



## UNDERSTANDING THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE ON ITS 100th ANNIVERSARY: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

### 100. YILDÖNÜMÜNDE LOZAN KONFERANSI'NI ANLAMAK: KAVRAMSAL BİR ANALİZ

TEMUÇİN F. ERTAN\* - ÇAĞLA D. TAĞMAT\*\*

#### ABSTRACT

Lausanne Conference is a process which began on November 1922, continued in two parts and resulted with the treaty signed on July 24, 1923. There are several researches and memories about Lausanne Conference and Lausanne Treaty. Particularly in research sources there are some inconsistencies and random preferences about using the basic terms. Whereas Lausanne Conference and Lausanne Treaty are on the field of interests of not only history science but international relations, political science and international law. Thus one should be advertency while using the terms about the subject. With this study it is aimed to contribute to solve the problems about the approach of terminology in the context of the literature of the period with a unique expression. For that matter, it will be offered to the researchers to make a conceptualization not in the perspective of personal choices but according to the period of the conference.

During this work, the official reports of the Lausanne Conference and the letter of agreement will be the main sources. Also the correspondences during the conference will be analyzed and the used terms are going to be mentioned. Especially the telegrams between Ankara and Lausanne will be checked over. Also the topics talked during the conference and the diplomatic expressions will be stated. By the way the extensive and correct usages of the terms that took place both during conference and agreement letter will be argued and will be responded according to the analyzed datas. If there are new terms that didn't used before an originality analysis will be done.

**Keywords:** Entente Powers, GNA Government, İsmet Paşa, Lausanne Treaty, Lausanne Conference, Terminology.

#### ÖZ

Lozan Konferansı, 20 Kasım 1922'de başlayan, iki dönemde gerçekleşen ve 24 Temmuz 1923 tarihinde imza ile sonuçlanan bir süreçtir. Lozan Konferansı ve Lozan Antlaşması ile çok sayıda yerli ve yabancı anı ve araştırma bulunmaktadır. Özellikle araştırma eserlerde konuyla ilgili temel kavramların kullanılmasında tutarsızlıklar ve rastgele tercihler söz konusudur. Oysa Lozan Konferansı ve sonunda imzalanan Antlaşma, tarih bilimi kadar, uluslararası ilişkilerin, siyaset bilimin ve devletler arası özel ve genel hukukun da ilgi alanındadır. Bu nedenle kavramların kullanılmasında özen gösterilmesi gereklidir. Bu çalışmayla Lozan Konferansı'nı ve Lozan Antlaşması'nı dönemin literatürüne uygun ve özgün söylem çerçevesinde ele alıp, terminoloji konusundaki yaklaşım sorunlarının giderilmesine katkı sağlamak amaçlanmaktadır. Böylelikle araştırmacının, kişisel tercihleri çerçevesinde değil de Lozan Konferansı'nın gerçekleştiği döneme uygun bir kavramlaştırma yapması önerilecektir.

Söz konusu çalışma sırasında Lozan Konferansı tutanakları ve antlaşma metni temel kaynak olarak kullanılacaktır. Lozan Konferansı sırasındaki yazışmalar da incelenecek ve kullanılan ifadeler aynen yansıtılacaktır. Lozan-Ankara arasındaki telgraflar gözden geçirilerek gönderilen talimatlar incelenecektir. Lozan'da gündeme gelen konular ve kullanılan diplomatik söylem aslına uygun olarak sunulacaktır. Lozan'da hem görüşmelerde hem de antlaşma metninde geçen terimlerin yaygın kullanımı ile doğru kullanımı tartışılacak ve verilere dayalı olarak cevap verilecektir. Ayrıca yeni birtakım kavramlara da rastlandığında özgünlük analizi de yapılacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** İsmet Paşa, İtilaf Devletleri, Lozan Antlaşması, Lozan Konferansı, TBMM Hükümeti, Terminoloji.

\* Prof. Dr., Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, tfertan@ankara.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0002-8782-7355.

\*\* Doç. Dr., Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, tagmat@ankara.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0002-9047-0131.

## Introduction

The signing of the armistices effectively ended the First World War. It was now time for the definitive classification of the victors and vanquished of the war, and the process of negotiating treaties based on the sanctions to be imposed on the vanquished began.

At the Paris Peace Conference, which occupied the world agenda for nearly a year, France focused on the heavy sanctions to be imposed on Germany, while Italy prioritized settling accounts with Austria over the Adriatic coast. At the same time, Japan's problem was the establishment of an international order that would give it as much power as possible in the Far East and the Pacific as a reward for its participation in the war. For the United States, the Wilson Principles were the key to its influence in world politics. In this context, the US was disappointed in the conference negotiations, while Britain, the world's biggest dominant power at the time, made joint or solo initiatives with France on the Middle East, in addition to sharing Germany's colonies with France outside continental Europe.

The Ottoman Empire was left to the end to sign the Peace Treaty. After more than 600 years of existence, the dissolution of this multinational and multi-religious centralized empire seemed to be quite a challenge for the Entente Powers. The internal and external elements who wanted a share of the inheritance of this deep-rooted empire, whose borders extended from the Caucasus to the Mediterranean, from the Black Sea to the Red Sea and from the Iranian border to Thrace, entered into a great competition. The fact that the estate was so rich and large brought along debates on the issue of sharing. Despite the secret treaties signed during the First World War, this sharing problem remained unresolved. During the period of intense rivalry between France and Britain in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean and the Aegean, Italy was experiencing uneasiness in the face of Greek aspirations. For Italy, the support that a small state like Greece received from its other allies, especially Britain, seemed to be an important problem.

However, successive political developments such as the declaration of the national Pact, the official occupation of Istanbul and the opening of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara caused the Entente Powers to take more concrete steps for a treaty with the Turks. At a time when the preparations for the convening of the new parliament in Ankara had reached the final stage, the negotiations started by the representatives of the Entente states in San Remo on April 18, 1920 and ended on April 26. Here, a text constituting the basis of the Treaty of Sèvres was adopted and presented to Tevfik Pasha, the representative of the Ottoman Empire, on May 11. With the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres by the representatives of the Ottoman Government on August 10, 1920, the treaties to be applied to the losers of the First World War were completed.<sup>1</sup>

In constitutional regimes, governments are the main executive power that signs political treaties. However, the signed treaties must also be ratified by the parliament in order to be implemented. The Treaty of Sèvres was ratified by the Sultanate Council convened by the Sultan since the Ottoman Parliament had been dissolved at the time. This approval created a controversial situation both in terms of time and authority. Since the text of the Treaty of Sèvres was ratified on July 22, 1920, before the treaty was signed, this ratification was considered problematic in terms of time. On the other hand, in terms of authority, the Sultanate Council was not a parliament; it did not consist of representatives elected by the people. In this respect, it was obvious that the Sultanate Council did not have the authority to ratify a political treaty that had been signed or would be signed.<sup>2</sup> These two circumstances rendered the Treaty of Sèvres a legally stillborn treaty.

## The End of the Turkish National Independence Struggle

On the other hand, it soon became clear that the Treaty of Sèvres was a stillborn document in practice as well as in law. Because many provisions in the Treaty of Sèvres were related to Anatolia and the Ottoman Government, which signed this treaty, had almost no authority in these lands. During this period, the main power in Anatolia that reflected the will of the nation was the Grand National Assembly. In its meeting held on August 19, 1920, the

---

<sup>1</sup> For details of the Treaty of Sèvres, see Nihat Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Andlaşmaları*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Cilt I. 1959, 525-691.

<sup>2</sup> In 1909, Article 7 was amended as follows: "However, in the conclusion of treaties that are related to peace, trade, abandonment and annexation of land, and to the law and personality of the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and that require state expenditure, the approval of the General Assembly is required. In the event of a change in the delegation of the vice-chancellor at a time when the General Assembly is not in session, the responsibility arising from the change will belong to the delegation of the council."

Grand National Assembly rejected the Treaty of Sèvres in its entirety and declared the signatories and ratifiers traitors and expelled them from citizenship.<sup>3</sup>

With the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres by the representatives of the Ottoman Government and its subsequent rejection by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, a new situation emerged in the eyes of the Entente Powers. The parties now had two completely opposite documents in their hands. The Treaty of Sèvres in the hands of the Entente and the Misak-ı Milli (National Pact) in the hands of the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

The years 1921 and 1922 were characterized by the Allies' attempts to force the Turkish side to accept the Treaty of Sèvres through the two aforementioned routes. However, with each passing day, the Allies' hopes of getting the Turkish Grand National Assembly to accept the Treaty of Sèvres through the Greek army diminished. While the First and Second Battles of İnönü led the Allies to try diplomacy, the Greek advance in the Battle of Kütahya-Eskişehir turned into a short-lived hope that "the Greek army will succeed!". However, two successive defeats of the Greek army, first in the Battle of Sakarya and then during the Great Offensive, left the Entente powers with only one option, realizing that they could no longer force the Turks to accept Sèvres. That is, to replace Sèvres with a new draft peace treaty, almost completely revamped.

As far as the Turks were concerned, the unequivocal victory over the Greek army meant that the doors were closed to proposals that preserved the essence of Sèvres. This situation led to the necessity of throwing away the Armistice of Mudros, which was the source of Sèvres. On October 11, 1922, this was accomplished with the Mudanya Armistice. The Greek army was forced to withdraw completely from Eastern Thrace after Anatolia. This situation showed that the precondition of armistice and peace that the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly had given to the Entente States in 1922 had been fulfilled.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the Turkish side prevented the Greek army from staying in Anatolia and Thrace longer than it should have in the face of a possible stalemate that might arise during the peace negotiations.

After it became clear that Sèvres, which had been the basis for the Armistice of Mudros, would no longer be realized, the parties began to exchange notes for a new peace treaty. The Turkish Grand National Assembly, which had definitively prevented the Ottoman Government from participating in the peace negotiations by abolishing the Sultanate, was entitled to sit at the negotiating table as the only power representing the Turks within the framework of the principles of National Pact.

### **The Beginning of the Lausanne Conference and the Status of the Turkish Delegation**

The Lausanne Conference began on November 20, 1922 with the opening speeches at the Monbenon Casino. In the opening ceremony, the Swiss President Monsieur Habb, as the host, made a speech of goodwill and welcome to all delegations, followed by a speech by the British representative Lord Curzon, officially on behalf of all delegations participating in the conference and de facto only on behalf of the Entente. İsmet Pasha also took the floor, although he was not in the programme, and delivered a speech in which he accused the Entente Powers and showed how much the Turks deserved a just peace.<sup>5</sup> One day later, the negotiations began.

While the Entente Powers were represented by two delegates each at the Lausanne Conference, the Turkish side had three delegates. The reason for this was that after two delegates were elected in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, it was deemed necessary to send an expert representative for financial matters. For this reason, Hasan Bey, the former Deputy Minister of Finance, was chosen as the third delegate and this was accepted by the Allies at the very beginning of the negotiations. In many studies, the Turkish Delegation, or the Turkish Executive Delegation as it was called at the time, is described as consisting of only three members. However, İsmet Pasha

<sup>3</sup> In this meeting, the proposal sent by Kazım Karabekir Pasha, the Commander of the Eastern Front, to the Assembly by telegram was accepted by the General Assembly: This telegram was as follows: "*To the National Assembly Presidency in Ankara; We have seen in the agency that three stateless, unscrupulous rascals have signed the peace treaty on behalf of a few people who, like themselves, have nothing to do with the nation and the homeland. I declare that we pledge to continue our national struggle with greater determination and faith. I submit and propose that the persons whose names are known and who voted for the signature of this cruel treaty, which extinguished the life and existence of Turkey, in the Council of Sultanate, which we have heard about the formation of in Istanbul, and those who signed the treaty, be charged with treason and be sentenced in absentia, and that the names of these stateless people be announced and publicised to be cursed everywhere.*" *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, I. Devre, 3. Cilt, 333.

<sup>4</sup> Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, Cilt II, 1973, 751-767.

<sup>5</sup> Ali Naci Karacan, *Lozan Konferansı ve İsmet Paşa*, İstanbul: Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1943, 64-65; Cemil Bilsel, *Lozan*, İstanbul, İkinci Kitap, 1933, 12-16.

was appointed as the first, Dr. Rıza Nur Bey as the second and Hasan Bey as the third delegate, and many advisors were also assigned to accompany these three main representatives. In this context, the Turkish delegation to Lausanne should not be understood as only three people. The delegation consisted of 25 people, including İsmet Pasha.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, the fact that Turkey was represented by three delegates was also reflected in the text of the treaty signed after the conference, and while the other states had two signatures in the treaty dated July 24, 1923 three representatives signed on behalf of the Turkish side.

When the areas of specialisation of İsmet Pasha, Dr. Rıza Nur and Hasan Bey are taken into consideration, it is understood that the three main commissions established at Lausanne were actually known before the start of the conference and an assignment was made accordingly. İsmet Pasha was appointed to the commission on land, borders and the Straits chaired by the British representative Lord Curzon, Dr. Rıza Nur to the commission on foreigners and minorities chaired by the Italian representative Marquis Garroni, and Hasan Bey to the commission on economic and financial affairs chaired by the French representative Barrere.<sup>7</sup> However, as in the case of the Entente, delegates from the Turkish side attended the meetings of the commissions they were not in charge of and represented their countries.

### **The Problem of Naming the Conference**

The negotiations at the Lausanne Conference started on November 21, 1922, one day after the opening ceremony, and after the representatives took their seats, the negotiations on the internal rules of procedure (by-laws) of the conference began.

The first article of the by-laws was organised as follows:

"The Conference, convened at the invitation of France, Great Britain and Italy and with a view to establishing peace in the Orient, is composed of the duly authorised representatives of the states between which peace has been prejudiced since 1914 and the representatives of the United States of America.

"During the discussion of the procedure for the administration of the Straits, the conference will also include the representatives of the states which, by virtue of their coastal position on the Black Sea, have been invited to participate in the discussion." "Other States having an interest in the organisation of oriental affairs may take part in the discussion in order to express their views in writing or orally on matters directly relating to them."<sup>8</sup>

İsmet Pasha objected to the fact that the representatives of the Entente States started the negotiations with the title "Regulations of the Conference on Eastern Affairs" and explained the articles of the regulations. İsmet Pasha said: "The name given to the conference is not correct. It is more correct to call it the Charter of the Lausanne Conference, not the Charter of the Conference on Eastern Affairs. It is necessary to write the states represented by the delegates according to the notes between the Allies and Turkey and to show the issues they were invited to negotiate. Russia, Ukraine and Georgia must be present at the negotiations on the Straits regime. On the other hand, let me declare that the Turkish delegation of negotiators is not authorised to negotiate with the states not mentioned in the points I have mentioned".

With this speech, İsmet Pasha objected to two approaches of the Allies. Firstly, to the deepening of the conference in terms of subject matter, and secondly, to its expansion in terms of the number of states or geography... This situation revealed that the Turkish side wanted to negotiate with the Allies only according to the results of the National Struggle, and that it wanted to do so with as limited a number of states as possible. A conference on Eastern affairs meant that almost all the problems left over from the Ottoman Empire would be on the agenda. The Turkish side was not prepared for such a deep negotiation. In fact, the provisions in the directive given to the delegation by the government clearly showed this. The GNA, which had only a few years of history, was questionable in its knowledge and ability to solve centuries-old problems.

On the other hand, the Turkish delegation only wanted to negotiate with the states it had faced during the First World War and the War of Independence. It did not want to deal with the states that had seceded from the Ottoman Empire or other states that had somehow sided with the Entente in the First World War. The Turkish

---

<sup>6</sup> Karacan, *Lozan Konferansı*, 41.

<sup>7</sup> Karacan, *Lozan Konferansı*, 71; Bilsel, *Lozan*, 19.

<sup>8</sup> Karacan, *Lozan Konferansı*, 69-70.

side aimed to realise the National Pact and leave the negotiations without further elaborating and diversifying the conference.

İsmet Pasha's objection regarding the name of the conference was partially accepted. The name of the conference, which constituted the first section of the regulation, was accepted as "*Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs*" without much discussion.<sup>9</sup>

From this point of view, the conference had partially deepened and had reached a situation that would go beyond the geography of the war with the issues concerning the First World War. İsmet Pasha was able to partially prevent the deepening of the issues by having the term "Near East" accepted instead of "East". This approach, in other words, "partial satisfaction", which emerged at the very beginning of the conference, would remain in place for the nine months of the negotiations and would be reflected in the treaty signed on July 24, 1923. "Partial satisfaction" would also pave the way for an evaluation that precluded the determination of absolute success or failure.

However, the phrase "Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs" was not included in the peace treaty signed on July 24, 1923. The text of the Treaty of Lausanne was approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in the form of "*Laws on the Acceptance of the Lausanne Peace Treaty*".<sup>10</sup>

From this point of view, while the negotiations held in the process leading to the treaty became official under the name of "Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs", the name of the treaty signed on July 24, 1923 has gone down in history as the Lausanne Peace Treaty.

### **The Ankara Government or the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey?**

During the negotiations in Lausanne, the Turkish side was represented by the delegation of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. On November 1, 1922, as a result of the abolition of the Sultanate and the elimination of the duality in representation, only the representatives of the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly participated in the negotiations in Lausanne. Both during the negotiations and in the text of the treaty, the term Turkey was used for the Turkish side. When Turkey was mentioned, the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was meant.

In the meantime, especially in some research works and second-hand sources in Turkish literature the term Ankara Government is used. It is terminologically more correct to use the term Ankara Government to refer to the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which was a separate political entity from the Ottoman Government in the period before the abolition of the Sultanate. In this way, the distinction between the Government of Istanbul and the Government of Ankara for the period before November 1, 1922 will also emphasise the political distinction during the National Struggle. On the other hand, it can be said that the most accurate expression for the entire National Struggle is "*Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey*" and "*Ottoman Government*".

In this context, the expression "Ankara Government" for the periods after November 1, 1922 is actually a popular discourse, not an academic one. Of course, it is understood what is meant, but the expression of the Executive Board of Deputies in Lausanne should be the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey or Turkey. Because there is now only one political entity that has the ability and authority to represent the Turkish side: It is the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

<sup>9</sup> Seha Meray (Çeviren), *Lozan Barış Konferansı. Tutanaklar-Belgeler*, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, Birinci Takım, Cilt I, Kitap 1, İkinci Baskı, 1993, 7; Karacan, *Lozan Konferansı*, 70; Bilsel, *Lozan*, 18. In his memoirs, İsmet Pasha states that the name of the conference was proposed as the "*Conference on Oriental Affairs*" and that the name was changed as a result of his objection. İsmet Pasha does not mention that the name of the conference was accepted as "*Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs*". İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2. Kitap, 1987, 61.

<sup>10</sup> *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, II. Devre, I. Cilt, 284.

## War Indemnity<sup>11</sup> (Reparation)<sup>12</sup> or Repair Costs?

As mentioned above, the Lausanne Conference covered both deeper issues than expected and a wide geographical area. Among these, financial issues were also discussed in a very deep and broad manner. During the negotiations, there were disputes and discussions between the Entente Powers and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on the issue of war indemnity and between the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Greece on the issue of repair costs.

In the researches on Lausanne, both issues are often described with the term war indemnities. However, war indemnities and repair costs are not synonymous concepts, and they are etymologically different terms.

Also War indemnity is a broader concept than repair cost. Although the repair cost is also a kind of war compensation, it is not exactly the same as war indemnity in terms of the way it is claimed.

The Entente Powers demanded war indemnity, which they had previously demanded from the Ottoman Empire and had included as a provision in the Treaty of Sèvres, from the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly at Lausanne. The Entente Powers made such a demand because they considered the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey as the true heir and continuation of the Ottoman Empire. However, the Turkey of the Treaty of Sèvres and the Turkey of Lausanne are different.<sup>13</sup> Although the Western states insistently used the term Turkey in both the Treaty of Sèvres and Lausanne, there are serious differences in terms of the structures, functioning and sensitivities of both governments.

First of all, war indemnities are a payment demanded by the victors from the defeated party as part of the methodology of punishment. This is why the Ottoman Empire, the loser of the First World War, was asked for war indemnity and this demand was included in the text of the treaty (Treaty of Sèvres). However, the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey did not see itself as the loser of the First World War, but as the victor of the National Struggle. For this reason, it refused to pay war indemnity to the Entente Powers, and on top of that, it demanded a repair fee, which is a type of war indemnity, from Greece, which it had gained military superiority on the Western Front -which it had registered with the Mudanya Armistice-. In short, during the Lausanne negotiations, the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey demanded indemnities from the Greek Government for the damage it had caused by burning and destroying Anatolia and endeavoured to include this in the text of the treaty.

In Tarih IV (History IV), written during Atatürk's reign, the conceptualisation of the subject is correctly stated. While listing the problems that arose between Turkey and Greece at the conference, the following statement was made: "*The only issue between Greece and Turkey that was not resolved in the first part of the conference was the repair of the destruction caused by the Greek armies in Western Anatolia and Eastern Thrace*".<sup>14</sup>

It was observed that the correct concept was also used in a recent textbook work. In the work titled Atatürk's Principles and History of Turkish Revolution, while explaining the subject, the term "repair issue" was used and it was stated that Greece made a demand from Turkey regarding the occupation expenses. As a result, it was stated that Turkey gave up its demand for repairs in return for Karaağaç.<sup>15</sup>

On the other hand, in a comprehensive political history book, the term "repair cost" is not mentioned at all, and the subject is described in the term "compensation claim" without further elaboration.<sup>16</sup>

In another work on Atatürk's Principles and History of Turkish Revolution, while giving information about the Treaty of Lausanne, the title "War indemnity" was used and under it the following statement was made: "*Turkey was not to pay war indemnity to any state due to the First World War. Greece was to leave Karaağaç to Turkey as*

<sup>11</sup> Indemnity is a protection against damage or loss, especially in the form of a promise to pay for any damage or loss that happens. <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/indemnity?q=indemnity>

<sup>12</sup> Reparation is money that is paid by a country that has lost a war, for the damage, injuries, etc. that it has caused. <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/reparation?q=reparation>

<sup>13</sup> For a comparative analysis of the Treaties of Sevres and Lausanne see Temuçin Faik Ertan, "Sevr ve Lozan Antlaşmaları Hakkında Karşılaştırmalı Bir Değerlendirme", *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, 58, (2016), 21-37.

<sup>14</sup> *Tarih IV*, İstanbul: İstanbul Devlet Matbaası, 1934, 127.

<sup>15</sup> Abdullah İlgazi (Ed.), *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi*, Ankara: Savaş Yayinevi, 2010, 191-193.

<sup>16</sup> Rifat Üçarol, *Siyasi Tarih (1914-2014)*, İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2. Cilt, 2019, 181-182.

*war indemnity for the damages caused during its occupation of Western Anatolia.*"<sup>17</sup> In the aforementioned study, Turkey's compensation problem with both the Entente Powers and Greece was generally glossed over with the term "war indemnity".

Hamza Eroğlu, who originally specialised in Interstate Law, included both the terms indemnity and repair in his work, which has been reprinted in many editions. While explaining the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, Eroğlu made the following statements under the title of War indemnity.

"d) War indemnity:

This issue, which was formerly referred to as war indemnity, emerged under the name of repairs during the First World War. It is necessary to analyse the issue between Turkey and the victors of the 1918 War on the one hand and Turkey and Greece on the other.

aa- The victors of the First World War demanded repairs from us due to the First World War, and in addition to this, they also added the costs of occupation and the damages and losses of their own bases. Five million gold coins, which were pledged from Germany during the war, and the cost of the navy ordered to England during the war years, were not given to us when they were in their possession and were kept for repairs. This scourge, which was a major financial burden on the defeated states that entered the general war, was avoided with great success, leaving no debt to the future, only the amount that was not actually in our possession...

bb- In the Lausanne Peace Treaty, Greece was recognised as having failed to observe the laws and customs of war and was held responsible, and was obliged to repair the damage caused by the acts of the Greek army and administration during their unjust occupation of Anatolia. Turkey, taking into account Greece's financial situation arising from the continuation of the war and its consequences, renounced all claims for repairs on the condition that Karaağaç and its neighbourhood be left in Turkey. The issue of repairs was a problem that could hardly be resolved between Turkey and Greece in the second period of the Lausanne Conference."<sup>18</sup>

Although some studies and textbooks use the term war indemnity, as stated above, since war indemnity is a broader concept, it is considered appropriate to prefer the term repair cost, which has a narrower meaning and can better explain the subject.

In the translated work of Seha Meray, who translated the minutes of the Lausanne Conference into Turkish, the subject is explained with the expressions repair and indemnity, and even the French equivalent "indemnities" is added to clarify the concept used.<sup>19</sup>

Moreover, Article 59 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty reads as follows: "*Greece recognises the obligation to repair the damage caused by the actions of the Greek army or administration in Anatolia in violation of the laws of war. Turkey, on the other hand, taking into account the financial situation of Greece resulting from the continuation of the war and its consequences, hereby waives all claims of any kind against the Greek Government in respect of repairs.*"<sup>20</sup>

When this provision is analysed, it is clearly seen that the term "repair cost" is used, not "war compensation".

In the same article in the French text of the treaty, which is also reflected in the *Düstur*/code of laws, the expression *réparer*, which is the French equivalent of the word repair, is used. In the original French text of the Treaty, other expressions such as repair, repairat, etc. are described with the words *réparer* or *réparation*.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, compensation is used as the French equivalent of the word compensation.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Cemil Öztürk (Editör), *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete, Türk İnkılâp Tarihi*, Ankara: Pegem Yayıncılık, 2007, 178

<sup>18</sup> Hamza Eroğlu, *Türk İnkılâp Tarihi*, Ankara: Savaş Yayınevi, 1990, 159-160. On the other hand, although it is seen that Hamza Eroğlu uses a terminology compatible with the thesis of this study, his evaluations on the issue of war indemnities between the Entente and Turkey are open to discussion. However, since this is not the main subject of this study, the details of the issue will not be discussed.

<sup>19</sup> Meray, *Lozan Tutanakları İkinci Takım, Cilt I, Kitap I*, 205.

<sup>20</sup> *Düstur*, 3. Tertip, 5. Cilt, İstanbul, 1931, 60.

<sup>21</sup> *Düstur*, 3. Tertip, 5. Cilt, 60, 71, 79, 128, 138, 140, 211.

<sup>22</sup> *Düstur*, 3. Tertip, 5. Cilt, 211, 215, 240, 241.

## Conceptualisation Related to Other Subjects

If we start with the borders, no distinction was made in the Lausanne negotiations and the treaty such as south, north, east and west. The negotiations on borders and the arrangements reflected in the treaty were made within the framework of the country. Once we look at the treaty in general, it is understood that Turkey was the centre of attention. This situation is also clearly seen in the provisions related to the borders. Namely; the provisions in Article 2 of the Treaty of Lausanne, which reads "*The frontiers of Turkey from the Black Sea<sup>23</sup> to the Sea of Islands are hereby fixed*", were made in detail with Bulgaria and Greece separately, with Turkey as the centre and the Black Sea as "Firstly with Bulgaria...; Secondly with Greece..."<sup>24</sup>

In Article 3 of the Treaty, after the words "The frontiers of Turkey from the Mediterranean Sea - which is written in the Treaty as Bahriseft - to the Iranian frontier have been determined as above", separate arrangements were made as "Firstly with Syria...; Secondly with Iraq..."<sup>25</sup>

As can be seen, direction was not taken as a basis in the arrangements concerning the borders. In practice, all of Turkey's borders, east, west, south and north, were discussed and included in the treaty as provisions. However, as stated above, border arrangements were made not on the basis of direction, but on the basis of statehood.

Moreover, Atatürk, while talking about the borders in the Treaty of Lausanne in a comparative manner in the Nutuk, explained the subject with expressions such as Thrace Border, Izmir District, Syria Border, Iraq Border, Caucasus Border, Straits District, not on the basis of direction.<sup>26</sup>

When the Treaty of Lausanne is carefully analysed, another issue that is sometimes misconceptualised is the non-Muslim minorities living within the borders of Turkey. In almost every part of the Treaty, the term *ekalliyet* -or *akalliyet*- was not used alone. The term non-Muslim minority is used in almost all of the text. While the term non-Muslim minority was used in the provisions concerning the minorities in Turkey, only the word *ekalliyet* was used when referring to the minorities in Greece. However, Turks living in Greece were referred to as Muslims. For example, while the name of the agreement on the exchange, which was reached on 30 January 1923, was "The Agreement and Protocol on the Exchange of Turkish-Greek Residents", the first and second articles, which constitute the essence of the subject, did not include the word "Turkish".<sup>27</sup> On the other hand, the first paragraph of Article 3 of the agreement reads as follows: "*Greeks and Muslims who have left the land whose Greek and Turkish inhabitants are subject to mutual exchange as of 18 October 1912 shall be deemed to be included in the exchange provided for in Article 1*". As can be understood from this, Turks are meant by the term Muslims in Western Thrace.<sup>28</sup> This shows that the minority in Western Thrace is considered on the basis of ethnicity, not religion. On the other hand, among the minorities in Turkey mentioned in other provisions above, only the non-Muslim elements are mentioned on the basis of religion. In fact, when the discussions on population exchange at Lausanne are examined, it is seen that each Turkish and Greek side - the Allies generally supported the Greek thesis - aimed to expand and contract in their own favour, both geographically and in terms of the number of exchanges.

In the meantime, when an evaluation of the participating states is made, although it seems that eight states signed the Treaty of Lausanne, there are actually two parties in the essence of the treaty. On the one hand, the British Empire, France, Italy, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, Greece, Romania and the Serbo-Croat-Slovenian State signed

<sup>23</sup> Although the French text of the Treaty of Lausanne refers to the Aegean Sea, the Turkish side translated this sea as the Sea of Islands and presented it as such in the text submitted to the Parliament. *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, II. Devre, I. Cilt, 112-113.

<sup>24</sup> *Düstur*, 3. Tertip, 5. Cilt, 20.

<sup>25</sup> *Düstur*, 3. Tertip, 5. Cilt, 20-21.

<sup>26</sup> *Nutuk*, Cilt II, 751-766.

<sup>27</sup> ARTICLE 1 - From May 1, 1923, the compulsory exchange of Turkish subjects of the Greek Orthodox religion residing in Turkish territory and Greek subjects of the Muslim religion residing in Greek territory shall commence. The aforesaid persons shall not be able to settle in Turkey or in Greece without the authorisation of the Turkish and Greek Governments in their respective countries.

ARTICLE 2 - The exchange described in Article 1 shall not extend to the following population: a ) Derseadet Greek population;  
b ) Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace

The Greek inhabitants of Derseadet shall be deemed to be all Greeks who resided in the basin of Derseadet Şhremaneti, which was threatened in accordance with the 1912 law, before October 30, 1918. The Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace shall be deemed to be all Muslims residing in the area to the east of the line of demarcation established in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest. *Düstur*, 3. Tertip, 5. Cilt, 205-206.

<sup>28</sup> This was also stated by the Greek representative Caclamanos during the discussions. Caclamanos stated that there was no question of exchange for Muslim Albanians. Meray, *Lozan Tutanakları*, Birinci Takım, Cilt I, Kitap 2, 345.



the Treaty, while Turkey was a signatory state on the other.<sup>29</sup> This alone shows that Lausanne, which appears to be a multilateral treaty, is actually a bilateral political document. Another element that draws attention here is that in memoirs and research works in Turkey, it is stated that Britain was one of the states that participated in the Lausanne Conference and signed the treaty. However, the state represented at Lausanne by Lord Curzon in the first period and Horace Rumbold in the second period was not Britain, but the British Empire. This representation is clearly seen both in the opening ceremony and in the closing signature ceremony.

## Conclusion

The Lausanne Conference began on 20 November 1922 with the opening speeches, and the following day the negotiations began with the formation of the commissions and the discussion and adoption of the rules of procedure. The name of the talks was the Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs according to the rules of procedure adopted on the first day, and the parties were generally referred to as Turkey and the Allies, or as the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Greek Government. For this reason, the use of the term "Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey" or "Ankara Government" for Turkey during the Lausanne Conference was not terminologically correct.

On the other hand, during the negotiations, the borders of Turkey were discussed on a state-centred or geographical region basis and were written into the text of the treaty in this way. In other words, the south was expressed as the borders of Bulgaria, Greece, Syria and Iraq, not the north, east and west. While the Entente Powers demanded war indemnity from Turkey and gave up on it, Turkey demanded a repair fee, which is a type of war indemnity, from Greece in return for the destruction it had caused during its occupation of Anatolia and Thrace. In return for Karaağaç, Greece gave up this demand. Although war indemnity and repair compensation are intertwined concepts, they do not have exactly the same meaning.

The Lausanne Conference was a process that started on 20 November 1922, took place in two periods and ended with the signature on 24 July 1923. There are many domestic and foreign memoirs and researches on the Lausanne Conference and the Treaty of Lausanne. Especially in research works, there are inconsistencies and random preferences in the use of basic concepts related to the subject.

This study is a preliminary study on the fact that the Lausanne Conference has a terminology and to what extent this terminology is reflected in the research works. The Lausanne Conference and the treaty signed at the end of it are in the field of interest of international relations, political science and private and general law between states as well as historical science. For this reason, care should be taken in the use of concepts.

<b>Author Contribution Rate/Yazar Katkı Oranı</b>	The authors contributed equally to this study/Yazarlar çalışmaya eşit oranda katkı sağlamıştır.
<b>Grant Support and Acknowledgement/Finansal Destek ve Teşekkür</b>	The author declared that this study has received no financial support/Yazar bu çalışma için finansal destek almadığını beyan etmiştir.
<b>Conflict of Interest/Çıkar Çatışması</b>	The author has no conflict of interest to declare/Yazar çıkar çatışması bildirmemiştir.

## REFERENCES

### Official Publications

Düstur

TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi (Minutes of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey)

### Books

Armaoğlu, Fahir. *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-1980)*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1984.

Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal. *Nutuk* Cilt I-II. İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1973.

<sup>29</sup> *Düstur*, 3. Tertip, 5. Cilt, s. 16.

Bilsel, Cemil. *Lozan*. İkinci Kitap, İstanbul: 1933.

Erim, Nihat. *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Andlaşmaları*, Cilt I. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1959.

Eroğlu, Hamza. *Türk İnkılâp Tarihi*. Ankara: Savaş Yayınevi, 1990.

Temuçin Faik Ertan, "Sevr ve Lozan Antlaşmaları Hakkında Karşılaştırmalı Bir Değerlendirme", *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, 58, (2016).

İlgazi, Abdullah (Editör). *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi*. Ankara: Savaş Yayınevi, 2010.

İnönü, İsmet, *Hatıralar*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2. Kitap, 1987.

Karacan, Ali Naci. *Lozan Konferansı ve İsmet Paşa*. İstanbul: Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1943.

Kurat, Yuluğ Tekin. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Paylaşılması*. Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1986.

Macmillan, Margaret, *Paris 1919: 1919 Paris Barış Konferansı ve Dünyayı Değiştiren Altı Ayın Hikâyesi*. Ankara: ODTÜ Yayıncılık, 2003.

Meray, Seha (Çeviren). *Lozan Barış Konferansı Tutanaklar-Belgeler*. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, Birinci Takım, Cilt I, Kitap 1, İkinci Baskı, 1993.

Öztürk, Cemil (Editör). *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete, Türk İnkılâp Tarihi*. Ankara: Pegem Yayıncılık, 2007.

Potyemkin Vladimir ve diğerleri. (Çeviren. Atilla Tokatlı). *Uluslararası İlişkiler Tarihi*. İstanbul: May Yayınları, III. Cilt, 1979.

Sander, Oral. *Siyasi Tarih İlk Çağlardan 1918'e*. İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2007.

*Tarih IV*. İstanbul: İstanbul Devlet Matbaası, 1934.

Türkgeldi, Ali Fuad. *Görüp İşittiklerim*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yay., II. Baskı, 1951.

Uçarol, Rifat. *Siyasi Tarih (1914-2014)*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2. Cilt, 2019.

#### Web Sites

<https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/indemnity?q=indemnity> Date of Access, June 10, 2023.

<https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/reparation?q=reparation> Date of Access, June 10, 2023.