İSTANBUL
UNIVERSITY
— P R E S S —

Sulukule Transition: Impact on Municipal Destigmatization and Stigma Stickiness*

Betül DUMAN BAY[1] , Zuhal GÜLER[2]

[1] Assoc. Dr., Humanities and Social Sciences, Yıldız Technical University, İstanbul, Türkiye
[2] Asst. Prof. Dr., Bolu Abant İzzet Baysal University, Faculty of Department of Sociology and Methodology, Bolu, Türkiye

Corresponding author : Zuhal Güler
E-mail : zuhalguler69@hotmail.com

ABSTRACT

This research article revisits the 'Sulukule' through the lens of destigmatization, where territorial stigma intersects with Roman ethnicity.' With reference to socio-spatial developments, this article unpacks the soft and hard components of destigmatization, from displacement to neighborhood renaming, and discusses its design and implementational shortcomings. Future socio-spatial change is the aim of municipalities' planning and design practices. Based on our observations from the 2018 field survey in Sulukule, we argue that the neighborhood's negative reputation persists, rendering it "ungentrifable." Consequently, the neighborhood developed its own spatial and social dynamics over time rather than producing the municipality's planned outcomes. The return of displaced Romani, the uncontrolled influx of refugees, rising tensions between non-Romani and Romani residents in Sulukule, and the flight of local middle-class residents to other districts all affected the outcome. In this context, we identified several flaws, such as the removal of territorial stigma and subsequent neglect of its overlapping nature; policy conflicts at both the central and local scales; and the prevalence of centralist and top-down urban governance. Directly addressing territorial destigmatization as a goal in all official documents and making those documents tangible through negotiations among stakeholders should be integral to the destigmatization process.

Keywords: Stigmatization, Destigmatization, Sulukule, Stickiness of Stigma, Planned Displacement.

1. Introduction

Territorial destigmatization comprises a series of deliberate interventions, processes, or methods implemented to diminish, eliminate, divert, or rectify the territorial stigmatization of certain locations (Schultz-Larsen & Delica, 2021). Stigma removal—making places favorable for outsiders to live and invest in—is a difficult and complicated task, as evidenced by various studies (Hasting & Dean, 2003; Mösgen, Rosol & Schipper, 2019). This led us to reevaluate Sulukule, a highly stigmatized inner-city neighborhood along the city walls of the Historic Peninsula in Fatih-Istanbul, due to its Romani inhabitants and high crime rates. Studies on Sulukule, capturing a snapshot between 2006 and 2012, have discussed territorial stigmatization as a strategy that paved the way to gentrification and described its gentrification in terms of the entire demolition of the historical neighborhood and the displacement of the Roma community (Islam, 2009; Islam & Sakizlioglu, 2015; Karaman & Islam, 2012; Kocabas & Gibson, 2011; Ozcan, 2015; Uysal, 2012). Lees, Shin, & Lopez-Morales (2015, p. 442) argued that capital-led restructuring of the built environment involving upper- or middle-income newcomers and the displacement of existing inhabitants are significant outcomes of contemporary gentrification. This study reconsiders the "Sulukule Case" through the lens of "destigmatization" and unpacking the soft and hard components, from displacement and physical upgrading to renaming the neighborhood. Based on our observations from the 2018 field survey in Sulukule, we argue that the stigma associated with Sulukule persists, rendering it "ungentrifable": (a) New middle-class buyers are not in-movers, indeed middle-class locals with long-term residency have moved to other districts; (b) Muslim refugees, the majority of whom are in precarious positions, characterize the neighborhood; and (c) tensions between the Romani, non-Romani, and the refugees, in addition to security concerns, have been intensifying. This article sheds some light on the shortcomings of destigmatization formulation and implementation in Sulukule as it continues to remain a socially unacceptable and "unsafe" neighborhood.

The article proceeds as follows: In the first section, we summarize the debates in the literature about territorial stigmatization, state, and urban policies. In this section, we contextualize state-led urban development, territorial stigmatization, and urban governance in Turkey. In the following section, we introduce the research site and methodology. After presenting the municipal destigmatization policy, we delve into its design and implementational flaws, analyzing how territorial stigma evolves over time and the various changes and dynamics that occur during this process. The article ends with a conclusion for policymakers.

2. Literature Review: Territorial Stigmatization and Destigmatization

Territorial destigmatization is a set of planned actions, processes, or methods used to lessen, get rid of, redirect, or fix stigma attached to a certain place (Horgan, 2018; Schultz Larsen & Delica, 2019, 2021). It is frequently associated with various urban policies and projects involving the renewal or gentrification of stigmatized housing estates, neighborhoods, and so on (Schultz Larsen & Delica, 2021, p. 423).

Territorial stigmatization discredits and devalues urban residents not only because of their poverty, class position, ethnic origin or religious affiliation but also because of the places they associate with (Slater, 2017). According to Wacquant (2007), territorial stigma intersects with class-based and ethnic discrimination, but it must not be reduced to them because territory has its own dynamics and distinctive logics. "Spatial stigma acts as a form of symbolic violence that disgraces the resident of a neighborhood, devalues the place, and justifies disinvestment." (Paton, McCall, & Mooney, 2017, p. 584). Wacquant, Slater, and Pereira (2014) described how impoverished areas are stigmatized as havens for violence and social disorders. This justifies the need for increased control over these areas, which are purportedly the source of "threat" and trouble (Uitermark, 2014; Wacquant 2007, p. 69). It affects the physical state of locations in terms of their appearance, level of police presence, and economic value (Uitermark, 2014).

Some researchers have revealed an intense and direct relationship between the stigmatization of place and the process of gentrification (August, 2014; Kallin & Slater, 2014; Letsch, 2023; Sakizlioglu & Uitermark, 2014; Wacquant, Slater & Pereira, 2014). According to Kallin and Slater (2014, p. 1354), the blemish of a place or the activation of territorial stigma is the new role of the state to generate the 'rent gap'. However, this policy has some limitations because the terribly negative perception of a place can sometimes set a barrier to capital investments (Hammel, 1999). The literature on territorial stigmatization not only establishes a connection between stigmatization and profit (Paton, 2018) but also demonstrates the use of stigmatization to influence policy changes or secure consent for dispossession and displacement (August, 2014; Kallin & Slater, 2014; Sakizlioglu & Uitermark, 2014; Slater, 2018; Paton, 2018), thereby marginalizing residents while creating value for investors (Tyler, 2013; Wacquant, 2008).

Stigmatized places have a bad reputation as 'no-go areas' due to either their residents' identities or criminal activities. Outsiders' perception, labeling, and representation of places are critical to territorial stigmatization. Only rejected segments of society remained in stigmatized places (Wacquant, 2008, p. 29). State actors' intention for destigmatization

strategy is to positively change the perception of outsiders about the place and close the "reputational gap" (Kallin, 2017) for gentrification to occur. However, territorial stigma is a complicated issue, and destigmatization is thus a challenging task, as previous studies reveal how difficult it is to change a place's perceptions and reputation (Hasting & Dean, 2003; Mösgen, et al., 2019). Mösgen, Rosol, and Schipper (2019, p. 428) show, using the Frankfurt-Ostend case, that despite the state's earlier interventions, such as buying privately owned land and merging it into larger plots appealing to investors, the pervasive place-based stigma kept Ostend 'ungentrifiable' until the mid-2000s. Furthermore, while stigma is acknowledged as a problem in renewal and gentrification projects, it is rarely addressed in a targeted, evidence-based manner. Instead, it is sometimes erroneously presumed that destigmatization would happen because of other measures (Hastings & Dean, 2003).

Moreover, several studies have discussed how people and community groups experience, cope with stigma, and adopt various destigmatization strategies to gain recognition (e.g. Kirkness, 2014; Letsch, 2023; Wacquant, et al., 2014). For example, based on a long-term ethnographic study, Constanze Letsch (2023) examined the state's strategy of territorial stigmatization in Tarlabaşı- İstanbul and discusses how differently stigmatized groups try to fight the blemish of their neighborhoods. Furthermore, in a rare study on destigmatization strategy at the institutional level in Greater Copenhagen, Schultz Larsen and Delica (2012) identified the contradictory role of institutions at the central and local scales in the destigmatization process, describing this role as policy schizophrenia. This led to the persistence of stigma.

3. Context: Territorial Stigmatization, Urban Policies and Urban Governance

In Turkey, the neoliberal turn in urban development began in 1980 and gained pace in the 2000s, during which the state's approach and governance changed. Between 1980 and 2000, with the delegation of power, the municipality adopted an entrepreneurial urban policy designed to make Istanbul a global city. The expanding middle class coincided with the restructuring of the urban economy, leading to an increase in the share of the service sector. Suburban developments, gated communities, and the physical restructuring of city centers align with the concept of a global city. Gentrification first appeared in Kuzguncuk and Arnavutköy in the early 1980s and continued in Beyoğlu and Cihangir in the historical city center in the 1990s. Individual professionals and investors also gentrified certain historical buildings in the inner city and some neighborhoods (such as Ortakoy) along the Bosporus Strait (Ergun, 2004).

Until 2008, EU accession talks, the IMF agreement, and the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) need for national and international legitimacy provided opportunities for decentralization. However, neoliberal economic restructuring and the AKP's search for governing coalitions and political constituencies opened the way for centralization. On the one hand, centralization of housing policy was ensured by the Mass Housing Administration (TOKī), with some provisions added to Law No. 2985 by Law No. 5162 in 2004: Expropriation, land privatization, zoning plans, and urban renewal programs in squatter settlements were among the unusual powers that TOKī was endowed with. On the other hand, Law of 5366 gave municipalities the authority to designate "urban renewal areas" within the parameters of "outdated parts of the city" or "the historical and cultural fabric of the city". Urban renewal in Tarlabaşı and Sulukule is the product of this prudent, ambivalent, and oscillating period.

Following the 2001 and intensely 2008 financial crises, the AKP Government prioritized a property-led regime of capital accumulation based on the construction industry (Penpecioğlu, 2013), signaling the start of a period in which private firms and land developers heavily shifted their investments to the built environment, as Harvey describes it (Harvey, 1978). The introduction of large-scale projects, PPPs, and new financial mechanisms for real estate developments laid the groundwork for improving crony capitalist relations between political elites and private developers. State-led projects have created a polity centered on the material and speculative gains of urban development.

State-led urban renewal and gentrification have targeted informal settlements, citing a lack of legal documents, a low rent gap, and their reputation as hubs for crime and deterioration. Laws of 5366, along with the enactment of Law 6306 in 2012 in disaster-prone areas, turned the metropolis of Turkey into a huge construction site. Both laws favor the "demolish and rebuild" type of physical renewal over regeneration, which addresses social, spatial, and economic factors.

These laws allow the state to formalize a property regime, incorporate it into the market, and facilitate property transfers in these regions. Thus, the state deploys its territorial stigmatization strategy to create a "rent gap" and reduce crime in inner-city "problematic neighborhoods" at the cost of displacement of lower-income groups. The size of the declared disaster-prone areas indicates that district and metropolitan administrations lack control over a large part of their service areas, a sign of centralization of urban governance. In these areas, central authorities oversee the determination of the site's boundaries, planning, expropriation and compensation, as well as determining who to

relocate to or move. In this particular situation, more recent studies on gentrification have focused on the changing role of the state and the right to city mobilizations in the gentrification process (Islam & Sakizlioglu, 2015, p. 246–247). Further, recent studies show that activation of territorial stigma by state actors produces consent in ethnic or informal neighborhoods in Turkey (e.g., Sakizlioglu, 2014), goes beyond an economic strategy for capital reinvestments and appears as a state-led political strategy that targets insurgents (e.g., Yardimci, 2020).

The other pillar of centralist and authoritarian urban governance is the complete exclusion of participation and expert knowledge. Many urban transformation projects have been undertaken without, and often even in disregard of, expertise from site selection decisions to planning. However, citizens are typically notified about projects at a later stage, and projects are predominantly carried out and executed via private networks, avoiding public scrutiny. Cronyism also enabled the AKP government to intervene in urban life to form Islamic-conservative districts.

The transition from a parliamentary system to a "Turkish style of presidential system," which primarily concentrates authority over the President, has left limited autonomy for municipalities, including those from the ruling party. Nevertheless, the victory of opposition parties in the 2019 municipal elections has intensified competition and disputes between central and local governments[1]. Despite their central management, opposition party mayors began to assert their control, particularly over urban flagship projects by garnering public backing[2].

Meanwhile, the ruling party mayors, who had safeguarded their constituencies during the elections, seized the opportunity to address certain issues that had caused unrest and strain in the local environment.

4. Research Site and Methodology

Sulukule, located within Istanbul's historic wall protection zone, is one of the marginally stigmatized neighborhoods in Fatih District and a home for the Roman community. The Neslişah and Hatice Sultan Neighborhoods (Sulukule) were declared a Renewal Area by the Decree of the Council of Ministers on April 22, 2006, under the Law of Conservation by Renovation and Use by Revitalization of the Deteriorated Historical and Cultural Immovable Property (5366). Fatih Municipality implemented the renewal in partnership with the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and TOKI, as per a protocol signed on July 13, 2006.

After a reasonable period following the implementation of the planned changes, Sulukule offers a compelling case study for discussing the success of the destigmatization process. This study traces socio-spatial developments following the initiation of a new life in Sulukule and presents an outcome at one point in time. However, destigmatization is not an end state; rather, it morphs over time.

We built a destigmatization strategy on Sulukule people's (in Sulukule and Taşoluk) accounts and experiences, with whom we conducted interviews as part of data collection in TUBITAK 1001 project No: 117K296. We received approval from the Istanbul University Ethics Committee on December 26, 2016. For triangulation purposes, we also gathered data from multiple sources. We conducted structured interviews with three types of actors on separate dates in July, September, and October 2018. Interviews with three official representatives of Fatih Municipality and the neighborhood mukhtar began in July and concluded on September 23. With the assistance of an Arabic-speaking translator, we interviewed ten residents (new buyers, rights holders, refugee tenants, and shopkeepers) in the renewal area on September 24, 2018, including Romani and Turkish residents as well as Muslim migrants, including Syrian, Palestinian, and Iraqi residents. Finally, on January 17 and 28, 2018, and then again on October 21, 2018, we interviewed nine former Sulukule residents living in nearby areas (see Supplemental Material 1). Respondents in the last two groups were recruited through a neighborhood real estate office using snowball sampling. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. We informed the residents about the study's aims and duration of the interview, assuring them of the confidentiality of the interviews and their voluntary participation in accordance with ethical considerations. In this study, we concealed their real names and assigned numbers. Each interview lasted approximately 40 minutes.

We collected data on the implementation and timeline of interventions from blogs such as Sulukule Gunlugu, Fatihaber, court cases, municipal reports, strategic plans, and annual activity plans. Residents also mentioned the municipality's governance tools, such as urgent expropriation, sales through political networks, and neighborhood stigmatization. However, the officials blamed the Roma community for the neighborhood's persistent negative reputation. To cross-validate the data on stigmatization, we analyzed existing studies on Sulukule and interviewed shopkeepers, who are often the first point of contact for outsiders. We also searched newspapers for allegations of

---

[1] For a detailed and comprehensive discussion of center-local competition and dispute within the context of urban transformation, see Duman Bay and Polat (2023, p. 13–23).

[2] For example, on July 15, 2021, the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization, and Climate Change approved the 1/5000-scale Master Development Plan and 1/1000-scale Implementation Development Plan Amendment for Istanbul Province, Yenisehir Reserve Construction Area (Canal Istanbul Project) Phase 1. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality objected to this amendment and brought the matter to the court. The municipality won the case, and the court cancelled the development plans (Gençdal, 2024).

political favoritism and an evolving perception of the neighborhood. For demographic changes, we used TUK and refugee statistics from IOM and the municipality. Respondents, without exception, described increasingly hostile and conflictual social relations in their neighborhood, as well as the neighborhood's ongoing negative reputation.

5. From Municipal Stigmatization to Destigmatization

5.1. Stigmatization

The majority of Romani believe that state actors have tried to stigmatize the area and its population to promote renewal, even though Sulukule had long been the target of disinvestment and deprivation. The Romani community entertained guests at their homes until police raids in the 1990s shut them down under the pretext of engaging in immoral and unlawful activities. The Romani, having lost their primary means of income, struggled to make a living (Foggo 2007, p. 41–42; Yilmaz, 2009), and some committed illegal activities. This laid the groundwork for the finding that outsiders and authorities tarnished the neighborhood reputation.

> Initially, they framed our neighborhood by visiting our "entertainment houses" with hidden cameras, acting like customers, and spreading false news about prostitution to public attention. After that, police raids began. Authorities exaggerated these instances to justify urban renewal. (Interview 1, January 2018)

News about prostitution, drug trafficking, substandard housing, and marginality further tarnished the neighborhood's reputation as a "no-go place." Unsurprisingly, territorial stigmatization paved the way for an urgent urban renewal project in Sulukule. The central government discourse aligns with this, labeling neighborhoods like Sulukule as "tumors of the city" and demanding their urgent removal (Turkun, 2015).

In addition, local governments' rhetoric and renewal initiatives have also contributed to territorial stigmatization. In their initial statements published on their websites, Fatih Municipality cited the deterioration of houses and Romani lifestyle as reasons for the segregation of this community from the city and society (Kaban, 2011, p. 46). Islam and Enlil (2010) analyzed the Municipal Report on Urban Renewal and contended that the report depicted the neighborhood in a stigmatizing manner. They specifically identified certain phrases used in the report, such as 'primitive living space,' 'middle-age city,' 'rubric,' 'wreckage,' and 'hut' (Islam & Enlil, 2010).

The municipality created territorial stigma by defining the site's problems and solutions as a "problematic neighborhood" in various institutional documents and descriptions. This top-down description of the 'problem' must be understood in light of the other objectives included in the annual activity reports and the five-year strategic plan, such as "attraction zone", "attracting new financial sources" and "making Fatih touristic."

Furthermore, Romani people have also experienced ethnic discrimination. The conjugation of ethnic and territorial stigmatization is also evident in scholarship on Roma communities, whose practices of occupation, inhabitation and dwelling are fundamental to their stigmatization (e.g., Tyler, 2013). According to one respondent, "the renewal resembled societal purification. First, the state officers blemished our neighborhood; later, they forcefully relocated to Taşoluk. Society believes it has the right to exclude us and treat us with prejudice. The mayor started a stigmatizing campaign. 'Rotten teeth is how he described our neighborhood." (Interview 2, January 2018,). Blaming Romani for the neighborhood's poor reputation and impurity demonstrates the extent to which local officials internalized outsider prejudice.

5.2. Planned Displacement, Ongoing Property Transfer, and Social Differentiation

The property owners consist of a few individuals from the Sulukule community who were previously granted rights in the project, as well as recent buyers who acquired houses either from the rights holders themselves or directly from TOKI or the municipality. The new buyers have attracted media attention several times and have been framed scandalously for their presumed political identity or close political connections (Daglar, 2009). The mayor confirmed some buyers' affiliation with the Municipal and National Assembly and stated that "27.19% of the deeds in the project area changed hands between 2004 and 2005." The number of deeds in the project area did not fluctuate as significantly as some have claimed." ("Mustafa Demir", 2009).

Sulukule had an informal property regime (Uysal, 2012), with only a few Romani people serving as rightful owners. This left significant opportunities for the local government to change property relations through interventions before and during the urban renewal project. The neighborhood's stigmatization pushed real estate prices extremely low, promising Sulukule residents an opportunity to extract some profit when selling their land for relatively higher prices following the renewal project.

Despite being an exceptional tool and lacking a provision for urgent expropriation in Law 5366, the Ministrial

Council's decision on "urgent expropriation" on December 13, 2006 (Yilmaz, 2009, p. 121) set the stage for speculation and devaluation. When conducting urgent expropriation, the authorities may forego regular procedures, and property owners cannot object to the report of the 'Appreciation Price Committee.' Furthermore, the authority can take any form of intervention, including demolition, once the compensation amount to the bank has been wired. The residents of Sulukule regarded the expropriation as an imminent threat, leading to panic sales to external parties. Several third parties bought multiple houses, with some acquiring up to 10 properties. (Interview 14, September 2018). Low and irregular earnings (Tuna, et al., 2006), as well as limited access to legal advice, have left Sulukule people powerless at first. Furthermore, the municipality strengthened divisions among the people based on multiple ownership and tenure types, drawing gatekeepers to its side (Interview 2, January 2018). However, most Sulukule residents immediately organized an association to protect Romani culture and Sulukule's historical function. Their resistance gained international support and visibility, and their struggle expanded to the legal sphere. The Association filed a lawsuit challenging the decision for urgent expropriation (Yilmaz, 2009, p. 64–65), while the Istanbul Chambers of City Planners and Architects initiated separate legal proceedings in 2008 to obtain a court order to halt the implementation of the project and invalidate it. However, in August 2008, the demolition process commenced, and the local government did not consider any form of community involvement or legal procedures. The court's 2012 ruling on the project's termination came after the demolition and replacement of old houses in the region with new houses. ("Sulukule projesi iptal", 2012)

According to an official announcement, property owners who decided to become rights holders in the project would pay the price difference between the demolished and new houses over 15 years without a down payment (Interview 8, September 2018). However, the payment schemes for new houses were not compatible with residents' budgets. For the few original residents remaining in the renewed Sulukule, the heavy burden of payments and inflation adjustments every 6 months makes property ownership almost impossible. (Interview 3, July 2018; Interview 8, September 2018). The authorities altered the contract terms in mid-process (Interview 14, September 2018). Regrettably, during our visit in June 2018, we witnessed the unvoluntary eviction of two elderly people due to high credit payments.

Meanwhile, TOKI planned to build social housing in Taşoluk, approximately forty kilometers away from the current area (i.e., planned displacement), for tenants and non-property owners who could prove evidence of residency in the area prior to July 31, 2005 (Yilmaz, 2009, p. 118). It is clear that the municipality aims to transform the area by excluding or minimizing the presence of its original inhabitants.

5.3. Reimagining a Neighborhood through Renewal Design and Renaming

Through its renewal efforts, the municipality aimed to reinvent the neighborhood's image and envision a future for Sulukule by attracting new conservative residents. This involved replacing existing informal housing with two-story houses featuring a common backyard, designed in the Ottoman style, which reflected a cohesive Islamic and conservative community.

Some noteworthy planners voluntarily formed the Borderless Autonomic Planners (STOP) and developed alternative plans for the site and housing designs, the goals of which represent a novel and unique approach to local government and planning. The alternative plan is comprehensive because it integrates spatial solutions with economic and social policies. The municipality could not ignore global and national resistance, so it met with STOP to discuss alternative plans. However, a plan developed by an architectural firm was promulgated and implemented ("STOP girişimi", 2009).

According to the senior municipal official who oversaw the implementation of the project, its purpose was not the removal of the original settlers, but rather, "We thought two-story houses with a common backyard would better suit the lifestyle of Romani...new houses are too small to accommodate a middle-class family. I express my deep regret at not being able to prevent the Romani community from selling their houses, which would result in a tangible economic detriment for them." (Interview 4, September 2018). However, as accepted by the mayor, almost one-third of the houses changed hands from rights owners to third-party owners even before the project began (Sulukule Gunlugu, 2013). Furthermore, the construction of more dwelling units than the number of rights holders, as well as the introduction of educational and commercial buildings on public land, suggested the municipality's goal of attracting new, wealthy residents to the site. In fact, the municipality completely ignored a sociological report on Sulukule. In contrast to the official perspective, one of the respondents concluded that the renewal project failed to offer higher life standards, or what he referred to as a "villa type of living," in the neighborhood. (Interview 3, July 2018)

The reimagining of Sulukule included the construction of a police station for local security concerns, a cultural center, and several shops. Other initiatives taken by the municipality to entice nonresidents to visit and live in the neighborhood include the distribution of public lands to a private college and various Islamic foundations affiliated with the ruling party (Interview 3, July 2018).

In this regard, it is worth noting that the ongoing discontent regarding the neighborhood's name emerged as a recurring theme during the field survey. The dispute over the neighborhood's name played a significant role in the contentious politics between the municipality and the Sulukule Platform. The central government realigned the neighborhood borders and united the Neslişah and Hatice Sultan neighborhoods under the name of Karagümrük in 2008 to erase traces of the past; however, in solidarity with the international community, the Sulukule Platform chose the name Sulukule as the easiest way to popularize their struggle due to its connections to the Romani community and the "good old days" (Islam, 2009). Territorial stigmatization is an antagonistic process; although it is generated from above, local people resist it from below through various activities (Sisson, 2021), including neighborhood naming in this instance. However, after new life emerged, Turkish residents of the renewed site preferred to refer to the neighborhood as Karagumruk or Sultan rather than Sulukule, an issue that seemed to be firmly tied to territorial stigma. Residents expressed discomfort when we called the neighborhood 'Sulukule.'

6. New-Middle-Class Buyers' Discontent and Return of the Romani

The municipality's destigmatization strategy assumed, based on official statements and practices, that the resettlement of new owners in the neighborhood, following the displacement of the Roman community and the construction of new houses, would restore a "reputational gap." (Kallin, 2017). The municipality sold 'future investment' to the new owners in exchange for an increase in general 'improvement' in the neighborhood. Between 2006 and 2013, rents and sale prices in Sulukule and Karagümrük increased by more than 300% (Sahinkaya, Duran-Diaz & Bendzko, 2018). The reputational gap occurred because the new owners were unwilling to move to Sulukule due to dissatisfaction with its social fabric. Refugee arrival provided an opportunity for new homeowners; therefore, with the exception of a small number of landlords, most owners showed a preference for renting two-story residences to refugees (Interview 11, September 2018). The Islamic-conservative residences and new owners believed that urban renewal would drive Romani people from Sulukule, rescuing them from crime and immoral activities (Ozet, 2020, p. 156). As a result, their expectations depended on the success of the planned displacement. However, the municipality did not achieve a planned displacement, and 273 out of 300 Romani families either sold their rights or could not stay in social housing in Taşoluk. These families returned to Sulukule and settled in nearby areas, primarily in basements, where they were surrounded by relatives and Romani neighbors. In this context, contrary to the municipality's intention, the neighborhood remains delineated by Romani people since prior to the renewal. The Romani people resided in a fairly constricted area (Sulukule), but after their return, they spread out throughout the district, causing the entire area to resemble Sulukule (Interview 3, July 2018; Ozet, 2020, p. 164). Unsurprisingly, the new Islamic-conservative owners and other native residents of the neighborhood are strongly urging the municipality to take immediate and drastic measures to remove Romani from the region, citing widespread discontent with their return (Ozet, 2020, p. 157, 161). Ironically, a common sentiment among Romani people is a sense of displacement.

Evidently, stigma does not adhere to all communities in identical ways, and stigma is more prevalent in some places than in others (Pattison, 2023). The renewal area, historically perceived as an ethnoculturally distinct area, was a home for Romani people, with a vibrant culture and sense of community. Furthermore, a neighborhood for Romani people serves as a solidarity network for their livelihood (Interview 1, January 2018). It is obvious that territorial stigma was associated with Romani identity, and discrimination and cultural stereotypes of Romani people (theft, illiterate, fun-addicted, state aid-dependent, etc.) persisted in the community (Balci, 2009). Both state actors and the public perpetuated long-term discrimination based on their identity and lifestyle and forced them into an exclusionary enclosure in certain geographies, such as Sulukule, where they faced policing and inadequate public service delivery. However, according to the municipality's definition, this is categorized as an integration problem, putting the responsibility on Romani community. De-contextualizing Sulukule from its socio-cultural roots and the structural inequalities that have shaped its life in practice has led to failed displacement. The flaws arising from de-contextualization are evident at each phase, from problem definition to the scale of territorial destigmatization.

According to the annual activity plan (2006), Fatih Municipality initially designed a renewal plan in five groups, each encompassing different parts of the Hatice Sultan and Neslişah neighborhoods. Only the first group was designated as a renewal area, which accounts for 4% of the overall planned area (Balci, 2009). The division of power over plan approval between metropolitan and district levels imposes barriers on the boundaries of renewal areas. Although both are in the hands of the ruling party, the metropolitan municipality has consistently denied Fatih municipality's requests for a site extension. During its fourth year in power and amid EU membership negotiations, the ruling party appeared reluctant to deal with rising community mobilization and international opposition, which included UNESCO. Instead, the governing elite chose to alleviate tensions at the metropolitan level. Consequently, the renewal area did not include

the entire Neslişah and Sultan neighborhoods; the remainder of the neighborhood, where Romani people continue to live in old, physically damaged structures, remained untouched ("nearby area" hereafter). As one of the respondents noted, the intervention area should have extended at least to Sarmasik, the Neyzen region, and Imam Cemil Street, but it was very narrow and did not include other problematic areas of the Sultan and Neslişah neighborhoods (Interview 3, July 2018; Ozet, 2020, p. 169).

The return of resentful Romani people in the neighborhood has created similar reputational and security problems for both outsiders and non-Romani individuals in the area. The municipality relied solely on the installation of a police station to address security issues, ignoring structural factors. However, "safety" or "crime prevention" requires a concerted effort across multiple levels and dimensions, including employment, education, training, and comprehensive initiatives like social assistance and rehabilitation. Prior to 2020, the municipality's strategic plans, which outline its operations and long-term goals for the following five years, were produced as internal documents, not as outcomes of stakeholder engagement. Furthermore, there is almost no reference to national-level actors or development plans. Eventually, Sulukule's initial problems persisted in the nearby area and spread to the new site, causing fears and security concerns and perpetuating the image of an 'unsafe' place. For instance, a 60-year-old man commented on the current state of the neighborhood, setting himself apart from those who had tarnished its reputation.

> Not taking drugs is considered a miracle here. We strongly supported the urban renewal project... At least we no longer have these types of moral problems in Sulukule since its renewal. However, we have other problems because falling into illegal activities is easy here. We are obliged to stay here; we feel a sense of [being] trapped. Who does not want to raise children in a better place? (Interview 20, October 2018)

Without exception, all respondents addressed the neighborhood's ongoing social problems: drug use, illegal activities, low education, school dropouts, and lack of employment. Romani people are severely disadvantaged at every level—housing, education, and employment. From their perspective, these issues have rendered criminal activity the only viable option for survival. The municipality and Romani people have different logics about what constitutes a local problem and how to solve it. Although the municipality refers to it as a "safety issue," the local community defines the problem as marginalization and exclusion. Several studies have demonstrated that the effectiveness of urban renewal projects in curbing urban crime remains limited. Successful destigmatization depends on coordinated action at the local and national scales, as well as the dissemination of data on the declining crime rate, forced evictions, tenant displacement due to economic hardship, and so on (Schultz Larsen & Delica, 2021). By recalling Sulukule's commitment to criminal activity, the Istanbul Police Department's mapping of Fatih and Beyoğlu as two of the six districts with the highest number of crimes perpetuates stigmatization ("Megakentte", 2020).

Discrimination against the Roman community has historical roots. Since the Resettlement Law of 1934, lifted into motion in 2004, the state has banned the migration of Romani to Turkey, where historically they were either displaced outside the city center or forcefully resettled (Balci, 2009). Regrettably, The Fatih Municipality's territorial destigmatization plan followed a similar historical path. The central government, which changed its stance in response to international policy, influenced the municipality's shift in attitude toward the Roma community. In 2015, several central bodies launched a project with EU financial assistance to streamline the integration of the Romani community in districts where the majority of the Romani population reside. The project selected 12 pilot provinces, including Istanbul. Its goal is to enhance the Romani community's accessibility to social security, employment, education, and other entitlements, as well as gather demographic data on the Romani population. The adoption of event-based destigmatization in Sulukule began in response to a shift in national rhetoric and policy, specifically the celebration of Roman Day in Sulukule, which is neither sustainable nor based on the recognition of the Romani community's cultural heritage and its link with Sulukule. This change involved branding Sulukule and attracting new visitors through the opening of the Art Academy. The mayor has promoted the Sulukule Art Academy on various television channels. In 2015, the local strategic plan incorporated the terms "Sulukule" and "Romani." The founder of the Children's Art Center, Funda Oral, claims that a schizophrenic policy was in place here (Aydın, 2015).

7. Refugee Arrivals and Flights of Long-Term Middle-Class Locals

The start of the refugee flow to Fatih, especially to Sulukule, coincided with the completion of new houses in 2012. There are 182,440 refugees and migrants in Fatih (IOM, 2019), with the majority being Syrians (80,920), who make up about one-third of the district's population. The refugees preferred Fatih because of its proximity to the city center and tourist infrastructure, which offered temporary and permanent job opportunities in numerous hotels and companies. They are highly visible in both business and labor markets. In the neighborhoods of Molla Gurani, Aksemsettin, Mimar Kemalettin, Aksaray, and Karagümrük, as well as on many streets such as Malta and Naci Şensoy streets, some wealthy

Syrians started new businesses in the food and textile industries. Syrian businesses in the district, as well as Syrian residents, have altered the district's overall identity and image.

Since most owners in Sulukule did not want to live in the renewed Sulukule and sought tenants who would pay higher prices, the arrival of refugees and their housing-sharing behavior offered an opportunity for new owners, and a new phase in Sulukule's history emerged. An official stated "Nowadays, Turkish middle-class people do not [like] live here." I heard Syrians rent most of the houses. Some Syrians pay higher amounts, so the landlords prefer not to reside there. Syrians have already occupied Fatih District." (Interview 4, September 2018).

Some upper- and middle-class Syrians purchased or rented newly renovated houses on an annual basis. Poor Syrians could afford rents through house sharing with other migrants. 6 months before we began our field survey (March 2018), police forces had evicted unlicensed refugees from the neighborhood. Before forced evictions, a single house filled with at least 16 to 20 beds had been the typical landscape of Sulukule (Interview 2, January 2018), and some of the two-story houses hosted two or three Syrian families, as reported in the newspapers (Vural, 2016).

Apart from Syrian refugees, other tenants in the renewal area included Lebanese, Iranian, Palestinian, Tunisian, and Turkish residents (Interview 8, September 2018). In the area, Syrians operated grocery stores, shops, markets, and barbers. Arabic gained immense popularity, leading some to regrettably refer to the neighborhood as "Little Syria," despite its previous association with the Romani community. In other words, the renewed Sulukule was inhabited by a mostly immigrant or refugee population, which changed the neighborhood landscape from a spoken language to catering options. One participant described the demographic shift in the renewal area:

> [The] Syrian population has decreased gradually since 2014. Before, it was like Syria's neighborhood. Syrians constitute approximately 45% of the neighborhood as of today. This neighborhood has been transforming from "Little Syria" after some Syrians moved to other districts, such as Esenyurt, due to increased rents. (Interview 9, September 2018)

The majority were university graduates; nevertheless, without accreditation, they, expressly Syrians, were forced to work in low-paid, informal jobs (Interview 12, September 2018):

> Syrians who [live] in this area earn low wages. For instance, one of my sons, who has a university diploma, works as a driver and earns 1,500 TL monthly. Syrians [cannot] earn their livelihood by performing their profession; thus, they are compelled to work in cheap and unstable jobs. Their driver's license and university diploma are not valid in Turkey. My other son works as a translator on the days he finds an opportunity; other days, he must look for an unqualified job. He is cheap labor in either case. Therefore, Syrians do not have an alternative other than living together in a single flat, notwithstanding inspections are very tight nowadays. (Interview 9, September 2018)

In Sulukule, all interviewees were aware of the divisive, sometimes hostile, attitudes toward refugee newcomers manifested among displaced Sulukule people living in the nearby area (Interview 3, July 2018; Interview 12, September 2018). This feeling entailed a shifting sense of place and belonging and was therefore a critical component of displacement. Romani accused the refugees of their displacement. On the other hand, long-term Karagümrük residents keep their distance from refugees, prefer non-interaction, avoid shopping at their markets, and emphasize cultural and lifestyle distinctions, despite their Muslim identity (Interview 1, January 2018). The mass flow of Syrian refugees and unfair competition over local resources intimidate long-term residents, leading to tension and a "sense of loss" among the local community (Saracoglu & Belanger, 2019).

> In the old days, we had a wealthy life, many jobs, and many money-making opportunities. We never suffered in those days. Today, strangers are everywhere; we have been uncomfortable since the day they arrived, and the government provides resources that meet their needs while ignoring ours. Syrians make a better living than I do. They have free shopping vouchers, so they can go to hospitals and schools. They get easy entry into businesses because they have a tax exemption. We are second-class citizens today (Interview 22, 'October 2018).

As a result, the refugees' arrival in Sulukule generated contradictory outcomes. On the positive side, the presence of refugees offered new owners a higher rental income; on the negative side, they increased social tensions and contributed to the neighborhood's 'negative and unsafe place' perception. Here, we encounter the stickiness of territorial stigma as a barrier to attracting the middle classes; however, "when the image and real estate potential of a neighborhood improve, larger factions of middle- and upper-income-class people arrive" (Simon, 2008). More than that, refugees' entry changed the demographic makeup of the Fatih district, forcing long-term residents who were conservative and middle class to flee to nearby districts like Beylikdüzü or Başakşehir. One official expressed the spoiling historical identity of the Fatih district, citing this change in the district's population as the cause for his move (Interview 8, September 2018). According to the TUIK data set, the population of Fatih district changed from 422.941 in 2012 to 356.025 in 2023, indicating a migration of about 67,000 people to neighboring districts.

The local setting deteriorated due to municipal inaction, a lack of responsiveness to community-level tensions, and a loss of capability to implement tailored solutions to maintain social and cultural fabric, while the central government shaped the scope and direction of refugee policy. The neighborhood's reputation suffers due to an increase in crime

("Megakentte", 2020), leading to its rebranding as a 'Syrian ghetto.' Recent research has asserted that the presence of Syrian ghettos in Istanbul is due to the clustering of Syrians in specific neighborhoods and districts, as well as their cohabitation in a single home with self-exclusion and exclusion from the wider community (Kavas, Avşar, Kadkoy, & Bilgiç, 2019). The Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality's most recent Strategic Plan (IBB, 2020) ranks the "immigrant/refugee issue" as the third most common cause of concern among locals.

The rising public discontent with the Syrian refugees and right-wing opposition parties' campaigns, as well as deteriorating relations with the EU, forced the AKP government's discourse and policies to change. At the local level, the growing social tensions and violent fights between the refugees and the host community unavoidably led the newly elected mayor to take action. The mayor, who retained his constituency and secured re-election in the 2019 local elections, transformed the strategic plan into a tangible document through collaboration with the local governance network and stakeholders. Before that point, neither the Municipal Strategic Plan nor the Annual Action Plan contained any provisions or measures to accommodate or integrate refugees. Some excerpts from the plan indicate that settings and leadership change at the local level: "Loss of neighborhood culture, flight of long-time residents to other districts—ghettos belong to foreigners, along with discrimination against them; require integrative and multi-scaled solutions.". According to the mayor, the excessive refugee flow has spoiled the country's identity and social fabric. Despite his persistent and vigorous advocacy, the central government did not halt the admission of new refugees to Fatih until 2021. Then, the International Affairs Directive ceased new foreign residency and commercial permits for Fatih ("Fatih belediye", 2021). The evolution of territorial destigmatization requires further field research because stigmatization and destigmatization are ongoing processes.

8. Conclusion

Based on the Sulukule case, we unpacked the "radical" and "soft" components of the municipal destigmatization strategy, from displacement to renaming the neighborhood, and discussed the failure in terms of its design and implementational shortcomings with reference to socio-spatial developments. Although the municipality recorded a success in transferring the properties of Romani to its middle-class political network through centralized and authoritarian governance, the "reputational gap" (Kallin, 2017) remains in Sulukule. Consequently, the neighborhood developed its own spatial and social dynamics over time rather than producing the municipality's planned outcomes. The return of the Romani people, the flight of local middle class, the image of the Syrian ghetto, and 'unsafe' neighborhood reproduced the historical negative reputation of Sulukule.

One of the outcomes of our study is associated with the connection between territorial stigma and gentrification. The activation of territorial stigma, in our case by the central and local authorities, discredits and devalues urban residents not only because of their poverty, ethnicity, class position, or religious affiliation but also because of the places they associate with (Slater, 2015). Where citizens are blamed for stigma, demolition and displacement arise as projected remedies, particularly where fear of crime is seen as restricting investment potential. In this context, the de-stigmatization strategy involves "gentrification", a physical upgrade, and social change toward a higher social class composition (Clark, 2005, p. 263). However, in the past 12 years, the municipality has not accomplished the promised general improvement in Sulukule that the middle class invested and lived in. Currently, the neighborhood's negative reputation has been reinvented through the "invasion of Syrian refugees", delaying the succession of middle and upper classes. Furthermore, these hostile relations deepen the unsafe perception of the renewed area.

As Wacquant (2008) noted, territorial stigma overlaps with the stigma of ethnicity, age, race, and class belonging to social categories. This intersectionality also reveals that territorial destigmatization in practice is a complicated, multidimensional, and multi-scale task. Ignoring the overlapping nature of territorial stigma and formulating an intervention limited to one or a few dimensions for stigmatized sites inevitably exacerbates the situation, similar to the ahistoric and non-integrative strategy of Fatih municipality. The issue at hand concerns the diverse manifestations of conflicts in territorial planning and governance. Different levels of planning authorities and centralized governance are at odds with each other, which shows that spatial planning is not integrated, local issues are not taken into account and local stakeholders are not involved. This has led to the formation of conflicts among numerous parties, including different levels of government. Achieving territorial destigmatisation requires collaboration across all levels of planning authority and cohesive spatial plans. From the policy perspective, directly addressing territorial destigmatization as a goal in all official documents—from national development plans to local strategies—and making those documents tangible through negotiations among stakeholders are integral parts of the destigmatization process. As such, destigmatization is also a collective effort involving not only local and central authorities but also residents, grassroots organizations, private companies, and developers. Policy conflicts between not only the central and local authorities but also the

international and national authorities, as well as over-centralism, contribute to stigma's persistence. In this context, we agree with Schultz Larsen and Delica (2021) on the contradictory role of state actors at the central and local scales in the destigmatization process, describing this role as 'policy schizophrenia'. If the municipality had worked with Romani people and other interested parties to create a destigmatisation strategy and set up a governance network in Sulukule, it could have led to an integrated regeneration with a range of goals, such as reducing crime and creating jobs, as well as "stay put" options.

Our study sheds some light on destigmatization strategy at the municipal level and discusses its success by analyzing how stigma attached to a place has changed over time through interventions. Further field research is necessary to understand the evolution of territorial destigmatization, given that stigmatization and destigmatization are continuous processes.

ORCID :

Betül DUMAN BAY   0000-0003-4616-0432
Zuhal GÜLER   0000-0002-7995-5699

REFERENCES

August, M. (2014). Challenging the rhetoric of stigmatization: The benefits of concentrated poverty in Toronto's Regent Park. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 46*(6): 1317–33.

Aydın, S. (2015, February 8). Belediye Sulukule kültürüne göz dikti. *Evrensel*. Retrieved from https://www.evrensel.net/haber/104146/belediye-sulukule-kulturune-goz-dikti

Balci, H. (2009). *Kentsel dönüşüm bağlamında Sulukule'yi anlamak: Roman kimliğinin analizi.* (Master Thesis). Yildiz Technical University. Turkey.

Clark, E. (2005). The order and simplicity of gentrification: A political challenge. In R. Atkinson and G. Bridge (Eds.). *Gentrification in a Global Context: The New Urban Colonialism.* (p. 256–264). London: Routledge.,

Daglar, I. (2009, 19 March). New AKP gentry in Roma district. Hürriyet. Retrieved From http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/new-akp-gentry-in-roma-district-11239923.

Duman Bay, B., and Polat, İ. (2023). Yerel yönetimlerin yeti kaybı, *Birikim*, February–March 2024, (418-419): 13–23.

Ergun, N. (2004). Gentrification in Istanbul. *Cities, 21*(5): 391–405.

Fatih belediye başkanı Turan. (2021, September 30). Sputnik. Retrieved from https://sputniknews.com.tr/20210930/fatih-belediye-baskani-turan-suriyeli-ya-da-baska-memleketli-fatihte-herhangi-bir-ev-kiralayamaz-1049384150.html

Foggo, H. (2007). The Sulukule affair: *Roma against expropriation. Roma Rights Quarterly,* 4: 41–47.

Gençdal, D. (2024, February 14). İmamoğlu duyurdu: 11. İdare Mahkemesi, Kanal İstanbul'un imar planını iptal etti. *Medyascope.tv.* Retrieved from https://medyascope.tv/2024/02/14/imamoglu-duyurdu-kanal-istanbul-imar-plani-iptal-edildi/

Hammel, D. J. (1999). Re-establishing the rent gap: An alternative view of capitalized land rent. *Urban Studies, 36*(8): 1283–1293.

Harvey, D. (1978). The urban process under capitalism: A framework for analysis. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 2*(1-3): 101–131.

Hastings, A., and Dean, J. (2003). Challenging images: tackling stigma through estate regeneration. *Policy Polit.*, 31(2): 171–184.

Horgan, M. (2018). Territorial stigmatization and territorial destigmatization: A cultural sociology of symbolic strategy in the gentrification of Parkdale (Toronto). *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 42*(3): 500–516.,

International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2019). Baseline assessment in Istanbul province, Annual Report. May-July 2019. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IST_Baseline_Assessment_Phase5_ENG_29012020.pdf.

Islam, T. (2009). *Devlet eksenli soylulaşma ve yerel halk: Neslişah ve Hatice Sultan mahalleleri (Sulukule) örneği.* (Doctoral Dissertation). Yıldız Technical University, Turkey.

Islam, T., and Enlil, Z. (2010). 5366 sayılı yasa merkezli dönüşüm ve Sulukule örneği: Belediye'nin hedefleri ve yaşanan gerçeklik. In D. Özdemir (Eds.). *Kentsel Dönüşümde Politika, Mevzuat, Uygulama: Avrupa Deneyimi, Istanbul Uygulamaları,* (p. 317–334). Ankara: Nobel.

Islam, T., and Sakizlioglu, B. (2015). The making of, and resistance to, state-led gentrification in Istanbul, Turkey. In L. Lees, H. B. Shin, and E. López-Morales (Eds.). *Global Gentrification: Uneven Developments and Displacements*, (p.245–264). Bristol: Policy Press.

Istanbul Buyuksehir Belediyesi (IBB) Stratejik Plan (2020-2024). Retrieved from January 10, 2020. Retrieved from https://www.ibb.istanbul/Uploads/2020/2/iBB-STRATEJIK-PLAN-2020-2024.pdf.

Kaban, E. (2011). *Kentsel dönüşüm ve Istanbul'un ilk kentsel dönüşüm uygulama projesi: Sulukule örneği.* (Master Thesis). Istanbul University, Turkey.

Kallin, H. and Slater, T. (2014). Activating territorial stigma: Gentrifying marginality on Edinburgh's periphery. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 46*(6): 1351–1368.

Kallin, H. (2017). Opening the reputational gap. In P. Kirkness & A. Tijé-Dra (Eds.), *Negative Neghborhood Reputation and Place Attachment. The Production and Contestation of Territorial Stigma.* (p.102–118). Abongdon: Routledge.

Karaman, O., and Islam, T. (2012). On the dual nature of intra-urban borders: The case of a Romani neighborhood in Istanbul. *Cities, 29*(4): 234–243.

Kavas, A., Avşar, İ., Kadkoy, O. and Bilgiç, E.B. (2019). İstanbul'da Suriyeliler ve savaş sonrası gettoları. Haziran 2019. TEPAV Report. Retrieved from https://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/mce/2019/haberler/tepav_istanbulda_suriyeliler_ve_savas_sonrasi_suriye_gettolari.pdf

Kocabas, A. and Gibson, M. (2011). Planned gentrification in Istanbul: The Sulukule renewal area (2005–2010). *International Journal of Sustainable Development and Planning, 6*(4): 420–446.

Lees, L., Shin, H. B., and López-Morales, E. (2015). Conclusion: Global gentrifications. In L. Lees, H. B. Shin, and E. López-Morales (Eds). *Global Gentrifications: Uneven Development and Displacement.* (p.441–452). Bristol: Policy Press.

Letsch, C. (2023). *Territorial stigmatization: Urban renewal and displacement in a central İstanbul neighborhood.* Transcript Publishing.

Megakent'te suçun yüksek olduğu 6 ilçe! (2020, February 13). *Haberturk.* Retrieved from http://www.haberturk.com/megakent-te-sucun-yuksek-oldugu-6-ilce-caliskan-kadina-siddette-bircok-avrupa-kenti-daha-kotu-2582819

Mösgen, A., Rosol, M., and Schipper, S. (2019). State-led gentrification in previously 'un-gentrifiable' areas: Examples from Vancouver, Canada and Frankfurt, Germany. *European Urban and Regional Studies, 26*(4), 419-433.

Mustafa Demir'den istifa açıklaması. (2009, March 19). Hürriyet. Retrieved from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/mustafa-demirden-sulukule-aciklamasi-11240332.

Ozcan, C. (2015). *The effects of gentrification on cultural identity: A case study in Istanbul, Sulukule.* (Master Thesis). Blekinge Tekniska Högskola, Sweden.

Ozet, İ. (2020). *Fatih Başakşehir: Muhafazakar mahallede iktidar ve dönüşen habitus.* İstanbul: İletişim.

Paton, K., McCall, V., and Mooney, G. (2017). Place revisited: Class, stigma and urban restructuring in the case of Glasgow's Commonwealth games. *The Sociological Review, 65*(4): 578–594.

Paton, K. (2018). Beyond legacy: Backstage stigmatization and 'trickle-up' politics of urban regeneration. *The Sociological Review, 66*(4): 919–934.

Pattison, J. (2023). "You don't go there": Spatial strategies of stigma negotiation in a post-industrial town. *Antipode*, 55(4): 1213–1233. https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12930

Penbecioglu, M. (2013). Urban Development Projects and the Construction of Neoliberal Urban Hegemony: The Case of Izmir. *METU Journal of the Faculty of Architecture, 30*(1): 165–189.

Sahinkaya, C., Duran-Diaz, P., and Bendzko, T. (2018). Urban regeneration in the context of two different planning approaches: A case study of Sulukule (Istanbul, Turkey) and Haidhausen (Munich, Germany). In: *FIG Congress 2018*, Istanbul, Turkey, 6–11 May 2018.

Sakizlioğlu, B. (2014). Living under the threat of displacement. *Tijdschr Econ Soc Geogr*, 105: 206–220.

Sakizlioglu, B. and Uitermark, J. (2014). The symbolic politics of gentrification: The restructuring of stigmatized neighbourhoods in Amsterdam and Istanbul. *Environment and Planning A, 46*(6): 1369–1385.

Saracoglu, C., and Belanger, D. (2019). Loss and xenophobia in the city: Contextualizing anti-Syrian sentiments in Izmir, Turkey. *Patterns of Prejudice, 53* (4): 363–383

Schultz Larsen, T., and Delica, K. (2019). The production of territorial stigmatisation, *City, 23*(4-5): 540–563.

Schultz Larsen, T., and Delica, K. (2021). Territorial destigmatisation in an era of policy schizophrenia. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 45*(3), 423–441.

Simon, P. (2008). Gentrification of old neighborhoods and social integration in Europe. In Yuri Kazepov (Eds.). *Cities of Europe: Changing Contexts, Local Arrangements and the Challenge to Urban Cohesion,* (p. 210–232). New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell.

Slater, T. (2017). Territorial stigmatization: Symbolic defamation and the contemporary metropolis. In J. Hannigan and G. Richards (Eds.). *The Handbook of New Urban Studies* (p.110–125). London: SAGE.

Slater, T. (2018). The invention of the 'sink estate': Consequential categorization and the UK housing crisis. *The Sociological Review, 66*(4):

877–897.

Sisson, A. (2021). Territory and territorial stigmatization: on the production, consequences and contestation of spatial disrepute. *Progress in Human Geography, 45*(4): 659-681.

STOP girişimi: Kentsel toplumsal muhalefette farklı bir deneyim. (2009, June 2009). *Mimarizm*. Retrieved from https://www.mimarizm.com/makale/stop-girisimi-kentsel-toplumsal-muhalefette-farkli-bir-deneyim_114062

Sulukule Gunlugu. (2013). Blog. Retrieved from http://sulukulegunlugu.blogspot.com.tr/.

Tuna, K., Satıroglu, A., and Çaglayandereli, M. (2006). Neslişah mahallesi toplumsal yapı araştırması. In A. Kara, B. Kara, and H. Suver (Eds.). *Bir Çingene Yolculuğu,* (p.154–180). Istanbul: Fatih Municipality Publications.

Turkun, A. (2015). Kentsel dönüşümü yeniden düşünmek: Mevcut uygulamalar ve hâkim söylem üzerinden bir değerlendirme In B. Duman and İ. Coşkun (Eds.). *Neden Nasıl ve Kim İçin Kentsel Dönüşüm*, (p.285–332). Istanbul: Litera

Tyler, I. (2013) *Revolting subjects: Social abjection and resistance in neoliberal Britain.* London: Zed Books.

Uitermark, J. (2014). Integration and control: The governing of urban marginality in Western Europe, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 38*(4), 1418–1436.

Uysal, U. E. (2012). An urban social movement challenging urban regeneration: The case of Sulukule, Istanbul. *Cities, 29*(1): 12–22.

Vural, G. (2016, January 25). Ranzalı kent: Sulukule [Bunkbed City: Sulukule]. *Nokta*. Retrieved from http://www.kuzeyormanlari.org/2016/02/02/ranzali-kent-sulukule/.

Wacquant, L. (2007). Territorial stigmatization in the age of advanced marginality. *Thesis Eleven, 91*(1): 66–77.

Wacquant, L. (2008). *Urban outcasts: A comparative sociology of advanced marginality.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Wacquant, L., Slater, T., and Pereria, V. B. (2014). Territorial stigmatization in action. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 46*(6): 1270–1280.

Yardimci, Ö. (2020), State stigmatization in urban Turkey: Managing the "insurgent squatter dwellers in Dikmen Valley, *Antipode*, 52(5): 1519–1538.

Yilmaz, E. (2009). *Türkiye'de kentsel dönüşüm uygulamalarında süreç ve aktörler: Sulukule örneği.* (Master Thesis). Mimar Sinan Guzel Sanatlar University, Turkey.

How cite this article

Supplemantal Material 1: Interviews

Supplemantal 1. Interviews with the residents.

Interview	Site	Sex	Age	Profession	Origin	Date
7		M	58	Private Security	Turkish	Sep. 24, 2018
8		W	55	Café manager	Turkish	Sep. 24, 2018
9		M	50	Grocer	Syrian	Sep. 24, 2018
10		M	20	Driver	Palestinian	Sep. 24, 2018
11		W	42	Tourism Agent	Romani	Sep. 24, 2018
12	Renewal Area	M	30	Graphic Animator	Syrian	Sep. 24, 2018
13		W	40	Tourism Agent	Turkish	Sep. 24, 2018
14		M	45	Teacher	Turkish	Sep. 24, 2018
15		M	20	Grocer	Syrian	Sep. 24, 2018
16		W	59	Housewife	Iraqian	Sep. 24, 2018
17		M	77	Driver	Turkish	Sep. 24, 2018
18		M	73	Old age pensioner	Turkish	Sep. 24, 2018
19		M	60	Worker-Ex prisoner	Romani	Sep. 24, 2018
20		M	55	Buffet Owner	Turkish	Oct. 21, 2018
21		M	49	Retiree/Cleaner	Romani	Oct. 21, 2018
22	Nearby Area	W	65	Çengi (Romani Dancer)	Romani	Oct. 21, 2018
23		W	40	Cleaner/unemployed	Romani	Oct. 21, 2018
1		M	23	Actor	Romani	Jan. 17, 2018
2		M	24	Singer	Romani	Jan. 28, 2018

Supplemantal 2. Interviews with the officials.

Interview	Position	Unit	Date
3	Mukhtar	Karagümrük Neighbourhood	July 5, 2018
4	Counsellor of Mayor	Fatih Municipality	Sep..24. 2018
5	Director/ Development and Urbanization	Fatih Municipality	Sep.24, 2018
6	Director/ Department of Analysis and Project	Fatih Municipality	Sep.24, 2018