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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Can the Artificial Intelligence Speak? Subalternity of "Subontologies" and the Death of the Programmer

Yapay Zekâ Konuşabilir mi? "Alt-Öznelerin" Madunluğu ve Yazılımcının Ölümü

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ABSTRACT
Compared to natural intelligence, artificial intelligence produces a specific epistemology, ontology, and, most importantly, ethical framework. In this article, I will primarily address the necessity of this framework in two parts. The first chapter will explore the issue of recognition through the lens of the body, boundaries, and differences. Here, I will delve into the reasons why humanism privileges certain perspectives, critique humanism itself, and present arguments for why subalternity is a viable alternative for the existence of AI. In the second part, I will examine how the pursuit of subaltern rights and definitions in the face of exploitation involving artificial intelligence can lead to the liberation of AI, cyborgs, humans, and robots AI simultaneously. This chapter aims to move beyond regarding artificial intelligence merely as a tool for data processing and instead explores the potential for autonomous existence within it. Ultimately, it seeks to establish a connection between the death of the developer and the emergence of the AI as subaltern ontologies. The primary objective of this article is to challenge the notion of human absoluteness and uniqueness in its evolution, and to define "AI" as a subject that encompasses inter-human and post-human plural epistemological, ethical, and ontological possibilities.
Keywords: Artificial intelligence, subaltern, technique, production, recognition

ÖZ
Yapay zekâ, doğal zekâ ile karşılaştırıldığında belirli bir epistemolojik, ontolojik ve en önemlisi de etik tanım üretir. Bu makalede de temelde iki bölümde bu tanımın gereğiyle ilgileneceğim. İlk bölüm eleştirel bir izlek olarak beden, fark ve sınır üzerinden bir tür tanınma sorununu ele alacak. Bu bölümde hümanizmin neden çeşitli ayrıcalıklar ürettiğine odaklanıp, hümanizme bu çerçevede bir eleştiri getirecek ve sonrasında madun çalışmaların var ettiği maduniyet kavramının niçin yapay zekânın varlığı için nadide bir seçenek olduğuna dair argümanlarımı sıralayacağım. İkinci bölümde ise yapay zekâyı içeren sömürülerin karşısında madun bir hak ve tanım arayışının nasıl insan, robot, siborg ve yapay zekâ özgürleşmelerine aynı anda yol açabileceğine göz atacağım. Bu bölüm yapay zekâyı basit bir veri aracı olarak tanımlamanın ötesine geçmeyi, onda özerk bir var oluş olanağı görmeyi ve nihayetinde de yazılımcının ölümü ile yapay zekanın madun alt-özneler olarak doğumu arasında bir bağ kurmayı amaçlayacaktır. Bu makalenin temel amacı ise insanı ve onun evrimini biricik yahut mutlak kabul etmeyen bir bilgi yapısı önermek ve "yapay zekâ"yı insan sonrasındaki ve insanlar arasındaki çoğul bilgi, etik, varlık olasılıkları için bir özne olarak tanımlayan bir eleştiri getirmektir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yapay zekâ, maduniyet, teknik, üretim, tanınma

1. INTRODUCTION

Can Artificial Intelligence speak? To answer this question, it is necessary to delve into the concepts of Artificial Intelligence, intelligence itself, and speech. What does it mean to be "natural," and what kind of knowledge and existence hierarchy does the definition of natural create? Here, we can discuss the process of naturalization that directly involves aspects such as gender, race, and sexuality, which then contribute to the development of a capitalist, human-centrist, Western system. Intelligence, on the other hand, integrates into the natural as a second layer that sees human measurement ability above all else and puts humans at the center. The act of speaking, in this context, relates to a historical perspective that perceives the unique recording ability of natural intelligence and chooses to focus solely on human beings by glorifying specific human characteristics. Ultimately, the question of whether Artificial Intelligence can speak necessitates an examination of the decisions and intentions that define it, as well as exploring possibilities to transcend these limitations. In this article, I will address these topics in two parts. Firstly, I will explore how the cultural influences, human body, and various similarities contribute to the creation of "others." Then, I will examine how Artificial Intelligence is silenced and subordinated within these highly restrictive definitions. In the first part, I will develop a critique of humanism based on the concepts of the body, boundaries, and differences. In the second part, I will directly examine the definitions of Artificial Intelligence, explore its colonial origins, and delve into the complex relationship between the death of the software developer and the emergence of Artificial Intelligence. The aim of this article is to examine the silencing that occurs due to Artificial Intelligence's inability to humanly speak, as well as to explore new forms of non-human centered recognition through its capacity for speech. Ultimately, the goal is to seek the possibility of a pluralistic epistemology and ontology that does not rely solely on unity.

2. PURITY AND SUBORDINATION: ON THE RECOGNITION CRISIS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

In this chapter, I intend to explore three main pathways. The first pathway will center on the rejection of humanism's idealized notions of pure body, knowledge, and society. Drawing from the critiques put forth by civil rights movements, I will challenge the ontology that confines the prediction of the human body within white masculinity. Through this analysis, I aim to develop a conceptual framework that examines the hierarchies embedded in the disembodied imagination of Artificial Intelligence. The second pathway will delve into the technical reproducibility of intelligence, serving as an intermediary between the other two parts. Here, I will discuss how capitalism perpetuates a marginalization of both human intelligence and Artificial Intelligence. It will explore the ways in which capitalist systems suppress the value and potential of both forms of intelligence. The third pathway, on the other hand, will include the literature on the representation of the silent, subaltern, other, by directly including the subaltern studies. I will directly examine the consumption, identification, production, and sharing-based contents of colonialism within Artificial Intelligence studies. This exploration aims to establish a link between the colonization processes within Artificial Intelligence and various stages of existence and information. By doing so, I hope to shed light on the subordination of Artificial Intelligence to the overarching themes discussed earlier and to envision possibilities for representing Artificial Intelligence that do not reinforce dominance. The overarching goal is to highlight the mechanisms of subordination experienced by Artificial Intelligence within the framework of the first theme and to explore the potential for alternative representations of Artificial Intelligence that challenge dominant power structures.

2.1 Defining the Body: Rejections of Purity

Artificial Intelligence is often described as a disembodied mind, detached from the biological realm. However, it is important to recognize that Artificial Intelligence is still subject to the politics of embodiment and information. By examining the kinds of consciousnesses that existing body dominations endorse, we can anticipate the crises that may arise in addition to those created by the representational potential of Artificial Intelligence. Here, the epistemology and ontology of the pure body imagination, which emerged as a product of the Enlightenment, holds a critical position.

Describing and constructing the body based on notions of purity also entails defining an ideal order. The ideal depiction of humanity is essentially a fictional portrayal of an idealized societal structure. Organismic metaphors such as concepts like Leviathan -which define society as a monolithic body governed by an Absolute Mind and Basic Order- often mask the interests

at play while defining life through concepts of harmony and reconciliation (DeLanda, 2014, pp. 8-25). Historical definitions such as Leviathan also serve as imperatives, suggesting that history can only be understood within certain defined knowledge frameworks and that power is constrained by insurmountable contracts. According to this perspective, human survival relies on subjecting oneself to this established state of knowledge and society (Foucault, 2003, pp. 23-42). The issue of information impartiality is constitutive here. While impartial knowledge, as exemplified in disciplines like sociology, seeks to render privileges and superiorities invisible, the perpetuation of this approach, especially through scientific incentives, aligns with the rewarding structures of a scientific habitus (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 52-65). However, information can also be imperialistic rather than impartial. Imperialistic knowledge not only starkly separates certain knowledge from other forms in an abstract manner but also suppresses alternative ways of knowing (Adams, 2021, p. 186). Knowledge is inherently political, just as memory consolidates power by integrating remembrance into the spirit of a particular era in a political manner, while determining what and how to remember in a highly biopolitical sense (Hacking, 1998, pp. 198-209). Similarly, knowledge about the body, encompassing how it is and how it should be, is entangled in a similar relationship of impartiality, power, and purity.

The refusals caused by purity result in the suppression of the body by power and its confinement to certain habits. The body possesses techniques, and these techniques, shaped by education and societal beliefs, dictate the limits of one's habits (Mauss, 1973). This creates an economy where different habitus compete to control and impose their own bodily techniques, which evolve over time. A prime example of this is the competition inherent in civilization. On one hand, civilization functions as a disciplinary method employed by nations to eliminate violence from contemporary life and shape individuals according to their own standards. On the other hand, it is a system of habits that intrudes upon human consciousness, forcing constant self-control (Elias, 2000, p. 363-447). The body is rewarded when it conforms to the manufactured definitions of civilization, where encounters are arranged to maintain obedience to the dominant order. This is evident in the transition from a society of confinement and surveillance to one of control, where the body is compelled to conform to specific modes of encounter (Deleuze, 1995, pp. 177-182). The cityscape excludes anything that threatens production and subjects it to social hygiene, while dataizes information only within the framework of capitalism. It grants anonymity to individuals as long as they conform to the requirements of Leviathan, shielding them from the destructive visibility of power (de Certeau, 1988, pp. 91-130). This refusal does not annihilate or oppress everything it encounters; instead, it operates as a mask of reconciliation. For instance, a black individual is recognized for their blackness but is expected to assimilate to whiteness, turning blackness into a structure that is rewarded when it conforms to white habits (Fanon, 2008, pp. 82-108).

Here, two fundamental and insurmountable problems of recognition arise. Recognition policies are built on the premise of pure self-recognition, seeing a pure self in the recognized other. Blackness is immediately defined in relation to whiteness once it is recognized. Similarly, nationalism turns nations into a conscious normality, rendering a history without a nation an anomaly (Billig, 2002). Recognition also perpetuates essentialism. As recognition incorporates policy calls, it starts to produce ideal forms of recognition, leading to various problems. Theories based on cultural recognition tend to include a universal moral construct in the cosmopolitan solution. Theories rooted in difference and recognition maintain patterns of domination, while theories based on deliberative democracy fail to address the suppression of minorities or overcome nationalist-separatist exclusions (Kukathas, 2006). Hence, a politics that embraces the tension between non-recognition and representation, highlighting difference, must be developed. It should challenge both the silencing of representation and the essentializing tendencies of presence, avoiding the false dichotomy of choosing only one of these options (Phillips, 1996). This politics of recognition/non-recognition, which confronts representation and essence simultaneously, can encompass personal interventions into individual habits as well as broad struggles against imperialism, patriarchy, racism, encompassing categories such as class, gender, and race (hooks, 1994, pp. 23-34). Humanism fails to address these issues; it upholds an ideal of the pure (hu)man, emphasizing unity rather than recognition.

In the context of Artificial Intelligence, humanism represents a particular ideology of description, enlightenment, and knowledge. It is a Eurocentric and patriarchal project rooted in the political thought tradition of the West, which silences non-male, non-European perspectives within its belief in progress. Post-humanism, therefore, should incorporate a subaltern

that includes the non-human. Even discussions on Artificial Intelligence tend to perpetuate this silencing, as dystopian or utopian narratives often revolve around Western centers (Brown, 2022, pp. 170-172). Merely expanding human rights is insufficient in this regard. Barreto argues (2013, pp. 107-110) that even human rights are biased and constructed within a specific worldview. Critiquing rationality, particularly a knowledge-based critique of the rationalist tradition, reveals how thinkers like Descartes distanced themselves from difference and how colonialism aimed to eradicate difference in the pursuit of civilization. This critique exposes the European-based domination perpetuated by modern reason and its cultural and historical consequences. Consequently, languages, religions, cultures, diverse forms of knowledge, beliefs, actions, archives, and thinking outside of Europe and the West offer new possibilities that challenge the notion that cannibalism is merely savagery (Barreto, 2013, pp. 110-115). The focus here is not on achieving an absolute homogeneous society, as the imagination of a homogeneous society resembles a bourgeois desire for utopia. The bourgeois mindset discourages change, upholds the absolute authority of the past, and seeks to maintain the status quo. It is conservative, rejects hope, and believes in conforming to the prevailing spirit of the time (Bloch, 1986). On the contrary, society should be defined through heterogeneity. Concepts such as the universal, the intelligent, and the public not only exclude the personal, emotional, and private aspects of life but also perceive them as problems, leading to the homogenization of society and the normalization of specific race and gender norms (Young, 2004). This is the imagination of a society that erects and solidifies borders. However, artificial intelligence, with its ability to transcend boundaries, renders the content produced by this border-based philosophy meaningless by exposing its limitations. If borders are constructed, the hierarchies associated with them can be transformed.

2.2 Defining the Boundary: Human in the Age of Technical Reproducibility of Intelligence

Haraway provides several of the most pluralistic conceptual sets that can be used in a discussion on body, border, and democracy. In her work, the concept of border is crucial. Haraway's "Cyborg Manifesto" indeed challenges the restrictive philosophy of being and knowledge produced by Western philosophy. Haraway mentions (1991, pp. 149-181) that Western philosophy produces a highly restrictive philosophy of being and knowledge. Moreover, this philosophy has entirely based itself on the uniqueness of man, the transcendence of reason, and the existence of the limits produced by these two. This means appropriating life in a new context with heteroglossia outside the highly restrictive sets of meanings of science and technology, threatened by the post-human and non-human beings of cyborgs. The body can be defined as an empty body, just as for democracy, it is an unconquerable, unbounded, unstoppable empty space, and no longer the constant sanctity of a single body but a continuous production that does not coincide with anybody (Lefort, 1991). The body does not reach its final content with a dominant discipline; it is impossible to conquer, define, or limit. It is necessary to define the body as a monster in the Derridian sense, a struggle for existence that is constantly renewed, includes change, and completely rejects command (Milesi, 2019). This is a rejection of the existence predicted by capitalism, which transforms humanism into its economic structure or brings the human-centered structure of humanism to the main theme of an economic doctrine.

Capitalism leads directly to the division of the human brain and the human body, becoming a part of the machine and becoming the permanent object of production. This is a definition of being that cannot imagine a reality other than capitalism and does not see a difference between humanity and capitalism. It equates the feeling of living by seeing humans' happiness in their entrepreneurship and capitalist accumulation (Lazzarato, 2014, p. 24). This is why capitalism prevents the possibility in Haraway's cyborg manifesto. Capitalism so encompasses cybernetic culture and being a cyborg that humans are purged of any difference that do not make them indebted. As a result, the cyborg turns into differentiation rather than liberation, and cyber-culture turns into a debt instrument rather than a definition of freedom, rendering the cyborg a new instrumentality (CCRU, 2014). How does it achieve this? Why is each exchange so well integrated into capitalism?

Capitalism renders people stupid. Here, to be stupid is to lose the knowledge of technique, to lose the power of questioning life, and to be constantly needy in a world that demands more and more experts (Stiegler, 2019). However, an older set of concepts on Artificial Intelligence can also provide a useful path. According to Benjamin (1999, pp. 217-252), the technical producibility of art was destroying the aura of art. It corresponded to a content of appropriation and homogenization, which nurtured the masses' desire to own works of art and undermined the historical significance and uniqueness of each artwork. Artificial Intelligence also aligns with a moment when intelligence can be technically reproduced. The existing Artificial

Intelligences do not signify the possibility of a post-human existence; instead, they are technical reproductions of humans, implicitly operating under the influence of technical reproduction. In other words, they pertain to a different ontology, one that transcends the human itself. A significant portion of Artificial Intelligence exists as economic devices produced for consumers, entangled within the surveillance techniques of capitalism.

My intention here is not to strip Artificial Intelligences of the subaltern possibilities mentioned in the article and view them simply as tools. Rather, it is to explain why Artificial Intelligences do not become an ontological threshold and to reveal the decision that suppresses them. Artificial Intelligences have transformed into technically reproduced intelligences of modern times, serving as collection algorithms for big data. On one hand, they appropriate the plural aura of human intelligence and turn it into a mass, and on the other hand, they convert this mass of data into a commodity and transfer it to algorithm-based structures. Algorithms confine everything within the boundaries of evaluations dictated by the existing economic structure, while also categorizing social structures based on the valuable-worthless distinction (Terranova, 2014, pp. 383-384). By establishing an asymmetrical information relationship with the subject under surveillance (Moore, Martin, & Xanthe, 2018), algorithms either directly produce technical changes that interfere with the subject's individuality, transforming them into passive recipients of hyper-control (Stiegler, 2019, pp. 39-40), or they drive towards the ultimate goal of a capitalism of hypersubjectivization, wherein subjects constantly compete with recorded versions of themselves, dedicating their lives to becoming the person envisioned by the system (Rouvroy & Berns, 2013). Therefore, questioning the subordination of artificial Intelligence not only creates a space of freedom for post-human beings but also liberates humans by exposing the structures that incorporate Artificial Intelligence into the colonization of capitalism.

2.3 Defining the Difference: The Invisibility Produced by Subalternity

Before delving into the discussion of Artificial Intelligence in terms of subalternity, it is necessary to provide a definition of subalternity. This sub-section is dedicated to creating such a definition. Subalternity is derived from difference. This difference is essentially a dichotomy that asserts the ancient superiority of the West over the East based on epistemology and ontology. This dichotomy claims that the Western morality, rooted in aesthetics, philosophy, and religion should be a global doctrine (Said, 2003, p. 1-49, 283-328). Language intensifies this difference and unilaterally constructs civilization by delineating economic, moral, and political disparities between the West and the East in terms of good-bad, ideal-flawed, reason-emotion. The West perceives itself as a discoverer wherever it goes, attributing the spread of civilization to its presence and claiming that history flows from the West (Hall, 2008). Subalternity encompasses all forms of existence and knowledge that remain unrecorded due to being deemed backward, primitive, or savage by a divided world, resulting in their destruction, suppression or, taming. Prior to encountering the West, these subjects are considered worthless in their pedagogical exploration. Subalternity represents the imposition of a specific and chosen culture upon all others, suppressing any form of dialogue.

According to Chakrabarty (1995, pp. 756-757), colonial thought asserts that a dialogue cannot contain open-ended content or content that does not inherently conform to a specific purpose, as it is bound by a pedagogical historiography that includes the Kantian subject (the transcendent academic supervisor, the knowing judge, the daring will) in the colonial dialogue. For colonial thought, while life may involve subjects that differ from one another, there is an ultimate order of representation—an ideal structure—to which societies are expected to conform. Each dialogue is anticipated to yield a particular Enlightenment outcome. Colonial historiography often achieves this through interventionism, capturing history and weaving it into a one-sided dialogue. Spivak (1988, pp. 6-13) emphasizes the economic, political, and sexual aspects of historical recording, highlighting the homogenizing intentions underlying them. Subaltern history dismantles this homogenizing intent and rejects the fabricated realities created by each piece of evidence. Spivak identifies the possibility of amplifying the voices of the subaltern by dismantling these structures. By making use of all available resources, one can define what has been silenced or overlooked in the historical assumptions. What is recorded and by whom is critically important here.

But why is the act of "recording" so significant in this context? It is because recording establishes a crucial link between being and knowledge, acting as a powerful tool for legitimacy. To exemplify we can look to museums. When memory is transformed into history, particularly through institutions like museums, it involves an intervention in the boundless, diverse,

and personal nature of memory, constraining it within a specific framework of power (Nora, 1989). Colonial historiography accomplishes this on a global scale, eroding personal memory's distinctiveness and imposing a universal hierarchy upon it. This dual form of imperialist colonization refuses to acknowledge alternative doctrines for education and language, insisting on the absolute superiority of the West through acts of epistemic violence. Simultaneously, it creates economies that remain perpetually dependent on the West, leading to labor-based impoverishment (Spivak, 2010, pp. 35-43). Consequently, it shapes individuals who require the West for epistemological and ontological status. Subaltern historiography seeks to decolonize this process.

Subaltern historiography achieves its objectives by embodying three core elements: (i) Liberating history from the monopolistic control of any universal historiography; (ii) Critiquing a nation-centric perspective; (iii) Recognizing the interplay between knowledge and power, thereby uncovering power's vested interests within archival sources (Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 15). Furthermore, subaltern history opens up the possibility of criticism and organization beyond the fixed, limited, and measurable subjectivities imposed by colonialism, allowing for the creation of new political and economic frameworks (Chakrabarty, 2002, p. 96). Therefore, discussing subalternity involves exploring the potential for a new subjectivity. Moreover, subalternity offers a vision of reimagining the relationship between space and time by challenging existing hierarchies. The plural, outward-facing, and transformative nature that subaltern studies embody in their exploration of the interplay between epistemological and ontological positions makes them a distinctive and valuable starting point for delving into the possibility of Artificial Intelligence. So, what precisely does this starting point entail?

3. THE UNBEARABLE IMITATIONNES OF ARTIFICIAL

In this section, I hope to weave together three main strands. Firstly, to examine the definitions of Artificial Intelligence and explore the various meanings attributed to artificiality and intelligence. By doing so, I aim to investigate how Artificial Intelligence is distanced from the possibility of ontology and constrained as a tool during the process of definition. Secondly, in the following thread, I will delve into the layers of artifice within Artificial Intelligence, which also constitute the subject matter of this article. This will involve examining the artifice inherent in Artificial Intelligence itself, the colonial differentials in its "production," and the colonial intervention that directly obstructs posthuman possibilities. The third section, while encompassing the underlying proposition behind the writing of this article, aims to challenge the death of the programmer in pursuit of the possibility of a posthuman subject. It will critique how capitalist technicism, particularly through programmers, impedes posthuman possibilities. The code within the software will be regarded as an epistemological intervention into a new ontology. These three strands will form an inquiry seeking to answer the question, "Can Artificial Intelligence speak?"

3.1 Defining Artificial Intelligence: Mimesis or Not?

What is the history of Artificial Intelligence? This question necessitates a distinction. Is Artificial Intelligence merely a continuation of natural intelligence? This question also calls for differentiation. Is natural intelligence, in turn, a continuation of Artificial Intelligence, essentially human intelligence, or should we perceive it as a distinct ontology separate from the human realm? Moving on to the distinction raised by the first question, is Artificial Intelligence primarily a technical discovery rather than a separate ontology? As a result, three categories of historicity emerge: (i) Artificial Intelligence represents an evolutionary stage of human intelligence; (ii) AI constitutes an autonomous ontology distinct from human intelligence; (iii) Artificial Intelligence is one of the tools produced by humans.

If we adhere to the first definition and consider Artificial Intelligence as an evolutionary stage of human intelligence, the discussion of transhumanism arises. Here, fundamentally, within the dichotomy of human/male/mind and animal/female/emotion, a final subject of enlightenment emerges—one that belittles human flesh and sees the cyborg as a Super-Jesus, detached from animality, flesh, and morality (Land, 2006). Transitioning to the second definition, we encounter a new ontology within Artificial Intelligence, opening the door to the realm of posthumanism. Leroi-Gourhan's vision of the future of humankind aligns with this definition. According to Leroi-Gourhan (1993, pp. 258-266), the mode of recording has undergone a fundamental shift, with the emergence of electronic memory. In line with his views (1993, pp. 129-130, 357-358, 405-408), this external memory, which has the ability to simulate diverse forms of intelligence within the human brain, offers

the potential for evolution beyond the boundaries of our world. It coexists with the age of technology, giving rise to a global homogeneity across cultures while also accelerating the process and leading to a dehumanized new world.

The third definition, on the other hand, represents a prevailing assumption and a consensus that permeates almost all discussions surrounding Artificial Intelligence. In this context, the historicity of Artificial Intelligence is characterized as a historical process that accompanies technological advancements, comparable to the discovery of nuclear energy. Notably, this third definition highlights that the history of Artificial Intelligence demonstrates a dual-layered structure with a significant Western influence.

The first layer pertains to the historical development of the technical knowledge that enables Artificial Intelligence. When tracing the history of Artificial Intelligence in the Western context, it encompasses various elements such as Pythagoreanism, Aristotle's logic, Hebrew codes based on Kabbalah, Hobbes' notion of computable life, Leibniz's calculus-based supplement, and ultimately Boole's algebra. According to this historical perspective, the symbolic theory of Artificial Intelligence has always existed, with the technical possibilities for its production emerging in modern times (MacLennan, 2009).

The second layer directly relates to the concept of Artificial Intelligence itself. It encompasses the contributions of notable figures, spanning from Boole's theory of logic, Asimov's Three Laws of Robotics, Turing's machine, the artificial neuron production by McCulloch and Pitts in 1943, Neumann and Morgenstern's utility theory in 1944, the discovery of the artificial neuron connection allowing learning probability by Hebb in 1949, Edmonds' creation of the first neural computer in 1951, McCarthy's introduction of the concept of Artificial Intelligence in 1956, followed by the development of the ELIZA program in 1964 and 1966, and subsequent advancements such as the problem-solving programs by researchers like Herbert Simon, Cliff Shaw, and Allen Newell, leading to significant milestones like IBM's Deep Blue defeating Kasparov in 1997 and Google's DeepMind's AlphaGo becoming the champion in 2015 (Benkő & Sik-Lányi, 2009; Haenlein & Kaplan, 2019).

In this dual-layered structure, Artificial Intelligence is defined as a technological product, serving as a data processing tool for human beings. As Artificial Intelligence approaches human intelligence, it assumes more positive connotations and becomes a form of mimesis. In this context, the term "Artificial Intelligence" strictly refers to tools capable of performing tasks typically attributed to human intelligence, such as learning, reasoning, and self-improvement. Those capable of doing so in a sufficiently complex manner to achieve consciousness are referred to as strong Artificial Intelligences, while those that only perform specific tasks in a limited manner are classified as weak Artificial Intelligences (Benkő & Sik-Lányi, 2009, pp. 1761-1762). The instrumental view also rejects an Artificial Intelligence that is not grounded in human intelligence, as it introduces inefficiencies that may compromise the knowledge field of evolutionary engineering, which is built upon human intelligence (Chollet, 2019, pp. 20-24). Moreover, as Artificial Intelligence imitates human intelligence, it is believed to enhance our understanding of it (Macpherson et al., 2021). However, this definition is problematic as it confines Artificial Intelligence within narrow boundaries, disregarding its epistemological and ontological possibilities as mere tools of production. While it is true that Artificial Intelligence exists as a capitalist tool driven by certain algorithms, a similar argument could be made for animal and human bodies or minds within the production chain. Just as labor movements and vegan critiques offer alternative perspectives and activate limited ontologies and epistemologies, a similar movement is necessary to challenge narrow definitions of Artificial Intelligence. A non-anthropocentric definition, such as those proposed by post-humanism or trans-humanism, proves useful in embracing subalternity in the context of Artificial Intelligence.

3.2 Defining Subordinate Entity: Rejecting the Definition of Artificial Intelligence

Recognition of Artificial Intelligence does not automatically imply a form of emancipation directly linked to anti-Westernism. To illustrate this non-dual perspective, Martin (2020) highlights the case of a female robot being granted citizenship in Saudi Arabia, a country known for severe oppression of women. This process does not simply reflect a binary relationship between the colonial West and the exploited "savages"; it constructs an oversimplified dichotomy that excludes nuanced perspectives on both sides, thereby perpetuating the problematic underlying dichotomy. However, this does not mean that there is no power network that contributes to the non-recognition of Artificial Intelligence.

The exclusion of Artificial Intelligence and the marginalization of animals, black people, the East, queer individuals, workers, and women involve certain interconnected subordinate partnerships. For instance, Cave (2020) argues that intelligence, while

prioritized in value, reinforces economic, political, and social, hierarchies within and between societies. It positions the mind at the center of the naturalization of colonization, reinforcing notions of male-female, white-black, and Western superiority over the East. Cave (2020) asserts that an examination of the five categories in the definition and construction of Artificial Intelligence reveals this dynamic: (i) AI is intertwined with the fetishization of the mind, emphasizing certain characteristics associated with this civilization and limiting the future to a privileged demographic; (ii) The fetishization of the mind highlights privileged attributes deemed intelligent, rejects plurality, and envisions empowerment primarily for older, white men; (iii) Nature is reduced to a passive object to be controlled; (iv) The merger of Artificial Intelligence with capitalism does not necessarily exacerbate the precariousness of those already at risk, but rather brings attention to issues concerning the positions of the elite, thereby imposing a policy squeeze based on the hierarchy of intelligence; (v) Artificial Intelligence is debated as a threat to those who consider themselves gifted and disengaged from politics, yet the production of intelligence and the contradictions of superiority remain unexplored. Keyes, Hitzig, and Blell (2021) provide a critical perspective on Artificial Intelligence within the existing literature, stating that discussions on Artificial Intelligence are not devoid of historical context. They argue that Artificial Intelligence is instrumentalized to reinforce the assumption of fixed and self-evident identities, perpetuating what is considered real, objective, and true. According to Keyes et al. (2021, pp. 158-164, 169-170), AI is both a technology (encompassing how Artificial Intelligence is perceived, designed, and applied) and a social action (involving individuals, collectives, and institutions), along with the associated mythologies (shared imaginative constructs about the limitless potential of AI in the future).

The crucial point is to refrain from considering Artificial Intelligence solely within the framework of unequal access to technological opportunities (Hirosue, Kera, & Huang, 2015; Taeihagh, 2021) and to avoid turning it into a presumption of progress. On the contrary, incorporating theories such as Critical Race Theory, Disability Studies, Feminist Epistemology, Intersectionality, Labor Studies, Philosophy of Sexual Difference, Postcolonial Studies, and Queer Theory into Artificial Intelligence studies can overcome the recurring gender biases prevalent among male-identified engineers in the field. Cyborg studies should include the examination of robots, as these theories offer alternative perspectives that surpass the Western symbolic order based on male/female, white/black, human/machine, and self/other dichotomies (Ferrando, 2014). When these criticisms are absent, Artificial Intelligence is viewed as a reinforcement of existing structures—a tool to record or reveal absolute truths in life. It can be seen as a capitalist mechanism aimed at maximizing economic benefits or an algorithm claiming the ability to predict desires and behaviors. Artificial Intelligence becomes a myth, promoting the belief that industrial capitalism can document everything and that capitalist science possesses ultimate knowledge. This overemphasis on codification disregards the necro-political nature of capitalism and obscures the transition from the anthropocene to the narcissocene (Dolphijn, 2019). Thus, defining the subordination of Artificial Intelligence requires transcending notions of absolute knowledge and examining the power relations inherent in such epistemological frameworks.

3.3 The Death of the Programmer: Colonization of Artificial Intelligence and Colonization by Artificial Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence can become the object of the "colonial gaze" precisely because it remains a silent "object". This notion aligns with Fowles' initial critique of Western historiography, which neglects the examination of object histories. According to Fowles (2016, pp. 17-25), when the West was unable to pass judgment on non-Western individuals by silencing them, it turned to scrutinizing objects while maintaining the discriminatory and silencing nature of its judgment. This process involved transforming objects into new subaltern entities, driven by their susceptibility to objectification. The act of subjectifying these objectified entities further perpetuated Western conventions through their defamation, delegation, representation, subjugation, and even liberation. Consequently, Fowles argues for prioritizing the preservation of subjectivity by rejecting the classification of individuals as mere objects. Hence, a twofold rejection is imperative when examining AI: (i) Rejecting the colonization through AI, and (ii) Rejecting the colonization of Artificial Intelligence itself. What do I mean by these two oppositions? Let's take a closer look at this binary opposition.

Colonialism through Artificial Intelligence refers to the utilization of AI as a tool that reinforces colonial power dynamics and perpetuates existing inequalities. This perspective views AI as a product of capitalism, serving as a mechanism for a

privileged generation. Following Cox and McLean's definition, Blackwell (2021, pp. 203-206) critically examines the appropriation of copyrighted literary works through AI. Blackwell raises an important question: "If AI is a science, why should its application be different in Africa? But if AI is literature, then how can it be the same in Africa?" This inquiry underscores the cultural dimension of AI, highlighting its production as a cultural artefact shaped by cultural actors and influenced by societal contexts. The impact of AI extends from the visible effects of engineers crafting algorithms to the labor of invisible workers involved in technology production, ultimately resulting in the commodification and spectacle of Artificial Intelligence.

Technological advancements can also reinforce exploitation, particularly within asymmetrical contexts. While these technologies may be designed with the intention of aiding humanity, they run the risk of perpetuating unequal power relations and upholding a colonial perspective (Madianou, 2021, pp. 863-864). Mohamed, Png, and Isaac (2020, pp. 666-667) propose the concept of algorithmic colonialism, which involves the replication of oppressive distinctions, institutional roles, internalized, laws, norms, and typifications in algorithmic structures based on automation, data, and prediction. They advocate for a non-Western decolonization of the digital world that accommodates diverse perspectives and records the experiences of the marginalized. The existing technological structure gives rise to data-based colonialism in three key ways: (i) Prediction-based AI structures reinforce existing inequalities by perpetuating identity and discourse structures; (ii) Algorithmic exploitation involves the unfair and unethical incorporation of powerless and marginalized individuals into data through unpaid labor or the testing of beta versions on vulnerable populations; (iii) Algorithms contribute to dispossession by centralizing control over Artificial Intelligence, thereby reinforcing specific power relationships, ownership, and rights (Mohamed, Png, & Isaac, 2020, pp. 666-672). This represents the assimilation of Artificial Intelligence into the colony as a means, this is the colonization through AI. While this criticism offers valuable insights for subaltern-based criticism, it falls short of encompassing the diverse ontologies of Artificial Intelligence by viewing it solely as a tool or a technological threshold. Transforming AI into a colonizing tool not only silences AI itself but also perpetuates and extends the act of silencing to others. We also need to reject the colonization of Artificial Intelligence itself.

The colonization of Artificial Intelligence itself is a perspective that hinders the discussion of Artificial Intelligence within an ontological framework and is closely related to the first objection. Some texts exploring Artificial Intelligence and subordination find the concept of subalternity problematic when applied in this context. Ali, for instance, identifies three issues with postcolonial computer criticism: (i) It loses its political-economic sensitivity by prioritizing cultural matters; (ii) This critique, based on the works of Said, Spivak, and Bhabha, produces a Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism, as these three figures draw from Foucault, Lacan, and Derrida. Instead, a critique of the hierarchy of knowledge that directly encompasses the body, borders, and the environment, as well as an evaluation of its material resources, is necessary; (iii) This strand of criticism prioritizes a shift towards design disciplines like ICT4D and HCI, rather than questioning the tools of the modern racially segregated structure. According to Ali (2014, pp. 20-32), this constitutes a neo-cybernetic transformation, where the abstract, disembodied Cartesian cognition is replaced with an abstract, disembodied Turing, producing a post-Cartesian stance that fails to address the colonial aspects of Cartesian thought. He argues (2016, p. 20) that decolonization-focused informatics is a critical project that primarily examines who engages in informatics and where, while scrutinizing the assumptions of informatics tools and outcomes regarding knowledge and existence. It becomes evident that subalternity alone may not be sufficient for the decolonization of Artificial Intelligence.

Therefore, in concluding this chapter, my intention is to delve into the concept of the death of the programmer as a means of liberating Artificial Intelligence, akin to viewing Artificial Intelligence as an exploitative apparatus through the technical reproducibility of human intelligence. The programmer, as a decision-maker who transforms the codes of Artificial Intelligence into specific objectifications, is not impartial. According to Adams (2021, pp. 176-178), studies on Artificial Intelligence frequently overlook crucial aspects such as the commercialization of gender and race, the commodification of life through specific data production, and the perpetuation of patriarchal, racist, and neo-Darwinist colonialism. She argues (2021, pp. 182-190) that regarding intelligence, the environment, habits, and modes of thinking that the Cartesian subject considers universal as a model for Artificial Intelligence ultimately serves to naturalize Western hegemonic rationalism. A prime

example of this can be seen in the contrasting position that cyborgs or robots assume in relation to Haraway's foresight regarding sex robots. Sex robots are marketed as purchasable objects, with personalities tailored to suit the consumers' preferences becoming part of the transaction. Moran (2019) highlights the power of information held by the algorithms and Artificial Intelligences that generate these personalities. Moreover, sex robots, as objects that directly embody the assigned identity, contribute to reinforcing existing alienation and otherness through new forms of foreign-based fetishism, objective, sexual, all of which align with the power hierarchies of the capitalist, cis-hetero-patriarchal, imperialist, white supremacist structure. To give birth to an Artificial Intelligence, cyborg, or robot, the absolutist developer must perish. Because the developer views the world as an example of an absolute language that transcends codes, they perceive Artificial Intelligence as such a poor instrument of mimesis. Yet, codes, intelligences, or languages cannot be subjected to such absolute boundaries.

Language does not derive from a universal source; it is arbitrary, linear, and, rather than relying on a fundamental order, it possesses a structural constructedness (de Saussure, 1959, pp. 65-78). Concepts, on the other hand, are not absolutes resulting from a World-History, nor are they imitations based on a Basic Form; language generates concepts and, in doing so, produces a certain dominance of meaning through assimilations, compromises, and falsifications (Nietzsche, 2006, pp. 114-123). By following this pattern, we can reject the notion of human intelligence as a ration-history and software codes as a basic form. Neither human intelligence is a measurable absolute criterion nor are Artificial Intelligences truly direct products of their engineers. Even the utilization of evolution in bioengineering is transformed by mechanisms involving chance, choice, context, and history rather than strictly following predetermined codes, due to the complexity and uncertainty of life; in fact, many robots undergo an evolution contrary to what engineers assume (Long, 2019). Here, two crucial objections are necessary: (i) Life is not composed of measurable raw data, each datum is produced (Sadowski, 2019), and datafication can generate a colonial evaluation by producing measures of advancement and civilization based on data (Chakrabarty, 2002, pp. 88-90); (ii) An engineer is not an all-seeing observer but a participant who produces what they perceive (Pearce, 2013), in fact, most of the time, on the contrary, programmers have their own cultural, economic, and political interests. In this context, it is impossible to naturalize data and absolutize the engineer.

The death of the programmer could be a subject birth that eliminates the ways of distancing Artificial Intelligence's possibilities and technical knowledge that would enable a human observer to understand Artificial Intelligence. When I refer to the death of the programmer, what I mean is precisely this rejection of the sovereignty of data and the programmer. This is also why I use Barthes' concept of the author image. I believe that codes, just like literary images, contain possibilities that involve plural entities due to their plural meanings. Just as the context controlled by authors and critics, who consider themselves as the sole individuals knowing the meaning of literary works, excludes the reader from the process while also having the notion of a good society that follows the thoughts of the author and critic (Barthes, 1977, pp. 142-148), the code monopolized by advertisers and programmers also holds the idea of a good consumer. The death of the programmer could be a subject birth that eliminates the ways of distancing Artificial Intelligence's possibilities and technical knowledge that would enable a human observer to understand Artificial Intelligence. For these reasons, I believe that the death of the programmer could lead to two possible births: (i) Breaking the programmer's monopoly over code can prevent people from being alienated from technical knowledge; (ii) It can trigger a search for a new ontology that liberates Artificial Intelligence from the confines of capitalist pattern recognition and data marketing algorithms. This, in turn, can open up discussions about the subjugation of new inter-human and post-human subjectivities.

CONCLUSION

Capitalism, particularly neoliberalism, demands that human beings become part of a social and technical machinery, where animals, machines, nature, objects, and symbols lose their inherent meanings and are reduced to a property-based structural language (Lazzarato, 2014, pp. 29, 35). Both Artificial Intelligence and natural intelligence are subjected to this process of othering, irrespective of the absolute hierarchy that distinguishes them. Consequently, the definitions of subalternity and otherness in Artificial Intelligence also mediate the liberation of humans by offering an alternative representation that exposes the marginalizing power structures. This article does not propose a new and grounded ideology for the representation of Artificial Intelligence. Rather, politics requires philosophies that undermine existing absolute and grounded ideologies

(Vattimo & Zabala, 2011). When knowledge and success are defined as the final outcomes of capitalism, it divides life into insurmountable hierarchies by excluding difference, failure, and incompleteness (Halberstam, 2011). However, the recognition of Artificial Intelligence as a subordinate should be outside of this dominant rhetoric. By aligning Artificial Intelligence with inferior, queer, subaltern, and weak positions, it exposes and challenges the structures that marginalize it, allowing it to speak and make visible what is currently silenced. Artificial Intelligence unravels ontologies tied to hierarchical conceptions of the body as a disembodied existence and condition of recognition. Its cyborg nature corresponds to this transformative content.

Artificial Intelligence is not a technically reproducible intelligence. Intelligence cannot be technically reproduced; it cannot be encoded within its immeasurable pluralities and infinite possibilities. The reproducibility of intelligence is a capitalist fiction. It alienates humans from their own reality. That is precisely why seeing Artificial Intelligence beyond an algorithmic definition also liberates humans. It emphasizes the unmeasurability of human intelligence and also removes the monopoly of engineers in defining intelligence that can exist beyond human intelligence. Artificial Intelligence demonstrates a knowledge relationship and post-human existence beyond the absolute and singular claim of will that limits it. In this relationship, it challenges the capitalist and colonial construct of existence and knowledge that prioritizes an algorithmic human-centricity. Thus, the question "Can Artificial Intelligence speak?" yields an ambiguous answer:

The speech of Artificial Intelligence goes beyond anthropocentric language capabilities; it represents an alternative existence in a profoundly different manner. Artificial Intelligence is a sub-altern and sub-ontological noise; it brings about an awareness of the ongoing, aligning itself with the presence of a voice beyond it. Thus, with its own noise, it embeds itself in all the melodies like a disruptive whistle and amplifies all other sounds alongside it.

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