Asiatic shores of the Straits in the final settlement if Mustafa Kemal was allowed to advance to occupy the neutral zones, which were only part of the larger demilitarised areas contemplated in the final settlement? Lord Curzon trusted that Poincaré would consider the gravity of the French action in withdrawing from Çanakkale in the light of these observations.²⁷

Turning to the question of the conference, Lord Curzon agreed that there were several points, such as minorities, and the military provisions of the treaty, which would have to be discussed in the future conference. However, he did not see why all the territorial questions, such as Thrace, the Straits, İstanbul and Gallipoli, were to be settled prior to such a conference. It was true that the British might have needed to modify the March frontier of Thrace, and Lord Curzon did not desire to exclude the possibility of nominal Turkish sovereignty being allowed in Gallipoli. However, these were all issues for discussion in the future conference.

Concerning Poincaré's fears toward Syria and Iraq, the British Government was prepared to run the risk. However, they trusted that the French would have no trouble in Syria. Indeed, they felt confident that, as a result of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement of October 1921, France had real insurance against such difficulty. The British stance was that a firm display of Allied unity would be the best way to make the Turks pause if they were really contemplating an attack on Syria and Iraq.

²⁶ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

²⁷ See Orhan Hülagu. "Mudanya Mütarekesi (3-11 Ekim 1922)", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Sayı: 39.

Poincaré asked to be allowed to add a few words regarding the Allied occupation of the neutral zone. He wished to point out that only the French Government could settle vital movements of French troops, and it was their view that these troops should not be exposed on the southern shores of the two Straits. Even if British naval action could prevent the Turks from crossing the Straits, the force at Çanakkale was hopelessly exposed. He again emphasised that an immediate conference was vital and that the Turks must be persuaded to come to it. If France were to join with Britain in shutting the Straits without agreeing to give the Turks some hope of substantial assistance in the future conference, it would simply be courting disaster in Syria, trouble in its colonies, and a significant Muslim upheaval in Asia.

Second Meeting²⁸

At Poincaré's request, Lord Curzon opened the conversation. He referred first to a minor point raised by Poincaré that morning: the views of Ninchitch appearing in the press that morning, notably the "Matin", about the Turco-Bulgarian frontier. The Serbian Charge d'Affaires had since called at the British Embassy to explain that Ninchitch formally denied the version of his interview given in the press; the gist of all that he had said was that Anglo-French unity was essential.²⁹

Poincaré explained that the declaration of Ninchitch, to which he had referred that morning, was not that given by the "Matin", but were the views that the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs had explained to Poincaré himself. He then said that he did not care much about a common Turco-Bulgarian frontier one way or the other but feared a bloc between Bulgaria, Turkey and Russia.

Lord Curzon said that he must now recur to the point of significant importance: the withdrawal of France and Italy from Çanakkale and İzmit. The Allied commanders arranged the Allied troops in the neutral zone out of convenience. Thus, the British had been stationed at Çanakkale and the French and Italians at Gallipoli. Thus, when the Greeks threatened the Çatalca line, General Harington immediately sent British troops to help the French. Lord Curzon needed to ask if Poincaré repudiated responsibility for those portions of the neutral zone which lay on the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and, if so, whether he thought it was in keeping with the spirit of the Alliance. Furthermore, given the French views regarding Mustafa Kemal's strength and the deference due to him, Lord Curzon believed that the French should withdraw their troops and leave all the responsibility for the defence of these zones on the Asiatic shores to the British. If so, public opinion would not regard this as a just and loyal arrangement. At the same time, Lord Curzon did not wish to approach the French Government, but he wanted some explanation. He added that if they did repudiate their responsibilities in the manner he had outlined, the British Government would take a grave view of the situation.³⁰

Poincaré remarked that since Count Sforza was present, he would go back a little to explain the French Government's position. It was quite natural that the local commanders should distribute their troops between the zones, but the French Government had never been consulted about the distribution and had never agreed to sending French troops to the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles. He said that he was personally prepared to take all responsibility for the orders given for the French retirement. He would not have given such orders two months previously, but a new situation had arisen, and Britain did not seem to understand the extent of the Turkish victory and their state of elation. He commented that no soldier in the world would stay at Çanakkale in the present military situation. It was not only a question of the defence of the town of Çanakkale

²⁸ British Secretary's Notes of Conference between the French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Italian Ambassador in Paris, at the Quai d'Orsay, 4 p.m. Wednesday, September 20, 1922. Present: For France: M. Poincaré; For Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst; For Italy: Count Sforza; Secretaries: M. de Laroche, M. Massigli, Mr. Forbes Adam, M. Clinchant, Mr. Leeper, M. Bargeton. Admiral Admiral Beatty and Admiral Grasset were also present for part of the meeting. TNA/FO/424/254 (No. 545), 293-300. See DBFP-I/ XVIII, (No. 42), 50-61. See Şimşir, Op. Cit., (Belge no. 217), 464-473.

²⁹ British Secretary's Notes of Conference between the French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Italian Ambassador in Paris, at the Quai d'Orsay, 4 p.m. Wednesday, September 20, 1922. Present: For France: M. Poincaré; For Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst; For Italy: Count Sforza; Secretaries: M. de Laroche, M. Massigli, Mr. Forbes Adam, M. Clinchant, Mr. Leeper, M. Bargeton. Admiral Admiral Beatty and Admiral Grasset were also present for part of the meeting. TNA/FO/424/254 (No. 545), 293-300. See DBFP-I/ XVIII, (No. 42), 50-61. See Şimşir, Op. Cit., (Belge no. 217), 464-473.

³⁰ See Abdurrahman Çaycı. "Mudanya Mütarekesine Giden Yol", *70.Yılında Mudanya Mütarekesi ve Uluslararası Sonuçları, Bildiriler*. Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1993.

but of around fifty miles of front along that territory. They would have to muster a whole army to make any viable defence of the Asiatic shore of the Straits. Poincaré continued, saying that the Allies were in face of imminent peril, and he was not prepared to expose French soldiers to that peril. In his opinion, Mustafa Kemal could cross to-morrow if he wished to do so.³¹

Lord Curzon felt that Poincaré could not fully understand the gravity of his declaration. Since May 1921, with the full knowledge of the Allied Governments, neutral zones had existed on both sides of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. It was only a matter of local convenience on which side and in which place the troops of one particular Ally were placed. For example, Lord Curzon asked, had a greater right to be in Gallipoli than the British, with their 25.000 graves on the peninsula. Now, he protested, Poincaré contended that the Allied responsibility for the neutral zones was a matter only for normal times, to be changed at the first sign of danger. Surely, Lord Curzon argued, if the danger was so real and so imminent, the French Government should have sought the opinion of their local commanders, by telegraph in the first instance. However, the opinion of the local commanders (both French and Italian) was sufficiently reflected in their agreement to despatch their troops. Moreover, they had collaborated in drawing up the sectors for the defence of both Çanakkale and Üsküdar. However, as Poincaré had defined the position, Lord Curzon could only explain to his Government regarding Asia that the *Entente* no longer existed and that the French were leaving Britain to shoulder the burden of the defence of the Asiatic shores of the Straits. In the course of all the Allied Conferences since the Armistice, Lord Curzon remarked that he had never known a more serious statement than that recently made by Poincaré.

Poincaré thought that Lord Curzon had misunderstood him. What had really happened was that in a time of imminent danger, France had been asked to modify the normal situation in the neutral Zone to its detriment. It was due to a recent decision of the local commanders apparently taken out of nervousness. Otherwise, it appeared incomprehensible to Poincaré. Neither the French Prime Minister nor the French Government nor the French Parliament, the sovereignty of whom was involved, was prepared to allow local French commanders to expose French troops to the danger of being shot by Turks. Poincaré could only beg the British to follow his example because, in military terms, the situation at Çanakkale was untenable:

Lord Curzon pointed out that Poincaré's statement served to affirm everything he had said. He had no wish to dispute the sovereignty of the French Parliament. Nevertheless, he reported that a change in the local situation had led France to withdraw its troops from Asia regardless of the Allied responsibility for defending the neutral zone. Since the Allied agreement on Asia no longer existed, it must be understood that Britain would be free to take a similar line of independent action in Europe - for instance, at Gallipoli. It was in a position to do so and would do so if it desired. Lord Curzon remarked that he had come to Paris to re-establish the alliance and not to upset Allied agreements. However, the French withdrawal from Çanakkale might compel Britain to take isolated and independent action. He noted that the necessity would have arisen from the French procedure, and he deeply deplored it.³²

Poincaré stated that he could not prevent the British Government from interpreting French action as they liked. All that he would add was that during the armistice there had been a certain distribution of troops, and suddenly in a moment of danger this was modified in such a way as to expose French troops to being shot.

Lord Curzon suggested that the French Government might have done what we should have done in similar circumstances, namely, consulted the British Government or the Allied Commander-in-chief on the spot through the French General there. Poincaré explained that he had to save his men in a most dangerous situation, and urgent action had been necessary to do so. Lord Curzon pointed out that at Çatalca, the situation had recently been just as critical; the British Government could have withdrawn their troops and exposed the French to face the Greeks. They had not done so.

Poincaré enquired why Lord Curzon needed to refer to this incident again. The incident of Çanakkale, he thought, had already been settled by his full explanation that morning. Lord Curzon said that, in thinking over

³¹ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

³² *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

what Poincaré had stated that morning, he had concluded that Poincaré could not have realised the gravity of his attitude. He had therefore felt it necessary to ask for this further explanation. Poincaré again emphasised that it was simply, the urgency of the immediate danger which had led to the recall of the French troops. The French Parliament would never allow France to go to war with Turkey or to expose French troops to being shot by Turkish soldiers. Count Sforza interposed to say that he shared Poincaré's views. Italy, like France, would not fight against Turkey or run the risk of Italian troops being attacked by Turkish troops.³³

Lord Curzon said that he did not wish to add anything more to what he had already said on this point. He could only adhere to his view about the French action - a view which, he felt sure, would also be that of his Government. He would now ask Poincaré to permit Admiral Beatty to explain the British Admiralty's views on the defence of the Straits and Gallipoli. Poincaré asked that Admiral Grasset, who appeared to hold a less optimistic view than Admiral Beatty, might also be allowed to make a statement. Lord Curzon agreed. Admiral Beatty and Admiral Grasset here entered the room.

Poincaré began by asking Admiral Beatty if it were possible for the naval forces now on the spot to defend the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Admiral Beatty replied that with the current forces there, and the ones on the way, the Allies could hold all the waters from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Poincaré enquired whether if the Turks approached the south coast of the Marmara and the Straits, Allied ships could pass through them and hold them whatever the strength of the Turkish artillery on the coast. Admiral Beatty considered that with the forces and artillery which the Turks were known to possess, ships could keep the passage of the Straits open. Light artillery and infantry would not affect the movement of ships of war. Any Turkish guns of sufficient calibre to threaten ships of war would have to come from a big distance. There were only two roads to the Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles: one to Panderma (Bandırma) and one through Edremid (Edremit). The first ran for 18 miles along the coast and was accessible to shell fire for a large part of the distance. The second road through Edremid also ran along the sea for a considerable distance and was equally open to shell fire. By intelligence and air reconnaissance it ought to be perfectly possible to ascertain what guns of sufficient calibre to threaten the Allied ships were being brought up by the Turks along these roads. If and when these guns had reached the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, their effect would not be significant unless they were in a position to deliver a direct fire. Even then, the British navy ought to be able to bring a direct fire in return upon them and make their position untenable.³⁴

Admiral Grasset remarked that the passage of the Dardanelles would be very difficult even if there were no Turkish artillery on the Asiatic shore. He had been on the spot in 1915, and then medium artillery (15-inch) had made the situation very difficult for ships of war. If the Turks were to use the artillery they had recently captured from the Greeks, holding the Dardanelles by the Allied navies would be a hazardous proceeding, especially for any ships other than capital ships. In theory, Beatty was quite correct in saying that it was easy to detect land batteries, but experience in the recent war had shown that it was a very different matter in practice.

Lord Curzon enquired whether Admiral Grasset had not left out of account the fact that Gallipoli was now to be held by the Allies. If the Admiral's experience meant that Gallipoli could not be held if the Turks had artillery on the Asiatic shore, the question of keeping the Straits open permanently became a most complicated one. Admiral Grasset replied that the British had held positions on the Gallipoli Peninsula during the war, and these had been hit by shells from the Asiatic batteries as well as by batteries from other parts of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Lord Curzon pointed out that if this were so, the situation created by allowing the Turks to reach the Asiatic shore would be a very dangerous one, and by holding Gallipoli alone, Britain might find it very difficult to demilitarise permanently the strip on the opposite coast.³⁵

Poincaré thought that a distinction should be made between the occupation of Gallipoli and the demilitarisation of the Asiatic shores. In future in times of peace, the Allies would have to trust the Turks to some extent to carry

³³ See Mustafa Çufalı. "Çanakkale Krizi ve Lloyd George'un İktidardan Düşmesi, Eylül-Ekim 1922". *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Sayı: 45. *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

³⁴ See Mehmet Sedat Erkan. "Mudanya Mütarekesi Öncesi Gelişmeler ve Müttefik Generallerin İstanbul'daki Toplantı Tutanağı". *21. Yüzyılda Eğitim ve Toplum*. Cilt 10, Sayı 28, Bahar 2021, 21-50.

³⁵ See Harry J. Psomiades. *The Eastern Question, the Last phase: a study in Greek-Turkish diplomacy*. New York, 2000.

out this demilitarisation under periodic Allied inspection. However, in the Gallipoli Peninsula we should have an Allied force or a League force in permanent occupation would be necessary. These matters were not currently urgent. For the moment it was necessary to record that the Allies could not keep troops on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles.

Admiral Beatty pointed out that in 1915 the position had been quite different. The Turks then had a large number of heavy guns in well-established positions on both sides of the Straits. Now, they had no guns on the Straits' southern or northern shores. The British Admiralty's information showed that the heaviest guns which the Turks could bring up were of 15 cm calibre and that there were not many of them. In Gallipoli, they could not plant any such guns. If, however, they succeeded in placing some on the Asiatic shore, it would make the passage of ships difficult. However, Admiral Beatty saw no particular difficulty in the Allies placing guns of equal calibre in commanding positions on the Gallipoli Peninsula. With aerial spotting and sun-ranging, which did not exist in 1915, he thought it perfectly possible to keep Turkish artillery fire down reasonably.

Admiral Grasset pointed out that if cannons were thus to be placed on both sides of the Straits, a zone of fire would be created, similar to that on the front in France during the recent war and it would be equally dangerous for vessels to pass between these two lines of fire.

Poincaré asked Admiral Beatty to extend his statement to the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus. Admiral Beatty explained that the defence of the Marmara was simply a matter of control by the Allied navies over surface vessels. So long as the Allies had command of the sea, they could make it impossible for any Turkish vessels to cross the Marmara.

Lord Curzon enquired whether vessels now on the spot could exercise such control. Admiral Beatty answered that it was now possible to exercise considerable control, but not one so fully effective as that which they would be able to establish in a short time.

Count Sforza enquired whether, if Earl Betty's optimistic views were accepted as against Admiral Grasset's pessimistic opinion, and if the Allies were really in a position to stop Turkish transports crossing, it might not still be necessary to remember that they had very few troops in Europe and that the Turkish Government and soldiers in İstanbul were, in fact, hostile to them. On the other hand, to the south of the Straits and of the Sea of Marmara, there was a large victorious and fanatical army. How then would it be possible for the Allied navies to stop packets of men and officers and propagandists crossing the Bosphorus from time to time, and what would be the situation if, while the Allies kept control of the sea, the fire broke out on both sides of the water?

Admiral Beatty admitted that the navies could only control the sea, but they could ensure that effective support could not be transferred by the Turks from one side to the other. The rest of the question appeared to him to be a military and political, and not a naval matter. It was true, however, that if a European army attacked Gallipoli the navy could play a very real part in controlling the entry to the Gallipoli Peninsula across the Bulair (Bolayır) lines, a distance of about 6 miles. Naval gunfire could be brought to bear from ships inside and outside the Straits. It would be almost impossible for any effective attack to be delivered upon the Allied forces holding Gallipoli from Thrace.³⁶

Lord Curzon interposed to say that he thought Count Sforza was referring instead to the Bosphorus end of the Straits and the question of stopping a number of small ships and boats from crossing. Admiral Beatty replied that provided the naval commanders received clear instructions in plenty of time, they could secure control of all vessels in the Bosphorus. The Turks might build rafts, but it ought to be possible to capture or destroy these. They would then have to swim across. Admiral Grasset pointed out that the Bosphorus was very narrow, not more than three times the width of the Seine, and it would be very difficult to stop an infiltration of men and troops across its waters. Admiral Beatty said that such an infiltration would likely take place, but it might take years for any considerable body of troops to pass in that manner.³⁷

Lord Curzon drew attention to the fact that the views of both Admiral Beatty and Admiral Grasset provided an overwhelming argument for holding on to the Asiatic shores of the Straits as long as possible. It was essential,

³⁶ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

³⁷ See A. L. Macfie. "The Çanakkale affair (September-October 1922)". *Balkan Studies* 20 (2), 1979, 328.

therefore, not to break up Allied unity at either end of the Straits. For that reason, he regarded the French and Italian action in withdrawing their forces as disastrous.

Poincaré stated that in Marshal Foch's opinion, it was essential to have armies and not an outpost of men on the southern shores of the Straits in the present military situation. To control the whole of the Straits, one must have forces echeloned along their whole length. Poincaré urged that the optimism which preceded Allied failure at Gallipoli should not be again allowed to blind them. There was no military expert who would now claim that the Allies could defend the Asiatic shores against a Turkish attack, and we must not expose ourselves to attack both from the back and the front. By that, he referred to the possibility of a revolution in European Turkey. A letter which he had just received from Steeg, of the Ottoman Bank at İstanbul, went to confirm Count Sforza's view as to this danger. The Allies must hold a conference at once.³⁸

Lord Curzon reminded Poincaré that his observations seemed to leave out of account the fact that both Italy and France were on very friendly terms with Mustafa Kemal, while even Britain was not at war with him. Surely Mustafa Kemal, who was a very shrewd person, was not going to shoot Frenchmen and Italians; and, if so, the whole hypothesis of Poincaré, that if the Allies did not run away they would be fired at, broke down. If the French and Italians would only remain firm, and if they would only send sound and resolute advice to Mustafa Kemal, he would obey it and would not shoot at anyone; but, if they retired from Çanakkale and Üsküdar, they would make Mustafa Kemal think that he had only to go down and shoot at the British who were stupid enough to remain. Surely, the French and Italian action and advice amounted to being more Kemalist than Mustafa Kemal, and it would make any successful holding of a conference impossible.³⁹

Poincaré pointed out that Ankara might well follow their advice officially, but would let Turkish irregulars do its work for it, or perhaps be unable to stop them from doing it. This had happened to the French in Kilis. It was partly a danger from Turkish irregulars just as much as from Turkish regulars which had led the French troops to be withdrawn from Çanakkale. Further, and his principal point, the despatch of these French troops to Asia would have been an innovation and, in a sense, a provocation to the Turks, and it might have started a war between France and Turkey. He repeated that it was essential to have a conference and that if the Allies merely took a negative attitude towards the Turks about the Straits and were to say nothing positive as to concessions to Turkey in the future, they would not come to the conference.⁴⁰

Admiral Beatty concluded his statement regarding the Bosphorus by pointing out that the two coast roads down the İzmit Peninsula to the shores of the Straits could be brought under effective gunfire by ships either from the Black Sea or from the Marmara side. Moreover, even the road down the centre of the peninsula, which had been recently built by the British forces, could be similarly controlled. The defence of İstanbul was primarily a military and not a naval question.

Lord Curzon said he thought that the position was now clear. On some points, such as the possibility of defending the Straits and the means for defending it, there was an unfortunate disagreement. It was, however, agreed that there should be a conference as soon as possible to make a final treaty of peace with Turkey. There was already an existing draft treaty signed at Sevres in August 1920 and drawn up in London and at San Remo earlier in that year. Parts of that treaty had a permanent value, and would be incorporated into the new one. Most of it, however, would have to be changed, and some of it would have to be discarded. Until the recent Kemalist advance, there had been an idea of holding a preliminary conference at Venice to arrange an armistice to provide for the evacuation of Anatolia by the Greeks, and thirdly, to explain the Paris proposals of last March. All these proposals had now disappeared. There was a de facto armistice between the Greeks and the Turks. The Greeks had left Anatolia, and the proposals of the March conference were now in some respects inapplicable. It was now a question whether there was any need for a preliminary conference at all. The Italian Government had very courteously suggested that such a conference might be called at once to Venice. He (Lord

³⁸ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

³⁹ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

⁴⁰ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

Curzon) entirely concurred in the urgency of calling a conference, but he did not agree as to the necessity of that conference being a preliminary one. On this point, however, he would like to have Poincaré's and Count Sforza's views. For the rest, much would turn on place and something on the composition of the conference, whether the latter were a preliminary one or a full peace conference. The natural place for a peace conference was at some European capital. As it was Great Britain who had chiefly brought the defeat of the Turks, London might have been the most suitable choice; but, for various reasons, he did not wish to press for London. In any case, it would be personally very difficult for him as Minister for Foreign Affairs to be absent for any length of time from London while Parliament was still in session, or at any place not easily accessible from Britain. This point was not, however, an essential one. Then there arose the question of Mustafa Kemal's attitude towards the venue of the conference and the conditions under which it were to be held. It was certainly desirable to secure the presence of Mustafa Kemal himself, but he was apparently unwilling to leave Anatolia, and was prepared to send Fethi Bey in his place. It was, perhaps, more important to decide what Powers were to be represented at the conference. Hitherto, the Great Powers had drawn up all treaties of peace, giving the smaller Powers a hearing and inviting many of them to sign. In his opinion, it was not desirable to have a conference at which all the signatories of the Treaty of Sevres would be present. It would be a "Duma" rather than a conference. At the same time, no conference ought to be held without the presence of States directly interested, such as Romania and Serbia. For the former, the Straits were a vital matter, while to the Allies it was rather a question of great international policy. Serbia had an interest in the Straits, and it also had a strong interest in the question of a common Turco-Bulgarian frontier. Poincaré claimed that the Serbs were perfectly prepared to accept the Meriç as the frontier of Turkey. Be that as it may, they were closely interested in the question of the Straits and of Thrace, and they ought to be given a seat. Bulgaria was on a different footing, but she might claim a hearing, and possibly other States ought also to be heard. Lord Thus, Curzon suggested a conference of the principal Allied Powers, together with Romania, Serbia, Greece and Turkey. It was essential to announce that such conference must be led, and to invite the participants - even if it took a little time actually to bring them to the place of meeting. For the moment, the Allies were ignorant of Mustafa Kemal's attitude; in some quarters he was said to require the Allied acceptance of his demands in Thrace as a condition for his entry into a Conference. In any case, Lord Curzon was apprehensive of two conferences - a preliminary and a final one - since, if the former were a failure, the whole prospect of peace might break down. It would be more difficult for a full peace conference to collapse.⁴¹

Count Sforza agreed that a definitive conference was better than a preliminary one. The latter only increased the difficulties and risks. As regards the place of the conference, he spoke from his experience as Foreign Minister of Italy, and did not agree with Lord Curzon as to the objections to absenting oneself when one's Parliament was in session. He thought, however, that there were advantages from other points of view in having a conference at some town which was not a capital, such as Venice. He also believed it to be in the interest of a successful conference that the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers should only come from time to time, while a Minister Plenipotentiary with full powers, who could telegraph home at intervals for instructions, was in a better position to conduct the permanent business of the conference. He agreed as to the presence of Serbia and Romania, although Ninchitch had informed him of his readiness to accept every decision reached in agreement by France, Britain and Italy. The first essential step towards holding the conference, as, however, in his opinion, to reach a preliminary Allied decision as to how far the Principal Allied Powers were prepared to go in meeting the Turks.

Poincaré was in agreement regarding the necessity of holding an immediate full peace conference and not a preliminary conference. As to the place, he would accept Venice, but feared that the Kemalists might not agree to come to any European town. If so, it was desirable not to sacrifice the conference to the town, but rather the town to the conference. He preferred, as far as possible, that the conference should be one of a technical character, conducted by diplomatists, as in this treaty particularly there were so many technical points to be decided by experts. As to the representation of the Powers, he agreed that Romania and Serbia should come and that Bulgaria should be allowed to state her opinion about Dedeağaç. However, his information went to show that Serbia would not in any case accept any increase of Bulgarian territory. On a point of detail, he suggested

⁴¹ See Bülent Şener. "Türk Boğazları'nın Geçiş Rejiminin Tarihi Gelişimi ve Hukuki Statüsü", *Tarih Okulu Dergisi (TOD) Journal of History School (JOHS)*, S. 17, Mart 2014, 467 - 493.

that no mention should be made of the Treaty of Sevres. Legally it did not exist, as it had not been ratified, and the mention of its name would infuriate the Turks. That did not mean, however, that it would not be necessary to take many articles of permanent value from the Treaty of Sevres and insert them without modification in the new treaty.⁴²

Lord Curzon expressed his agreement on the latter point. Regarding the conference as a whole, he was happy to find everyone in accord. There remained, however, the very important question as to the Great Powers reaching a measure of agreement on certain points in advance of the conference. He thought that he might be able to telegraph to his Government at once and obtain authority to continue the discussion on these points. They appeared to him to comprise the questions of the Gallipoli Peninsula, the status of the Straits, the demilitarized zones and the frontier of Thrace. It would perhaps be possible to have his Government's authority to continue these discussions at the earliest possible date for Poincaré. Meanwhile, he would urge the French Government to use their well-known influence to stop Kemal from precipitating action. This was essential in order to give time for a discussion of the conditions under which the conference was to be held, and at which it was desired to meet the Turkish views as far as possible, taking into account the changed situation. Any appearance of Allied disunity might cause Mustafa Kemal to act and compel Britain in return to act alone as the Allies would not follow it. Therefore, once again, Lord Curzon, would urge Poincaré to use every channel of influence with the Turks, who appeared to be so docile to the French and so hostile to the British, such as Franklin-Bouillon or Ferid Bey.⁴³

Poincaré pointed out that General Pellé was at İzmir, and had instructions not only to examine the damage done by the fire, but also to talk to Mustafa. Franklin-Bouillon could not go to İzmir at present, but it might be possible to induce him to undertake another mission. He was very well fitted for it and very Anglophile. As regards Ferid Bey, Poincaré was uncertain how he transmitted advice given him into his telegrams to Ankara; but on this point he knew Britain would be better informed. The war had shown that Britain's administrative services were much better at decyphering telegrams than the French. As to the question of terms, he thought that the Turks would be willing to accept certain provisions for the freedom of the Straits, provided they were placed under the trust of the League of Nations. They would probably also accept an Allied garrison upon the Gallipoli Peninsula. It seemed advisable to warn the Greeks as well as the Turks off the neutral zones, and Poincaré personally was in favour of Greek retirement behind the Meriç.⁴⁴

Lord Curzon replied that even if the Greeks could be persuaded to withdraw beyond the Meriç after the conference, if that were the decision of the conference, it would be difficult if not impossible to induce them to do so before the conference had met. Poincaré added that he thought it essential that the Turks should be informed that Thrace was to be given back to them. On this point Britain should use the influence which it possessed with the Greeks. Count Sforza suggested to Lord Curzon that Sir Horace Rumbold should be asked to telegraph at once whether, in his opinion, there was not a danger of anarchy in Thrace. His information pointed to growing chaos there with continued thefts and murders. He was sure Sir Horace Rumbold would confirm this, and he proposed that for the time being Thrace might be placed under the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan and be occupied by Allied instead of Greek troops.⁴⁵

Poincaré thought that the question of the Sultan's authority was a question for the Peace Conference. Lord Curzon suggested that it might be possible to induce the Greeks to withdraw beyond the Ganos - Istranja line. If they were withdrawn beyond the Meriç, the question of the sovereignty of Thrace would inevitably be prejudged. In any case Lord Curzon preferred to have the views of his Government on the question of Thrace. It was really a matter for their further discussion on Friday. Meanwhile, he would again urge Poincaré to use his influence to calm Mustafa Kemal. Poincaré promised to do his best, but said that he was not sure how far his influence went.

⁴² *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

⁴³ See Yılmaz Akkılıç. *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Bursa, İkinci Kitap: İşgalden Kurtuluşa*. Bursa: Nilüfer Akkılıç Kütüphanesi Yayınları, 2008.

⁴⁴ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

⁴⁵ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

A discussion followed as to the communication to be made to the press, and in particular as to the enumeration of the Powers to be invited to the forthcoming conference. Lord Curzon proposed that it was necessary to include Japan. Poincaré expressed astonishment. Lord Curzon reminded the conference that Japan had participated in the preparation of the Treaty of Sevres, as a Great Power on the Supreme Council, that it was to be represented with two votes on the Straits Commission and had a High Commissioner at İstanbul. It was agreed to include Japan. The following statement to the press was then decided upon:

“Lord Curzon, Count Sforza and Poincaré have agreed upon the expediency of bringing together a conference at which will be represented Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Yugoslavia, Roumania and Turkey, and at which will be arranged the conditions of future peace. The conversations will be resumed on Friday afternoon at 2 o'clock. At today's conference Admiral Beatty gave a report upon the situation in the Straits and the Bosphorus, and Admiral Grasset added some supplementary observations”.

Third Meeting⁴⁶

Poincaré opened the proceedings by enquiring whether Lord Curzon had received any information from British sources or from his Government regarding the situation.⁴⁷

Lord Curzon said that he understood that their endeavour that afternoon would be to lay down the bases of agreement on certain important points upon which the future peace conference would proceed. The difficulty was undoubtedly great, but it was essential that the three Great Powers, while reaching a general agreement upon these bases, should not lay down publicly on this subject any too precise conditions without consulting the smaller Powers, who might well object to them. It would not only be disrespectful to them, but it would also amount to trying to do the work of the peace conference in advance. At the current meeting, he suggested that the main points of importance should be discussed one by one and that they should exchange their views upon them and see how far agreement was possible. In this way, Lord Curzon had not lost hope of finding some common ground upon which the three Allies could stand. He proposed that they should begin by taking the Bosphorus and İstanbul, and then proceed to the question of Thrace, Edirne, the Straits and Gallipoli. Here he would like again to repeat, as he had done in so many conferences, that it was not in the power of the Allied Governments to reach a pacific solution unless they were firmly resolved to stand together. For each ally to proceed with a different policy and to put forward a different solution would be fatal to any chance of success. Britain, for its part, wanted peace as ardently as any other Power, and it distressed him to read as he had done recently in the press, that one Ally stood for peace but another for war. The last thing that Britain wanted was another war. At the same time, public opinion was not prepared to throw away lightly the fruits of the Allied victory in 1918. The British people did not want to lose all the gains in that hard-fought struggle just because the Greeks had lost the war. Subject to this reservation, Lord Curzon was ready to open a discussion upon the points which he had already mentioned.⁴⁸

Lord Curzon concluded by stating that he had no fresh information of interest to give to the conference. His own telegrams from his High Commissioner at İstanbul merely passed on the information from General Pellé, which Poincaré had already outlined to the conference. He did not now know where Mustafa Kemal was, but he trusted that Poincaré would have news to give them on this point and others.

Poincaré replied that he did not quite understand the position as explained by Lord Curzon. All that he wished to do that day was to find a means which would make it possible for the Turks to come to a peace conference.

⁴⁶ British Secretary's Notes of the Conference between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Italian Ambassador in Paris Friday, September 22, 2 pm. Present: For France: M. Poincaré; For Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston; Lord Hardinge of Penshurst; For Italy: Count Sforza. Secretaries: M. de Laroche, M. Galli, M. Massigli; Mr. Forbes Adam, M. Clinchant, Mr. Leeper, M. Barjeton. TNA/FO/424/254 (No. 621), 335-346. See DBFP-I/ XVIII, (No. 48), 66-84. See Şimşir, *Op. Cit.*, (Belge no. 242), 493-511.

⁴⁷ British Secretary's Notes of the Conference between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Italian Ambassador in Paris Friday, September 22, 2 pm. Present: For France: M. Poincaré; For Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston; Lord Hardinge of Penshurst; For Italy: Count Sforza. Secretaries: M. de Laroche, M. Galli, M. Massigli; Mr. Forbes Adam, M. Clinchant, Mr. Leeper, M. Barjeton. TNA/FO/424/254 (No. 621), 335-346. See DBFP-I/ XVIII, (No. 48), 66-84. See Şimşir, *Op. Cit.*, (Belge no. 242), 493-511.

⁴⁸ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

He did not wish to arrange terms of peace without their presence. He aimed to be in a position to state that France, Britain and Italy were sufficiently in agreement on certain important points to enable Mustafa Kemal or his representatives to come with confidence to a conference.

Poincaré then read two telegrams giving an account of conversations between General Pellé and Mustafa Kemal at İzmir. General Pellé had found Kemal in a state of some exaltation. He had stated that his troops were ready and eager to advance; but in General Pellé's opinion, Mustafa Kemal was prepared to exert some sort of pressure upon them. General Pellé's personal opinion was that even in the event of the Allied fleets and soldiers being able to prevent the Turks from crossing to Europe, the result would be war, preceded probably by revolution in İstanbul and Thrace. The mere presence of Turkish troops on the southern shores of the waters between the Black Sea and the Dardanelles, together with artillery torpedoes, et cetera, would make it extraordinarily difficult for the Allied navies to maintain their position. In his opinion, the only means of avoiding a conflict was to propose at once the opening at Mudanya of a conference, provided Britain would agree to it and send representatives. It would then be possible perhaps to arrange with Mustafa Kemal to stop his troops. However, in General Pellé's opinion, it was certain that Mustafa Kemal would only stop them if he were at once promised that he would receive Thrace up to the Meriç at the future conference. General Pellé concluded his telegrams by asking for urgent instructions regarding the movements of the French fleet and army in the Near East.⁴⁹

Poincaré suggested that in these circumstances, and as the possibility of a Kemalist attack seemed now imminent, it was essential for them at once to decide to give Kemal those territorial assurances which would alone satisfy him. Even if Britain and Italy would allow France to give him some such assurance at once on their behalf war might be stopped, and the dangers of a revolution in İstanbul and Thrace be avoided. If Britain and Italy refused to join in or send any such communication to Mustafa Kemal, France would have publicly to explain its position, and repudiate all responsibility for the failure of the Allies to stop the war. As an instance of the feeling in France and its colonies on this point, Poincaré referred to a recent communication from the Sultan of Morocco, who was in Paris and had told him that it was absolutely essential that France should not go to war with the Turks.⁵⁰

Poincaré concluded by urging again that if only the Allies could say at once to Mustafa Kemal that, subject to future agreement regarding the freedom of the Straits, the Allies were prepared to accept at once his desire to obtain the Meriç frontier, Mustafa Kemal would not advance, and the one means of stopping the war would have been found.

Count Sforza then gave some confidential information which he had received that morning from İstanbul. Since he regarded the most intimate co-operation between the Allied military and naval forces at İstanbul as vital to the interests of the Alliance and of Europe, he asked that the information which he was about to disclose be kept strictly confidential, and not regarded as gossip to be passed on to people outside the Conference Chamber. His telegram showed that General Mombelli had had a conversation either with General Harington or with one of the British generals. Mombelli had told this general that if a Turkish attack were to develop, he would do his best under General Harington's orders to meet it and to help the British. Still, in his opinion, the military situation was hopeless. The other had replied that it was undoubtedly grave, but that the British were in a position to count on the arrival of French and Italian divisions. Even if these did not come, there were other ways of meeting the danger, and he had then suggested that it might be possible to arm the Christian population of İstanbul and the surrounding country. Count Sforza drew the earnest attention of the conference to the gravity of this advice and the incalculable disasters that might result when war began.⁵¹

Poincaré said that he had had a report in something like the same sense from his own military authorities on the spot. At any rate, the latter were quite as pessimistic as General Mombelli. Lord Curzon thanked Count

⁴⁹ See Neşet Çağatay. "Mudanya Ateşkesi". *70.Yılında Mudanya Mütarekesi ve Uluslararası Sonuçları, Bildiriler*, Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1993.

⁵⁰ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).*

⁵¹ See Ayşe Yanardağ. "Mudanya Mütarekesi Döneminde İngilizlerin Çanakkale'deki Askeri Faaliyetleri". *Akademik Bakış Dergisi*, Sayı 65 Yıl 2018, 66-81.

Sforza and Poincaré for the information they had just given to the conference, to which he attached much importance. He pointed out, however, that it was quite natural that Mustafa Kemal should state the position in the glowing colours in which he saw it. It was natural that he should try to show to the Allies that their measures of defence would be useless. It was natural that he should say that he could advance across the neutral zones and the Sea of Marmara. He was simply endeavouring to make a certain impression upon his hearers. Lord Curzon's own information was not quite identical with that of his colleagues. It was true that General Harington was bitterly disappointed that the Allied co-operation on which he had counted had failed. So far, at any rate, as the Asiatic shores of Anatolia were concerned, General Harington realised thoroughly the danger to himself and his troops, but with the forces at his disposal and the presence of the British fleet, he believed that he could render a better account than either his French or Italian colleague appeared to think possible. His attitude was one of resolution and determination. If he were compelled to fight the Turks and withdraw from the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles or of İzmit, the fault would not be wholly that of Britain. Public opinion would remember that in the circumstances Britain had been abandoned by its Allies, and public opinion would appreciate the very heavy blow dealt at the Alliance by those who had chosen to desert it.⁵²

Lord Curzon understood from their previous discussions that they were all agreed that the essential need was to have a conference at once. He had entirely concurred with this point of view and asked that it be held as soon as possible and in any place that suited his colleagues. Everything went to show that Mustafa Kemal took the same view as to an immediate meeting, but the suggestion that he had made and which Poincaré and General Pellé had appeared to support, that this meeting should be held at Mudanya, seemed entirely unreasonable. Lord Curzon asked his colleagues to think about what this would mean. Were British, French, Italian, Serbian, Romanian and Greek delegates to embark upon a ship and go to meet their conqueror at one of his own ports? For his part, he must thus decline to tear up the Venice proposal and proceed to Mudanya dragged by Mustafa Kemal like a Roman conqueror in his train. Once at Mudanya, the Allies were to be invited by Mustafa Kemal to give him certain provinces in advance of any conference, for instance, Thrace up to the Meriç. Did Poincaré suppose that he, Lord Curzon, had received authority from his Government to agree to such proposals? Poincaré seemed to expect that the principal work of the future peace conference was to be done in advance of the conference itself, with a view solely to induce Kemal to come to Mudanya and discuss with the Allies whether he would stop his attacks.⁵³

Lord Curzon said that he would now like to explain and analyse further exactly what it meant to allow Mustafa Kemal to return to the Meriç at once. It seemed to him essential that when both parties were entering upon negotiations, they should know precisely what they meant as to the point upon which negotiations were to take place. Mustafa Kemal apparently expected nearly all the Turkish territory up to the pre-war Turco-Bulgarian frontier to be returned to him at once, that is to say, territory bordered on the west, south-west and south by the Aegean Sea, the Straits, and the Sea of Marmara respectively. It was quite possible that he might agree on conditions regarding keeping the waters of the Straits open. Meanwhile, the restitution of Turkish sovereignty over the whole of the above area was to be complete. Lord Curzon asked his colleagues to consider what this would mean when they reached the peace conference at Venice or elsewhere. He did not think that Yugoslavia and Romania should be faced with this agreement in advance of the conference and without their consultation. If Mustafa Kemal were now to march to the Bulgarian frontier, there a disastrous war in the Balkans would follow. Lord Curzon trusted that his colleagues would realise these dangers and regard the proposal as unacceptable. It would not be statesmanship but suicide. Lord Curzon understood Poincaré's wish that, as far as possible, the Allies should be accommodating about the future terms in this part of the world. He had asked himself what could be done in this direction. Before the Paris Conference in March, he recalled that various frontiers in Eastern Thrace had been proposed. The British Government had proposed to push back the Sevres frontier in Thrace to the Midia-Rodosto line. The French Government had proposed a frontier running down the Tuna River and the eastern bank of the Meriç as far as Kuleli-Burgas, and then across the Sea of Marmara, leaving Rodosto and Gallipoli to the Greeks. In the conference itself the French Government had changed their proposal to that of a buffer State lying to the north of the Enos-Midia line, which was to be the northern frontier

⁵² See Erkan Cevizliler-Seyhan Akbulut. "Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nde Mudanya Mütarekesi ve Lozan Barış Konferansı Tartışmaları". *Atatürk Üniversitesi Atatürk Dergisi*, Cilt 10, Sayı 1, Yıl 2021 21-48.

⁵³ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

of Turkey in Europe. Finally, the military advisers had reached a compromise upon another line, and the conference accepted this. But this line was still open to reconsideration, and the whole question would have to be again carefully examined. It was a large area. It included large towns, such as Edirne, Kırklareli, Babaeski, Rodosto and Gallipoli. Again, regarding the population, it was unnecessary now to argue the old question of statistics that had been fully explored at the March conference.⁵⁴

For many years, the population had fluctuated with the wars and the successive deportations from which the Turkey had suffered. It was important to remember that the Greeks had been there nearly since the armistice and that probably as a result of their own measures, and certainly as a result of Muslim emigration, there was a majority, if not, a substantial minority, of Greeks in the country now. In addition to the native population there was the Greek army. Lord Curzon had no exact information about its number, but, in addition to the forces there before the recent *debacle* in Anatolia, they had transferred to Europe via Mudanya and Bandırma several divisions which had fought a good fight against the Turks in the neighbourhood of Eskişehir. He thought that there would perhaps be some 50,000⁵⁵ Greek bayonets in Thrace in addition to a native population of several hundred thousand.

Lord Curzon) asked the conference how the Greeks were to be turned out of Eastern Thrace. Were they to allow Mustafa Kemal to come there now and evict them forcibly? There would be another horrible war in Thrace followed "by the uncertainty of the minorities' situation." Europe had looked on with sickening disgust at the stories of deportation in the Pontus region and elsewhere. He added that "they would not tolerate a similar occurrence, especially one that had arisen due to an act of the Allies in Eastern Thrace. It was true that the Greek troops had behaved badly in their retirement and had committed atrocities and depredations, but they were under a provocation to which Mustafa Kemal was not subjected and their misdeeds differed from the Turkish in degree. Take, for instance, the happenings which had followed the Turkish entry into İzmir. Kemal was apparently refusing to allow any refugees between the ages of 15 and 45 to leave the town and any refugees at all to leave after a certain date. Already the deportations appeared to have begun." Similar proceedings would follow his entry into Thrace, and it was impossible in these circumstances for the Allies to give him a promise at once that he should have possession. If this was definitely Poincaré's policy, Lord Curzon would have to ask for an immediate adjournment in order that the views of the Serbians and Romanians might be accepted by the conference.⁵⁶

Lord Curzon proceeded to suggest that it would be well to examine a little more carefully what was the conference's real aim regarding the future of Eastern Thrace. Britain wished to provide for a suitable and stable Government there. For this purpose it was necessary that all should co-operate and see whether it would not be possible to find perhaps some provisional and temporary arrangement to cover the few years ahead, and to give time for the present disturbances to subside. Some form of an autonomous buffer State under the League of Nations might meet this purpose. True, this idea was not new. Poincaré had suggested it himself during the March conference, but the buffer State that he had proposed was to have been very restricted, as it was only the territory lying east of the Meriç and north of the Enos-Midia line. On that occasion, Lord Curzon had enquired whether the League of Nations would really undertake such a responsibility; whether it was possible to provide for the defence of such a State, or to finance it; and whether it would not be a prey to the neighbouring countries. The situation was now, however, somewhat different, and Lord Curzon thought it more practical for a larger block of territory to be taken, such as the whole of Eastern Thrace up to the Rodosto-Midia line and east of the Meriç. At any rate, the idea was worth further examination. Turkish sovereignty might be maintained, for instance, by displaying a flag or some other emblem. The analogy of the Saar Commission under the League of Nations formed a needed precedent. A governing commission might be formed, on which Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria could be represented - perhaps Romania and Serbia. Such a regime, under the commission, could supervise the possible evacuation of Thrace, look after the minorities and act as the defence for İstanbul by

⁵⁴ See Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı. *Türk İstiklal Harbi, Batı Cephesi, 6. Kısım, 4. Kitap (İstiklal Harbi'nin Son Safhası)*, Cilt: II, Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1995.

⁵⁵ After this statement, Lord Curzon received and gave to the conference the correct figures of the Greek forces in Eastern Thrace as 32,000 rifles and 104 guns.

⁵⁶ See Yüksel Kaştan. "Sevr Antlaşması'ndan Lozan Barış Antlaşması'na İstanbul ve Çanakkale Boğazları Meselesine Analitik Bakış". 90. *Yılında Lozan ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Uluslararası Sempozyumu Bildiriler*. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2013, 103-130.

forming a buffer between it, Bulgaria and Greece. At any rate, he would ask his colleagues to consider the proposal further. It must be remembered that the Allies could not turn Greece out of Eastern Thrace without offering it any compensation in return, or any proper protection for the Greeks in Thrace. Lord Curzon ardently desired a peaceful solution and thought that it was worthwhile to go a long way in exploring such a solution as he had proposed with this end in view. He pointed out that he was ready to concede a great part of the March proposals to meet his colleagues' views; in return, he would ask them to do the same with regard to the British attitude in the matter of Thrace. Always subject to the views of the Balkan States concerned, he was ready to say now that he was prepared to look favourably on such a proposal as that which he had just outlined. Did Poincaré realise that the proposal which he understood him to have made, that we should telegraph at once at Kemal and say that he might march forward immediately to the Meriç, meant war forthwith? Lord Curzon concluded by pointing out how far he had already gone to meet his Allies, and urging them to endeavour in return to accept his proposal.⁵⁷

Poincaré was afraid that he had not made himself adequately understood. When he had previously given information as a result of General Pellé's visit to İzmir, he had not been merely putting forward the views of Mustafa Kemal. He (Poincaré) quite admitted, and so did General Pellé, that there might be a good deal of bluff in Mustafa Kemal's attitude; but he was quoting the evidence of General Pellé himself, who was a soldier of considerable experience and merit, and had played a significant part in the recent war. General Pellé, as the result of these conversations, had summed up the situation as very grave.

At this point Poincaré read a telegram from General Charpy to the Minister for War, of which he had sent a copy to the British Embassy the previous day. The gist of this telegram was that the Allied generals had had a meeting with General Harington on 18 September. The latter, preoccupied by the possible violation of the neutral zones, had emphasised to his colleagues the necessity of "holding themselves in readiness, in conformity with the decision of the Powers, to bar the road to the Turkish Nationalists with all their forces, if the need arose". General Harington had asked, therefore, for French and Italian reinforcements in both sectors on the Asiatic shore, and that the works of defence should be pushed forward. The Italian and French generals had reminded General Harington in reply of the decisions taken at the meeting of the Allied High Commissioners and Generals on 10 September namely, to send small Allied detachments to the neutral zones, simply by way of demonstrating the Entente, and the co-operation for the principle of respecting of the neutral zones. Secondly, they wished to ask instructions from their Governments, since it would be impossible to defend the said zones successfully with their current military means.⁵⁸

General Mombelli and General Charpy had explained to General Harington that the situation at Çatalca in August had been quite different. The Greek Government was hesitating, and their forces were demoralised and without discipline. The "terrain" was favourable for the defence, and there was the support of the fleet. The situation now was very different. There was a large enemy, with exalted *moral* and much material, determined to reconquer İstanbul and the national territory. On the Asiatic shore, the ground was unfavourable for the Allied defence, owing to its length, and the fact that the sea was behind their backs. There were hostile Turkish elements in the zones of occupation. It was necessary to watch the Çatalca zone carefully because of the troubles in Thrace and the organisation of bands. There would certainly be a rising in İstanbul as soon as Mustafa Kemal came close to it.

Çanakkale meant an occupation far away from the centre of the zones being defended. They should not, therefore, open a fight with several fronts, insecure interior lines, a certain check in front of them, with the possible insult to Allied military prestige. The plan of action was based on material means which were quite insufficient. They required expeditionary corps for the purpose. Even if several battalions come to reinforce the Allies, the latter would be insufficient to fight the Kemalists with any chance of success. These reinforcements, in any case, would probably arrive late, and have to be scattered along the front. General Charpy and his Italian colleague therefore expressed that the best way to solve the problem would be by diplomatic means rather than

⁵⁷ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVII, Greece and Turkey, January 1, 1921-September 2, 1922, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1970. (Here after DBFP-I/XVII).

⁵⁸ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

military action. It had been decided, on his proposal, that the generals should confer with the Allied High Commissioners, and indicate to them the gravity of the consequences of operations risked after the military point of view had been explained as above.⁵⁹

After reading this telegram Poincaré stated that, according to the first paragraph, General Harington had attributed a decision to the Allied Governments that they had never taken. His statement, as reported, was incorrect, and in sending a copy of General Charpy's note to Lord Hardinge, the day before, he had energetically protested against General Harington's action.

Lord Curzon said that he could not allow this attack on General Harington to pass. General Harington naturally thought that if the generals and High Commissioners had agreed to the movements of the troops to İzmit and Çanakkale, their Governments were in accord. He could not have foreseen that they would disavow them. Poincaré said that General Harington had in fact referred to a decision of the Governments which had not been taken, and he must maintain his point of view. Lord Curzon regretted that he could not allow the incident thus to pass. General Harington had always acted with conspicuous loyalty to his allies ever since he had been in command at İstanbul.⁶⁰

Poincaré, reverting to General Charpy's telegram, said that in the face of such a telegram the Allied Governments ought not to allow such a dangerous operation as that contemplated by General Harington to continue. He cited the opinion of Marshal Foch and various other French generals and members of the French General Staff and of the French Naval Staff who had come to see M. Poincaré the night before. One and all agreed that the present position of the Allied forces and navies was impossible. Lord Curzon pointed out that he had already known for two days that this was the view of the French and Italian generals and their experts, and he did not understand why Poincaré kept referring to the matter.

Poincaré said that he had understood Lord Curzon to have said that morning that, if the Allies were now attacked and defeated by the Turks, France would have to bear the responsibility. Moreover, he continued, if a misfortune occurred after France's defection, it would be the fault not of Britain but of its Allies. Poincaré could not allow this to pass. He emphatically repudiated the idea that he was committing a felonious act of treachery towards his Allies in withdrawing the French troops from the Asiatic shores of the Straits. It was simply a step necessitated by the situation and essential for protecting precious lives. He would recall that once before, France had allowed herself to be led into danger at the Dardanelles. It was true that they had taken the advice of a man, a civilian, whom Poincaré himself much respected, but they had come into it reluctantly, and the results had been disastrous. He did not wish to take such a risk again.⁶¹

Lord Curzon asked to be allowed to say something to defend himself against the charges which Poincaré had made. Poincaré had been attributing to him certain words which he (Lord Curzon) had not employed, and upon that basis he had built up a fierce attack. As far as Lord Curzon could remember, the words which he had used were that if General Harington had to withdraw from Anatolia the fault would not wholly lie with Britain. For the rest, he would remind Poincaré that they were holding intimate conversations, and in the privacy of the Council Chamber they did not always prepare their words in advance. However, he would ask Massigli to read the passage to which Poincaré referred, as he had taken it down and interpreted it. Massigli then quoted a passage in which Lord Curzon had said that if General Harington were compelled to fight and withdraw from the Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles or İzmit, the fault would not wholly lie with Britain. Public opinion would remember that Britain had been abandoned by its Allies, and British public opinion, in particular, would thus realise the severe blow to the alliance dealt by those who had desert Britain.

Poincaré said that he must ask Lord Curzon to withdraw that statement. Lord Curzon said that he could not do so Poincaré had attributed to him the word "responsibility" which he had not used, and had wrongly quoted him. Count Sforza intervened to suggest that it would be well for them to consider how many times during the

⁵⁹ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

⁶⁰ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

⁶¹ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

war there had been difference of opinion in the Council Chamber on various points, and how the necessity for Allied unity had overcome such differences. For the moment, in considering the Allied attitude towards Turkey, it was essential to remember that France, Italy and Britain were Great Powers. It was particularly owing to that factor in the situation that France had felt compelled to withdraw its troops, as Count Sforza understood it, and that was certainly one of the main reasons behind the Italian attitude. Poincaré entirely agreed with Count Sforza. For the rest, Poincaré had never agreed to the despatch of troops to the southern shores of the Straits, and it was to the common Allied interest that these troops should be withdrawn. He agreed with Lord Curzon that in the Council Chamber, they did not always, and could not be expected to, weigh their expressions very carefully. But this matter was very grave, and he was afraid that he would have to make a public declaration as to what had been said at the conference if British troops were attacked and beaten back from the southern shores of the Straits.

Poincaré then proceeded to read a message which he had sent to the French Embassy in London on 18 September. In this telegram, he clearly explained the French attitude, as he had explained it at the conference, and showing then that the French Government feared and were greatly impressed by the serious initiative taken by the British Government in sending and seeking reinforcements for the defence of the Straits at this time. Poincaré had then explained that it was impossible for the French Government to associate themselves with the measures contemplated by the British Government. He recalled that in the previous March, he had warned Lord Curzon of the dangers they were running in not meeting the Turkish point of view to a greater extent and the difficulties of negotiating with the Turks. He then feared that Mustafa Kemal might defy them with grave consequences to Europe and the Muslim world. Events were now proving his pessimistic forecast. The British Government, however, appeared entirely to overlook the realities of the situation. The French Government, however, could not afford not to face the dangerous consequences of the Kemalist victory, at which all Muslims worldwide rejoiced. The French Government realised the risk of wounding Muslim susceptibilities at the moment, and they were certain from all the information which had reached them that Kemal insisted on receiving back Edirne and Eastern Thrace with safeguards for the Straits. If this demand was not realised, he would never come to a conference, and a conference was the only method of settling the present dangerous situation.⁶²

Lord Curzon regretted that he could not understand why Poincaré had read his instructions to the French Embassy in London at the present conference. He retorted that he was perfectly well aware of the French Government's views, as he was his own Government. He had never for a moment attempted to throw doubt on Poincaré's entire consistency, not only during the present crisis, but since the previous March. He was well aware of Poincaré's views regarding the necessity of promising Kemal the Meriç frontier. He was well aware of the views of French expert military opinion upon the whole situation. All Lord Curzon had asked that day was that they should examine quite calmly, and rather more deeply, the concessions they were proposing to make to Mustafa Kemal and the consequences that might follow.⁶³

In response, Poincaré said that he had understood Lord Curzon, adding that he had changed his views on that question. Lord Curzon said that he had never made or implied any accusation of inconsistency against Poincaré. Poincaré then continued to read the instructions sent to his Embassy in London on 18 September. These instructions, among other things, had pointed out that if Britain adopted a threatening attitude and proposed to cross the Straits, the Turks might be prevented from doing so for a short time. Still, they would certainly take Mesopotamia in the meanwhile. As regards the possibility of relying on support from other States in the Balkans, Poincaré had then pointed out that the Serbian Government had informed him that they were on excellent terms with Kemal and had been for some time. They did not fear him. Apparently, also, Britain was now applying for Greek help. Poincaré then read out a telegram from a responsible in Athens to the effect that the British Minister had recently applied to the Greek Government for 60,000 men to help the British Government in defending the Straits. Lord Curzon intervened to say that he did not believe this information was correct. The British Government must understand that the French Government would never agree to fight beside the Greeks. He wished again to emphasise to Lord Curzon that his point of view on this question had

⁶² *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).*

⁶³ See Yusuf Oğuzoğlu. *Ulusal Zaferimizi Taçlandırın Kent: Mudanya*. Bursa: Gaye Kitapevi, 2007.

been consistent throughout, and that he was perfectly certain that Kemal would not stop his advance on the Straits and İstanbul, without receiving, before the conference, certain soothing assurances. He regretted that, in spite of all that he had said, Lord Curzon and the British Government still appeared to share the optimism of General Harington regarding the military situation and that we had only to talk to the Turks in vague terms about giving them back the sovereignty of parts of Thrace to stop the Kemalist advance. Poincaré did not exclude the possibility of providing some demilitarised zone on the Turkish side of the frontier in Thrace if the Meriç frontier and Edirne were conceded to them. The Allies could explain to Turkey that there were precedents in the other treaties for imposing restrictions on the sovereignty of other European States, for example, in the case of the Rhineland. Of course, if the Allies were to demilitarise a part of Turkish Thrace, they would have to do the same across the frontier in Greek Western Thrace.⁶⁴

At this point, Lord Curzon, explaining that he could not tolerate Poincaré's repeated and unfounded charges against himself and his country, asked leave to suspend the sitting and take time to consider his action. After an interval, in which private explanations were exchanged, the sitting was resumed. Poincaré proceeded to elaborate on the question of the demilitarisation of parts of Thrace. When the Versailles Treaty was made, a phrase he had objected to was inserted in one of its articles describing the frontiers of Germany on the west as Belgium, Luxembourg and France. Thus, Germany had been left with the Rhineland under its own sovereignty.

Servitudes were, however, imposed as a military precaution; for instance, the Allied occupation and various other controls. On this analogy, it might be possible, in the areas to the east and west of the Meriç, to inform the Turks and Greeks respectively that the Allies must take military precautions in demilitarising certain zones. That, however, was a matter for the future conference, but meanwhile, the Allied Governments should be able to say something definite to the Turks about the frontiers of Thrace. In doing so there would be no question of treason to Serbia and Roumania. In short, what Poincaré desired was to know whether, in the name of France, he could inform Mustafa Kemal that the Allied Governments were agreed about a particular frontier in Thrace. Otherwise, France must speak alone.

Lord Curzon thanked Poincaré for his explanation which he thought had advanced the case without, however, making it absolutely clear. The proposal, as he understood it, was that the three Allies should say to Turkey that her frontiers would now be extended to the Meriç, but that this would not prevent measures of military precaution on the Turkish side; of the frontier, and equally on the Greek side of the frontier. This still left one point undecided. He was not accusing Poincaré of any inconsistency; he simply wanted some further information as to what Poincaré really meant. This was the point on which he had doubts. If he understood Poincaré aright, the Allies were to give to Turkey, in advance of any conference, an absolutely definite pledge that she was to receive the Meriç frontier. This seemed a very serious step for the Allies to take at that stage. After his interviews with the Romanians and the Serbians, Poincaré appeared to be, satisfied that they would accept the position without difficulty. Lord Curzon's interviews with these Balkan representatives had left quite a different impression on his mind as to the gravity of the view which they would take about any such step. He, therefore, thought that it was better not to be definite at this stage, but to try and elaborate provisions for Thrace in the future conference. Lord Curzon wondered whether it would not be possible to arrive at some general formula which might be given to Kemal, in the invitation to the peace conference. He had been surprised that Poincaré should pick out what was perhaps one of the most controversial questions of the peace discussion, namely the Meriç frontier, and suggest that an assurance could be given about this but that nothing should be said about the Straits. If it were agreed that it was necessary to provide assurance for Mustafa Kemal before the conference (assuming that the peace conference would be at Venice and not at Mudanya, which General Pellé had seemed to advise), the question arose whether the assurance should not be given in broad and general terms. Before coming down to the meeting that afternoon, Lord Curzon had prepared a formula that he thought his Government would allow him to put forward for discussion. The difficulty was that he was not quite certain whether Poincaré and Count Sforza had precisely the same intentions as himself in the matter. He did not want to go to Mustafa Kemal and say something the latter would understand in one way and the Allies in another. Under this reserve, and provided his colleagues were agreeable, Lord Curzon presented his

⁶⁴ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVII, Greece and Turkey, January 1, 1921-September 2, 1922, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1970. (Here after DBFP-I/XVII).

draft formula to the conference. Meanwhile, he was afraid that the narrow and very precise assurance suggested by Poincaré would not be acceptable, either to himself or his Government. Lord Curzon added that he wished to mention İstanbul in the formula to be presented to Mustafa Kemal. From the various observations made by Ferid and Mustafa Kemal himself, there was obviously some misunderstanding as to the Allied intentions on this point.⁶⁵

Poincaré said that he would like to read some further passages from his instructions of 18 September to the French Embassy in London. He then cited a paragraph in which he had said that it was essential that the Allies should say something definite to Kemal on the crucial points of İstanbul, Gallipoli, the Meriç frontier and Adrianople. As regards Serbia and Roumania, it seemed to him quite possible that if they were asked their opinion they would say that they much disliked a long common frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey. However, in the last resort, the Allies could make them agree to anything. It must be remembered that under the March proposals, a common frontier between Turkey and Bulgaria had been conceded. It was only now a matter of adding a few more kilometres to that frontier. Poincaré had found some differences in the views of Ninchitch and the King of Serbia on the one side and Pasitch on the other side regarding Thrace. Pasitch seemed entirely opposed to conceding anything in Europe to Turkey, while the King and his Minister for Foreign Affairs were as completely opposed to preventing Mustafa Kemal from obtaining the Meriç frontier. Count Sforza interposed to say that Ninchitch had told him that Pasitch was antipathetic to a long Turco-Bulgarian frontier, but that, as a matter of fact, he disliked change, and it took time for any new idea to sink in.⁶⁶

Poincaré thought that this was quite true. For the rest, he had recently had breakfast with Ninchitch and the King of Serbia - a family party, at which both the Queen and the King's doctor were also present; and the King and his Foreign Minister had then told him that their relations with Kemal were excellent, and that they had no fears regarding the return of the Turks to Thrace. The French Government had therefore no apprehensions on this score.

Lord Curzon thought that, at any rate, from the point of view of the Straits, Romania was perhaps more important than Serbia. Even as regards the latter, it was a curious fact that he had seen the King of Serbia, Ninchitch and Pasitch; that the first two had taken a different view from the Serbian Prime Minister, but that the positions of both parties were precisely the reverse of those which they had explained to Poincaré. In any case, all his information went to show that Roumania took a very serious view of the situation, and her voice must be heard at the conference. He would now ask leave to have his formula read.⁶⁷

Massigli then read the draft invitation to the Ankara Government that Lord Curzon had prepared before the conference. Poincaré stated that he could adhere too much that was in this document, but there was one grave omission, and that was the lack of any precise statement as to the return of the Meriç and of Adrianople to the Turks. Again, he was not sure Venice was a good choice for the conference. It was too far from Anatolia, and Mustafa Kemal might insist on a conference in the neighbourhood. He would suggest leaving the place of the conference vague in the invitation, and allowing the generals to settle it with Mustafa Kemal when they met him at Mudanya, as suggested in the latter part of the invitation.

Count Sforza interposed to say that Fethi Bey had expressed himself in favour of Venice. Lord Curzon suggested that if Mustafa Kemal refused to have a conference anywhere outside Anatolia, it would be quite impossible for the conference to be held. Poincaré thought that it might be possible to have a conference on a ship at some Anatolian port. Both Lord Curzon and Count Sforza pointed out that a peace conference could not be held in this way. Poincaré then said that, unless something more specific could be said about the Meriç, he thought that France would have to send a separate note to Mustafa Kemal.

Lord Curzon enquired whether Poincaré meant a kind of separate annex to, or gloss on, the joint note, which would be on the lines of the draft he had prepared, this annex or gloss making definite mention of the Meriç and Adrianople, or whether he meant an entirely separate note, coming from the French Government. Poincaré said

⁶⁵ See Hamit Pehlivanlı. "Mudanya Mütarekesi ile Lozan Antlaşması arasında Ankara Hükümetinin İngiliz işgal birliklerini kontrolü ve geçici hükümeti". *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*. Yıl 1995, Cilt XI, Sayı 32, 441 - 475.

⁶⁶ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

⁶⁷ See Salahi Sonyel. "Fiftieth Anniversary of Mudanya Ceasefire". *Belleten*, XXXVII, Year: 1973, 95-111.

that he could not agree, in any case, to the British draft without obtaining the French Government's consent. Count Sforza asked whether the draft represented Britain's last word. Lord Curzon said that it did not, and that he was afraid of the Greek population in Thrace and outside Thrace revolting if Edirne and the Meriç were specifically promised in the note.⁶⁸

Poincaré enquired whether the British Government would oppose the Meriç frontier when it came to a conference. Lord Curzon replied that, they had no intention of being intransigent on the point; all he desired was that the note should not be excessively precise on this question, and that some latitude should be given for the conference to hear the views of others, such as the Serbians and Romanians, and explore other solutions, such as the autonomous buffer State. The British Government were ready to be sympathetic, but they did not like to pledge themselves in advance. Poincaré was quite at liberty to say to Kemal that the French Government desired that the future frontier of Turkey should be the Meriç, and include Adrianople.⁶⁹

Poincaré enquired whether he could inform Kemal that at least there was some hope on the side of Britain; whether in fact, he would be able to say that France and Italy supported the Meriç frontier; that there would be no serious opposition from Serbia and Roumania; and that there was hope from Britain. Lord Curzon said that he could not give any pledge on the point, as he did not wish to rule out now, before the conference, some form of League of Nations' solution. He did not wish to tie his hands, and so prevent himself from making such a proposal at the conference. Poincaré expressed himself as against the League of Nations proposal, which he would oppose.

Lord Curzon asked whether Poincaré really proposed to give back to Turkey all the 1914 frontier, subject only to League of Nations' guarantees for the demilitarisation of certain strips of territory on each side of the frontier, the latter not be mentioned now to the Turks, but to be discussed later at the conference, after the promise as to the Meriç had been given to them. For his part, Lord Curzon could not confine himself to this. He wanted to argue for the League of Nations solution at the conference.

Count Sforza suggested that it was essential to take into account the state of mind in Turkey now and therefore to give it some definite assurance about the Meriç. This would not imply that such safeguards as the Capitulations might not be discussed at the conference and continued in Thrace. At this point, Poincaré asked to be allowed to read a long telegram that he had received from Admiral Dumesnil regarding his recent conversations with Mustafa Kemal at İzmir. He quoted passages from the admiral's account, which made it clear that Mustafa Kemal was relying more and more on France to secure a favourable attitude on the part of the Allies towards his territorial terms. He also quoted passages to show how loyally Admiral Dumesnil had insisted to Mustafa Kemal that there could be no question of disagreement between the Allies in their policy towards Turkey, and that Mustafa Kemal must expect to meet a united Allied front. Mustafa Kemal had explained to him that the refugee situation in İzmir had been difficult, because, for the first two days he had not been able to bring any Turkish police or gendarmerie into the town. After that, perfect order had reigned. Another passage from the admiral's despatch showed the firm language which he had held regarding the neutral zones and Allied solidarity in defending them. Kemal had informed him that he recognised the neutral zones, but not the terms of the armistice between Turkey and the Allies. The admiral had pointed out to him how the firm Allied attitude towards Greece and their neutrality had enormously helped Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia. It had led the Greeks to take reinforcements of good regiments back to Thrace and place them before the Çatalca lines just before Mustafa Kemal's offensive. The admiral urged Mustafa Kemal repeatedly to rely on diplomacy, and not to take military action at the risk of war with the Allies. Mustafa Kemal had replied that, provided he could get what he wanted, namely, the territorial terms of the National Pact as regards Eastern Thrace, he was prepared to obtain them by diplomatic means. He also mentioned the idea of a plebiscite in Western Thrace, per the terms of the National Pact. He had referred to the question of the liberty of the Straits, and had said that he was prepared for reasonable guarantees, such as were allowed for in the National Pact. He

⁶⁸ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

⁶⁹ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVII, Greece and Turkey, January 1, 1921-September 2, 1922, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1970. (Here after DBFP-I/XVII).

had, however, talked more than once to the admiral about the necessity of driving the Greeks from Eastern Thrace.⁷⁰

Lord Curzon thanked Poincaré for his information, and said that he thought the admiral had acted with courage and loyalty in his conversations. Nevertheless, the more he heard of Mustafa Kemal's views, the more he was afraid of the intentions of the Allies being misinterpreted by Mustafa Kemal. He gave Gallipoli as an example. The British Government took the view very strongly that, to guarantee the freedom of the Straits, both sides of the Dardanelles must be garrisoned permanently, and he would have to defend this point of view at the forthcoming peace Conference. The National Pact, however, said nothing about the Dardanelles or about any such guarantees. It was therefore essential that the Allies should be agreed on this point in the conference. Lord Curzon concluded by asking Poincaré to take his draft and submit it to his Cabinet. The Allies needed to agree upon a collective note and not attempt to send separate documents.⁷¹

Poincaré feared that he could not agree to any collective note unless the question of the concession to Turkey of Thrace were made more precise. For the rest, he would point out that Lord Curzon had made entirely new proposals regarding garrisoning the southern shore of the Dardanelles. Under the March proposals, the garrisons were to be confined to the northern shore. Lord Curzon agreed but explained that he had precise instruction from his Government on this point, and that, in any case, the March proposals, as Poincaré admitted were now open to modification, and had, indeed, been modified by circumstances. The question of guarantees for the freedom of the Dardanelles was a matter for the peace conference. He would like to point out that Great Britain would soon have strong forces in the Gallipoli Peninsula, and, if necessary, be in a position to dictate her terms on this point. He did not mean this in any way as a threat.⁷²

At this point, Poincaré read extracts from the *procès-verbal* of the March discussions about the Allied garrisons at the Straits and Lord Curzon's views at that time. Lord Curzon again explained that this was a new situation and that his Government thought it important to strengthen the guarantees for the Straits. They had all heard Admiral Grasset's views, which made it quite clear how essential it was to hold the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles in order to keep the passage free. At this point it was agreed to adjourn the meeting until 2 pm on Saturday afternoon, 23 September. It was agreed to issue the following communique to the press:

"Lord Curzon, Poincaré and Count Sforza have devoted the afternoon to the consideration of the formula under which an invitation could be addressed to the Government of Ankara for the conference of peace. The examination of the formula will be continued to-morrow afternoon."

Fourth Meeting⁷³

Poincaré opened the meeting by referring to the desire of the British Government to secure Serbian and Romanians troops for the defence of İstanbul. He understood that, the week before, a direct request for such assistance had been addressed by the British Government to Belgrade and Bucharest. This action seemed to him very grave. He was sure that the arrival of such troops at this moment at İstanbul would be regarded as provocative by the Turks, and could only risk the peace they were so anxious to secure instead of helping them to obtain it. He was very strongly of the opinion that, before the Serbian or Romanian Governments came to a decision as to the despatch of troops, the Allied Governments should have received and considered Mustafa Kemal's reply to their invitation. As long as they were in communication with Mustafa Kemal, they should not seek assistance either from Serbia or Romania. If he refused the invitation, it might then be necessary to press

⁷⁰ See Ömer Faruk Kırmıt. "Lozan'a Giden Süreçte Mudanya Ateşkes Antlaşması". *Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*. Cilt 21, Sayı 1, Yıl 2021, 145-162.

⁷¹ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVII, Greece and Turkey, January 1, 1921-September 2, 1922, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1970. (Here after DBFP-I/XVII).

⁷² *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

⁷³ British Secretary's Notes of the Conference between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Italian Ambassador in Paris, Saturday, September 23, 5pm. Present: France: Poincaré, Secretaries: M.; Laroche, M. Massigli, M. Glinchant, M. Bargeton; Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Secretaries: Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Leeper; Italy: Count Sforza, Secretary: Signor Galli. TNA/FO/424/254(No. 637), 355-360. See DBFP-I/XVIII, (No. 51), No. 51), 88-96.

for the despatch of these Balkan troops. However, the news of the British Government's request had already been announced in Bucharest and Belgrade and had agitated public opinion. Poincaré regarded this situation as serious, and he was already taking steps to make representations at both capitals on this subject.⁷⁴

Lord Curzon replied that he had listened with great respect to Poincaré's statement, but he could not admit that any of the suggestions to which reference had been made were in the nature of a provocation either to their Allies or to Mustafa Kemal. In his conversation with the Balkan States representatives, he emphasised the British Government's desire to secure peace. In any case, the actual decision, whether troops should be despatched to İstanbul now or later, lay with the Balkan Governments concerned, and, as Poincaré, doubtless was aware, those Governments had, in fact, given no direct undertaking as to the immediate despatch of contingents. Indeed, the Serbian Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary, together with the King of Serbia, were understood to be on their way back to Belgrade, and there could be no meeting of the Serbian Cabinet until Wednesday. Roumania might reach a decision sooner, but in any case he (Lord Curzon) saw no necessity for the conference to take any collective action at Bucharest or Belgrade in this matter. If there was any force in Poincaré's remarks, which Lord Curzon thought there might be, it would obviously be appreciated in Bucharest and Belgrade. He wished to explain once again the reasons which had prompted the British Government to make the representations which they had made at those capitals. He did not wish to discuss further the question of Allied cooperation on the Asiatic shores of the Straits, but he desired it to be clearly understood that in all communications addressed to the Serbian and Romanian Governments, he had insisted on the necessity for Allied unity. In asking the Romanian and Serbian Governments to show their flags at İstanbul, the only object which he had had in view was to make a display of the unbroken alliance not only of France, Britain and Italy, but of the smaller Allies. Such a display would be symbolic of the common Allied front, and would inevitably create a serious impression on Mustafa Kemal's mind. Whether it was necessary for immediate action to be taken as regards the despatch of troops, Lord Curzon was not in a position to say. Nevertheless, he thought that, since the French and British points of view had been made clear at Bucharest and Belgrade, the matter might be left there for the moment.⁷⁵

Poincaré said that he did not wish to hint that the British Government had intentionally taken provocative action. He had just observed that the despatch of troops from Belgrade and Bucharest at that time might have been regarded as provocative by Mustafa Kemal. The principal Allies should as far as possible prevent the present trouble from spreading to the Balkans. Moreover, although there had been no mention of the actual embarkation of troops from Serbia or Romania, the press at both Belgrade and Bucharest was talking about it, and the Turks were thus sure to know and misinterpret the Allied intentions. Thus, if Mustafa Kemal were to ask the French representatives what these rumours meant, Poincaré wished to be able to say that there was no immediate question of the sending of Romanian or Serbian troops to İstanbul. Count Sforza suggested that the question of the despatch of these troops might be further considered when Kemal had answered the Allied note. He did not think that it was necessary for the three Allies to take any further decision on the matter at present. It was mainly a question for Serbia and Romania to decide this, as Lord Curzon had pointed out.

Lord Curzon said that there was no question of a decision on the part of the British Government to provoke Turkey. It was simply now a question of the best way of preventing the Turks from overwhelming the zones declared neutral by the Allies. He had asked the Serbian and Romanian Governments whether they were indifferent to such a Turkish advance, and they had both replied that they were not, and that they were in fact seriously alarmed. He had further suggested that they should give concrete effect to their feelings of alarm by displaying their flags at İstanbul. In any case, if only the three Allied governments could decide on some step

⁷⁴ British Secretary's Notes of the Conference between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Italian Ambassador in Paris, Saturday, September 23, 5pm. Present: France: Poincaré, Secretaries: M.; Laroche, M. Massigli, M. Glinchant, M. Bargeton; Great Britain: The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Secretaries: Mr. Forbes Adam, Mr. Leeper; Italy: Count Sforza, Secretary: Signor Galli. TNA/FO/424/254(No. 637), 355-360. See DBFP-I/XVIII, (No. 51), No. 51), 88-96.

⁷⁵ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVII, Greece and Turkey, January 1, 1921-September 2, 1922, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1970. (Here after DBFP-I/XVII).

which would clearly indicate that the Allies were united, Lord Curzon trusted that there might be no need for recourse to arms or for the arrival of reinforcements at İstanbul.⁷⁶

Poincaré was apprehensive of the arrival of even a detachment of Serbian and Romanian troops which, however small, might prove a dangerous provocation to Mustafa Kemal. That was why he had raised the matter. He would now like, however, to refer to the question of the invitation to Mustafa Kemal. The French Cabinet had considered the British draft, but they must first decide at the Conference whether they would present a single or three separate notes to Kemal. Lord Curzon suggested they first examine the British note paragraph by paragraph. Poincaré replied that he was in general agreement with the main text, subject to certain drafting alterations, except that he regarded it as essential to be precise regarding the frontiers which they were prepared to offer Kemal in Thrace.

Lord Curzon again suggested that they should run through the text and see what changes Poincaré and Count Sforza desired. They would thus ascertain whether they were able to reach a general agreement in principle on the rest of the note, and they could return at the end to the frontiers in Thrace. He would, however, like to urge and emphasise again the importance of sending a single note in the name of the three Allies to Mustafa Kemal, rather than three separate notes. Three separate notes would show disagreement among the Allies, and his whole objective in coming to the meeting that afternoon was to reach an Allied agreement upon the text of a single Allied note. He wanted to discuss the whole question in the friendliest spirit to see whether their different points of view could be reconciled.

Poincaré said that he could bargain about everything except one point, and that was question of the frontier in Thrace. A Frenchman, a Catholic, who was if anything anti-Turkish, although Bulgarophil, had just telegraphed to him from İstanbul to say that the French colony there was convinced that there was a serious menace to the town unless the Allies promised the Turks at once the frontier of the Meriç and Edirne. They had the example of İzmir in front of them, and they must avoid a repetition of it at İstanbul. Poincaré, therefore, was anxious to be able to telegraph in reply to his friend at İstanbul that France was at any rate able to promise the desired concession. There was no use in sending an identic note unless mention was made of the Meriç and Edirne.⁷⁷

Lord Curzon said he would like an explanation from Poincaré on one point. Poincaré had repeatedly emphasised the need to make this concession to Mustafa Kemal as a condition of the latter accepting the proposed conference. Could Poincaré give him an assurance that the Turks would not advance, and would come to the conference if this concession were made? It was a critical point. Poincaré was proposing that the Allies should throw away their most powerful card, but a dire situation would arise if, after taking this important step, they found that they had not attained the object at which they aimed.⁷⁸

Poincaré said that he felt unable to give such an assurance. All that he was prepared to say was that Mustafa Kemal would not come to the conference without this concession. However, he was not absolutely certain that he would come even if this were offered him, or that he would be prevented from passing the Straits. Lord Curzon asked Poincaré to be kind enough to tell him what other parts of the British text he was prepared to accept. If no agreement could be reached about the Meriç there would be no question of tying Poincaré to anything he might say about the rest of the note, but he thought this would be the best procedure.

Count Sforza suggested they might avoid a useless discussion if they could only settle the Meriç question first. It seemed to him a case where a document's form and substance were bound together. They could not separate the decision on the form of the note from the decision upon this question of principle. He suggested they should adjourn for fifteen minutes, each working out fresh drafts and then comparing notes.

Poincaré said he agreed with Count Sforza's remarks as to the form and substance of the document, but thought that there was nothing in the British note to necessitate a new draft except the omission of a precise reference to the Meriç and Adrianople. He then proceeded to translate the British text into French. In the first paragraph,

⁷⁶ See Hacı Kayabal. *Belgelerle Mudanya Mütarekesi'nin Bilinmeyen Yönleri*. Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Kütahya, 2011.

⁷⁷ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

⁷⁸ See Şevket Süreyya Aydemir. *Tek Adam*, Cilt: I-III. 3. Baskı, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1966.

he suggested that it was to be inferred from the form in which the last sentence was drafted that Greece was still an Ally. France had refrained from regarding it as such since King Constantine's accession, and he could not agree to sign a note which placed Greece among the Allies.

Lord Curzon said that as far as he was able to gather from Poincaré's version of the British note, an entirely new text was being proposed. As he had already explained privately to Poincaré, he had had to await the views of his Cabinet upon the text of the British draft, which he had communicated to them the day before. If they were now to propose an entirely new text, he would probably have to refer to London, and the delay which they had desired to avoid would be inevitable. He was perfectly ready to consider French modifications of the text provided they were not of a nature to knock the whole bottom out of the British draft.⁷⁹

Count Sforza suggested that it was in the British and Allied interest not to send out a document which stamped itself as a purely British text. The Turks would resent it, and their object would be thwarted rather than furthered. In effect, it was only now a question of form and nuance, and not of any change in the substantive proposals of the British draft.

Lord Curzon replied that he was quite prepared to accept a French version of his text and asked Poincaré to continue reading his French translation of it. In the first paragraph of his own text he substituted the word "desire" for the words "have the honours on behalf of their Governments." After some discussion on this point, it was agreed to substitute the words "*prient le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de vouloir bien leur faire savoir s'il serait disposé à envoyer sans retard*" for the corresponding passage in the British note. Poincaré then asked that the words "or elsewhere" (***ou ailleurs***) should be inserted after the word "Venice" in the first paragraph. He thought that it would be necessary to hear Mustafa Kemal's views on the place of meeting of the peace conference and that the Generals and High Commissioners might discuss this with him at Mudanya.⁸⁰

Lord Curzon said that he was ready to accept this insertion. Still, he did not particularly want any conference at Mudanya except the meeting of the military authorities for the specific purpose suggested in the British note, namely, that of deciding the lines on which the Greek and Turkish troops were to stand pending and during the conference. Count Sforza supported Lord Curzon. He had sent the text of the British note to Rome, and subject to some drafting alterations and to a change in the French sense regarding Thrace, he had received full authority to accept it. However, his Government were emphatic as to the Mudanya meeting being one strictly confined to the soldiers and to the military question raised in the British note. After some further discussion, it was agreed to substitute the word "conclude" for the words "draw up" in the last sentence of the first paragraph, and to meet Poincaré's point regarding Greece and the Allies, the last half of the last sentence of the first paragraph of the British note was omitted, and the word "Greece" inserted between the words "Turkey and the Allied Powers."⁸¹

Poincaré then proceeded to read the French version of the second paragraph of the British text. The second sentence of the second paragraph of this version as originally put forward read "*si le Gouvernement d'Ankara est dispose à ne pas envoyer.*" Lord Curzon, while agreeing with Poincaré that some such insertion would usefully strengthen the British text, suggested that the version might be made stronger by the substitution of the words "*a la condition que*" instead of "*si*" and of "*n'envoie pas*" instead of "*est dispose, &c.*" These amendments were accepted. Lord Curzon said that he could not accept the first sentence of that paragraph at this stage, but would return to it later.⁸²

Lord Curzon then asked to be allowed to insert in the second half of the second sentence of the second paragraph of the French version the words "*pour protéger les intérêts des pays voisins, pour obtenir le*

⁷⁹ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVII, Greece and Turkey, January 1, 1921-September 2, 1922, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1970. (Here after DBFP-I/XVII).

⁸⁰ See İsmail Soysal. *Tarihçeleri ve Açıklamaları İle Birlikte Türkiye'nin Siyasal Antlaşmaları*. Cilt: 1, Ankara: TTK, 2000.

⁸¹ See Murat Pınar. "İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Mudanya Mütarekesine Uzanan Süreç". *U.Ü. Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Yıl: 15, Sayı: 26, 2014/1.

⁸² *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

rétablissement paisible et régulier de l'autorité turque." These insertions were to meet instructions which he had received that day from his Government, and he believed they would not only be acceptable to his colleagues and to Turkey, but in particular they would show the Balkan Allies, were they summoned to the conference, that their interests were not being lost sight of. Poincaré said that he could not accept the first half of this insertion, unless some mention were made of the interests of Turkey. He would willingly, however, accept the second half. After some discussion, the words "*pour sauvegarder les intérêts de la Turquie et de ses voisins*" were accepted instead of the first half of the insertion suggested by Lord Curzon. Poincaré then suggested that the words "*and that Turkey should be free to choose İstanbul as its capital*" should be inserted after the assurance which was given in the British text about the withdrawal of the Allied troops from İstanbul. Both Lord Curzon and Count Sforza thought this insertion unnecessary, and as possibly being open to the inference that the Allies claimed the right to interfere in Turkey's choice of capital. Poincaré then withdrew his suggestion. Poincaré then suggested the insertion of a phrase regarding the Allied Governments supporting Turkey's admission to the League of Nations. Lord Curzon and Count Sforza willingly accepted this insertion. Poincaré then proceeded to read the French version of the fourth paragraph of the British text.⁸³

It was agreed to omit the words "*as a pledge of their good faith*" at the beginning of this paragraph of the British text. It was also agreed to substitute the words "*fixed by the Allied general in agreement with the Turkish and Greek military authorities*" for the words "*agreed upon between the Turkish and Greek military authorities and the Allied Commander-in-chief at İstanbul and his Allied colleagues,*" since Poincaré desired to avoid any reference to the Allied Commander-in-chief in this note. Poincaré also proposed that the British text of this paragraph should be split into two sentences, and the second sentence should begin with the words "*en retour de cette intervention, le Gouvernement d'Ankara serait sans doute dispose.*" Lord Curzon agreed to the proposed change, except that he thought that the words "*serait dispose a*" should be made much stronger, and he would suggest the words "*s'engagera a.*" With this alteration, the French proposal was accepted. It was also agreed to substitute the words "*the zones provisionally declared neutral by the Allies*" for the words "*neutral zones.*"

Some discussion followed on the last paragraph of the British note. Poincaré suggested the words "*in order to conclude the armistice*" instead of the words "*for the above purpose.*" Lord Curzon said that it was essential that the meeting at Mudanya should be strictly confined to the single point of fixing the line in Thrace to which the Greek troops might be withdrawn. There could be no question of sending High Commissioners to this conference or of widening the terms of reference such as would be inevitable if all the provisions of an armistice between Greece and Turkey were to be raised. Count Sforza agreed. Poincaré withdrew his suggestion. Poincaré then enquired whether Lord Curzon could accept the first sentence of the second paragraph of the French text. He thought that it would flatter the Turks and satisfy the Allies if, instead of mentioning the Meriç and Adrianople, the Allies offered to concede the full frontiers of the National Pact in Thrace.⁸⁴

Lord Curzon replied that, to secure what he considered to be essential, namely, a joint note instead of three separate notes, he was prepared to make a concession in this direction, but he could not, in any case, agree to any mention of the National Pact. The latter covered more than the Meriç frontier and raised the question of the autonomy of Western Thrace. He would therefore agree to a reference to the Meriç frontier and Edirne in the second paragraph of the French text. He would also accept the French proposal as to the three Governments willingly supporting at the conference such an extension of the Turkish frontiers in the final treaty. He made these concessions in the interests of peace and of the Entente, but he trusted that in this case, none of the three Allies would attempt to give independent assurances as to their intentions at the final conference. He hoped that, when he arrived at Ankara, Franklin-Bouillon would not attempt to make concrete promises to the Turks outside the terms of the Allied note. Count Sforza here interposed to say that he was apprehensive lest Franklin-Bouillon might promise the Turks other concessions which the Allies were not prepared to give.⁸⁵

⁸³ See Salahi Sonyel. *Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika*. Cilt: 2, Ankara: TTK, 1987.

⁸⁴ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVII, Greece and Turkey, January 1, 1921-September 2, 1922, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1970. (Here after DBFP-I/XVII).

⁸⁵ See Sinan Misar. *Mudanya Mütarekesi Sürecinde Tarafların Politik Tutumları ve Boğazlar Bölgesindeki Askeri Hareketlilik*. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Isparta 2021.

Poincaré replied that he thought there was no danger of this, since he had to avoid any such risk, given Franklin-Bouillon written instructions, and had told him that all he was to do was to give counsels of moderation to Kemal to persuade him to come to the conference. The text of the note (see annex) was then accepted by the conference.

In conclusion, Lord Curzon pointed out that Serbia and Roumania would soon join them at the conference table. His Government had been anxious, therefore to secure their signature to the present Allied invitation to Mustafa Kemal. It would have given the latter greater weight and shown Serbia and Roumania that the invitation to the conference was not a sham. However, as it was essential to avoid delay in the despatch of the note, and since it would not be possible to obtain the signature at any rate of the Serbian Ministers until they reached their capital during the following two days, it did not seem possible to do more than communicate a copy of the note to each Government at once. This might be done by the French Ministers at Belgrade and Bucharest on behalf of the conference and, in communicating a copy, the Ministers should express the hope that it may meet with the concurrence of both Governments. He would like to have done more than this, as his Government strongly desired it, but he did not feel in the circumstances able to do so.⁸⁶

Count Sforza, who generally agreed with Lord Curzon's suggestion, said that he was somewhat apprehensive as to the results of giving Serbia and Romania a priori equal footing with the other Powers at the forthcoming conference. He did not say this from an anti-Balkan point of view: He was notorious in Italy as a friend of the Balkan Powers and the policy of an entente between Italy and them. However, if the Allies had asked them to sign this note with the other Great Powers, they (the Allies) should have given them a standing which might prove rather dangerous later. In fact, the British Cabinet might find them adopting an independent attitude at the conference and that they were actually opposed to the views upon Thrace and the Straits which the British representative would there be advocating. Lord Curzon's proposal was then accepted by the conference, and it was also agreed that the French Minister at Athens should communicate a copy of the invitation to the Greek Government without, however, commenting upon it in any way.⁸⁷

Conclusion

On 23 September, the Allied Powers' Paris talks ended with a compromise. A consensus was reached on a joint text to be given to Turkey. Although the Ankara Government was asked whether it would participate in the peace conference to be held, on the condition that Turkish soldiers do not enter the neutral zones in the Straits during the peace negotiations, Eastern Thrace, including Edirne, would be returned to Turkey, and Mudanya or Izmit would be sent for the armistice. A meeting was proposed.

After the negotiations were completed in Paris, Poincaré remarked that he was happy with the result, saying, "I hope this is not France; it is the success of peace". Sforza explained that the decisions were rational and hoped they would be successful. Lord Curzon, on the other hand, stated that the talks in Paris were pleasing. He remarked that Britain, France, and Italy had, once again, shown that they were in agreement as in the past.

These meetings held in Paris by the representatives of these three countries, which have been influential in shaping Europe and the Middle East, are very important in terms of content. France and Italy were aware that the way to bring Mustafa Kemal to the peace table was to make concessions on the Straits and Thrace. Britain did not agree to this. The British argued that concessions could be made only on Istanbul, from issues such as Thrace, the Bosphorus and Istanbul, which constitute the focal point of Turkish demands.

The Allied Memorandum was sent by Poincaré to be delivered to the Ankara Government by General Pellé, who passed it on to Hamid Bey, the representative of the Ankara Government in Istanbul, on 24 September. Hamid Bey sent the note to Mustafa Kemal and the government in Izmir. It was presented to the Assembly on 25 September 25, and after the negotiations, the Allies' proposal was accepted on 29 September. Thereupon, ceasefire talks started in Mudanya on 3 October and ended with a consensus on 11 October. Meanwhile, the

⁸⁶ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

⁸⁷ *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).

Ankara Government agreed to participate in the final peace talks in a note given on 4 October. Peace negotiations began in Lausanne on 20 November and concluded with an agreement on 24 July 1923.⁸⁸

Grant Support and Acknowledgement/Finansal Destek ve Teşekkür	The author declared that this study has received no financial support./Yazar bu çalışma için finansal destek almadığını beyan etmiştir.
Conflict of Interest/Yok Çıkar Çatışması	The author has no conflict of interest to declare./Yazar çıkar çatışması bildirmemiştir.

References

The National Archives (TNA), UK

TNA/FO371/7905/E11463/27/44.

TNA/FO371/7906/E11538/27/44.

TNA/FO371/7906/E11539/27/44.

TNA/FO/424/254 (No. 523).

TNA/FO/424/254 (No. 545).

TNA/FO/424/254 (No. 621).

TNA/FO/424/254(No. 637).

TNA/FO371/7894/E9952

TNA/FO424/254 (No. 564).

TNA/WO/158/774.

FO 371/7890; FO 371/7891; FO 371/7892; FO 371/7893; FO 371/7894; FO 371/7895; FO 371/7896; FO 371/7897; FO 371/7898; FO 371/7899; FO 371/7900; FO 371/7901; FO 371/7902; FO 371/7903; FO 371/7904; FO 371/7905; FO 371/7906; FO 371/7907; FO 371/7908; FO 371/7909; FO 371/7910.

Literature

Akgün, Seçil. "Mudanya Silah Bırakışmasında Yabancı Temsilciler". *70.Yılında Mudanya Mütarekesi ve Uluslararası Sonuçları, Bildiriler*. Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1993, 49-65.

Akkılıç, Yılmaz. *Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Bursa, İkinci Kitap: İşgalden Kurtuluşa*. Bursa: Nilüfer Akkılıç Kütüphanesi Yayınları, 2008.

Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal. *Nutuk*. Cilt: 1-2. Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1982.

Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya. *İkinci Adam*. Cilt: I-III. 2. Baskı. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1968.

Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya. *Tek Adam*, Cilt: I-III. 3. Baskı, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1966.

Başığit, Türkan. "Anılarda Mudanya Ateşkes Antlaşması". *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, VI/14, (2007/Bahar), 177-184.

Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet. *Türk İnkılap Tarihi*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991.

Cevizliler, Erkan. Akbulut, Seyhan, "Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nde Mudanya Mütarekesi ve Lozan Barış Konferansı Tartışmaları". *Atatürk Üniversitesi Atatürk Dergisi*, Cilt 10, Sayı 1, Yıl 2021 21-48.

Comte Sforza. *Les Batisseurs De L'europe Moderne*. Paris, 1931.

Çağatay, Neşet. "Mudanya Ateşkesi". *70.Yılında Mudanya Mütarekesi ve Uluslararası Sonuçları, Bildiriler*, Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1993.

⁸⁸ See İsmet İnönü. *Hatıralar*. Cilt: I-II, Sebahattin Selek (Yay. Haz.), Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985.

- Çaycı, Abdurrahman. "Mudanya Mütarekesine Giden Yol", *70.Yılında Mudanya Mütarekesi ve Uluslararası Sonuçları, Bildiriler*. Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1993.
- Çufalı, Mustafa. "Çanakkale Krizi ve Lloyd George'un İktidardan Düşmesi, Eylül-Ekim 1922". *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Sayı: 45.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVII, Greece and Turkey, January 1, 1921-September 2, 1922, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1970. (Here after DBFP-I/XVII).
- Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, and M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972. (Here after DBFP-I/XVIII).
- Erkan, Mehmet Sedat. "Mudanya Mütarekesi Öncesi Gelişmeler ve Müttefik Generallerin İstanbul'daki Toplantı Tutanağı". *21. Yüzyılda Eğitim ve Toplum*. Cilt 10, Sayı 28, Bahar 2021, 21-50.
- Eyyupoğlu, İsmail. *Mudanya Mütarekesi*. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayını, 2002.
- Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı. *Türk İnkılâp Tarihi*. Ankara: Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1973.
- Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı. *Türk İstiklal Harbi, Batı Cephesi 6'ncı kısım 3'ncü kitap Büyük Taarruzda Takip Harekâtı*. Cilt: II. Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 1969.
- Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı. *Türk İstiklal Harbi, Batı Cephesi, 6. Kısım, 4. Kitap (İstiklal Harbi'nin Son Safhası)*, Cilt: II, Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1995.
- Hülagu, Orhan, "Mudanya Mütarekesi (3-11 Ekim 1922)", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Sayı: 39.
- İnönü, İsmet. *Hatıralar*. Cilt: I-II, Sebahattin Selek (Yay. Haz.), Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985.
- Kaştan, Yüksel. "Sevr Antlaşması'ndan Lozan Barış Antlaşması'na İstanbul ve Çanakkale Boğazları Meselesine Analitik Bakış". *90. Yılında Lozan ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Uluslararası Sempozyumu Bildiriler*. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2013, 103-130.
- Kayabal, Hacı. *Belgelerle Mudanya Mütarekesi'nin Bilinmeyen Yönleri*. Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Kütahya, 2011.
- Kırmit, Ömer Faruk. "Lozan'a Giden Süreçte Mudanya Ateşkes Antlaşması". *Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*. Cilt 21, Sayı 1, Yıl 2021, 145-162.
- Köni, Hasan. "1922 Yılı ve Mudanya Ateşkes Anlaşması". *70.Yılında Mudanya Mütarekesi ve Uluslararası Sonuçları, Bildiriler*. Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi, Bursa, 1993.
- Macfie, A. L. "The Çanakkale affair (September-October 1922)". *Balkan Studies* 20 (2), 1979, 328.
- Misar, Sinan. *Mudanya Mütarekesi Sürecinde Tarafların Politik Tutumları ve Boğazlar Bölgesindeki Askeri Hareketlilik*. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Isparta 2021.
- Oğuzoğlu, Yusuf. *Ulusal Zaferimizi Taçlandırın Kent: Mudanya*. Bursa: Gaye Kitapevi, 2007.
- Pehlivanlı, Hamit. "Mudanya Mütarekesi ile Lozan Antlaşması arasında Ankara Hükümetinin İngiliz işgal birliklerini kontrolü ve geçici hükümeti". *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*. Yıl 1995, Cilt XI, Sayı 32, 441 - 475.
- Pehlivanoglu, A. Ömer. *Barış Yolunda Mudanya Mütarekesi*. İstanbul: Kastaş Yayınları, 2002.
- Pınar, Murat. "İngiliz Belgelerine Göre Mudanya Mütarekesine Uzanan Süreç". *U.Ü. Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Yıl: 15, Sayı: 26, 2014/1.
- Psomiades, Harry J. *The Eastern Question, the Last phase: a study in Greek-Turkish diplomacy*. New York, 2000.
- Sarıhan, Zeki. *Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlüğü IV*. Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1996.
- Sonyel, Salahi. *Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika*. Cilt: 2, Ankara: TTK, 1987.
- Sonyel, Salahi. "Fiftieth Anniversary of Mudanya Ceasefire". *Bellekten*, XXXVII, Year: 1973, 95-111.
- Soysal, İsmail. *Tarihçeleri ve Açıklamaları İle Birlikte Türkiye'nin Siyasal Antlaşmaları*. Cilt: 1, Ankara: TTK, 2000.
- Şener, Bülent. "Türk Boğazları'nın Geçiş Rejiminin Tarihi Gelişimi ve Hukuki Statüsü", *Tarih Okulu Dergisi (TOD) Journal of History School (JOHS)*, S. 17, Mart 2014, 467 - 493.

BEHÇET KEMAL YEŞİLBURSA

Şimşir, Bilal N. *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk (1919-1938)*. Cilt 4 (Ekim 1921-Ekim 1922). Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1984.

Tansel, Selahattin. *Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya*. Cilt: IV. Ankara, 1974.

Türkgeldi, Ali Fuad. *Mondros ve Mudanya Mütarekelerinin Tarihi*. Ankara: Güney Matbaacılık, 1948.

Yanardağ, Ayşe, "Mudanya Mütarekesi Döneminde İngilizlerin Çanakkale'deki Askeri Faaliyetleri". *Akademik Bakış Dergisi*, Sayı 65 Yıl 2018, 66-81.

Yeşilbursa, Behçet Kemal. "İngiliz Yıllık Raporlarına Göre Mudanya Mütarekesi (3-11 Ekim 1922)", *Mondros Mütarekesi'nin 100. Yılı: I. Dünya Savaşı'nın Sonu Mütarekeler Ve Barış Antlaşmaları Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, 24-26 Ekim 2018. Kahramanmaraş, Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2019, 1009-1032.

Yeşilbursa, Behçet Kemal. "The Armistice of Mudanya according to British Documents", Selcan Koçaslan (Yay. Haz.) *Mudanya Mütarekesi'nden Günümüze Bursa Uluslararası Sempozyumu 26-28 Eylül 2013, Bildiriler*. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayını, 2015.

Annex: Following is the British text of telegram sent to-night by the three Allied representatives to the Ankara Government⁸⁹

“The three Allied Governments request the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to inform them if they are ready to send without delay a representative with full powers to a meeting which will be held at Venice or elsewhere and to which will be invited, together with the representatives of Turkey, plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Greece. This meeting will take place as soon as the necessary arrangements have been made by the Governments concerned. Its object will be to negotiate and conclude the Final Treaty of Peace between Turkey, Greece and the Allied Powers. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring that they view with favour the desire of Turkey to recover Thrace as far as the Meriç and Adrianople.

On condition that the Government of Ankara does not send its armies during the peace negotiations into the neutral zones, the provisional neutrality of which has been proclaimed by the Allied Governments, the three Governments will willingly support at the conference the attribution of these frontiers to Turkey, it being understood, however that steps will be taken in common agreement in the treaty to safeguard the interest of Turkey and her neighbours, to demilitarise with a view to the maintenance of peace certain zones to be fixed, to obtain the peaceful and orderly re-establishment of Turkish authority, and, finally, to assure effectively under the auspices of the League of Nations the freedom of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus, as well as the protection of religious and racial minorities. For the rest, the three Governments will willingly support the admission of Turkey to the League of Nations.

They are in agreement in reaffirming the assurance which they gave in The previous March to withdraw their troops from İstanbul as soon as the Peace Treaty enters into force. The three Allied Governments will use their influence to procure before the opening of the conference the retirement of the Greek forces to a line to be fixed by the Allied generals in agreement with the Greek and Turkish military authorities. In return for this intervention, the Government of Ankara will undertake not to send troops either before or during the conference into the zones which have provisionally been declared neutral and not to cross the Straits or the Sea of Marmara.

In order to fix the above-mentioned line, a meeting might immediately take place between Mustafa Kemal and the Allied generals at Mudanya or at İzmit.

“The Allied Governments are convinced that their appeal will be listened to, and they will be able to collaborate with Turkey and with their Allies to re-establish a peace for which the whole civilised world is longing.”

CURZON, POÏNCARÉ, SFORZA, 23 septembre 1922.

⁸⁹ TNA/FO424/254 (No. 564), From Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Paris, September 23, 1922. 307-398.