

Determinants of Türkiye's Relations with Africa: Insights from High-level Leader Visits

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Abstract: Since 1998, when Türkiye inaugurated its 'Opening up to Africa Policy,' there has been a concerted effort to cultivate political, economic, and cultural ties with African states. This growing engagement has prompted extensive scholarly inquiry into its underlying motivations and outcomes. Scholars utilized diverse analytical tools to propose and evaluate potential determinants. This paper posits that the frequency of high-level leadership visits serves as a barometer for the intensity of Türkiye's bilateral relations and seeks to unravel the rationale behind the preferential focus on certain African countries. The study empirically tests the determinants identified in the existing literature by leveraging data on Türkiye's high-level visits to the continent. The findings show that Turkish leaders' visits to African countries are predominantly influenced by economic interests and historical ties, with a clear preference for nations offering larger markets and shared historical connections, while humanitarian considerations appear to play a minimal role.

Keywords: Turkish Foreign Policy, Africa, High-level Visit

1. Introduction

Before 2010, scholarly attention to Türkiye's relations with Africa was sparse, with limited academic investigations noted (Karaca, 2000, Özkan, 2008). This limited focus can largely be attributed to the minimal substantive interactions between Türkiye and the majority of African nations, with the notable exception of North African countries.¹ However, the onset of Türkiye's proactive engagement with the African continent in the early 2000s catalyzed a significant surge in academic interest (Balcı, 2021, p. 320). The primary aim of this interest was to elucidate the motivations behind this burgeoning relationship. Notably, Mehmet Özkan (2010), an eminent scholar in this field, articulates several key determinants influencing Turkish interest in Africa. *The Historical and Cultural Continuity Hypothesis* posits that Türkiye's enduring historical and cultural connections with Africa, tracing back to the Ottoman Empire, positively impact its present-day interactions with the continent. *The Economic Interests Hypothesis* argues that the burgeoning trade volumes and Turkish business investments in Africa are central to Türkiye's augmented presence, motivated by the pursuit of new markets and investment opportunities to bolster its economy. According to *the International Influence Hypothesis*, Türkiye's proactive stance in Africa should be viewed as a component of a larger geopolitical strategy aimed at amplifying its sway within international arenas, such as the United Nations, through accrual of support from African nations. Lastly, *the Development and Humanitarian Aid Hypothesis* contends that Türkiye's engagement is heavily influenced by its commitment to development and humanitarian initiatives, which focus on poverty reduction, infrastructure enhancement, and agricultural support, thereby cementing robust bilateral relations.

These assumptions are predominantly based on the official statements of political figures and analyses of scholars in the field. For instance, the rationale behind Türkiye's outreach to Africa through foreign aid is twofold. On one hand scholars such as Donelli (2018), Belder and Dipama (2018) and Devocioğlu

¹ Prior to 1998, Turkish leaders made 45 official visits to the African continent, yet only seven of these were to Sub-Saharan African nations. President Cevdet Sunay and Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan undertook official visits to Ethiopia in 1969 and Nigeria in 1996, respectively. The remaining five visits were conducted by foreign ministers and prime ministers to Kenya in 1976, Niger in 1982, and Senegal in 1991 and 1993, all within the context of participating in multilateral meetings.

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(2024) postulate that Türkiye's aid is driven by genuine needs and represents a form of counter-colonial assistance, distinguishing it from Western models. This perspective aligns with *the Development and Humanitarian Aid Hypothesis*, suggesting that Türkiye is motivated by a desire to support African nations in need. On the other hand, scholars like Langan (2017, Stambøl and Berger, 2023) contend that Türkiye is striving to forge a new foreign policy identity as a 'virtuous power', in stark contrast to the historical European imperial 'Other', through its aid initiatives. While this notion does not directly correlate with *the International Influence Hypothesis*, it implies that Türkiye is seeking to attain a renewed status in international relations by providing aid to Africa. Subjecting these ideas to a stringent empirical test through the analysis of Türkiye's high-level leadership visits to Africa could potentially reexamine their intricate nuances. Nevertheless, such empirical scrutiny may elucidate which concept possesses greater explanatory capacity in deciphering Türkiye's motivations behind its engagement with African nations.

The structure of the paper is outlined as follows: Initially, it delineates the principal assumptions underlying Türkiye's increasing engagement with African nations over the past twenty-five years. Subsequently, the paper introduces the dataset comprising Türkiye's high-level visits to African countries, accompanied by descriptive statistics and visual representations such as figures and tables. Thereafter, the methodology of the paper is described, detailing the model employed and discussing the statistical outcomes derived from it. In conclusion, the paper engages in a discussion of the implications stemming from its key findings.

2. Türkiye's Motivations for Africa

The scholarly discourse encompasses numerous theories regarding the causes of Türkiye's increasing interest in Africa. Nonetheless, empirical investigation of some of these theories poses a challenge. For instance, Donelli (2018, Parlar Dal, Kurşun, and Mehmetcik, 2018, p. 68) posits that a key motivation behind Türkiye's recent engagement with African nations is the pursuit of increased operational autonomy from its traditional Western allies. In conjunction with this, it is argued that shifts in both international and regional contexts (such as Türkiye's challenges with EU accession and the ascendancy of the Global South) serve as external determinants shaping Türkiye's African policy. If we consider the year 2010 as a pivotal point for both Türkiye's stagnated relations with the EU and the rise of the Global South, a comparative analysis of visits before and after this date could potentially illuminate the impact of these structural dynamics on Türkiye's interest in Africa. However, this empirical design's selection of 2010 as the critical year is somewhat arbitrary, given the multiple periods of stagnation in Türkiye's relations with the EU and the lack of a clear demarcation for the onset of the Global South's rise. Therefore, the specific determinants intrinsic to the Türkiye-Africa relationship are more suitable for empirical evaluation. While external dynamics may shed light on Türkiye's approach to Africa as a whole, they are inadequate in elucidating the selective intensity of Türkiye's interactions with specific African nations. The ensuing section of this paper, therefore, elaborates on the dyadic factors influencing the relationship between Türkiye and individual African nations.

The most prevalent hypothesis in the literature is *the Economic Interests Hypothesis*, which posits that Türkiye's engagement with Africa is driven by the imperative to explore new markets for sustaining its economic growth and market demands (Tepeciklioğlu, Tepeciklioğlu, and Karabıyık, 2023; Calabrese, 2022; Yılmaz, 2020; Parlar Dal and Dipama, 2020; Özşahin, and Özşahin, 2020; Eyrice-Tepeciklioğlu, 2017; Cannon, 2017; Doğan and Tunç, 2015). As Türkiye experienced economic growth and a shift in its social structures, notably with the emergence of a new middle class, the Turkish private business sector began to expand its interests in Africa (Cannon, 2016, p. 106; Bayram, 2022, p. 78; Aras, 2013; Karaoğuz and Gürbüz, 2021). Consequently, Turkish governments aligned with these evolving economic dynamics, seeking new markets to secure electoral and ideological support (Cannon, 2016,

p. 106; Parlar Dal, Kurşun and Mehmetcik, 2018, p. 68). The fact that a large delegation of businessmen accompanied official state visits is an indication of the desire to develop economic and commercial relations (Erdağ, 2019, p. 334). In 2003, the Under-secretariat for Foreign Trade published a strategy document on the Development of the Economic Relations with African countries. In this strategy document, aims are clearly stated as “to increase the share of Türkiye in the total trade volume of African countries up to 3% in three years (the share of Türkiye in the total trade volume of Africa which is 567 billion dollars in 2005 is 2.1%), to open way for our small and medium sized enterprises so that they can penetrate into the region countries, to make either joint investments or direct Turkish investments with the relevant countries in Africa in order to increase the competitive power of Türkiye in certain sectors” (Quoted in Kızılarşlan, 2009, p. 20).

The Historical and Cultural Continuity Hypothesis posits that the Türkiye-Africa relationship extends beyond trade volume or substantial investments (Stambøl and Berger, 2023, p. 504). Türkiye’s efforts in renovating Ottoman-era towns, edifices, and mosques across Africa buttress its ideational discourse regarding ancestral ties and Islamic solidarity. For instance, Özkan and Akgün (2010, p. 538; Donelli, 2019) maintain that “the policy of opening up to Africa would lack completeness and durability in the absence of religious connections, which are intrinsically tied to the Ottoman legacy.” *The Development and Humanitarian Aid Hypothesis* asserts that Türkiye’s interest in Africa is motivated by the humanitarian necessities of the continent (Ilgit, 2023: p. 222; Fakuade, 2023; Bayram, 2022, p. 79; Ali, 2011; Haşimi, 2014; Gök, 2021; Turhan, 2021; İpek, 2021; Aras and Akpınar, 2015, Devocioğlu, 2024). Keyman and Sazak (2014), envisioning Türkiye as a “Humanitarian State,” argue that Türkiye is distinct from both conventional and new donors concerning its humanitarian engagement with conflict-affected and fragile states. Proponents of this humanitarian perspective point out that Türkiye’s main aid agency, TİKA, is secular in its operations, as evidenced by the substantial portion of its activities in Ethiopia in 2005, which lacked any religious underpinning (Bayer and Keyman, 2012, p. 78; Demirtaş and Pirinççi, 2024, p. 108). In May 2011, Türkiye hosted the 4th United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, with the participation of Turkish and African business groups and civil society organizations (İpek and Baytekin, 2013, p. 133). This and other similar political actions by Türkiye strengthen the humanitarian hypothesis.

Finally, *the International Influence Hypothesis* articulates a transformation in Turkish foreign policy, marking a transition “from a passive pro-Western state to an active and constructive participant in global affairs” (Özkan and Akgün, 2010, p. 526). As Ankara seeks to establish itself as a formidable global presence (Balci, 2024, p. 84-88), it cannot afford to neglect the emerging influence of Africa, necessitating the forging of stronger connections with the continent (Donelli and Gonzalez-Levaggi, 2016). With African nations increasingly asserting themselves in the sphere of global governance (Gray and Murphy, 2015), they have become focal points for Türkiye’s ambition to exert greater influence on the world stage. Consequently, Türkiye has intensified its involvement with African regional organizations. Such active engagement not only bolsters Türkiye’s regional profile in Africa but also enhances its global stature in international forums (Sıradağ, 2020, p. 531).


3. Türkiye’s High-level Visits to Africa

In contrast to many other topics in Turkish foreign policy, data-driven studies are relatively prevalent concerning Türkiye’s engagement with Africa, covering areas such as humanitarian aid (Mehmetcik, 2018; Muğurtay, 2022) and Turkish Airlines’ flight routes (Selçuk, 2013 and 2023; Němečková and Varkočková, 2024). One significant contribution to this field is the dataset on Turkish leaders’ (presidents and prime ministers) visits to Africa between 2002 and 2020, compiled by Tepeciklioğlu, Eyrice-Tepeciklioğlu, and Karabıyık (2023, p. 7). However, this dataset is not publicly accessible. Using this data, the authors assessed the impact of these visits on Türkiye’s export opportunities but found no statistically significant effects (Tepeciklioğlu, Eyrice-Tepeciklioğlu, and Karabıyık, 2023, p. 10).

Departing from the approach of treating high-level visits as an independent variable, our study instead examines the factors that shape Turkish leaders' visits to Africa, considering these visits as the dependent variable. Since the distribution and direction of high-level leader visits provide a significant indicator of which countries are perceived as important (Balci, 2024b and 2024c), it is analytically sound to treat these visits as a dependent variable to evaluate how various determinants shape Türkiye's prioritization of African nations. Over the past quarter-century, Ankara's engagement with the African continent has been characterized by significant variation in its geographical distribution. For example, countries such as Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Congo have not hosted visits from Turkish presidents or prime ministers, whereas North African nations have consistently been prioritized as destinations for high-level delegations. This asymmetrical pattern underscores the utility of leader visits as a robust indicator for assessing the influence of potential determinants on Türkiye's strategic interests in Africa. To this end, the study utilizes the most recent publicly available dataset, curated by Balci and Pulat (2024), which documents all foreign travels by Turkish presidents and prime ministers from 1989 to 2022. By focusing specifically on visits to African nations, this analysis seeks to elucidate the determinants driving Turkish leaders' engagements with the continent.

Figure 1


Map of Turkish Leaders' Travels to African Nations, 1989-2022



Between 1989 and 2022 (see Figure 1), Turkish presidents and prime ministers made 91 visits to African countries. Of these, 14 occurred before 1998, which is when the Africa Opening policy was officially declared. Out of the 91 visits, 72 were official, with 62 of these occurring after 1997. There were 17 multilateral visits, 13 of which were after 1997, and 2 goodwill visits, both after 1997. Of the total visits, 60 were by presidents (52 after 1997) and 31 by prime ministers (25 after 1997). Among these 91 visits, 48 (37 after 1997) were to North African countries, including Egypt (23 visits), Tunisia (9), Algeria (6), Libya (5), and Morocco (5). Excluding North African countries, Turkish leaders made 43 visits to other African countries between 1989 and 2022. Of these visits, only three occurred before 1998: two were to Senegal for Islamic Conference summits, and one was an official visit to Nigeria. The substantial interest in the sub-Saharan region began in March 2005, marked by official visits to Ethiopia and South Africa. These visits were part of then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Africa tour. Of the 40 visits to sub-Saharan countries after 1997, 6 were multilateral, while 34 were official. In sub-Saharan Africa, Senegal is the most frequented destination, with a total of 9 visits by Turkish leaders. Of these, 3 were multilateral. South Africa follows with 5 visits, including 2 multilateral ones. Notably, Senegal received 6 official visits, all of which occurred after 2011.

Figure 2

The Frequency of Turkish Leader Visits to African Nations, 1989-2022



From the raw data, we can deduce three significant insights. Firstly, the Southern Africa region is the least favored destination for Türkiye’s high-level leaders. Eighteen countries within continental Africa have yet to receive any high-level leader visits from Türkiye. Out of the 54 countries in Africa, 26 received either prime ministerial or presidential visits from Türkiye. Secondly, high-level visits to African nations seem to be sporadic and not part of an established diplomatic routine (Balci and Pulat, 2024, p. 4). Thirdly, the distribution of Turkish leaders’ visits to African nations is disproportionately weighted towards North African countries. This inclination is depicted in Figure 2, which shows Egypt as the most visited country, followed by Tunisia and Libya. The frequency diminishes progressively for other nations, indicating a possible strategic or geopolitical preference in Türkiye’s foreign relations approach towards North African countries.

4. Determinants of Turkish Visits to Africa

What determines the distribution of Turkish leaders’ foreign visits to African nations? The explanatory power of existing hypotheses in accounting for these visit patterns warrants examination. To test *the Economic Interests Hypothesis*—which suggests that Türkiye’s engagement with Africa is motivated by the search for new markets for Turkish products—we posit that Turkish leaders are more likely to visit countries with larger populations and higher GDP per capita. In the literature on leader visits, several studies have employed population size as an indicator of market opportunities, with findings indicating a higher likelihood of receiving visits from Chinese presidents and premiers in more populous nations (Wang and Stone, 2023, p. 217, 219; Li, 2015, p. 498; Chen, 2023, p. 174; Balci, 2024a). It is thus hypothesized that Turkish leaders will similarly find populous and economically robust African countries to be more attractive destinations, aligning with a focus on market opportunities. Hence, relevant market-related variables include both population and GDP per capita.

To assess *the Historical and Cultural Continuity Hypothesis*, we examine the religious affinity between Türkiye and African nations. There is a tendency for leaders to visit countries with shared ethnic, religious, and cultural identities, as well as similar ideologies (Yan and Zhou, 2023). Balci and Pulat (2024, p. 8-9; Köktaş, 2018) highlight a positive and significant correlation between Turkish leaders’ visits and states characterized by Turkic, European, or Muslim identities. Reflecting this literature, we posit that a shared historical legacy under the Ottoman Empire and common religious beliefs

(membership to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, OIC) may influence the travel decisions of Turkish leaders within Africa. In evaluating *the Development and Humanitarian Aid Hypothesis*, we consider the poverty levels of African nations. Recognizing that poverty often correlates with GDP per capita, we instead focus on the undernourishment in these countries. We introduce a binary variable that assigns ‘1’ to nations with a prevalence of undernourishment higher than the Africa Eastern and Southern average (percentage of the population) and ‘0’ to those below this threshold. The World Bank (2023) provides data on the prevalence of undernourishment (percentage of the population) for the period from 2001 to 2021, from which we calculate the mean value of this indicator.

Lastly, *the International Influence Hypothesis* posits a shift in Turkish foreign policy towards greater autonomy from the US-led order and an increased role in global governance. To examine this, we consider the voting alignment of African countries with the US in the UN General Assembly (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten, 2017), and the UN Security Council (UNSC) membership of these nations. We hypothesize that Türkiye’s pursuit of autonomy incentivizes visits to countries that are politically distant from the US. Furthermore, we anticipate that African countries’ elevation to prominent international platforms, the UNSC, heightens their appeal to Turkish leaders. To account for extraneous variables, we control for the geographical distance between the Turkish capital and African capitals (Mayer and Zignago, 2011), as well as the natural resources of the African countries. Considering Türkiye’s status as a developing nation, its motivations may extend beyond market interests to include securing natural resources for its burgeoning industry. These hypotheses regarding the determinants of Türkiye’s high-level foreign visits to African countries are tested using probit regression models of those visits spanning 22 years after the Cold War (1998–2020).

Table 1 reports the main results of our econometric model. The positive and statistically significant coefficients for “log_population” and “log_gdp_per_capita” across all categories indicate that countries with larger populations and higher GDP per capita are more likely to receive visits from Turkish leaders. This finding supports the hypothesis that market opportunities significantly influence the decision-making process for Turkish visits. Additionally, the negative coefficients for “resource_pct” reinforce the emphasis on Türkiye’s market priorities. The variables “oic_member” and “ottoman” exhibit positive coefficients, with “ottoman” being statistically significant in official and presidential visit models. This suggests that countries historically connected to the Ottoman Empire are more likely to receive high-level visits, aligning with the hypothesis that historical ties influence Turkish foreign engagement patterns. The variable “lag_idealpointdistance,” which measures the political distance between African countries and the US, shows negative coefficients, significant in official and presidential visits. This indicates that countries more politically aligned with the US are less likely to receive visits from Turkish presidents, partially supporting the hypothesis that Türkiye seeks to visit countries representing a shift toward greater autonomy from the US-led order.

Table 1

Probit Regression Results of Türkiye's African Interest (Presidential, and Prime Ministerial Visits)

	All Africa				Sub-Saharan Africa			
	all_visits	all_Official_visits	president_official	pr.minis_official	all_visits	all_Official_visits	president_official	pr.minis_official
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
oic_member	0.144	0.207	0.115	0.339	0.215	0.275	0.199	0.426
	(0.157)	(0.168)	(0.182)	(0.304)	(0.164)	(0.176)	(0.187)	(0.352)
ottoman	0.445	0.653**	0.834**	0.042	0.967**	1.058**	1.106**	-2.866
	(0.278)	(0.290)	(0.335)	(0.413)	(0.405)	(0.416)	(0.431)	-332.880
log_population	0.355***	0.360***	0.364***	0.259***	0.395***	0.401***	0.370***	0.328***
	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.072)	(0.088)	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.106)
log_gdp_per_capita	0.305***	0.274***	0.168*	0.332***	0.359***	0.334***	0.279***	0.332**
	(0.073)	(0.079)	(0.089)	(0.127)	(0.083)	(0.090)	(0.099)	(0.156)
resource_pct	-0.008	-0.007	-0.016*	0.001	-0.004	-0.003	-0.008	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.014)
lag_idealpointdistance	-0.266	-0.329*	-0.583***	0.064	-0.189	-0.256	-0.485**	0.286
	(0.167)	(0.181)	(0.217)	(0.249)	(0.200)	(0.216)	(0.246)	(0.350)
UNSC_Membership	-0.116	-0.056	-0.096	0.168	-0.207	-0.233	-0.215	-0.133
	(0.230)	(0.238)	(0.274)	(0.297)	(0.297)	(0.320)	(0.348)	(0.498)

undernourishment	-0.045	0.007	0.080	-0.196	-0.115	-0.071	0.006	-0.207
	(0.191)	(0.202)	(0.217)	(0.405)	(0.208)	(0.221)	(0.235)	(0.447)
log_distance	-0.345	-0.190	-0.119	-0.460	-0.028	0.009	0.010	0.185
	(0.262)	(0.271)	(0.300)	(0.387)	(0.375)	(0.396)	(0.439)	(0.682)
Constant	-5.763*	-6.910**	-6.068*	-5.426	-9.812**	-10.003**	-8.415*	-12.944*
	-2.971	-3.107	-3.464	-4.559	-3.839	-4.044	-4.370	-7.321
Observations	1,36	1360	1360	1360	1211	1211	1211	1211
Log Likelihood	-255.781	-223.776	-171.767	-100.077	-176.994	-152.237	-124.603	-48.141
Akaike Inf. Crit.	531.562	467.551	363.534	220.154	373.989	324.474	269.207	116.282

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

“UNSC_Membership,” referring to whether an African country holds membership in the United Nations Security Council, shows negative coefficients across all categories in the regression model. However, these coefficients are not statistically significant, suggesting insufficient evidence to conclude that UNSC Membership impacts the likelihood of receiving a visit from Turkish leaders significantly. Similarly, the coefficient for “undernourishment” is not statistically significant in most categories, indicating that the prevalence of undernourishment in African nations is not a strong predictor of Turkish visits. This finding does not support the hypothesis that Türkiye’s presidential and prime ministerial visits are significantly influenced by the level of humanitarian needs. In summary, the findings affirm the first hypothesis regarding economic factors influencing Turkish diplomatic visits to Africa. They partially support the second and third hypotheses related to ideational motivations and foreign policy shifts, while not confirming the fourth hypothesis concerning humanitarian considerations.

5. Conclusion

In 2010, Özkan and Akgün (2010, p. 534) wrote that “Türkiye’s Africa policy does not seem to give priority to any region or a group of states”. Unlike such sweeping generalizations, our quantitative investigation suggests some priorities for Turkish leaders in their travel plans to Africa. The analytical results of the study present a nuanced picture of the determinants influencing Turkish leaders’ visits to African nations. The Economic Interests Hypothesis and the Historical and Cultural Continuity Hypothesis receive robust empirical support, as indicated by the statistically significant coefficients for variables such as population size, GDP per capita, and historical ties. This underscores the propensity of Turkish leaders to visit larger and economically stronger nations, as well as those with shared historical connections. Conversely, the International Influence Hypothesis is only partially substantiated. While the foreign policy shift did show some significance, indicating a tendency for Türkiye to engage with countries less aligned with US interests, the lack of significant results for UNSC Membership suggests that seeking international influence may not be a pivotal factor in Turkish diplomatic strategies.

The Development and Humanitarian Aid Hypothesis does not receive empirical support from the regression analysis, as the variable representing humanitarian challenges—undernourishment—fails to significantly influence the patterns of Turkish leaders’ visits. This is further reinforced by the positive association with the ‘log_gdp_per_capita’ variable, indicating a tendency for Turkish leaders to prioritize visits to wealthier African nations. Contrary to case studies focusing on countries like Somalia, our comprehensive analysis based on presidential and prime ministerial visits finds no evidence to suggest that humanitarian concerns are a significant driver of Türkiye’s foreign policy across Africa. While Türkiye may prioritize humanitarian aid in specific instances such as Somalia, these actions do not appear to represent a generalizable policy approach throughout the continent. However, when analyzing foreign ministerial visits exclusively, the undernourishment coefficient becomes significant and positively impacts Türkiye’s engagement in sub-Saharan Africa (see Appendix 1, Model 5). This finding is particularly notable given that Türkiye’s humanitarian assistance to African nations is a prominent topic in domestic political discourse. In practice, however, this humanitarian aspect of Türkiye’s engagement with Africa seems to be delegated to bureaucratic visits rather than being highlighted through symbolic leadership visits.

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Appendix 1

Probit Regression Results of Türkiye's Sub-Saharan Africa Interest (Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Foreign Ministers)

	all_visits	all_Official_visits	president_official	pr.minis_official	fm_official
	1	2	3	4	5
oic_member	0.332**	0.285	0.320	0.321	0.235
	(0.165)	(0.173)	(0.209)	(0.363)	(0.230)
ottoman	0.868**	0.926**	1.119**	-2.781	0.493
	(0.379)	(0.385)	(0.447)	-334.976	(0.484)
log_population	0.383***	0.377***	0.382***	0.326***	0.301***
	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.077)	(0.110)	(0.090)
log_gdp_per_capita	0.393***	0.370***	0.351***	0.330**	0.268**
	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.109)	(0.158)	(0.119)
resource_pct	0.004	0.005	0.002	0.012	-0.004
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.011)
lag_idealpointdistance	-0.258	-0.297	-0.618**	0.389	-0.035
	(0.197)	(0.211)	(0.275)	(0.362)	(0.260)
UNSC_Membership	-0.244	-0.257	-0.179	-0.070	-4.367
	(0.295)	(0.316)	(0.359)	(0.499)	-260.481
undernourishment	0.143	0.191	0.230	-0.222	0.517*
	(0.196)	(0.205)	(0.253)	(0.460)	(0.265)
log_distance	-0.301	-0.364	-0.047	0.130	-0.458
	(0.355)	(0.372)	(0.461)	(0.700)	(0.449)
Constant	-7.509**	-6.686*	-8.554*	-12.794*	-5.114
	-3.644	-3.806	-4.526	-7.531	-4.765

Observations	1,211	1,211	1,211	1,211	1,211

Appendix 1 (Continued)

Log Likelihood	-181.838	-158.551	-105.721	-43.906	-85.911
Akaike Inf. Crit.	383.676	337.101	231.441	107.812	191.823

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 2*Turkish Presidential and Prime Ministerial Visits to African Nations*

Year	Leader	Status	Country	Start Date	End Date	Day	Purpose
1989	Turgut Özal	Prime Minister	Tunisia	21.05.1989	23.05.1989	3	Official
1990	Turgut Özal	President	Egypt	16.10.1990	17.10.1990	2	Official
1991	Turgut Özal	President	Senegal	8.12.1991	13.12.1991	6	Multilateral
1992	Turgut Özal	President	Egypt	5.12.1992	9.12.1992	5	Official
1993	Turgut Özal	President	Senegal	10.01.1993	12.01.1993	3	Multilateral
1994	Süleyman Demirel	President	Egypt	7.05.1994	7.05.1994	1	Official
1994	Tansu Ciller	Prime Minister	Morocco	30.10.1994	7.11.1994	9	Multilateral
1994	Tansu Ciller	Prime Minister	Egypt	5.11.1994	7.11.1994	3	Official
1994	Süleyman Demirel	President	Morocco	12.12.1994	14.12.1994	3	Multilateral
1996	Süleyman Demirel	President	Egypt	19.03.1996	19.03.1996	1	Official
1996	Necmettin Erbakan	Prime Minister	Egypt	2.10.1996	4.10.1996	3	Official
1996	Necmettin Erbakan	Prime Minister	Libya	4.10.1996	6.10.1996	3	Official
1996	Necmettin Erbakan	Prime Minister	Nigeria	6.10.1996	8.10.1996	3	Official
1997	Süleyman Demirel	President	Egypt	16.09.1997	16.09.1997	1	Official

Appendix 2 (Continued)

1998	Süleyman Demirel	President	Tunisia	4.05.1998	5.05.1998	2	Official
1999	Süleyman Demirel	President	Algeria	25.01.1999	26.01.1999	2	Official
1999	Süleyman Demirel	President	Morocco	25.07.1999	25.07.1999	1	Goodwill
1999	Süleyman Demirel	President	Egypt	26.07.1999	26.07.1999	1	Official
2001	Ahmet Necdet Sezer	President	Egypt	24.02.2001	25.02.2001	2	Multilateral
2002	Ahmet Necdet Sezer	President	South Africa	1.09.2002	5.09.2002	5	Multilateral
2003	Abdullah Gül	Prime Minister	Egypt	4.01.2003	6.01.2003	3	Official
2003	Ahmet Necdet Sezer	President	Tunisia	15.05.2003	16.05.2003	2	Official
2004	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Egypt	12.11.2004	12.11.2004	1	Goodwill
2005	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Ethiopia	2.03.2005	3.03.2005	2	Official
2005	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Tunisia	28.03.2005	29.03.2005	2	Official
2005	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Morocco	30.03.2005	31.03.2005	2	Official
2005	Ahmet Necdet Sezer	President	Egypt	26.12.2005	27.12.2005	2	Official
2005	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	South Africa	3.03.2005	5.03.2005	3	Official

Appendix 2 (Continued)

2006	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Egypt	20.05.2006	21.05.2006	2	Multilateral
2006	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Algeria	22.05.2006	23.05.2006	2	Official
2007	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Ethiopia	28.01.2007	30.01.2007	3	Multilateral
2008	Abdullah Gül	President	Egypt	14.01.2008	16.01.2008	3	Official
2008	Abdullah Gül	President	Senegal	13.03.2008	14.03.2008	2	Multilateral
2009	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Egypt	1.01.2009	1.01.2009	1	Official
2009	Abdullah Gül	President	Egypt	18.01.2009	18.01.2009	1	Multilateral
2009	Abdullah Gül	President	Egypt	15.07.2009	15.07.2009	1	Multilateral
2009	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Libya	23.11.2009	25.11.2009	3	Official
2009	Abdullah Gül	President	Kenya	20.02.2009	22.02.2009	3	Official
2010	Abdullah Gül	President	Cameroon	16.03.2010	17.03.2010	2	Official
2010	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Libya	27.03.2010	28.03.2010	2	Multilateral
2010	Abdullah Gül	President	Egypt	20.07.2010	21.07.2010	2	Official
2010	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Libya	29.11.2010	30.11.2010	2	Multilateral
2010	Abdullah Gül	President	Nigeria	7.07.2010	9.07.2010	3	Multilateral

Appendix 2 (Continued)

2011	Abdullah Gül	President	Gabon	24.03.2011	26.03.2011	3	Official
2011	Abdullah Gül	President	Ghana	23.03.2011	24.03.2011	2	Official
2011	Abdullah Gül	President	Egypt	3.03.2011	3.03.2011	1	Official
2011	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Egypt	12.09.2011	14.09.2011	3	Official
2011	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Tunisia	15.09.2011	16.09.2011	2	Official
2011	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Libya	16.09.2011	16.09.2011	1	Official
2011	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Somalia	19.08.2011	19.08.2011	1	Official
2011	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	South Africa	3.10.2011	5.10.2011	3	Official
2012	Abdullah Gül	President	Tunisia	7.03.2012	9.03.2012	3	Official
2012	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Egypt	17.11.2012	18.11.2012	2	Official
2012	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Senegal	22.06.2012	22.06.2012	1	Official
2013	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Gabon	6.01.2013	8.01.2013	3	Official
2013	Abdullah Gül	President	Egypt	5.02.2013	7.02.2013	3	Official
2013	Abdullah Gül	President	Egypt	5.02.2013	7.02.2013	3	Multilateral
2013	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Morocco	3.06.2013	4.06.2013	2	Official

Appendix 2 (Continued)

2013	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Algeria	4.06.2013	5.06.2013	2	Official
2013	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Tunisia	5.06.2013	6.06.2013	2	Official
2013	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Prime Minister	Senegal	9.01.2013	11.01.2013	3	Official
2014	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Equatorial Guinea	20.11.2014	21.11.2014	2	Multilateral
2014	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Algeria	19.11.2014	20.11.2014	2	Official
2015	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Djibouti	23.01.2015	25.01.2015	3	Official
2015	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Ethiopia	21.01.2015	23.01.2015	3	Official
2015	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Somalia	25.01.2015	25.01.2015	1	Official
2016	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Ghana	1.03.2016	1.03.2016	1	Official
2016	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Guinea	3.03.2016	3.03.2016	1	Official
2016	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Kenya	2.06.2016	2.06.2016	1	Official
2016	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Nigeria	2.03.2016	2.03.2016	1	Official
2016	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Senegal	5.02.2016	5.02.2016	1	Official

Appendix 2 (Continued)

2016	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Somalia	3.06.2016	3.06.2016	1	Official
2016	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Uganda	1.06.2016	1.06.2016	1	Official
2017	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Chad	26.12.2017	26.12.2017	1	Official
2017	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Madagascar	25.01.2017	25.01.2017	1	Official
2017	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Mozambique	24.01.2017	24.01.2017	1	Official
2017	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Tunisia	27.12.2017	27.12.2017	1	Official
2018	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Mali	2.03.2018	2.03.2018	1	Official
2018	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Mauritania	28.02.2018	28.02.2018	1	Official
2018	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Senegal	1.03.2018	1.03.2018	1	Official
2018	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Algeria	26.02.2018	28.02.2018	3	Official
2018	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	South Africa	2.05.2018	3.05.2018	2	Official
2018	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	South Africa	25.07.2018	27.07.2018	3	Multilateral
2018	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Zambia	28.07.2018	28.07.2018	1	Official

Appendix 2 (Continued)

2019	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Tunisia	25.12.2019	25.12.2019	1	Official
2020	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Senegal	28.01.2020	28.01.2020	1	Official
2020	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Algeria	26.01.2020	26.01.2020	1	Official
2021	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Angola	17.10.2021	18.10.2021	2	Official
2021	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Nigeria	20.10.2021	20.10.2021	1	Official
2021	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Togo	19.10.2021	19.10.2021	1	Official
2022	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Senegal	21.02.2022	22.02.2022	2	Official
2023	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	Algeria	21.11.2023	21.11.2023	1	Official

Appendix 3*Turkish Foreign Ministerial Visits to African Nations*

No	Leader	Status	Country	Start Date	End Date	Day	Purpose
1989	Mesut Yılmaz	Foreign Minister	Egypt	7.02.1989	10.02.1989	4	Official
1989	Mesut Yılmaz	Foreign Minister	Morocco	24.07.1989	26.07.1989	3	Official
1990	Ali Bozer	Foreign Minister	Egypt	27.08.1990	28.08.1990	2	Official
1990	Ali Bozer	Foreign Minister	Egypt	31.07.1990	5.08.1990	6	Multilateral
1991	A. Kurtcebe Alptemoçin	Foreign Minister	Egypt	13.02.1991	15.02.1991	3	Official

Appendix 3 (Continued)

1991	A. Kurtcebe Alptemoçin	Foreign Minister	Libya	22.03.1991	24.03.1991	3	Official
1991	A. Kurtcebe Alptemoçin	Foreign Minister	Morocco	29.05.1991	2.06.1991	4	Official
1991	Hikmet Çetin	Foreign Minister	Senegal	9.12.1991	12.12.1991	4	Multilateral
1993	Hikmet Çetin	Foreign Minister	Algeria	30.03.1993	31.03.1993	2	Official
1993	Hikmet Çetin	Foreign Minister	Tunisia	1.04.1993	3.04.1993	3	Official
1993	Hikmet Çetin	Foreign Minister	Egypt	25.12.1993	26.12.1993	2	Official
1994	Mümtaz Soysal	Foreign Minister	Morocco	30.10.1994	1.11.1994	3	Multilateral
1994	Mümtaz Soysal	Foreign Minister	Egypt	5.11.1994	7.11.1994	3	Official
1994	Mümtaz Soysal	Foreign Minister	Morocco	10.12.1994	11.12.1994	2	Official
1995	Erdal İnönü	Foreign Minister	Tunisia	28.07.1995	29.07.1995	2	Multilateral
1998	İsmail Cem	Foreign Minister	Egypt	20.03.1998	23.03.1998	4	Official
1999	İsmail Cem	Foreign Minister	Egypt	25.07.1999	26.07.1999	2	Official
2000	İsmail Cem	Foreign Minister	Morocco	6.02.2000	9.02.2000	4	Official
2000	İsmail Cem	Foreign Minister	Algeria	20.04.2000	22.04.2000	3	Official
2000	İsmail Cem	Foreign Minister	Tunisia	23.03.2000	26.03.2000	4	Official
2001	İsmail Cem	Foreign Minister	Sudan	9.01.2001	10.01.2001	2	Official
2001	İsmail Cem	Foreign Minister	Libya	20.01.2001	21.01.2001	2	Official
2003	Yaşar Yakış	Foreign Minister	Egypt	...01.2003	...01.2003	?	Official
2005	Abdullah Gül	Foreign Minister	Algeria	9.04.2005	10.04.2005	2	Official

Appendix 3 (Continued)

2006	Abdullah Gül	Foreign Minister	Tunisia	16.03.2006	18.03.2006	3	Official
2007	Abdullah Gül	Foreign Minister	Egypt	3.03.2007	4.03.2007	2	Multilateral
2007	Ali Babacan	Foreign Minister	Egypt	17.10.2007	18.10.2007	2	Official
2008	Ali Babacan	Foreign Minister	Senegal	10.03.2008	11.03.2008	2	Multilateral
2008	Ali Babacan	Foreign Minister	Mauritania	9.03.2008	9.03.2008	1	Official
2008	Ali Babacan	Foreign Minister	Egypt	27.06.2008	28.06.2008	2	Multilateral
2008	Ali Babacan	Foreign Minister	Uganda	18.06.2008	20.06.2008	3	Multilateral
2009	Ali Babacan	Foreign Minister	Egypt	1.01.2009	1.01.2009	1	Official
2009	Ali Babacan	Foreign Minister	Egypt	18.01.2009	18.01.2009	1	Multilateral
2009	Ali Babacan	Foreign Minister	Egypt	1.03.2009	2.03.2009	2	Multilateral
2009	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Foreign Minister	Egypt	1.09.2009	3.09.2009	3	Official
2009	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Foreign Minister	Egypt	9.09.2009	9.09.2009	1	Multilateral
2010	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Foreign Minister	Egypt	2.03.2010	3.03.2010	2	Official
2011	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Foreign Minister	Tunisia	21.02.2011	21.02.2011	1	Official
2011	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Foreign Minister	Morocco	..11.2011	..11.2011	?	Official
2011	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Foreign Minister	Morocco	..11.2011	..11.2011	?	Multilateral
2012	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Foreign Minister	Ethiopia	29.01.2012	30.01.2012	2	Multilateral
2012	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Foreign Minister	Ethiopia	29.01.2012	30.01.2012	2	Official
2012	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Foreign Minister	Djibouti	14.11.2012	16.11.2012	3	Multilateral

Appendix 3 (Continued)

2012	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Foreign Minister	Somalia	14.11.2012	14.11.2012	1	Official
2012	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Foreign Minister	Djibouti	14.11.2012	15.11.2012	2	Official
2012	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Foreign Minister	Ethiopia	15.11.2012	15.11.2012	1	Official
2012	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Foreign Minister	Eritrea	16.11.2012	16.11.2012	1	Official
2014	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Foreign Minister	Algeria	28.05.2014	29.05.2014	2	Multilateral
2014	Ahmet Davutoğlu	Foreign Minister	Tanzania	30.05.2014	31.05.2014	2	Official
2014	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Algeria	18.11.2014	19.11.2014	2	Official
2014	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Equatorial Guinea	19.11.2014	21.11.2014	3	Multilateral
2015	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Ethiopia	30.01.2015	31.01.2015	2	Multilateral
2015	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Morocco	16.12.2015	17.12.2015	2	Official
2016	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Libya	30.05.2016	30.05.2016	1	Official
2016	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Rwanda	30.05.2016	31.05.2016	2	Official
2016	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Uganda	31.05.2016	1.06.2016	2	Official
2016	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Kenya	1.06.2016	2.06.2016	2	Official
2016	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Somalia	2.06.2016	3.06.2016	2	Official

Appendix 3 (Continued)

2016	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Tunisia	29.11.2016	30.11.2016	2	Multilateral
2016	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Tunisia	29.11.2016	30.11.2016	2	Official
2017	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Tanzania	22.01.2017	23.01.2017	2	Official
2017	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Mozambique	23.01.2017	24.01.2017	2	Official
2017	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Madagascar	24.01.2017	25.01.2017	2	Official
2017	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Ivory Coast	10.07.2017	11.07.2017	2	Multilateral
2017	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Liberia	11.07.2017	11.07.2017	1	Official
2017	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Burkina Fasco	12.07.2017	12.07.2017	1	Official
2017	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Sudan	24.12.2017	25.12.2017	2	Official
2017	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Chad	25.12.2017	26.12.2017	2	Official
2017	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Tunisia	26.12.2017	27.12.2017	2	Official
2018	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Algeria	26.02.2018	28.02.2018	3	Official
2018	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Mauritania	28.02.2018	28.02.2018	1	Official
2018	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Senegal	28.02.2018	1.03.2018	2	Official
2018	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	South Africa	25.07.2018	27.07.2018	3	Multilateral

Appendix 3 (Continued)

2018	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Zambia	28.07.2018	28.07.2018	1	Official
2018	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Libya	22.12.2018	22.12.2018	1	Official
2018	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Tunisia	22.12.2018	24.12.2018	3	Official
2019	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Sudan	16.08.2019	17.08.2019	2	Official
2019	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Algeria	8.10.2019	9.10.2019	2	Official
2020	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Algeria	6.01.2020	7.01.2020	2	Official
2020	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Togo	20.07.2020	20.07.2020	1	Official
2020	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Niger	21.07.2020	21.07.2020	1	Official
2020	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Equatorial Guinea	21.07.2020	22.07.2020	2	Official
2020	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Libya	5.08.2020	6.08.2020	2	Official
2020	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Mali	9.09.2020	9.09.2020	1	Official
2020	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Guinea Biss au	10.09.2020	10.09.2020	1	Official
2020	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Senegal	10.09.2020	11.09.2020	2	Official
2020	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Niger	26.11.2020	28.11.2028	3	Multilateral
2021	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Libya	3.05.2021	3.05.2021	1	Official

Appendix 3 (Continued)

2021	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Libya	12.06.2021	12.06.2021	1	Official
2021	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Algeria	14.08.2021	15.08.2021	2	Official
2022	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Morocco	11.05.2022	11.05.2022	1	Multilateral
2022	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Morocco	11.05.2022	11.05.2022	1	Official
2022	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Libya	3.10.2023	3.10.2023	1	Official
2022	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Senegal	25.10.2022	25.10.2022	1	Multilateral
2022	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Ghana	26.10.2022	26.10.2022	1	Official
2022	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Benin	27.10.2022	27.10.2022	1	Official
2022	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Morocco	23.11.2022	23.11.2022	1	Multilateral
2022	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Morocco	23.11.2022	23.11.2022	1	Official
2022	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Algeria	10.12.2022	11.12.2022	2	Official
2023	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	South Africa	9.01.2023	10.01.2023	2	Official
2023	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Zimbabwe	10.01.2023	11.01.2023	2	Official
2023	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Rwanda	11.01.2023	12.01.2023	2	Official
2023	Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu	Foreign Minister	Egypt	18.03.2023	18.03.2023	1	Official

Appendix 3 (Continued)

2023	Hakan Fidan	Foreign Minister	Egypt	13.10.2023	14.10.2023	2	Official
2023	Hakan Fidan	Foreign Minister	Egypt	21.10.2023	21.10.2023	1	Multilateral
