



WHITHER *PAIDEIA*? READING ARENDT AND
RANCIÈRE TOGETHER ON EDUCATION AS A
DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE

HANGİ *PAIDEIA*? DEMOKRATİK BİR PRATİK OLARAK
EĞİTİMİ ARENDT VE RANCIÈRE'DE BİRLİKTE
OKUMAK

Ömür BİRLER*

ABSTRACT

This study delves into the complex relationship between democracy and education by examining the perspectives of Hannah Arendt and Jacques Rancière. Both thinkers, while sharing an anti-Platonic stance, offer distinct approaches to understanding the role of education in democracy. Arendt, drawing inspiration from Socrates, emphasizes the critical gap between the creative force of natality innate to children and the inherent plurality of the public realm and concludes that education and politics must be kept separate for the protection of the former. For Rancière, on the other hand, it is not Socrates but the “ignorant schoolmaster” to whom one should turn as the inspiration for democratic education. He denounces the Socratic maieutic and instead argues for the "equality of intelligence" and the democratization of knowledge. By analyzing their divergent yet complementary views on the Socratic *paideia*, this study explores how education can foster critical thinking, challenge hierarchical structures, and

* Ass. Prof. Dr., Middle East Technical Univ., Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ankara, Türkiye, birler@metu.edu.tr, ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6128-8691>

* Makale Geliş Tarihi / Article Received: 01.11.2024
Makale Kabul Tarihi / Article Accepted: 01.01.2025

ultimately contribute to realizing equality as the democratic ideal.

Keywords: Education, Democracy, Plato, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Rancière.

ÖZ

Bu çalışma, Hannah Arendt ve Jacques Rancière'in bakış açılarını inceleyerek, demokrasi ile eğitim arasındaki karmaşık ilişkiyi derinlemesine araştırmaktadır. Her iki düşünür de Platon karşıtı bir duruş paylaşırken, eğitimin demokrasideki rolünü anlamaya yönelik farklı yaklaşımlar sunmaktadır. Arendt, Sokrates'ten ilham alarak, çocuklara için olan yaratıcı doğurganlık gücü ile kamusal alanın için çoğulluğu arasındaki kritik boşluğu vurgular ve ilkinin korunması için eğitim ve siyasetin birbirinden ayrı tutulması gerektiği sonucuna varır. Öte yandan Rancière'e göre demokratik eğitim için dönülmesi gereken esin kaynağı Sokrates değil, "cahil hocadır". Rancière Sokratik ebelik yöntemini reddeder ve "akılların eşitliği" ve bilginin demokratikleşmesini savunur. Bu çalışma, bahsi geçen iki düşünürün Sokratik *paideia* üzerine farklı ancak birbirini tamamlayan görüşlerini analiz ederek, eğitimin nasıl eleştirel düşünmeyi teşvik edebileceğini, hiyerarşik yapıları sorgulayabileceğini ve nihayetinde demokratik ideal olarak eşitliğin gerçekleştirilmesine nasıl katkıda bulunabileceğini araştırmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Eğitim, Demokrasi, Plato, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Rancière.

INTRODUCTION

Reflecting on democracy with Hanna Arendt and Jacques Rancière is a delicate process. For the reader of both theoreticians, finding a comfortable place to locate them between their predecessors and contemporaries in the history of political thought is a challenge. They stand as unique thinkers of their eras due to their exposure to hybrid traditions: Arendt began her studies with Heidegger and later continued as a German emigree in the States, and Rancière initiated his studies in political theory as a student of Althusser but only to radically part himself with any strain of Althusserian Marxism. However, this does not prevent

them from making politics, in general, and democracy, in particular, the leading subject of their works.

Although divergent in their formulations regarding what constitutes democracy one common element brings them together: their shared anti-Platonism. Both Rancière and Arendt oppose politics to philosophy since the latter's dedication to knowledge often eliminates the former, which is fundamentally about opinions. Rancière, like Arendt, defines politics as a form of action whose main purpose is to bring about equality. This, in Rancière, manifests itself as "dissensus," while Arendt insists that political action is spontaneous and capable of bringing something new into the world. This is why, for Arendt (1990: 19), "the modern concept of revolution, inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of history suddenly begins anew, that an entirely new story, a story never known before, is about to unfold," lies at the very center of modern democratic politics.

In that sense, there exists an exhaustive literature analyzing both thinkers' problematization of democracy both as a concept and as a political regime. Their discussions on political rights, particularly human rights, are among the vistas that contemporary scholarship frequently refers to (Deranty, 2003; Dikeç, 2013; Perica, 2019; Schaap, 2011; Schaap, 2020; Türk, 2016; Ünlü, 2021). Similarly, another prominent field of democratic practice, education, has been explored by critical pedagogy theories, although its focus is limited to the individual works of Arendt (Gordon, 1989; Biesta, 2016; Nixon, 2020) and Rancière (Biesta, 2010; Simons and Masschlein, 2001; Subaşı, 2021; Duman, 2021). However, despite such intersecting research agendas, there is almost no study bringing these two figures together. This article attempts to read Arendt and Rancière together to shed light on their distinctive ideas on democracy by analyzing their approach to education. Although both thinkers are occupied with the relationship between democracy and education, and both take a definite anti-Platonic position, this study argues that it is their diverse take on Socrates that, in the end, sets their views on education apart.

To elaborate on this point, the study will first focus on the origins of the relationship between education and democracy in Platonic philosophy. Outlining the basic tenets of this association is critical for grasping both thinkers' criticism of Plato. Following this brief detour, the study will engage with Arendt and her analysis of the crisis of education. However, her portrayal of Socrates, radically different from the Platonic one, takes precedence in grasping the complex and paradoxical arguments she raises concerning education. Therefore, in the second section of the study, Arendt's conception of the *Socratic paideia* will be the initial topic, followed by an examination of her writings on education. The final section will then concentrate on Rancière and his well-known book, *The Ignorant*

Schoolmaster. Here, the study will try to demonstrate the reasons behind his criticism of Socratic education and how the question of equality centers on Rancière's understanding of democracy. The Socratic notion of *paideia*, which, for Arendt, functions in two different ways, is the fundamental reason for her adamant argument that education and politics must always be separated. According to Rancière, as we will see, such a conclusion could only ensue from an uncritical account of authority that Arendt still harbors as an essential part of the educational realm. Democracy, for which equality is the *sine qua non* condition, cannot co-exist in a hierarchical social structure, even if this structure is as modest as a classroom. However, Rancière's ignorant schoolmaster is not totally devoid of a certain authority over his students. Thus, the study will conclude by questioning whether Arendt and Rancière's views on education and democracy could be considered complementary despite their initial differences.

1. THE PLATONIC *PAIDEIA* AND DEMOCRACY

Harpern (2011: 545) argues that the Greeks invented both democracy and political theory, allowing them to conceptualize what this regime should entail. To be sure, in this conceptualization, the role of citizens in a democratic polis occupied a significant concern. The Athenian notion of citizenship embodied a depiction of a political life beyond the mere collection of individuals whose rights were protected by the existing laws. On the contrary, for the Greeks and notably for Plato, the relation between the polis' regime and its citizens formed an organic whole. In other words, the virtues and vices of regimes were direct reflections of its members and vice versa. Hence, a good life was only possible through its citizens' "healthy souls". And to that end, the Greeks had one crucial instrument: education.

Without a doubt, had it not been for Plato, we would not be as informed as today about how deeply the Greeks concerned themselves with education. Not only the sheer sum and rising popularity of the teachers¹ but also the diversity of approaches in the education of the youth is striking even for our contemporary world. As Kamtekar (2019: 605) points out, one could observe sophists like Protagoras, teachers of rhetoric such as Gorgias, orators like Isocrates, and on top of them, poets such as Homer were creating rival schools during the fifth century B.C. However, of these competing accounts of education, which one had the true content that would cultivate the Greek citizens for the good life, was a serious question.

¹ Ober (1989: 76) argues that the number of *rhetors* grew significantly, approximately from 20 to "at least 100 and perhaps as many as 500", between the fifth and the fourth centuries B.C.E. Similarly, we begin to see the records of well-known Sophists around the same era. Even though only 30 of the Sophists' names survived until today, their actual number was clearly much larger (Sophists, 2024).

Thus, it is no wonder that education plays a significant role in Plato's writings. Besides his two most extended works, the *Republic* and *Laws*, in which he outlines a meticulous and utopian educational program, Plato tirelessly emphasizes the relationship between virtues and education in almost all his dialogues. For him, upbringing the youth was a task beyond providing them with a particular set of skills and abilities: the question at stake was the cultivation of their souls. Hence, the term *paideia*. Although a simple translation of the term would mean education, Plato's use of the term refers to a rather complicated relationship between one's soul, its cultivation, and its impact on the general political life of the polis. As Gurley (1999: 357) states, Plato's discussion on education "espouses a way of living on: of recreating oneself through pedagogic processes, while also reproducing one's polis". Thus, the idea of *paideia* necessarily entails a political outlook to achieve the best possible regime. Since the regime ruled by a philosopher-king is portrayed as the best possible regime, undoubtedly, the philosopher has a critical role in the pedagogical curriculum. Education should serve the cultivation of cardinal virtues, i.e., wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation, and only a philosopher could attain the true knowledge of them. In that respect, the content of Platonic education is a critical tool in so far as it aims to nurture the next generation of Athenian citizens. It establishes itself against the existing values of Athenian democracy. Therefore, one must first turn to Plato's analysis of democracy to understand his educational program.

In *Republic*, Book VIII, Plato locates democracy among the four unjust regimes. Similar to the other three, democracy has its driving qualities. While timocracy is associated with its citizens' motivation for the love of honor, oligarchy with the love of wealth, and tyranny with the love of power, democracy, Plato argues, stands out for its citizen's love for equality and freedom. For him, neither of these qualities is the sole cause of injustice in democratic cities. In other words, one could not criticize Plato for opposing equality and freedom as political values. On the contrary, he praises these qualities since they give spiritedness to democratic cities. "It is probably the fairest of the regimes", he says (*Rep.* 557c). Democracy originates from the practice of granting the right to "rule offices with those who are left on an equal basis; and, for the most part, the offices in it are given by lot" (*Rep.* 557a). As Santos (2001: 61) points out, the principle of equality is achieved through institutional procedures. In the assembly, every citizen is a member with one vote, while in the council and the jury courts, equality is achieved by rotation in office and selection by lot. Similarly, the desire for freedom is supported by freedom of speech along with the "freedom to choose any career one pleases and to move from any vocation into politics" (Santos, 2001: 61).

However, despite this initial positive attitude, Plato's following analysis of the democratic man reveals his main concerns about the regime. As Williams

(2010: 71) argues, underlying this analysis is Plato's assumption that in any given regime, an organic connection exists between the citizens and the state. For him, both the soul and the state have the same structure. Thus, justice, the principal virtue of any good regime, or lack thereof, in both the state and the individual soul, takes the same form. That is to say, flaws of the democratic regime inevitably create a population of unhealthy citizens. Consequently, democracy, no matter how well-intended or suitable for the lovers of freedom and equality, is not a sustainable regime: it is bound to collapse precisely due to the inherent conflict it causes in the individuals' souls. This final verdict on democracy is also related to the Platonic epistemology discussed in *Republic* Book V (*Rep.* 476d-480a), associating knowledge with unity and opinions with plurality. Similarly, he (*Rep.* 423c) makes it clear "every person is not a plurality, but a unity". If this principle is left out from the foundation of the political regime, then there is no way to achieve a just city, which "naturally grows to be one and not many" (*Rep.* 423d).

Although there is no scholarly consensus on Plato's reasons for criticisms, one thing is clear: as a regime, democracy values freedom too much and knowledge too little. Based on this broad statement, Brooks (2008: 19) develops a more analytical argument that summarizes Plato's criticisms in four points: 1- Democracy is an anarchic society, thus lacks a coherent unity; 2- Democracy follows its citizens' individual desires rather than the common good; 3- As the population grows, no democracy could provide a sufficient voice to its citizen, thus contradicts its constitutive principle; and 4- Democracies are run by ignorant masses. These points prove that the foundational motivation of democratic regimes, love of freedom and equality, conflicts with the essential requirements of any good regime: stability and justice. However, in Plato's account, this is not a flaw of the democratic regimes per se; on the contrary, the responsibility lies on the shoulders of the democratic man. In other words, his criticisms of democracy stand as an x-ray of its citizens.

Plato characterizes democratic citizens by two qualities: the lack of a dominant desire, which results in an inability to prioritize them, and a disregard for distinguishing between necessary and unnecessary appetites (*Rep.* 559a-d).

While the first quality originates from the principle of equality, for the democratic man all desires are worthy of equal satisfaction, the second one emerges from the principle of freedom, which refuses to bring any restraint on the ordering of appetites according to their usefulness. The consequences of these two qualities point out a dire problem for Plato: the democratic man has no rational way of guiding his choices since he wants to satisfy them all at once, hence leading him to reject to distinguish what is good from what is evil. In other words, the democratic man lacks a coherent unity in his soul, which inevitably renders him a self-centric person, consistently in search of the fulfillment of his desires.

Moreover, his refusal to attribute any criteria external to any appetite makes him devoid of knowledge. In the end, it is the democratic man's disorderly soul that causes democratic regimes to turn into anarchic societies ruled by ignorant masses with a disregard for the common good.

It is only sensible, then, that Plato's diagnosis of the problem should lead him to rehabilitate the democratic man, not the regime. His fundamental tool for this treatment is a pedagogic program based on a particular philosophy of education. The key to this philosophy is the analysis of the parts composing the human soul: the mind, the spirit, and the body. For Plato, the role of education is strictly associated with disciplining each part according to the proper virtue that should rule them. Accordingly, the mind could only reach its highest capacity when ruled under the virtue of wisdom. As Williams (2010: 73) suggests, this initial and most crucial step of Platonic education is necessary to ensure that the body and the spirit conform to their appropriate virtues: temperance in the case of the body and courage in the case of the spirit (*Rep.* 441c-e). Thus, the first lesson that the democratic man should learn is how to order the different parts of his soul and prioritize the dictates of reason rather than his desires that are demanding to be satisfied simultaneously.

Clearly, this first lesson aims to achieve an orderly soul and end the harm caused by the love of freedom and equality. In the rehabilitation of the democratic man, this step would help him to distinguish what is necessary from the unnecessary and thus enable him to consider beyond his own good. However, according to Plato, the damage is not limited to the individual soul. The ordering of the soul demonstrates that not every desire can be handled equally. The democratic assumption that every individual is equal should also be corrected since some are born with higher rational capacities, while others inherit the qualities associated with the spirit or the body. Therefore, citizens' education must be aimed at developing one's dominant qualities. One could argue that this constitutes the gist of Platonic education: the hierarchy among the faculties should always be observed. *Paideia* means, above all, cultivation of the highest faculty, i.e., the rational capacity. But if *paideia* also means reproducing the polis by mirroring this pedagogical program, then the rehabilitation of the democratic regime must follow the same steps. Those educated to use the rational capacity should rule over the others. Therefore, the outcome of Platonic education is a brand-new way of restructuring the democratic polis. To prevent the inevitable anarchy caused by the equality of all, Plato divides the polis into three classes, which fall into each category of the human soul. Those with lower degrees of spiritedness and rational capacity but with stronger desires would be suited for practical occupations. The second class, auxiliaries, are the spirited elements of the community and are best suited for executive roles due to their courageous and

honorable nature. The third and highest-ranking class, the guardians, is the ruling class as a result of the virtue of their capacity for rational reflection and their prolonged and rigorous education.

The Platonic ideal city is one where the wise rule over the courageous and productive classes. In that sense, pedagogical rehabilitation of the democratic regime involves a dual division of the polis' citizens. On the one hand, the differential distribution of education would separate the demos according to their capacities. The legitimation of the first division originates from the moral value that Plato attributes to the use of rational faculty. Of all the virtues, wisdom is the rarest among demos. Hence, it is only sensible that a city should be ruled by the most knowledgeable. On the other hand, the education of different capacities would ensure a second division among the citizens according to their occupations. As Cowen (2000: 135) argues, Plato's scheme does not only cultivate virtues but also, by associating them with different professions, results in a class-based society with lifelong political economic roles. This dual division is precisely what brings Arendt and Rancière together in their shared anti-Platonism. For the former, the life of contemplation associated with the wise or the philosopher thoroughly remains outside the political realm. Therefore, one cannot and should not subscribe to the Platonic idea of *paideia* based on the cultivation of wisdom as a tool for rehabilitating democracy since it ultimately serves its depoliticization rather than its betterment. In issues concerning democracy, particularly in democratic education, Arendt is more inclined to think against than with Plato. Despite agreeing with Arendt, Rancière's grounds for criticizing Plato differ and lie in the second division. As will be discussed, for him, Platonic education aims at sustaining class differences. Thus, considering education as a field of democratic practice means not only whether philosophy is a part of the political realm but also how class inequalities are reproduced through the distribution of the sensible. But, to elaborate on Rancière, first we need to turn to Arendt and understand the relationship between democracy and the crisis of education in her writings.

2. FROM PLATONIC *PAIDEIA* TO THE CRISIS OF EDUCATION

One could argue that Arendt's criticism of Plato is the central axis structuring her works. Her first encounter with him dates back to her renowned work *On the Origins of Totalitarianism*. In this early work, published in 1951, she mentions the Greek philosopher in brief instances where the issue concerns his condemnation of the Sophists and their total disregard for the truth at the expense of opinions (Arendt, 1973: 9). Despite the growing popularity of Karl Popper's (1945: 149) final judgment on Plato as a "totalitarian party politician", Arendt never places him among the thinkers whom according to her among the sources of totalitarian thought. It is only seven years later, after the publication of *The Human Condition*, Arendt's critical examination of Plato becomes available to her readers. For her,

Plato may not have taken part in the foundations of totalitarianism. Still, the effect of his project was far more reaching: a utopian reorganization of polis aiming nothing but to make a philosopher's way of life (Arendt, 1998: 14). In other words, it was none other than Plato who diminished the value of political life in polis for the higher achievements of philosophy.

As the thinker of “the political” Arendt continues to form her ideas against the Platonic philosophy. In “Philosophy and Politics”, Arendt (1990) maintains that the project of the *Republic* is based on a hierarchical conception of the relation between philosophy and the polis. While philosophy is always associated with the search for the truth, the polis's life thrives on its citizens' ever-changing opinions. The problem for Plato lies in the unbridgeable gap between the two: opinions, even the most sophisticated ones, could never help citizens grasp the truth. And what is more, the (democratic) masses are not interested in the knowledge of the truth. This became clear to Plato after Socrates' trial and condemnation by the Athenian citizen judges. In his mind, Socrates was unjustly accused by the masses, who had neither any interest nor the tolerance to face the truth that Socratic philosophy provided for them. Opinion and knowledge, or the demos and the philosopher, were two extreme ends of human existence that could not exist alongside one another. As discussed in the previous section, his solution lay in reforming the democratic polis, which eventually transformed it into the rule of the wise.

It is true that Arendt's criticism of Plato is based on his preference for the life of philosophy over the life of politics. However, central to this criticism is Plato's misrepresentation of the Socratic philosophy. Arendt suspects that by portraying Socrates as a lover of wisdom and a stubborn critique of the people's opinions, Plato does not restrict himself to refuting the democratic ideals of the polis but also undermines a crucial aspect of his teaching: confronting the crisis of democracy not by eliminating its principles of freedom and equality but through their strengthening. Plato's state, based on the rule of wisdom, does not need to form free and equal citizens. Nor does it wish to cultivate its citizens' insights (Arendt, 1990: 75). Therefore, Arendt concludes, for Plato, renouncing these qualities was the most reliable solution to the inevitable degeneration of democratic regimes. As a result, according to Arendt, the Platonic proposal has two inherent defects: not only is it an attempt to establish a polis under the authority of the wise man at the expense of democratic demos, but it also obscures Socrates' teaching, borne out of his actions and dialogues, aiming to reinforce democratic principles not abolish them (Arendt, 1990: 78-81).

To achieve a better understanding of Arendt's analysis, one needs to unpack the qualities she attributes to Socrates. For her, the distinguishing element of Socrates' teaching is his acceptance of the world of opinions. In contrast to the Platonic depiction, Arendt insists that for Socrates, opinions composed the basic

assumptions of political life: “every man has his own opinion, his own opening to the world” (Arendt, 1990: 81). Moreover, Socrates was very much a public figure. Despite refusing any public office or honor, he never withdrew into his private life but continued to engage with citizens of all opinions. In this world, common to all, what Arendt sees in Socrates is the coupling of opinion with plurality. Socratic teaching, then, was never aimed at attaining the single truth -it was instead a way of recognizing a common horizon shared by all citizens.

Therefore, Arendt argues that the Socratic *paideia* completely differed from the Platonic one. While the latter was based on “a new political and social pedagogics, within which the possession or the lack of wisdom respectively determines whether one belongs to the rows of the ‘rulers’ or of the ‘subjects’” (Possenti, 2009: 209), the former the role of the philosopher was far from ruling the city. Instead, the celebrated Socratic maieutic was aimed at provoking doubt, making citizens realize themselves as “question-asking beings” (Arendt, 1990: 99). To do so, Arendt maintains, is only possible by maintaining a dialogue in the public forum. The Socratic maieutic proceeds by questions precisely because of the plurality of opinions. Asking systematic questions is the only way to understand how the common world appears to others by comparing one’s opinion with that of her fellow citizens. The principle of this incessant questioning is not to discover philosophical truths but to “make the city more truthful by delivering each of the citizens of their truths” (Arendt, 1990: 81).

Hence, the Socratic *paideia* necessarily takes place in the public realm, surrounded by others. The conversational tone of asking questions and raising doubts is a strategy to unveil the need to form a common world out of the plurality of opinions. And yet, according to Arendt, this constitutes only the first aspect of the Socratic *paideia*. The second one, the “fundamental discovery of Socrates”, is that we are already “two-in-one”, that I live together with myself (Arendt, 1990: 86). The self is the only thing one cannot be separated from. Nor can one completely disagree with one’s self, says Socrates in *Gorgias* (Plato, 1987: 482c). What Arendt initially calls “conscience”, but later on refers to as “thinking” in *The Life of the Mind* (1978) is an educational practice so long as it makes oneself question whether one’s choices and actions are just. However, unlike the first form of education, taking place in a dialogue with others, the “two-in-one” dialogue requires a retreat from the light of the public realm. Carefully distinguishing this retreat from the Platonic escape of the world of opinions, Arendt (1978: 70) argues that the solitary experience of thinking does not produce loneliness. The retreat that Socratic *paideia* offers is a paradoxical solitude that Arendt (1958: 525; 1978: 7-8) best summarizes with Cato’s famous maxim: “Never is he more active than when he does nothing, never is he less alone than when he is by himself.” As Duarte (2001) argues, the example of Socrates and his method of education

represent the exact opposite of the Platonic *paideia*. Thinking that Socrates provokes within his interlocutors is not ceasing the dialogue, which Plato assumed to be impossible with a crowd. On the contrary, it is “an activity of withdrawal that is perfected through practice” (Duerte, 2001: 2016). Consequently, the Socratic *paideia* serves citizens’ democratic education by cultivating an inner dialogue that guides them to live an examined life and a public one that still allows them to regard one another as equals and plural subjects originating from their freedom.

The intensity and the scope of the discussion that Arendt reserves for Socrates and his pedagogic practice clearly indicate that the relationship between education and politics is not of local interest to her theory of politics. Nonetheless, her writings focusing on the issue of education remain peripheral, at least in their quantity. The very controversial “Reflections on Little Rock”, written in 1957 in the wake of the events following the rule on forced desegregation in American schools, and “The Crisis in Education”, delivered as a lecture in 1958, compose the main body concerning her ideas on education, democracy, and politics. Although Arendt alludes to the question of education in *The Human Condition*, published in the same year as “Crisis”, and later on in *The Life of the Mind*, the topic was never retaken as an independent subject. However, despite this limited number of works, Arendt’s ideas on the matter are provocative and, at times, trying to locate in her general theoretical framework.

As the preceding discussion presents, Arendt is not unconcerned about the cultivation of citizens. On the contrary, she celebrates the Socratic maieutic precisely for its pedagogic purpose. However, a brief glance at “The Crisis of Education” might raise questions as to whether Arendt contradicts herself. An apparent inconsistency emerges when she declares that “education can play no part in politics” (1977: 177) or, in a similar vein, argues that “one cannot educate adults” (1977: 177). However, despite the visible discrepancy, a careful reading would reveal that for Arendt, the term education is different from *paideia* and, thus, a complex issue that calls for a unique analysis. The best way to unpack her arguments is to begin by asking what education entails for Arendt.

As O’Byrne (2005: 391) argues, education as an activity bears two distinct and conflicting roles: “the one reactionary, the other revolutionary”. Both roles concern the children and the young people as the subject of education. For Arendt (1977: 192), education is a conservative activity “in the sense of conservation” because it is “of the essence of the educational activity, whose task is always to cherish and protect something—the child against the world, the world against the child, the new against the old, the old against the new”. However, as the careful reader would immediately notice, the protective nature of education is crucial not only for the child but also for the world. And it is here where the revolutionary

potential of education appears on the stage. According to Arendt, every child is born with the new, with the power of natality, which renders them the revolutionaries of the next generation (1977: 193). Therefore, education paradoxically conserves what is new and revolutionary. But how does education achieve this goal if it is to be separated from politics, and more importantly, why should it be considered this way?

Higgins (2010: 403) argues that education for Arendt is a process through which the children are introduced to the world outside their homes. In other words, different from the general concept of *paideia*, she addresses the specific practice of schooling. To the extent that schools are not focused on maintaining the children's physical health and growth, they cannot be taken as a part of the private realm. However, as Arendt makes it clear, they could not be associated with the public either. Thus, schools are halfway institutions where “we interpose between the private domain of home and the world in order to make the transition from the family to the world possible at all” (Arendt, 1977: 188-189). This, in turn, causes both actors of the educational process, that is, the child and the teacher, to remain in an “in-between” stage.

Her argument for the in-betweenness of the children is pretty much straightforward. Schools' task is to introduce children to the world. As the bearers of “the new and the revolutionary”, the children need to learn about the past that the world presents to them today. However, Arendt's uneasiness stems from the contradiction between the two inherent capacities of the human condition: natality and plurality. Being born into this world is the actualization of natality. And with “each birth something uniquely new comes into the world” (Arendt, 1958: 178). It is in this sense that the children are the bearers of natality. It is their “miraculous” power that one day would save the world (Arendt, 1958: 247). However, despite its potency, the children's natality is threatened by human plurality, which essentially defines life in the public realm “as a distinct a unique being among equals” (Arendt: 1958: 178). There is a natural inequality between children and adults, which should be observed and protected at all costs. Considering that in Arendt's framework, politics necessarily belongs to the public realm, the children cannot be allowed to enter this sphere without protection. The public realm necessitates each of its members to be “seen and heard”, and thus “visibility and audibility are of prime importance” (Arendt, 1959: 47). Nonetheless, these criteria strictly apply to the equals. Clearly, no matter how powerful their natality is, the children cannot be present here, for they can withstand neither the sheer number nor the variety of human plurality. As a result, as Duarte (2010: 468) suggests, children's lives need to remain pre-political insofar as they are kept outside activities of the public realm.

This is precisely where the role of the teacher, which again presents another form of being in-between, begins. Without hesitation, Arendt states that teachers' lack of authority in the education system is the sole cause of the crisis. Thus, what needs to be done is reinstating this authority. What sounds like a very traditional view of education is, in fact, a much more nuanced analysis of the teachers' role. As Baluch (2020: 37) rightly points out, Arendt's notion of authority originates from an Aristotelian framework in the form of the old ruling over the young. In other words, her justification of authority is based on biological reductionism as opposed to the Platonic one built on the wise over the ignorant. In fact, Arendt takes the matter as far as to claim that the teacher's authority is not the same as her qualifications. While her qualifications consist of her knowledge and ability to instruct, this by itself cannot be the source of authority. To Arendt, what gives a teacher her authority is introducing a sense of responsibility for our shared common world to children.

This argument becomes apparent when Arendt strictly opposes the transformation of education into a realm where children are instructed in "the art of living". This approach of vocational training, in the name of providing children with specific skills and abilities for their future professional life, "is to use children as a means to a predefined end, and thereby rob them of the opportunity to shape the world" (Baluch, 2020: 43). So, the teacher's only way, and in fact the only responsibility, to familiarize the children with our world is to cultivate thinking. One could argue that after a troublesome discussion, Arendt brings us back to her understanding of the Socratic *paideia*. The teacher's in-betweenness lies in her dual position: she acquires a specific knowledge, but in her encounter with the children and their natality, it is not the knowledge that she could guide them with. Instead, she could only teach them what she does not know: the silent two-in-one dialogue present in each child. As discussed earlier, Arendt insists that thinking requires one to withdraw from the public realm. Only in solitude could one examine her opinions and create a chance to improve them. And this practice of thinking is what the children need to learn before engaging with the plurality existing in the public realm. In a roundabout and surprising fashion, Arendt's remarks about education bring us back to her Socratic roots and concern with preserving democratic politics. After all, her diagnosis for the crisis of education is that there is no longer any room to teach how to think. But she is well aware that democratic regimes can easily fall prey if they are not protected by questioning minds. Therefore, a return to Socratic principles of education is vital for the future of democracy. To do so, the Arendtian pedagogy needs to keep politics and equality as the fundamental democratic principle outside the classroom. Although ironic, the primary reason for such an endeavor can be explained by her view of childhood as a developmental phase and, hence, education as a domain for preparation. Coupled with her Aristotelian notion of a natural authority between

the old and young, Arendt leaves no room for questioning the political dimensions of educational processes and practices. Ultimately, while Arendt's arguments on education stem from her concern for preserving democracy, her educational project leaves the classroom outside democratic practice. It is on this last point that one needs to turn to Rancière and his ignorant schoolmaster.

3. FROM SOCRATIC MAIEUTICS TO THE IGNORANT SCHOOLMASTER

Since the translation of *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy* in 1999, Rancière has been a well-known figure among English-speaking academic circles. His theory of the political, which manifests the fundamental equality of all human subjects, is in radical contradiction to the daily workings of the polis order based on instituting and administering a hierarchical order. While his uncompromising analysis of contemporary politics positioned Rancière among the most vocal critiques of our age, his close interest in other disciplines, such as aesthetics, pedagogy, and history, distinguishes him from his contemporaries and provides prolific research topics besides political theory. However, calling Rancière among the highest ranks of radical democracy above all would not be an overstatement. Democracy as the only expression of radical equality of all men has been his main research topic since his doctoral thesis, *Nights of Labor: The Worker's Dream in Nineteenth-Century France*. In his discussions on democracy, Rancière has never been shy in pointing out that the principle of equality has been, first and foremost, a class issue. Thus, in his criticism of Plato, unlike Arendt, Rancière's aim is not only to reveal how, in the mind of the Athenian philosopher, democracy equates to a scandal but also to expose the class dimension inherent in the hatred of democracy. As a result, his analysis of the Greek philosopher unfolds on two grounds: one, rejecting the undisputed authority of knowledge over the plurality of political life, and two, opening up a discussion on the role of philosophy in the justification of class-based societies.

Similar to Arendt, Rancière's starting point is the division between philosophy and politics. According to him, mainstream Western philosophy has always excluded the latter. Plato was undoubtedly the first philosopher to do that with a "radical exceptionality". This first encounter between philosophy and politics defined their relationship as mutually exclusive, thanks to Plato. The polis had to be ruled by "either the politics of politicians or that of the philosophers" (Rancière, 1999: ix). Rancière called the Platonic framework of politics by the philosophers as "archipolitics", which involves replacing a democratic configuration of politics with "a community based on the complete realization of the *arkhê*" (Rancière, 1999: 65). In Plato's case, the *arkhê* in question is "total awareness" of each member's role in the name of a "geometric equality". In contrast to the vulgar arithmetic equality presiding over the commercial exchanges

of citizens, the geometric one implies a different counting and ordering of the parts of the polis. It ensures that the community is ordered by the common good, which is realized by safeguarding that each party is counted according to the respective values they bring to the polis. The outcome is a proportional division by submitting “the shares of the common held by each party in the community to the share that party brings to the common good” (Rancière, 1999: 6). For Rancière, this is an ingenious solution to the democratic scandal. Remember that for Plato, democracy is a regime run by ignorant masses. The problem with democratic demos is that in their claim to equality, they, indeed, leave out every distinguishing quality that makes us human beings. They are not particularly wise, courageous, or just. But more importantly, nor are they wealthy. This leaves us with the only remaining option: the democratic demos is the poor, the part of the polis, which therefore has no part in the arithmetic equality. This is precisely what makes them dangerous in Plato’s view. His solution, the geometric equality, then is a proposal of “inverse proportionality”. In the *Republic*’s ideal polis, where the wise rule over the ignorant, the former cannot have any material gold for themselves. The latter, then, can possess what is their own “on the condition of not interfering with the affairs of the community in any way” (Rancière, 1996: 66). Through the exclusion of the masses from the space and time that would even allow them to contest the social order, the *arkhê* of the archipolitics is achieved.

In *Hatred of Democracy*, Rancière (2006) refines his problematization of the Platonic archipolitics. This time, targeting the *Laws* rather than *the Republic*, he analyzes the order of the various titles to *arkhê*, i.e., legitimate claims to rule. Plato (*Laws* 690a-690b) presents seven titles, of which the initial four relate to birth - parent over children, old over young, master, master over slaves, and noble over commoner. The following two titles “express the nature if not birth” (Rancière, 2006: 39). The rule of the strong over the weak and the intelligent over the ignorant compose the justification of natural inequalities. Either by birth or by nature, all six titles are based on particular inequalities; thus, they are necessarily non-democratic. This is where the seventh title comes into the equation: “lucky is what we call the seventh sort of rule” (*Laws*, 960c). The last *arkhê* is obviously not a title but the drawing of lots, which requires “a people of equals deciding the distribution of places” (Rancière, 2006: 40). For Rancière, this constitutes the very scandalous nature of democracy. By precisely not being a title, it displaces all forms of entitlements that justify any form of ruling. His conclusion is striking: democracy is not a political regime. Instead, it is “the very institution of politics itself” (Rancière, 2001). With this analysis, Rancière’s presentation of Platonic archipolitics reaches its conclusion. For Plato, politics could only happen if it is replaced with philosophy and its consequent class-based regime.

Rancière's reckoning with Plato as the first anti-democratic philosopher neither begins here nor does he cease to raise his criticisms against him in his later writings. However, there is an interesting detail that one can easily overlook. Although in his two early works, *The Philosopher and His Poor* (originally published in 1983) and *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation* (originally published in 1987), Rancière engages with Socrates and his teachings, in the following books, the figure leaves his place to Plato and disappears almost completely. This detail is far from trivial. For Rancière, unlike Arendt, there is no other interpretation of Socrates and his teachings than we already find in Plato's work. In fact, at times, he seems to suggest that the line between the Socratic and the Platonic philosophy is too blurred to separate the two from one another.

Hence, it is no surprise that Socrates appears as the primary opponent when Rancière takes up the topic of democratic education. Rancière agrees with Arendt that the Socratic maieutic is a form of education in which the teacher feigns ignorance to provoke the student's capacity to think. However, what interests Rancière in the name of democratic education is not the aftermath effect of the pedagogic dialogue but rather the instant it takes place. Plato's *Meno* (82a- 85e) is an example that identifies the dynamics of Socratic teaching. There, he leads Meno's slave by merely asking questions to discover mathematical truths that already lie within himself. The purpose of this dialogue is, of course, to present the theory of recollection. Socrates wants to show Meno that man already possesses innate knowledge of ideas. All that is required is remembering them, which is what Socrates is seemingly helping Meno with. However, despite what appears to be a form of guidance, Rancière (1991: 29) argues that "Socrates interrogates in order to instruct". In the end, Meno's slave discovers nothing but his incapacity in two ways: without the teacher's superior knowledge, he cannot enable himself to discover truths, and even after that, he is still a slave. Therefore, in Socratic maieutic, Rancière finds only a pretense that aims to impose a program of antidemocratic geometric equality upon democratic demos. His take on Socrates is nothing like the Arendtian one that serves to cultivate one's soul in the plurality of opinions.

Then, how does one practice democracy in education? Considering that for Rancière, the Western philosophical tradition is susceptible to an anti-democratic tendency, it is not surprising that his example is someone with whom many of us are unacquainted: Joseph Jacotot. Rancière's interest in Jacotot originates from the pedagogical challenge that the French scholar faced when he took up a post at the University of Leuven: as an exiled teacher of French literature who did not speak Dutch, he was expected to teach Dutch-speaking students who did not know French at all. The lack of a common language pushed him to use an unconventional method. He assigned a bilingual edition of *Telemachus* and asked

students to learn the French text using its Dutch translation. Even though initially, his expectations from the students were very low, the results were utterly surprising: the students were performing the assigned tasks as well as any French student would have done. This led Jacotot to question his former methods that relied on transmitting his knowledge to bring students to his level of expertise (Rancière, 1991: 2-3). However, what happened showed that students did not require explanation or instruction. “They had learned by themselves, without a master explicator” (Rancière, 1991: 11). This unexpected discovery opened a new ground for Jacotot. Before this experiment, he had always considered a hierarchical relationship between the master’s and students’ intelligence. The former had to be the superior, organized, and questioning as opposed to the latter’s inferior, inexperienced, and uncritical existence. However, what he had discovered was not only negating this initial assumption but also revealing a relatively simple truth: all were equally intelligent. The distinction between the presumed types of two intelligence is nothing but a “pedagogical myth” (Rancière, 1991: 7). For Jacotot, the demystification could only be possible by replacing the central pedagogical paradigm with two new assumptions: First, one could teach what one does not know since to teach is not “to explain what you know to those who do not yet know it” (Hallward, 2005: 28). And second, this is only possible because “the same intelligence is at work in all the acts of the human mind” (Rancière, 1991: 6).

For Jacotot, this simple but striking conclusion, equality of all intelligence, is qualified by the capacity to learn one’s mother’s tongue without assistance or teacher’s explanations. The practical evidence of universal intelligence proves that learning does not depend on teachers’ transmission of their knowledge; instead, it requires students’ desire and the will to learn. Hence, Jacotot’s great lesson: Universal teaching, that is, “to learn something and to relate it to all the rest by this principle all man have equal intelligence” (Rancière, 1991: 18) leads the path to emancipation. Without a doubt, Rancière’s interest in Jacotot lies in the conjuncture of these three terms: knowledge, equality, and emancipation. In his rewriting of Jacotot, Rancière constantly brings our attention to the French teacher’s ascription to equality in learning and teaching. In other words, the significance of universal teaching lies beyond the limits of classroom experience. Jacotot’s case contains the gist of the definition of democratic politics, verifying the presupposition of equality. This presupposition is the exact antidote to the Platonic education. Its entire operating system relies on undercutting particular characters (or titles as in the *Laws*) that qualify and classify the *arkhês*. In that respect, to the extent that it is a rejection of existing classifications, the presumed equality is “in fact not so much to unify as to declassify, to undo the supposed naturalness of orders and replace it with the controversial figures of division” (Rancière, 2007: 32-33). Thus, one could conclude that the example of *The*

Ignorant Schoolmaster presents a case in which it is possible to disagree with all hierarchical divisions, particularly the one that begins with the presumption of the inequality of intelligence.

Rancière dedicated his ongoing intellectual journey to analyzing the ways through which the people could expand the experience of democratic politics. In that sense, it is only sensible that to him democracy, just like politics, must concern every possible human activity, ranging from aesthetics to education. Any separation between politics and different forms of human activities purports to exclude the people in the guise of a higher good. Therefore, it is clear that the Arendtian formulation of education as a separate realm from politics signifies a veiled anti-democratic tendency. In the end, Rancière does not hesitate to read Plato (and Socrates) and Arendt as two philosophers who think of ruling, commanding, and beginning as a particular type of action that qualifies some legitimate actors and disqualifies others. However, one crucial question remains that this study still needs to answer. Is there a radical difference between Arendt and Rancière, as the latter claims to have?

4. CONCLUSION

So far, this study has explored the divergent yet interconnected perspectives of Hannah Arendt and Jacques Rancière on the relationship between education and democracy. Both thinkers, while sharing an anti-Platonic stance, differ significantly in their interpretations concerning the role of politics in the educational realm. As shown, Arendt expresses an intense unease when matters of education are handled politically or vice versa. In her framework, the essence of the educational realm and its primary subjects, the children, is defined by natality, whereas the political realm is where the human plurality flourishes. An ill-equipped and timeless encounter between these two great qualities, she suspects, might result in the harming, if not the destruction, of the former by the latter. Hence, she argues not only for a sharp distinction between the two realms but also for the necessity of a strong figure of authority, a protective one, in the classroom. As discussed, this figure is none other than Socrates. Arendt, as a fervent anti-Platonic thinker, provides us with a different understanding of Socratic *paideia*, which establishes the educational realm as a pre-political and developmental phase for the newcomers of our shared world.

Put as such, the differences between Arendt and Rancière could not be more evident. While the former builds her understanding of politics on the separation between public and private, for the latter, this pertains to a disguised form of an exclusionary law designed to keep demos out of politics. When Arendt defends keeping education as an isolated realm for the protection of children, this only reinforces Rancière's suspicions concerning the concealed anti-democratic

agenda. And finally, Arendt's insistence on the necessity of authority in the classroom stands against the very principle of radical equality upon which Rancière's democratic project is built.

However, a more nuanced reading of the two thinkers might reveal that despite these apparent contradictions, their understanding of democratic education may not be that different after all. Such a reading would require a closer look at the two main figures of the classroom: the teacher and the student. For Arendt, as discussed in detail, the teacher's authority originates from being an in-between figure. As any teacher should have, she acquires specific knowledge, but in her encounter with the children, it is not the knowledge that she can guide them with. Instead, she could only teach them what she does not know: the silent two-in-one dialogue present in each child. This figure of authority, one might argue, is not far from how Rancière depicts the ignorant schoolmaster. For him, Jacotot's fundamental discovery was the supposition of the equality of the minds. Under this assumption, what he did was to teach them what he did not know. Similar to Arendt's Socrates, Rancière's ignorant master claims to know that he does know nothing -or that what he knows is not the subject of education. Moreover, Rancière's ignorant master's sole responsibility is to stimulate the students' intellects without instructing them. Undoubtedly, this is not what Rancière sees in Socrates's figure. However, for Arendt, it was precisely what Socrates was doing: raising doubt and awakening curiosity in the minds of his interlocutors. One might argue that the authority that the two thinkers attribute to the figure of the teacher originates from similar sources.

Closely related to the figure of the teacher is how the student is portrayed. The point of being in the classroom is never attaining the knowledge of a particular craft - on this, both Arendt and Rancière agree. Thus, the point of education is not to provide students with a set of skills or abilities but to empower their intellect. At least, this is what both Socrates and Jacotot try to the extent that the former always wishes to initiate an inner dialogue, and the latter invites his students to discover their own means of learning by leaving it totally to themselves. Neither of the approaches is a simple encouragement or a plain motivational strategy since both figures closely monitor the process with a common tool: incessant questioning. The Socratic empowerment in the Arendtian framework may look less active -after all cultivation of natality is a silent process, as opposed to Jacotot's students' endless evidence for unearthing their capacity of equal intelligence. But in the last instance, the empowerment of the students is only possible through their perceived equality. That is to say, for both Arendt and Rancière, education is a field of equality and, hence, democracy.

Returning to the question raised at the end of the previous section, this study concludes that both Arendt and Rancière strictly perceive education as a field of

democratic practice. Although the two thinkers seemingly fall into different categorizations concerning the relationship between education and politics, their construction of the roles in the classroom reveals that education pertains to a democratic relationship. There is, however, one crucial point that would set two thinkers apart regardless of their shared concerns with democratic education. When Arendt claims that the original need for authority in education lies in the natural inequality of children and adults, she sets the ground of her argument beyond critique. This is an idea that Rancière would always go against. In that regard, this study concludes that despite their complementary nature, a prospect for democratic education might require us to align more with Rancière than perhaps with Arendt.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arendt, Hannah (1951), *On the Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt Brace).

Arendt, Hannah (1958), *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

Arendt, Hannah (1959), "Reflections on Little Rock", *Dissent* 6 (1): 45-56.

Arendt, Hannah (1977), "The Crisis in Education", Arendt, Hannah (Ed.) *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Penguin Books): 173-196.

Arendt, Hannah (1978), *The Life of the Mind* (New York: Harcourt Brace).

Arendt, Hannah (1990), "Philosophy and Politics", *Social Research*, 57 (1): 73-103.

Arendt, Hannah (1990), *On Revolution* (London: Penguin Books).

Baluch, Faisal (2020), "Thinking with Arendt: Education and Temporality", Veck Wayne and Helen M. Gunter (Eds.), *Hanna Arendt on Educational Thinking and Practice in Dark Times* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic): 32-45.

Biesta, Gert (2010), "A New Logic of Emancipation: The Methodology of Jacques Rancière", *Educational Theory*, 60 (1): 39-59.

Biesta, Gert (2016), "Reconciling Ourselves to Reality: Arendt, Education, and the Challenge of Being at Home in the World", *Journal of Educational Administration*, 48 (2): 183-192.

Brooks, Thom (2008), "Is Plato's Political Thought Anti-Democratic", Kofmel Erich (Ed.), *Anti-Democratic Thought* (Exeter: Imprint Academic): 17-33.

Cowen, Robert (2000), "Nigel Grabt and Plato: A Question of Democratic Education", *Comparative Education*, 36 (2): 135-141.

Deranty, Jean-Philippe (2003), "Rancière and Contemporary Ontology", *Theory & Event*, 6 (4), DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1353/tae.2003.0010>.

Dikeç, Mustafa (2013), "Beginners and Equals: Political Subjectivity in Arendt and Rancière", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 38 (1): 78-90.

Duerte, Eduardo (2001), "The Eclipse of Thinking: An Arendtian Critique of Cooperative Learning", Mordechai Gordon (Ed), *Hannah Arendt and Education: Renewing Our Common World* (Oxford: Westview Press): 201-224.

Duarte, Eduardo (2010), "Educational Thinking and the Conservation of the Revolutionary", *Teachers College Record*, 112 (2): 488-508.

Duman, Musa (2021), "Rancière'in Temel Pedagojik Düşüncesi", *Erciyes Akademi*, 35 (3): 1153-1166.

Gordon, Haim (1989), "Learning to Think: Arendt on Education for Democracy", *The Educational Forum*, 53 (1): 49-62.

Gurley, Jennifer (1999), "Platonic *Paideia*", *Philosophy and Literature*, 23 (2): 351-377.

Halpern, Richard (2011), "Theater and Democratic Thought: Arendt to Rancière", *Critical Inquiry*, 37 (3): 545-572.

Hallward, Peter (2005), "Jacques Rancière and the Subversion of Mastery", *Paragraph*, 28 (1): 26-45.

Higgins, Chris (2010), "The Classroom Drama: Teaching as Endless Rehearsal and Cultural Elaboration", *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 44: 399-434.

Kamtekar, Rachana (2019), "Plato on Education and Art", Fine Gail (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Plato* (New York: Oxford University Press): 605-626.

Nixon, Jon (2020), *Hannah Arendt: The Promise of Education* (Cham: Springer).

Ober, Josiah (1989), *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology and the Power of People* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

O’Byrne, Anne (2005), “Pedagogy Without a Project: Arendt and Derrida on Teaching, Responsibility, and Revolution”, *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 24: 389-409.

Perica, Ivana (2019), “The Archipolitics of Jacques Rancière”, *Krisis*, 1: 15-26.

Plato (1968), *The Republic* (New York: Basic Books) (Trans. Allan Bloom).

Plato (1980) *The Laws* (Chicago: Chicago University Press) (Trans. Thomas L. Pangle).

Plato (1987), *Gorgias* (Indianapolis: Hackett) (Trans. Donald J. Zeyl).

Plato (2002), *Meno* (Indianapolis: Hackett) (Trans. George M. A. Grube).

Popper, Karl (1945), *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Vol. 1: *The Spell of Plato* (London: Routledge).

Possenti, Ilaria (2009), “*Paideia*. Hannah Arendt on Socrates and Critical Thought”, *Naharaim*, 3 (2), 200-217.

Rancière, Jacques (1989), *Nights of Labor: The Workers Dream in Nineteenth Century France* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press).

Rancière, Jacques (1999), *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

Rancière, Jacques (1991), *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

Rancière, Jacques (2001), “The Thesis on Politics”, *Theory and Event*, 5 (3).

Rancière, Jacques (2004), *The Philosopher and His Poor* (Durham: Duke University Press).

Rancière, Jacques (2006), *Hatred of Democracy* (London: Verso) (Trans. Steve Corcoran).

Rancière, Jacques (2007), *On the Shores of Politics* (London: Verso) (Trans. Liz Heron).

Santas, Gerasimos (2001), “Plato’s Criticism of the “Democratic Man” in the *Republic*”, *The Journal of Ethics*, 5 (1): 57-71.

Schaap, Andrew (2011), “Enacting the Rights to Have Rights: Jacques Rancière’s Critique of Hannah Arendt”, *European Journal of Political Theory*, 10 (1): 22-45.

Schaap, Andrew (2020), “Inequality, Loneliness, and Political Appearance: Picturing Radical Democracy with Hannah Arendt and Jacques Rancière”, *Political Theory*, 49 (1): 28-53.

Simons, Maarten, & Jan Masschelein (2011), *Ranciere, Public Education and the Taming of Democracy* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell).

Sophist (2024), <https://britannica.com/topic/Sophist-philosophy> (15.10.2024).

Subaşı, Erol (2021) “Jacques Rancière: Eğitim, Siyasal Olan ve Özgürleşimci Eşitlik”, *MSGSÜ Sosyal Bilimler* 23: 228-243.

Ünlü, Seval (2021), “Arendt ve Rancière’in Politik Düşünceleri Arasındaki Gerilim”, *Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi*, 9 (1): 199-218.

Türk, Duygu (2016), “Eşitlik, Özgürlük, Otorite: Arendt ve Rancière’i Karşılıklı Düşünmek”, *Mülkiye Dergisi*, 40 (3): 87-114.

Williams, Ieuan (2010), “Plato and Education”, Bailey Richard, Robin Barrow, David Carr and Christine McCarthy (Eds), *Philosophy of Education* (London: Sage Publications): 69-83.