



The Role of Self-Construal, Values, and Religiosity on Judgements of the Reasonability of Lying

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Abstract

Although lying, which is a social part of human life, is seen as a negative phenomenon in society, it is considered quite reasonable by people in some cases. In this respect, it is important to examine in which circumstances lying is acceptable. This study aims to examine the relationships between self-construal, values, religiosity, and the acceptability of different types of lies. A total of 605 participants completed the self-report measures of the Reasonability of Lying Scale, Portrait Values Questionnaire, and Autonomous-Related Self Scale. In addition, considering possible response biases, social desirability scores were also controlled. The results of the hierarchical regression analysis showed that religiosity, conservation, and self-enhancement values were the predictors of acceptability of self-protection lies. In terms of the acceptability of face management lies, conservation and self-enhancement values, and autonomous-relational self were the significant predictors. It was founded that the only variable that was a significant predictor of acceptability of prosocial lie was self-transcendence values. Acceptability of evasion lies were significantly predicted by religiosity and autonomous-relational self. Another finding was that religiosity, conservation and self-enhancement values and autonomous-relational self-construal were the significant predictors of acceptability of necessity lies. The results showed that religiosity, conservation and self-enhancement values, and autonomous-relational self-construal variables were significant predictors of acceptability of instrumental lies. Finally, in terms of the total acceptability of different types of lies; religiosity, conservation and self-enhancement values and autonomous-relational self-construal variables were the significant predictors. The results obtained from this study indicate that evaluations of lying are affected by different social factors, and these factors are discussed in the light of recent findings.

Keywords: Lying, reasonability of lying, religiosity, self-construal, values.

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Yalanın Uygunluğuna İlişkin Yargılarda Benlik Kurgusu, Değerler ve Dindarlığın Rolü

Öz

İnsan yaşamının sosyal bir parçası olan yalan söyleme davranışları toplumda olumsuz bir fenomen olarak görülmesine rağmen bazı durumlarda insanlar tarafından oldukça makul karşılanmaktadır. Bu açıdan yalanın hangi durumlarda kabul edilebilir bulunduğunu incelemek önem taşımaktadır. Bu çalışma benlik kurgusu, değerler, dindarlık ve farklı yalan türlerinin kabul edilebilirliği arasındaki ilişkileri incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmada 605 katılımcı, Yalanın Uygunluğu Testi, Portre Değerleri Anketi ve Özerk İlişkisel Benlik Ölçeğini doldurmuştur. Ayrıca olası tepki yanlılıkları göz önünde bulundurularak sosyal beğenirlik düzeyleri de kontrol amacıyla ölçülmüştür. Hiyerarşik regresyon analizinin sonuçları, dindarlık, muhafazacılık ve öz-genişletim değerlerinin kendini koruma yalanlarının kabul edilebilirliğini yordadığını göstermiştir. İmaj yönetimi yalanlarının kabul edilebilirliği açısından, muhafazacılık ve öz-genişletim değerleri ile özerk-ilişkisel benliğin anlamlı yordayıcılar olduğu görülmüştür. Prososyal yalanın kabul edilebilirliğinin anlamlı düzeyde yordayıcısı olan tek değişkenin öz-aşkınlık değerinin olduğu saptanmıştır. Geçişirme yalanlarının kabul edilebilirliği, dindarlık ve özerk-ilişkisel benlik tarafından anlamlı olarak yordanmıştır. Çalışmanın bir diğer bulgusu ise muhafazacılık ve öz-genişletim değerleri ile dindarlık ve özerk-ilişkisel benlik kurgusunun zorunlu yalanların kabul edilebilirliğinin anlamlı yordayıcıları olduğudur. Sonuçlar, dindarlık, muhafazacılık ve kendini geliştirme değerleri ile otonom-ilişkisel benlik kurgusu değişkenlerinin, araçsal yalanların kabul edilebilirliğinin önemli yordayıcıları olduğunu göstermiştir. Son olarak, farklı yalan türlerinin toplam kabul edilebilirliği açısından; muhafazacılık ve öz -genişletim değerleri, dindarlık ve özerk-ilişkisel benlik kurgusu değişkenlerinin anlamlı yordayıcılar olduğu bulunmuştur. Bu çalışmadan elde edilen sonuçlar, yalana ilişkin muhakemelerin farklı sosyal faktörlerden etkilendiğini göstermektedir ve bu faktörler bulgular ışığında tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yalan söyleme, yalanın uygunluğu, dindarlık, benlik kurgusu, değerler.

INTRODUCTION

Lying can be defined as an “untrue statement,” but the definition is not as simple as it seems, and is evidenced by researchers’ lie classification. Goffman (1967) categorizes the types of lies under general headings, such as pragmatic lies that are acceptable and harmless to others, and also defines unacceptable and harmful lies as self-interested lies. Evaluating the underlying motives of lying on the basis of two criteria, such as the person who benefits from the lie and the results of the lies, DePaulo et al. (2004) proposes different types of lies -i.e., instrumental, identity-based, to avoid punishment, to protect oneself, to hurt others, to protect others, and for entitlement. On the other hand, Bryant (2008) finds that lies are differentiated according to intention, result, beneficiary, accuracy, and acceptability as a result of his study with adult participants and classified them into white, true, and gray lies. In a Turkish sample study conducted by Aydın and Balım (2021), participants were asked in an open-ended manner about the situations in which they told lies for their own benefit and for the benefit of others. They subsequently developed a scale using both these data and classifications in the literature and found a six-factor structure in their analysis: self-protection lies, face management lies, prosocial lies, evasion lies, necessity lies, and instrumental lies (Balım & Aydın, 2021).

According to Aydın and Balım (2021), self-protection lies refer to the ability of people to protect their privacy and autonomy when they perceive an obstacle to what they want to do (e.g., not telling friends about where s/he wants to go alone). Face management lies include lies that are used when people feel the need to show themselves better than they are (e.g., telling her manager about things she hasn't done in order to get a better position at her job, as if she had done them herself). Prosocial lies are told to protect the well-being of others (e.g., reluctantly doing something to make a friend happy), while evasion lies are told to change a subject the person does not want to talk about (e.g., even though he's having trouble with his boss, telling friends who ask about his job that he's happy to brush it off and end the conversation). Necessity lies refer to the group of lies that one feels entitled to tell in order to avoid a situation, especially when it is very likely that the liar will be punished if the lie is not told (e.g., even though she smokes, she tells her family that she doesn't smoke because she is afraid). Finally, instrumental lies are used by people to gain an advantage in a subject or a situation (e.g., saying she knows certain software programs she doesn't know how to use to get hired).

In general, two approaches dominate the view of lying, which is conceptualized in various ways in the literature: the absolutist view and the pragmatist view. The absolutist view argues that lying is never acceptable and is wrong, regardless of the context. For example, Kant tries to explain the concepts of truth and lying through universal morality, taking into account the rights of the individual, and stated that there should not be the slightest deviation or exception to these universal moral rules (for a detailed discussion, see Bok, 1978). A contemporary philosopher Harris (2013) claims that the white lie, which is told for the benefit of others, does not exist at all. However, from the pragmatist view, it is thought that not all lies would lead to negative results. Accordingly, lying is not always wrong, and that it actually serves some purpose (Bok, 1978). For example, Hartshorne and May (1928), citing the “principle of specificity, states that different social contexts might be associated with lying and being honest. They claim that it would not be appropriate to see such behaviors as personality traits, and that they are easily affected by the social environment. For example, a person whose birthday is being celebrated may try to prepare himself to like the gift. It is stated that gifts received in such social contexts are appreciated, even if they are a courtesy. Another example on this subject is that in many societies and religions, “lies told to improve relations between people” are not perceived as a negative situation (Algül, 2017). Therefore, social contexts, norms and values provide important information on how lying is perceived.

In support of the sociability emphasis mentioned on the perception of the lie, Triandis et al. (2001) also argue that whether a lie is morally wrong or not may vary according to socio-cultural contexts, and

that some cultures may consider lying acceptable in certain contexts and may even encourage it in some cases. Moreover, according to the pragmatist approach, the absolutist view on the reasons for lying is wrong, as it represents the individualism that exists in Western cultures. For example, Lee et al. (2001) state that in some Asian cultures, individuals' concerns such as freedom of information and choice are not considered important in deciding the moral consequences of lying, but social processes such as group cohesion are important determinants in the evaluation of a lie as correct or wrong. In line with these explanations, it can be said that a study of different cultures is important for fully investigating the acceptability of lying.

Culture is one of the most important factors to be considered when examining communication processes. The positive evaluation of telling the truth and the negative evaluation of deceiving others may qualify as universal in many cultures; however, the emphasis of cultures on truth and falsehood may differ. People raised in different cultures may judge the same message as true or false and may differ in their predictions of how other people in their culture will judge a particular message. In fact, people's judgments of truth and falsehood may change according to cultural norms, traditions, and values. In studies examining lying in different cultures (Kim et al., 2008), it is emphasized that deception and lying are considered as a "social necessity" in some cultures; therefore, statements that do not contain truth can be considered acceptable. Given that social rules differ from one culture to another, it is clear enough that cultural differences in lying should not be ignored. Despite this fact, most studies on lying have been carried out only in Western cultures, especially in America and Canada. This is an important shortcoming of research on this subject. Therefore, the generalizability of the findings to more collectivist cultures remains controversial.

The binary concepts of individualism-collectivism are one of the most widely used dimensions in the differentiation of cultures (Hofstede, 2001). Individualism is explained by the independence of an individual from groups, networks and other social organizations, while group ties, goals, needs and norms are essential in collectivism (Triandis et al., 2001). In individualistic societies, morality is equivalent to one's intention to express the truth, so revealing the truth is a matter of honor (Kim et al., 2008). On the other hand, in collectivist cultures, since the well-being of members of the identified group is important, members of this community focus on the effects of their behavior on the group (Triandis et al., 2001).

One point where collectivistic and individualistic cultures differ in this context may be the underlying reasons for lying. Triandis et al. (2001) state that people in collectivistic cultures are more likely to tell lies that benefit others than those in individualistic cultures. There are studies regarding the differences in the acceptability of lying according to different cultures (Fu et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2001; Sim, 2002). For example, Aune and Waters (1994) examine the differences between Samoan culture, which values the common interest and good of society, and the individualistic American culture through lie scenarios designed to examine whether the acceptability of lying is affected from cultural factors. The results of this study showed that Americans tend to cheat in personal matters, while Samoans tend to cheat in family or group matters. In another study, Seiter et al. (2002) test whether there was a difference between American and Chinese participants' motivation to lie. The results revealed that lying was generally perceived as more acceptable by Chinese respondents because their culture emphasizes on social harmony and norms rather than personal benefits and well-being (Seiter et al., 2002). However, American participants evaluated cheating as less acceptable overall. Researchers explained the results to have been determined by the values to which each culture gives importance, which are different from each other.

Kim et al. (2008) state that the difference between independent/autonomous and relational/interdependent self-construal is important in the judgements of lying. Those with a high level

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of independent self-construal perceive themselves as separate from others, while those with a high relational self-construal perceive themselves as connected to others. From this perspective, it might be said that the importance attributed to the individual or to the group would also affect moral evaluations. Cultures in which the group takes precedence over the individual tend to view morality as a social phenomenon that considers the needs and expectations of group members. In a way, the desire to be in harmony with the group would lead to an increase in the level of relatedness; thus, lying might be considered more reasonable. In the case of independence, the opposite relationship can be expected.

In one of the empirical studies carried out by Mealy et al. (2007), differences in the acceptability of lies in Euro-American and Latino culture were examined. Researchers selected these cultures because the target cultures were found to differ with regard to such criteria as individualism/collectivism, independence/interdependence of the self. Accordingly, it was supposed that "Latinos regard lies that are intended to benefit others as more acceptable than Euro-Americans because they help to maintain harmony in interpersonal relationships and facilitate relationships with those in power" (Mealy et al., 2007). In contrast, researchers expect that "self-benefiting lies would be regarded as more acceptable in Euro-American culture than in Ecuadorian culture because Euro-American culture emphasizes independence". As a result of the study, it was found that participants rated lies told for the benefit of someone else acceptable in both societies, but Euro-Americans rated self-benefiting lies more acceptable, consistent with expectations. There are also some studies that "compared children's and adolescents' moral evaluations of honest and deceptive statements told to benefit a collective across Chinese and Canadian cultures" (Dmytro et al., 2014, Fu et al., 2007; Lo et al., 2020, Tong et al., 2023). In these studies (Fu et al., 2007, Lo et al., 2020, Tong et al., 2023), even if the rules are violated, Chinese participants approve of hiding transgression and lying in favor of the collective. In fact, these types of lies are antisocial-valued because they benefit the collective by covering up someone else's personal mistakes. In contrast, Canadian participants find lies which serve personal interests more acceptable, regardless of harm to the collective. In another study, Kim et al. (2008) examined the relationship between self-construal and the reasons for lying participants from Hong Kong, Hawaii, and the United States. The results of this study showed that "higher degrees of interdependence were related to a greater overall motivation to deceive for both self- and other benefit". The researchers interpreted the findings that higher degrees of interdependence would be more likely to perceive messages that depart from truth as not deceptive because its nature lies in relationality.

Studies examining the role of culture in the reasonability of lying have used the dual distinction between autonomous and relational selves. Kağıtçıbaşı (1996), who opposed the mutually exclusive evaluation of these two self-construals, stated that in the Turkish culture, the autonomous and relational self could coexist, and so the autonomous-relational self was added to categorization. Therefore, in this study, self-construal is evaluated in three dimensions: autonomous, relational, and autonomous-relational self, since they would better reflect Turkish culture. Thus, the present study contributes to the literature by helping in the development of an understanding of the relationship between autonomous, relational, autonomous-relational self-construal, and the different types of lies.

Although it is accepted that these perspectives are a good way to examine the diversity between cultures, it can be said that they are partially inadequate in understanding the differences that may occur between individuals within the same culture. Therefore, in the current study, 'values' have been included as another variable in terms of the impact it has in shaping people's social lives. In other words, the relationship between individual values and the reasonability of lying is discussed within the framework of Schwartz's theory of values, which is a comprehensive and up-to-date approach to values.

Values are defined as concepts or beliefs that come to the fore in achieving various desired goals and behaviors, guiding behavior, or preferences, and are ranked according to the importance of the

current context (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990). Schwartz (1992, 1994), who showed a large number of values that stood out in previous approaches (see Rokeach, 1973), classified them under 10 universal types, and also dealt with these value types in different value dimensions. The dimension with stimulation and self-direction on the one hand, and security, conformity, and tradition value types on the other, was called “openness to changes-conservation,” while the dimension with power and success at one end and universalism and benevolence at the other end was called “self-enhancement and self-transcendence” (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz et al., 2012). Hedonism, on the other hand, is included in both the openness to change and self-enhancement value dimensions. Of these value dimensions, openness to change means remaining open to new thoughts and actions, whereas conservation means avoiding change by preserving the existing order. While self-enhancement indicates that the person should consider their own interests first, self-transcendence corresponds to prioritizing the well-being of others by putting their own interests in the background (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz et al., 2012). Therefore, the self-transcendence and conservation value dimensions are socially focused, while the self-enhancement and openness to change value dimensions have a self-oriented aspect. Depending on these differences in emphasis on value dimensions, the relationships between different value dimensions and acceptability of lying types may also vary. In this study, four value dimensions are used.

Within this framework, some value dimensions defined by Schwartz (1992, 1994) may be related to the reasonability of lying. The fact that the values of universalism and benevolence under the self-transcendence dimension are related to caring for others, being related to others, and having tolerance may cause people to respond more positively to lies told for the benefit of others. Self-oriented values such as self-direction, hedonism, success, and power can explain the reasonability of lies told for one’s own benefit. Tradition, compliance, and security value types in the conservation dimension are related to preserving the existing relationship order and social structure in society; the lies that the person tells for their own benefit by prioritizing the relevant value types may be perceived as a threat to the social order and therefore may not be accepted. Lies told for the benefit of others, on the other hand, may be seen as more reasonable by people who care about conservation values as they contribute to the preservation of the relational order established in society.

According to the literature, just a few studies deal with Schwartz’s theory of values and lying. In a study conducted with children, Aydın (2022) finds that children’s and parents’ values of self-transcendence and conservatism were positively related to the level of reasonability of prosocial lies. It has also been found that there is a negative correlation between the values of self-enhancement and openness to change and the reasonability of prosocial lies. This study is important in terms of presenting pioneering ideas; however, there is still a need to investigate the relationships between these variables in adulthood.

While examining the reasonability of lying, besides self-construal and values, religiosity is also an important variable. Religiosity plays a key role in people’s lives and is effective in regulating interpersonal relations, so it can also make a valuable contribution to this framework. In general, it is seen that the views of monotheistic religions on lying behaviors are negative. For example, one of the Ten Commandments in Judaism states, “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.” “Even if you should suffer for righteousness’ sake, you are blessed!” and the expression “devil is the father of lies” is an indicator of how lies are evaluated in Christianity. “Avoid the false words,” mentioned in the Qur’an, also reveals how Islam evaluate lies (Gunduz, 2007). Because Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all prohibit lying, religious people may oppose deception on ethical grounds.

In line with these explanations, it can be expected that religious belief systems, which deeply affect people’s attitudes and value structures, would also be effective in making judgments about lying.

However, there are just a few studies on this subject. In one of these studies, 312 participants with Christian faith have been included and researchers examined the relations between lie acceptability and religiosity of adults (e.g., Oliveira & Levine, 2008). In this study, researchers find that lie acceptability was correlated negatively with religiosity. Similarly, in the study conducted by Cantarero et al. (2018) with adults from 7 different European countries, it is reported that as the level of religiosity increases, the ratings of acceptability of lying decreases. However, according to the limited studies in the literature, these relations between religiosity and lying behaviors do not seem clear. There are some research claiming that religiosity is a strong predictor of honesty (Stavrova & Siegers, 2013) and some other research reports that there were no relations (Heyman et al., 2013). In an indirect study on this subject, the relationships between the level of religiosity of parents and lying to their children are examined (Setoh et al., 2022). This study showed that, in contrast to Chinese and American parents, higher religiosity among Singaporean parents is related to less lying to children. Setoh et al. report that because of the fact that the relationship was found only in a Muslim society, both culturally and religious driven factors could affect lying. In this respect, results from Türkiye may also contribute to the literature. Therefore, it would be useful to examine whether the level of religiosity is effective in the judgments of participants from different societies and religious backgrounds. From this point of view, another aim of this study is to examine the predictive effect of adults' religiosity levels on their acceptance of different types of lies.

As can be seen, there is a need for studies on how perceptions of the reasonability of lying change in situations. In addition, considering that lies emerge during social interactions, it can be said that perceptions of the reasonability of lies are heavily influenced by cultural value systems. Although the relationship between the values defined by Hofstede (1980) and lying has been discussed in some studies, there are deficiencies in how Schwartz's (1992) values can be related to the reasonability of different types of lies. Therefore, the aim of this exploratory study is to examine the relationship between self-construal, values, religiosity, and the reasonability of lying.

METHOD

Participants

In the study, conformity sampling, one of the non-probability sampling types, was used, considering easy accessibility to the participants. A total of 605 participants, 190 male (31.4%) and 415 (68.6%) female, aged between 18 and 62 years ($M_{age} = 23.99$, $Sd = 7.80$) were included in the study. Regarding education level, 74.7% of the participants were university students, 14.9% had graduated, and 7.6% were postgraduates. It was reported that 53.1% of the participants perceived themselves as belonging to the middle-income group, 19% as lower-middle-income, and 16.7% as low-income. Regarding marital status, 82.5% of the participants were single. 84.6% of the participants lived in metropolitan areas. It was reported that 91.7% were Muslim and 5.1% of the participants did not believe in any religion.

Measures

Demographic Form. The form was created by researchers to obtain demographic information of the participants' age, gender, education level, income level, marital status, religious beliefs, and the place of residence.

Reasonability of Lying Scale. The Reasonability of Lying Scale developed by Balım and Aydın (2021) was used to evaluate the level of reasonability of lying. The five-point Likert scale (1 = not at all appropriate; 5 = completely appropriate) consisted of 35 items in total. In the scale, there were nine items related to "self-protection lies" (e.g., "Özlem told Fatma that she had to go home because she wanted to go shopping alone during her break time"), six related to "face management lies" (e.g., "In order to

impress Cem, Gaye told that her father was a very respected businessman even though it was not"), seven related to "prosocial lies" (e.g., "Although Sema did not want to watch the movie, she told that she was very curious about the movie in order to make her friend happy,"), five related to "evasion lies" (e.g., "Even though İsmail was having problems with his boss, when Sedat asked about his job, he said that he is happy at his job to cover up"), four related to "necessity lies" (e.g., "Aylin smoked but told her family that she had never smoked because she was afraid") and four related to "instrumental lies" (e.g., "In the job interview, in order to be accepted for the job, Arda said that he knew the programs that he did not actually know how to use"). The scale has six dimensions. Common Turkish names were used for each vignette. High scores indicated that the participants' reasoning for lying increased.

Considering the validity and reliability analyses of the scale, the Cronbach alpha coefficients obtained as a result of the analysis were .91 for the whole scale; for sub-dimensions, it was found to vary between .64 and .87. The test-retest reliability results of the scale, on the other hand, showed highly significant correlations between .88 and .98 (Balım & Aydın, 2021). The fit indices of the scale are as follows: χ^2/df (1768.57/543) = 3.26, CFI (comparative fit index) = .91, GFI (goodness of fit index) = .86, RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation) = .061, SRMR (standardized RMR) = .063.

Portrait Values Questionnaire. The Portrait Values Questionnaire, developed by Schwartz et al. (2001) and adapted in Turkish by Demirutku (2007), was used to measure the value structures of the participants. In each item, the definition of the individual is given, and the participants are asked to indicate how similar they are to the individual whose definition is given. The scale uses a six-point Likert scale (1 = not like me at all; 6 = very similar to me) and consists of 40 items in total. The sub-dimensions of the scale are "power," "success," "hedonism," "stimulation," "self-direction," "universality," "benevolence," "tradition," "compliance" and "security". The reliability coefficients obtained in the Turkish adaptation study (Demirutku, 2007) were as follows: power: .81; success: .81; hedonism: .77; stimulation: .70; self-direction: .65; universality: .72; helpfulness: .66; tradition: .82; compliance: .75 and security: .80.

Autonomous-Related Self Scale. The Autonomous-Related Self Scale developed by Kagitcibasi (2007) was used to measure participants' self-construal. The scale consists of 27 items in a five-point Likert type, and has three sub-dimensions: "autonomous self," "related self" and "autonomous-relational self". For the reliability scores, the Cronbach's alpha coefficient of the autonomous self-construal sub-dimension was .74, the related self-construal was .78, and autonomous-related self-construal was .84.

Religiosity. In terms of measuring religiosity, it is seen that single-question measurements are also preferred in the literature, as well as measurement tools focusing on religious activities and attitudes (see Hill & Hood, 1999). The religiosity of the participants was measured as "Do you describe yourself as a religious person?" with a single 7-point Likert scale (1: I am not religious at all; 7: I am very religious). The mean level of religiosity of the participants was 4.87 (Sd=1.47).

Social Desirability. Social desirability was included as a control variable in this study. In order to measure, "Social Desirability Scale" developed by Kozan (1984) was used in the current study. The scale consists of 20 items marked as true or false. The scale is one-dimensional and the participants get 1 point for each answer they give in parallel with their social desirability. An increase in the score obtained from the scale indicates an increase in the level of social desirability. The Cronbach Alpha internal consistency coefficient of the scale was found to be .76, and the test-retest reliability was found to be .91.

Procedure

Before conducting the study, ethical approval was obtained from the university Social and Human Sciences Research Ethics Committee. While reaching the participants, announcements were

made via social media platforms and e-mail. Data were collected between March and August 2021 through online platforms because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The materials were added to a data collection site on the internet with an informed consent form that introduced the research and obtained the participants' voluntary participation in the study. Each participant completed the study in approximately 30 minutes.

According to the central limit theorem, as the sample size increases, provided that there are at least 30 participants, the data approaches normal distribution, and in this case, the data is considered to be normally distributed (Dekking et al., 2005; Privitera, 2015). Based on this, it was observed that the sample size in this study was sufficient for normal distribution. Pearson correlation analysis and hierarchical regression analysis were used to examine the relationships between variables. Hierarchical regression analysis was preferred in our study for progression within a theoretical framework and for presenting both significant and nonsignificant findings. Before the hierarchical regression analysis, normality, linearity and homoscedascity criteria were examined (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) and then the hierarchical regression analysis was carried out as a result of meeting these criteria. Social desirability was placed in the first block as a control variable, religiosity was placed in the second block, value dimensions were placed in the third block, and self-construals were placed in the last block, and the six dimensions and total score of the appropriateness of lie scale were placed as dependent variables. These both correlation and regression analyses were performed using SPSS 21.

RESULTS

The means and standard deviations of the variables obtained from the descriptive statistical analyses are given in Table 1.

Table 1.

Means and standard deviations of the variables

Variables	M	SD
Reasonability of Self-Protection Lies	24.71	7.90
Reasonability of Face Management Lies	10.28	4.72
Reasonability of Prosocial Lies	20.55	5.80
Reasonability of Evasion Lies	16.07	4.19
Reasonability of Necessity Lies	8.53	3.91
Reasonability of Instrumental Lies	8.89	3.18
Total Score of Reasonability of Lying	89.04	22.95
Autonomous Self	26.4	5.27
Related Self	31.73	5.37
Autonomous-Related Self	36.03	5.46
Self-Transcendence	49.34	9.26
Conservation	59.68	11.97
Self-Enhancement	39.83	10.54
Openness to Change	44.99	9.64

Religiosity	4.87	1.47
Social Desirability	15.37	2.70

The relationships between self-construal, values, religiosity, and reasonability of lying are shown in Table 2. In terms of self-construal, the correlation analysis showed that autonomous self-construal had a significant negative relationship only with reasonability of prosocial lies ($r = -.12, p < .01$). On the other hand, there was a significant negative correlation between relational self-construal and reasonability of face management lies ($r = -.16, p < .001$) and a positive relationship with reasonability of prosocial lies ($r = .09, p < .05$). Finally, autonomous-relational self-construal was significantly negatively correlated with the reasonability of face management lies, necessity lies, and instrumental lies ($r = -.41, p < .001$; $r = -.14, p < .001$; $r = -.23, p < .001$, respectively) and positively correlated with the reasonability of evasion lies ($r = .14, p < .001$).

The correlation analysis demonstrated that there were significant negative relationships between the self-transcendence value dimension and the reasonability of face management lies ($r = -.14, p < .001$), and significant positive relationships were observed between the self-transcendence value dimension and reasonability of prosocial lies and evasion lies ($r = .09, p < .05$; $r = .07, p < .05$, respectively). On the other hand, there were significant negative relationships between the conservation value dimension and reasonability of self-protection, face management, necessity, and instrumental lies ($r = -.12, p < .01$; $r = -.11, p < .01$; $r = -.18, p < .001$; $r = -.14, p < .001$). The self-enhancement value dimension had positive and significant relationships with all types of lies ($r = .22, p < .001$ for self-protection lies; $r = .13, p < .01$ for image management lies; $r = .10, p < .05$ for prosocial lies; $r = .10, p < .05$ for evasion lies; $r = .20, p < .001$ for necessity lies; $r = .23, p < .001$ for instrumental lies). Finally, there were significant positive correlations between the value dimension of openness to change and self-protection, evasion, necessity, and instrumental lies ($r = .14, p < .001$; $r = .11, p < .01$; $r = .13, p < .01$; and $r = .09, p < .05$, respectively).

Religiosity, the last predictor variable considered in the study, had significant negative relationships with self-protection, face management, evasion, necessity, and instrumental lies ($r = -.27, p < .001$; $r = -.10, p < .05$; $r = -.17, p < .001$; $r = -.30, p < .001$; $r = -.23, p < .001$, respectively).

Finally, social desirability, the control variable considered in the study, had significant negative relationships with self-protection, prosocial, evasion, necessity, instrumental, and total scores of lying ($r = -.19, p < .01$; $r = -.09, p < .05$; $r = -.12, p < .01$; $r = -.17, r = -.15, p < .01$; $r = -.16, p < .01$ respectively).

Table 2.
Correlations between reasonability of lying and values, self-construal, religiosity

Variables	Self-Protection	Face Management	Prosocial	Evasion	Necessity	Instrumental	Total Score of Reasonability of Lying
Autonomous Self	.03(<i>ns</i>)	-.03(<i>ns</i>)	-.12*	.03(<i>ns</i>)	.07(<i>ns</i>)	-.01(<i>ns</i>)	-.01(<i>ns</i>)
Related Self	.01(<i>ns</i>)	-.16***	.09*	.02(<i>ns</i>)	-.07(<i>ns</i>)	-.07(<i>ns</i>)	-.03(<i>ns</i>)
Autonomous-Related Self	-.004(<i>ns</i>)	-.41***	.03(<i>ns</i>)	.14***	-.14***	-.23***	-.11**
Self-Transcendence	.01(<i>ns</i>)	-.14***	.09*	.07*	-.06(<i>ns</i>)	-.07(<i>ns</i>)	-.009(<i>ns</i>)
Conservation	-.12**	-.11**	.04(<i>ns</i>)	-.04(<i>ns</i>)	-.18***	-.14***	-.11*
Self-Enhancement	.22***	.13**	.10*	.10*	.20***	.23***	.21***
Openness to Change	.14***	.005(<i>ns</i>)	.07(<i>ns</i>)	.11**	.13**	.09*	.12**
Religiosity	-.27***	-.10*	-.03(<i>ns</i>)	-.17***	-.30***	-.23***	-.24***
Social Desirability	-.19**	-.02(<i>ns</i>)	-.09*	-.12**	-.17**	-.15**	-.16**

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; *ns*: non-significant

Regression Analysis

After examining the tolerance and VIF values of the variables (Tolerance values are between .225 and .971, VIF values are between 1.03 and 4.435), a series of multiple hierarchical regression analysis were conducted to see the variables that predicted reasonability of different types of lies. The relevant findings are presented in Table 3-9 (See, Appendices). Accordingly, the similar sequence was followed in all hierarchical regression analysis regarding the acceptability of different types of lies. Thereafter, lie types were entered as dependent variables in each regression model. In the first step of regression models; social desirability was entered as the control variable; and the religiosity variable entered to the model in the second step. In the third step, value types were entered. And, lastly in the final step, self-construal was included in the model.

Regression analysis was firstly interpreted in terms of self-protection lies. Social desirability made a significant contribution of 3.5% to the model in the first step. In the second step, the religiosity variable entered to the model and it made a significant contribution of 5.7%. When values were entered in the third step, it was found that the explanatory power of the model significantly increased by 5.8%. In this step, the variables that significantly predict self-protection lies were the religiosity, conservation values, and self-enhancement values. It was observed that the self-construal variables added to the model in the fourth step did not contribute significantly to the model (0.2%). In the final model, in which all the variables were entered, it was concluded that the variables that were significant predictors of self-protection lies were religiosity, conservation values, and self-enhancement values. The result of the regression analysis regarding the acceptability of self-protection lies were given in Table 3.

When the analysis was interpreted in terms of the acceptability of face management lies, the social desirability variable which was included in the model in the first step did not make a significant contribution. In the second step, the religiosity variable was included in the model, and it made a significant contribution of 1%. When value types were added in the third step, it was found that the

explanatory power of the model increased by 7.3%. In this step, the variables that significantly predict face management lies were self-transcendence and self-enhancement values. In the fourth step, it was observed that the self-construal variables made a significant contribution of 13.5% to the model. In the final model, it was seen that the variables that were significant predictors of face management lies were conservation and self-enhancement values, and autonomous-relational self. The regression analysis results regarding the acceptability of face management lies were presented in Table 4.

In terms of the acceptability of prosocial lies, it was found that the social desirability variable, which was entered to the model in the first step, made a significant contribution of approximately 1%. The religiosity variable included in the model in the second stage did not cause a significant change in the model. When value types were entered in the third step, it was found that the explanatory power of the model showed a significant increase of 1.7%. In this step, the variables that significantly predicted the acceptability of the prosocial lies were social desirability and self-transcendence values. It was seen that the self-construal variables entered to the model in the fourth step contributed 1% to the model and this change was not significant. In the last model, it was observed that the only variable that was a significant predictor of prosocial lie was self-transcendence values. The regression analysis results regarding the acceptability of prosocial lies were presented in Table 5.

When the regression analysis was interpreted in terms of evasion lies, the social desirability variable made a significant contribution of 1.4% to the model. The religiosity variable entered in the second step made a significant contribution of 2.2% to the model. When value types were entered in the third step, it was found that the explanatory power of the model increased significantly by 1.8%. Variables that significantly predict evasion lies in the third step were social desirability, religiosity, and self-transcendence values. In the fourth step, it was observed that the self-construal variables caused a 1% change in the model, but this change was not significant. In the final model, the variables that were significant predictors of evasion lies were religiosity and autonomous-relational self. The regression analysis results regarding the acceptability of evasion lies were given in Table 6.

In terms of the acceptability of necessity lies, it was observed that the social desirability made a significant contribution of approximately 2.8% to the model in the first step. The religiosity variable entered to the model in the second stage also had a significant explanatory power of 7.6%. In the third step, value types were entered, and it was found that the explanatory power of the model showed a significant increase of 6.5%. In the third step of the model, the variables that significantly predict the acceptability of the necessity lie were religiosity, conservation, and self-enhancement values. In the fourth step, self-construal variables contributed 2.5% to the model significantly. In the final model, religiosity, conservation and self-enhancement values and autonomous-relational self-construal were the significant predictors of the necessity lies. The results of the regression analysis regarding the acceptability of necessity lies were presented in Table 7.

In terms of the acceptability of the instrumental lies, the social desirability made a significant contribution of 2.2% to the model in the first step. The religiosity variable also made a significant contribution of 4.3% to the model in the second step. In the third step, it was found that the explanatory power of the model increased significantly by approximately 8% when the value types were entered to the model. In the third step, religiosity, conservation, and self-enhancement values were the predictors of acceptability of instrumental lies. The self-construal variables entered to the model in the fourth step caused a significant change of 5%. In the final step, it was observed that religiosity, conservation and self-enhancement values, and autonomous-relational self-construal variables were significant predictors of instrumental lies. The regression analysis results regarding the acceptability of instrumental lies were given in Table 8.

Finally, when the regression analysis regarding the acceptability of all types of lies (total score) was performed, it was found that the social desirability variable entered to the model in the first step made a significant contribution of approximately 2.7%. It was also found that the religiosity variable entered to the model in the second step had a significant explanatory power of 4.4%. When value types were entered in the third step, it was found that the explanatory power of the model showed a significant increase of 5.2%. In the third step of the model religiosity, conservation, and self-enhancement values were the significant predictors of acceptability of lying scores. When the self-construal variables were entered to the model in the fourth step, there was a significant change in the model approximately 2%. In the final step of this model, religiosity, conservation and self-enhancement values and autonomous-relational self-construal variables were the significant predictors of the acceptability of the lies. The results of the regression analysis regarding the acceptability of the lie were presented in Table 9.

DISCUSSION

This study aimed to investigate the roles of values, self-construal, and religiosity on the reasonability of different types of lies with adult individuals. Correlation and regression analyses demonstrated that the relationships between values, self-construal, religiosity, and reasonability of lying differed due to the motivations for lying.

According to the relationships between self-construal and reasonability of lies, it was found that only autonomous-related-self affected reasonability of some types of lies. Considering that self-orientedness and non-interference in private life are important for autonomous self-construal, as Markus and Kitayama (1991) stated, participants who prioritized this self could be expected to find self-motivated lies to be more reasonable. While previous studies found that those with autonomous self-construal find lying more reasonable regardless of whether it is self- or other-oriented (Mealy et al., 2007), some of them showed that those with related self-construal find lying more reasonable (Bae et al., 2021). In the current study, regression analysis showed that there were not any significant relationships between autonomous-related-self and acceptability of self-protection lies and prosocial lies. In fact, a reflection of the inconsistent results present in the literature emerged in this study. In other words, examining self-construal in a different way did not clarify its relationship with different types of lies and made it difficult to evaluate. A possible explanation for this result may be the feature of shaping a certain situation with a sense of competence, which is seen in autonomous self-construal (Kağıtçıbaşı, 2005). For example, face management lies and instrumental lies may have certain aspects that ignore the competence of the person in achieving certain concrete goals. A person who uses face management lies may claim that he/she is successful even if he/she is not, while someone applying instrumental lies may lie by saying that he/she has different skills to get hired. Therefore, such lies may be perceived as a threat to one's competence and appraised as less reasonable. These results add a new one to the mixed findings in the literature. Therefore, further research should investigate the relationship between reasonability of lying and self-construal.

To elaborate on the findings in terms of self-construal, related self-construal had no predictive effect on the level of reasonability of any type of lie. It could be expected that participants with related self-construal consider prosocial lies to be more reasonable because unity, group welfare, and group purposes are important for them (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Although earlier studies predominantly found positive relationships between related self-construal and prosocial lies (e.g., Aune & Waters, 1994; Seiter et al., 2002), there are also some that do not confirm the results in the same way (e.g., Sweet et al., 2010). In the present study, there was a contradiction with the literature. Despite the lack of a relationship between related self-construal and the reasonability of prosocial lies, it was found that autonomous self-construal was a variable in the negative direction. This finding is consistent with other

studies in terms of the negative effects of autonomous self-construal on judgments about lying for the benefit of others (Kim et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2001).

Another finding from the study was that participants with high levels of autonomous-relational self evaluated face management lies, necessity lies, and instrumental lies as less reasonable; on the other hand, they considered evasion lies more reasonable. Autonomous-relational self-construal includes autonomy in terms of competence, self-determination, and relationality in terms of establishing emotional intimacy (Kağıtçıbaşı, 2005). As mentioned earlier, evasion lies are lies that a person uses to change the subject they do not want to talk about during the interaction (Balım & Aydın, 2021). In this aspect, evasion lies refer to one's own autonomy; that is, negative face, as Brown and Levinson (1987) stated, is not taken into account. At the same time, considering that these types of lies are in the category of simple lies that do not cause harm (Bryant, 2008; DePaulo et al., 2004), it can be said that evasion lies protect people's autonomy and do not threaten the relationality of the person in terms of not harming the other person. Accordingly, it seems understandable that participants with high autonomous-relational self-construal would consider evasion lies to be more reasonable.

One possible explanation for the lack of clarity in the relationship between self-construal and reasonability of lying could be that the present study examined self-construal with a triple structure. In particular, the fact that relational-autonomous self-construal includes both autonomous and relational aspects makes it difficult to clearly see the relationships between the variables. Previous studies based on dual comparisons of individualism and collectivism (e.g., Kim et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2001) revealed the cultural differences that emerged in the reasonability of lying. According to these studies, the importance of relationships with others makes lying more acceptable in collectivist cultures; but in individualistic cultures, evaluations of lies are generally more negative. However, considering that relationality and autonomy coexist in many societies, more studies are needed on this subject. In one study, relationships between mothers' self-construal and children's level of reasonability of lying were examined in a Turkish sample, and it was found that self-construal in the triple structure was not related to the level of children's reasonability of lying (Aydın et al., 2022). These results indicate that the relationships between relational, autonomous, and autonomous-relational self-construal and evaluations of lying should be examined in different cultures. Thus, it would be easier to comment on whether these results were observed only in Turkey.

The results for the reasonability of lying and values showed that the self-enhancement and conservation value dimensions came to the forefront in predicting the reasonability of different lie types. The self-enhancement value dimension significantly increased the reasonability of lies in general, except for prosocial and evasion lies. As stated, the self-enhancement value dimension indicates that the individual should keep self-interest in the foreground (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). It seems meaningful that participants found the lies that would create situations in their favor more reasonable, such as self-protection lies, face management lies, necessity lies, and instrumental lies. As this value dimension is person-centered, it could be expected to result in a decrease in the reasonability of prosocial lies. Surprisingly, there was an increase in the reasonability of prosocial lies, but this relation was not significant. One point that can be stated is that the approval of prosocial lies may also serve one's own interests. For example, during an interaction, people may need to create a positive self-image by managing others' impressions of themselves (Goffman, 1967; Leary & Kowalsky, 1990). In other words, an act of self-interest here may be to lie in favor of others and create a positive image for themselves in others' eyes. In fact, the power value type within the self-enhancement value dimension concerns the importance of social status and prestige (Schwartz, 2012).

It was also observed that conservation, which is another value dimension, resulted in a decrease in the level of reasonability of self-protection lies, face management lies, necessity lies, and instrumental

lies. The conservation value dimension is related to preserving the existing relationship order and social structure (Schwartz, 1994). With this value dimension, the decrease in the reasonability of these four types of lies may be related to the fact that they are seen as a threat to the existing social order and network of relations.

When the results were evaluated in terms of the connections between religiosity and reasonability of lying, it was found that as the level of religiosity increased, the level of reasonability of self-protection lies, evasion lies, necessity lies, and instrumental lies decreased significantly. These results support the attitudes of the monotheistic religions towards lying, and it was expected that the participants with high levels of religiosity would have low levels of reasonability of lying. According to the literature, religiosity plays an important role in moral issues such as people's judgments about lying (Banerjee et al., 2010). Similar results were obtained in the limited number of studies that examined the reasonability of lying and religiosity variables together (Cantarero et al., 2018; Oliveira & Levine, 2008).

The finding that differed in the relationship between the reasonability of lying and religiosity was that there was no significant predictive effect of religiosity on participants' approval of prosocial lying. Although the views of religions are clear on judgments about lying, it has been revealed that the attitudes of the participants change when it comes to the benefit of another person. According to St. Augustine's hierarchical classification of the harms caused by lying, the inadmissibility of lies told for the good of another was rated lower (for discussion, see Keyes, 2004). A similar condition seems valid for Islam. There are some who hold the view that lies told in order not to make mischief can be evaluated differently in this regard. Even though the participants in this study had high levels of religiosity, it can be thought that they reached judgments by giving importance to the intention of lying and taking into account the benefit of others.

When interpreting the relationships between religiosity and lying behaviors, who is called religious may be a separate topic of discussion. When the term religious is used, the first thing that comes to mind is people and/or groups who are generally more committed to religion and follow their religious practices. However, since it is difficult to make a full definition and draw a clear boundary, religiosity is mostly described through its reflections. Because most of the time, religion means something different for each individual and group and evokes different things. In this respect, it should not be ignored that the perception of religiosity and the level of experiencing religion are different. Additionally, the fact that monotheistic religions also find lying acceptable on some contexts (e.g., improving relations) makes it difficult to determine and comment on the influence of religion on this issue.

The present study has some limitations. The main one is common method variance because of using self-report data (Podsakoff et al., 2003). In the current study, social desirability variable was included to somewhat control this effect. It was observed that social desirability did not have any significant predictive effect in the final steps of the regression analysis. However, it was also found to have a partially significant impact in the previous steps in the regression models. It may be beneficial to include this variable in further studies to be carried out on the acceptability of lying. Besides, as can be seen in Table 2, the correlation values between variables varied and there were also some correlations nearly zero. Therefore, the common method variance did not seem to have so much impact in this study.

The other limitation that can be mentioned is sample characteristics. Although there is no significant gender difference in studies on the reasonability of lying, it should be noted that female participants were the majority in this research. Similarly, it can be said that there was no homogeneous distribution in terms of the religion to which the participants belonged and their belief in God. Another limitation of the study may be the difficulty in reaching sample groups to be compared in terms of self-

construal. The most appropriate way to overcome these issues is to conduct intercultural studies. Assuming that the self-construal of adults from different religious beliefs and societies may also vary, it is clear that more studies are needed. However, in this study, religiosity is discussed with a single question as a method used in the literature, but there are approaches that evaluate religiosity in multiple dimensions and related measurement tools (e.g., Allport and Ross's (1967) distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity; see also Hill & Hood, 1999). The relationship between religiosity and the reasonability of lying can be examined using such multidimensional measurements. There is also another limitation that needs attention in this study. Although some relations between variables are significant, the correlation coefficients are in low. The explanatory powers of predictors in the regression analysis are also low. The significant but low-level relationships may be due to the large number of participants in the study. Therefore, the relationships between reasonability of different types of lies and values and self-construal may need to be re-examined in the future studies. Another important issue that can be examined for future research is the study of not attitudes but the actual lying and honesty behaviors with social-cultural variables. It is known that the most important criticism of studies examining attitudes and cognitive processes, such as moral reasoning, is the inconsistencies in terms of behavior and reasoning (see, Cesur, 2018). Therefore, addressing similar variables at the behavioral level is among the important issues waiting to be examined in the future studies.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this study examined the roles of various sociocultural variables on the reasonability of different types of lies, considering that the lies manifest themselves in the context of social relations. It can be said that a contribution has been made to the literature in terms of investigating the reasonability of lying within the framework of Schwartz's theory of values and the autonomous-relational self for the first time.

Article Information

<i>Ethics Committee Approval:</i>	The study received Ethical Approval from Istanbul University with the approval number of 2021/61 and the date of 08.03.2021.
<i>Informed Consent:</i>	The purpose of the study is explained to the participants and their informed consent was obtained.
<i>Financial Support:</i>	The study received no financial support from any institution or project.
<i>Conflict of Interest:</i>	No conflict of interest.
<i>Copyrights:</i>	No images and photos used in the study.

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APPENDICES

Table 3.*Hierarchic regression analysis results on predictors of reasonability of self-protection lies*

Self-Protection Lies	ΔR^2	B	SE	β	t	p
1. Social Desirability	.035**	-.54	.12	-.18	-4.65	<.001**
2. Social Desirability	.057**	-.42	.11	-.14	-3.67	<.001**
Religiosity		-1.30	.21	-.24	-6.15	<.001**
3. Social Desirability	.058**	-.22	.12	-.07	-1.86	.06(ns)
Religiosity		-.94	.23	-.18	-4.12	<.001**
Self- Transcendence		.10	.06	.12	1.62	.10(ns)
Conservation		-.16	.05	-.29	-3.29	<.01*
Self-Enhancement		.22	.05	.29	4.53	<.001**
Openness to Change		-.05	.06	-.06	-.75	.45(ns)
4. Social Desirability	.002	-.22	.12	-.08	-1.81	.07(ns)
Religiosity		-.97	.23	-.18	-4.18	<.001**
Self- Transcendence		.11	.07	.13	1.70	.09(ns)
Conservation		-.16	.05	-.24	-3.29	<.01*
Self-Enhancement		.21	.05	.29	4.24	<.001**
Openness to Change		-.04	.06	-.05	-.61	.54(ns)
Autonomous Self		.02	.07	.01	.26	.79(ns)
Relational Self		.07	.08	.05	.92	.35(ns)
Autonomous-Related Self		-.07	.07	-.05	-1.04	.29(ns)

* $p < .01$, ** $p < .001$; ns: non-significant

Table 4.

Hierarchic regression analysis results on predictors of reasonability of face management lies

Face Management Lies	ΔR^2	B	SE	β	t	p
1. Social Desirability	.001	-.04	.07	-.02	-.60	.54(<i>ns</i>)
2. Social Desirability	.01*	-.01	.07	-.01	-.18	.85(<i>ns</i>)
Religiosity		-.32	.13	-.10	-2.42	<.05*
3. Social Desirability	.073***	.13	.07	.08	1.84	.07(<i>ns</i>)
Religiosity		-.23	.14	-.07	-1.66	.09(<i>ns</i>)
Self-Transcendence		-.12	.04	-.24	-3.04	<.01**
Conservation		-.01	.03	-.01	-.22	.82(<i>ns</i>)
Self-Enhancement		.14	.03	.33	4.81	<.001***
Openness to Change		-.04	.04	-.08	-1.05	.29(<i>ns</i>)
4. Social Desirability	.135**	.02	.07	.010	.248	.80(<i>ns</i>)
Religiosity		-.21	.13	-.06	-1.57	.11(<i>ns</i>)
Self-Transcendence		-.02	.04	-.04	-.50	.61(<i>ns</i>)
Conservation		-.06	.02	-.14	-2.01	<.05*
Self-Enhancement		.08	.03	.18	2.85	<.01**
Openness to Change		.02	.04	.03	.44	.66(<i>ns</i>)
Autonomous Self		-.08	.04	-.09	-1.93	.054(<i>ns</i>)
Relational Self		-.003	.04	-.003	-.06	.95(<i>ns</i>)
Autonomous-Related Self		-.34	.04	-.40	-8.83	<.001***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$; *ns*: non-significant

Table 5.*Hierarchical regression analysis results on predictors of reasonability of prosocial lies*

Prosocial Lies	ΔR^2	B	SE	β	t	p
1. Social Desirability	.009*	-.20	.08	-.09	-2.32	<.05*
2. Social Desirability	.0	-.19	.08	-.09	-2.20	<.05*
Religiosity		-.07	.16	-.01	-.44	.66(ns)
3. Social Desirability	.017*	-.19	.09	-.09	-2.04	<.05*
Religiosity		-.06	.18	-.01	-.36	.71(ns)
Self- Transcendence		.11	.05	.17	2.14	<.05*
Conservation		-.02	.03	-.05	-.73	.46(ns)
Self-Enhancement		.06	.03	.11	1.60	.11(ns)
Openness to Change		-.06	.04	-.11	-1.37	.17(ns)
4. Social Desirability	.01	-.16	.09	-.07	-1.70	.08(ns)
Religiosity		-.09	.18	-.02	-.51	.60(ns)
Self- Transcendence		.10	.05	.17	2.00	<.05*
Conservation		-.04	.03	-.08	-1.11	.26(ns)
Self-Enhancement		.05	.04	.09	1.28	.20(ns)
Openness to Change		-.04	.05	-.06	-.82	.41(ns)
Autonomous Self		-.10	.05	-.09	-1.82	.07(ns)
Relational Self		.02	.06	.02	.44	.66(ns)
Autonomous-Related Self		-.02	.05	-.02	-.47	.63(ns)

* $p < .05$; ns: non-significant

Table 6.
Hierarchic regression analysis results on predictors of reasonability of evasion lies

Evasion Lies	ΔR^2	B	SE	B	t	p
1. Social Desirability	.014**	-.18	.06	-.11	-2.95	<.01**
2. Social Desirability	.022**	-.14	.06	-.09	-2.30	<.05*
Religiosity		-.42	.11	-.15	-3.68	<.001***
3. Social Desirability	.018**	-.13	.06	-.08	-2.07	<.05*
Religiosity		-.33	.12	-.11	-2.57	<.05*
Self- Transcendence		.07	.03	.16	2.06	<.05*
Conservation		-.05	.02	-.14	-1.87	.06(ns)
Self-Enhancement		.00	.02	.02	.32	.74(ns)
Openness to Change		.02	.03	.05	.61	.53(ns)
4. Social Desirability	.01	-.11	.06	-.07	-1.68	.09(ns)
Religiosity		-.32	.12	-.11	-2.50	<.05*
Self- Transcendence		.05	.03	.11	1.39	.16(ns)
Conservation		-.04	.02	-.12	-1.54	.12(ns)
Self-Enhancement		.02	.02	.05	.79	.43(ns)
Openness to Change		.01	.03	.02	.34	.73(ns)
Autonomous Self		-.01	.04	-.02	-.48	.63(ns)
Relational Self		-.04	.04	-.06	-1.10	.27(ns)
Autonomous-Related Self		.09	.03	.12	2.55	<.05*

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$; ns: non-significant

Table 7.*Hierarchic regression analysis results on predictors of reasonability of necessity lies*

Necessity Lies	ΔR^2	B	SE	B	t	p
1. Social Desirability	.028**	-.24	.05	-.16	-4.205	<.001**
2. Social Desirability	.076**	-.17	.05	-.12	-3.083	<.01*
Religiosity		-.74	.10	-.28	-7.166	<.001***
3. Social Desirability	.065**	-.05	.05	-.03	-.968	.33(ns)
Religiosity		-.51	.11	-.19	-4.582	<.001**
Self-Transcendence		.01	.03	.02	.332	.74(ns)
Conservation		-.08	.02	-.26	-3.753	<.001**
Self-Enhancement		.09	.02	.25	3.906	<.001**
Openness to Change		.02	.03	.05	.658	.51(ns)
4. Social Desirability	.025**	-.10	.06	-.07	-1.71	.08(ns)
Religiosity		-.50	.11	-.19	-4.54	<.001**
Self-Transcendence		.04	.03	.11	1.47	.14(ns)
Conservation		-.10	.02	-.31	-4.31	<.001**
Self-Enhancement		.07	.02	.19	2.98	<.01*
Openness to Change		.03	.03	.08	1.14	.25(ns)
Autonomous Self		.00	.03	.01	.12	.89(ns)
Relational Self		.01	.03	.02	.52	.60(ns)
Autonomous-Related Self		-.13	.03	-.18	-4.03	<.001**

* $p < .01$. ** $p < .001$; ns: non-significant

Table 8.

Hierarchic regression analysis results on predictors of reasonability of instrumental lies

Instrumental Lies	ΔR^2	B	SE	B	t	p
1. Social Desirability	.022***	-.17	.04	-.14	-3.65	<.001***
2. Social Desirability	.043***	-.13	.04	-.11	-2.77	<.01**
Religiosity		-.45	.08	-.21	-5.27	<.001***
3. Social Desirability	.079***	-.02	.04	-.01	-.40	.68(ns)
Religiosity		-.33	.09	-.15	-3.63	<.001***
Self-Transcendence		-.01	.02	-.04	-.56	.57(ns)
Conservation		-.04	.02	-.16	-2.22	<.05*
Self-Enhancement		.12	.02	.40	6.13	<.001***
Openness to Change		-.03	.02	-.11	-1.53	.12(ns)
4. Social Desirability	.05***	-.06	.04	-.05	-1.29	.19(ns)
Religiosity		-.33	.09	-.15	-3.66	<.001***
Self-Transcendence		.02	.02	.07	.96	.33(ns)
Conservation		-.06	.01	-.23	-3.29	<.01**
Self-Enhancement		.10	.02	.31	4.82	<.001**
Openness to Change		-.01	.02	-.04	-.56	.57(ns)
Autonomous Self		-.03	.02	-.05	-1.12	.26(ns)
Relational Self		.01	.03	.02	.53	.59(ns)
Autonomous-Related Self		-.14	.02	-.24	-5.45	<.001***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$; ns: non-significant

Table 9.*Hierarchic regression analysis results on predictors of total scores of reasonability of lies*

Total Score of Lies	ΔR^2	B	SE	B	t	p
1. Social Desirability	.027**	-1.39	.34	-.16	-4.07	<.001**
2. Social Desirability	.044**	-1.08	.33	-.12	-3.19	<.01*
Religiosity		-3.31	.62	-.21	-5.33	<.001**
3. Social Desirability	.052**	-.49	.35	-.05	-1.39	.16(ns)
Religiosity		-2.42	.67	-.15	-3.58	<.001**
Self-Transcendence		.16	.19	.06	.84	.39(ns)
Conservation		-.37	.14	-.19	-2.64	<.01*
Self-Enhancement		.65	.14	.30	4.52	<.001**
Openness to Change		-.15	.18	-.06	-.82	.41(ns)
4. Social Desirability	.019*	-.65	.36	-.07	-1.80	.07(ns)
Religiosity		-2.43	.67	-.15	-3.59	<.001**
Self-Transcendence		.32	.19	.13	1.65	.09(ns)
Conservation		-.46	.14	-.24	-3.26	<.01*
Self-Enhancement		.53	.14	.24	3.64	<.001**
Openness to Change		-.03	.18	-.01	-.16	.86(ns)
Autonomous Self		-.21	.21	-.04	-.98	.32(ns)
Relational Self		.08	.22	.01	.36	.71(ns)
Autonomous-Related Self		-.62	.19	-.14	-3.12	<.01*

* $p < .01$; ** $p < .001$; ns: non-significant