

STATE VISIT OF PRESIDENT CEVDET SUNAY TO BRITAIN (1-8 NOVEMBER 1967)

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ABSTRACT

The State visit of the President of the Republic of Turkey to the United Kingdom took place from the 1st to the 8th of November, 1967. The President was accompanied by an official suite of 16, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his wife, three politicians from three different Turkish political parties, including one who was a former Ambassador in London and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and one who was a former Minister of Reconstruction, officials from the Foreign Ministry and the Presidential Office, and the Major-General commanding the War College. The purpose of the Turkish President's visit was to demonstrate Britain's interest in Turkey as an ally and an economically developing country in the process of democratisation. The Turks recognised the mainly symbolic nature of the visit, but for a number of reasons were somewhat apprehensive beforehand. The visit was, however, successful and the Turkish delegate was impressed by the hospitality of their hosts. The Turks were pleased to engage in political discussions of substance. The Turkish Press gave the British positive coverage, and the British Government hoped that some impact would be made on the Turkish people as a whole. The visit certainly made an impact on the President and his suite, who were impressed by the excellent planning and the traditional splendour. However, what surprised and pleased the Turks most of all was the ease of the relationships which they formed. They returned with a lot to think over, and the British Ambassador believed that the visit would help Anglo-Turkish relations.

Keywords: Cevdet Sunay, Turkey, Britain, Turkish Foreign Policy

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CUMHURBAŞKANI CEVDET SUNAY'IN İNGİLTERE ZİYARETİ

(1-8 KASIM 1967)

ÖZ

Türk-İngiliz ilişkileri her iki taraf için tarihin bütün dönemlerinde çok önemli olmuştur. Yine Türk-İngiliz ilişkileri tarihin derinliklerinde diğer ülkelerin aksine, genellikle ya çok iyi ya da çok kötü dönemler geçirmiştir. Özellikle, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti açısından Atatürk döneminde Türkiye ile o dönemde dünyanın en güçlü ülkelerinden birisi olan Birleşik Krallık ile ilişkileri büyük önem arz etmiştir. Dolayısıyla Türkiye'nin İngiltere ile ilişkileri diğer ülkelerle olan ilişkilerinden farklılıklar içermiştir. Türkiye'nin İngiltere ile ilişkileri hiçbir ülkeyle bu denli olumlu veya olumsuz kutupların uç noktalarında buluşmamıştır. Soğuk Savaş döneminde ise iki ülke arasındaki ilişkiler bu tarihi süreçteki olumlu dönemlerden birini oluşturmuştur. Bu dönemde üst düzeyde (devlet başkanları düzeyinde) karşılıklı ziyaretler gerçekleşmiştir. Cumhurbaşkanı Cevdet Sunay'ın ziyareti de bunlardan sadece biridir. 1-8 Kasım 1967'de Cumhurbaşkanı Cevdet Sunay İngiltere'ye resmi bir ziyarette bulundu. Cumhurbaşkanı'na eşi Atıfet hanımın yanı sıra dışişleri bakanı, harp okulu komutanı ile siyasi partilerden, dışişleri bakanlığından ve cumhurbaşkanlığından 16 kişilik bir heyet eşlik etti. Ziyaretin amacı, İngiltere'nin Türkiye'ye olan ilgisini göstermekti. Türk heyeti ziyaretin sembolik olduğunu biliyordu. Türk heyeti gösterilen misafirperverlikten oldukça etkilendi. Ayrıca Türk heyeti İngiliz mevkidaşlarıyla siyasi konularda konuşma fırsatı buldukları için de mutlu oldu. Ziyaret süresince bazı Türk gazetelerinin İngiltere hakkında olumlu haberler yapması da İngiliz yetkilileri mutlu etti. İngiliz yetkililer bu haberlerin Türk halkını İngiltere hakkında olumlu yönde etkileyeceğini düşündü. Zira ziyaret Cumhurbaşkanı ve mahiyetini oldukça etkiledi. Ayrıca bu ziyaret Türk-İngiliz ilişkilerini olumlu yönde de etkiledi. Sonuç olarak ziyaret gayet başarılı olmuştu.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Cevdet Sunay, Türkiye, İngiltere, Türk Dış Politikası

1. Purpose of the visit

The State visit of the President of the Republic of Turkey to the United Kingdom took place from the 1st to the 8th of November, 1967.¹ The President was accompanied by an official suite of 16, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his wife, three politicians from three different Turkish political parties, including one who was a former Ambassador in London and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and one who was a former Minister of

¹ *Milliyet*, 1 Kasım 1967. For short biography of Cevdet Sunay see Selçuk Duman, **Türklerde Devlet Başkanlığı, Başkanlık Tartışmaları ve Cumhurbaşkanlarımız**, Berikan Yayınevi, Ankara 2011, pp. 263-275.

Reconstruction, officials from the Foreign Ministry and the Presidential Office, and the Major-General commanding the War College. Nearly half of the group including the President himself and his wife, Atifet, spoke little or no English, although a few of these understood something or spoke a little French. Thus the language barrier was significant obstacle.²

State visits were common currency in Turkey. If all had gone according to plan, President Sunay would that year have made five, and he would have received four. There had been some criticism in the Opposition Press not only of the visits abroad made by the President but also of those made by the Prime Minister. Such criticism had been partly on the ground of the expense of these visits, and partly on the ground that the visitors would have been better employed at home. Nevertheless, there were signs that the Turkish Press and public had been flattered by some of these foreign trips and the ones with which the State visit to the United Kingdom was most likely to provoke comparison were those to President Johnson and President de Gaulle. The almost "morbidly sensitive" Turkish Press had, on each occasion, been on the lookout to see whether it could detect that Turkey had been in any way slighted, in the person of the President, by being accorded less than the highest possible honours. In this connection, the visit of the Ecumenical Patriarch to the Archbishop of Canterbury very shortly after the State visit aroused fears in the Turkish Government that comparisons might be made between the two visits. Fortunately, as it unfolded, the Patriarch's visit passed off relatively unnoticed by the Turkish Press.³

The purpose of President Sunay's visit was primarily to demonstrate the British Government's interest in Turkey as an ally and as a power of great and growing importance on the eastern flank of Europe. It was, as was pointed out at intervals during the visit by the Turkish Press, exactly a 100 years since the last occasion when a Turkish Head of State visited Britain⁴; and the Turks appreciated that a visit by the President to Her Majesty the Queen was intended as a gesture of goodwill, symbolic of the good relations between the two countries, rather than as an occasion for deep political discussions. At the same time, Turkey's importance to Britain on account of its geographical position and potentialities as a market for British exports made the visit timely. The fact that Turkey was a developing country in whose success Britain had a considerable stake, and which could serve as a

² PREM13/1884, "State Visit of President Sunay to Britain", from Sir Roger Allen to Mr. Brown, 7 December 1967. FCO9/614, Turkey: Annual Review for 1967, from Sir Roger Allen to Mr. Brown, 5 January 1968. *Milliyet*, 1 Kasım 1967. *Cumhuriyet*, 1 Kasım 1967.

³ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. *Milliyet*, 2 Kasım 1967. *Cumhuriyet*, 2 Kasım 1967.

⁴ In 1867, Sultan Abdulaziz visited Britain.

model for other countries in somewhat similar positions, justified an economic interest in its future; and its interest in Cyprus, in which Britain also still admitted an interest, formed a political link between Britain and Turkey from which events had shown how impossible it was to escape. Finally, Turkey's democratisation efforts in recent years (1960s) also seem to warrant recognition by Britain.⁵

Before the Turkish delegation's departure and immediately on its arrival, some slight signs of strain were noticeable. Not only was there the consciousness of the domestic Press "ready to snipe", if given the chance, but also there was a slight concern that their British hosts might prove a little difficult and demanding. As the British Ambassador stressed, "the detail with which the programme for the visit had been organised in advance and the efforts to secure particulars as far ahead as possible were alien to oriental ways of doing things. The fear, which other nations often seem to have, that Britain is the home of a protocol which is so rigid as to be sometimes almost incomprehensible, and so chilling as to give the impression that the visitors are not really welcome", was always Turkish minds. They were probably also conscious of the language barrier mentioned earlier, and of the "rather disparate elements" of the delegation. In addition, and quite apart from the special circumstances, "the Turks are a proud and sensitive people, more ready than most to take offence".⁶

The British Ambassador, Roger Allen, had researched this background in some detail because "the contrast between what they half feared and what they actually found helps one to understand why the visit was such a resounding success with the Turkish visitors." From the moment they arrived, and were met by Her Royal Highness Princess Alexandra and her husband in the pouring rain, they began to feel better. The arrival at Victoria Station impressed them also, because they could see the effort which had been made over their reception; and the carriage procession to Buckingham Palace, although the weather was inclement, was a unique occasion for them and the visitors were pleasantly surprised by the number of people and the Turkish flags to be seen in the streets. However what won over all the visitors was the first luncheon with Her Majesty the Queen and His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh and the Household at Buckingham Palace. "In Turkey and in Middle Eastern countries in my experience"; Allen said, "the really important people do not mingle much with the other guests on State occasions. The Turkish visitors were surprised and delighted to find

⁵ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. *Milliyet*, 2 Kasım 1967.

⁶ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. *Milliyet*, 1 Kasım 1967.

that this was not so on this occasion as regards the Queen and the Duke.” The State banquet in the evening completed and strengthened this impression since, despite the splendour of the occasion; the visitors found that they each had the chance of talking to members of the Royal Family. “I think it was this combination of formal procedure and personal accessibility which made the deepest impression on the Turks. Certainly, nearly all the members of the Turkish suite with whom I have had a chance to talk have emphasised the friendliness and indeed gaiety of this occasion.”⁷ This atmosphere set the tone of the visit.

2. Some of the highlights of the visit

Some of the highlights of the visit were as follows: On the first day, the brief visit to Westminster Abbey, impressed the Turks by the simplicity and sincerity of their reception by the Dean; on the second day the dinner at the Royal Artillery Mess at Woolwich was a great success, especially with the President, who, as an ex-gunner, felt himself pleasantly at home.⁸ The luncheon banquet at the Turkish Embassy on the third day, attended by the Queen and members of the Royal Family, obviously made the Turks extremely happy. A great deal of trouble had clearly been taken over it and they were naturally pleased that it seemed to go well. The Guildhall dinner in the evening was, after the State banquet, perhaps the most impressive event for the visitors and the one which they were most surprised to find themselves enjoying as much as they did. It was something rather outside the range of their expectations, and the President himself said to Roger Allen afterwards as they left: “As a military man, I have had to attend many ceremonies but that is the most magnificent of any I have ever seen.”⁹ The fourth day in Scotland was perhaps a little too heavy. The visitors enjoyed the country and were delighted by their contacts with the Scottish people, but they were a bit tired after the overnight train journey, and it was the only time when the British got at all seriously behind schedule. The result was that the visit to the Forth Bridge had to be cancelled. However, the Turks were impressed by the beauty of Edinburgh, and by the floodlit castle, and they were interested in the Palace of Holyrood house. The visit to the Royal Observatory was, from the President’s point of view, a great success, and the ensuing luncheon at Lennoxlove also gave great pleasure, since the Turks who were invited “felt that they were being admitted to British country life in a family house.” The visit to the nuclear power station at Dungeness, after

⁷ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. *Milliyet*, 1 Kasım 1967.

⁸ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. *Milliyet*, 2 Kasım 1967.

⁹ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. *Milliyet*, 3 Kasım 1967.

the return from Scotland, was well organised and was enjoyed despite the absence of technical knowledge of all the visitors. The President, nevertheless, managed to ask some quite shrewd questions relating to the possible future interest of Turkey in constructing its own power station. Finally, the dinner at Hampton Court on the last evening, at which George Brown, the British Foreign Secretary, was the host, also pleased and impressed the visitors.¹⁰ Roger Allen also added a few “rather disconnected” observations on the visit as a whole. As he had indicated, the Turks accepted that the visit was mainly a goodwill gesture, but the facts that the President was able to have political talks with the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, followed by a luncheon at No. 10 Downing Street, and that the Turkish Foreign Minister had a discussion with George Brown, the British Foreign Secretary, gave the visit a just sufficient political flavour for the Turks to make it even more worthwhile, from the point of view of their public opinion.¹¹

3. Meeting Between Cevdet Sunay and Harold Wilson

Cevdet Sunay¹² had a meeting with Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, at number 10 Downing Street on 6 November at noon. In an initial exchange of courtesies, President Sunay expressed his thanks to the British Government for all they had done in planning and arranging the programme of the State Visit. Turning to business, President Sunay remarked on the long ties between Britain and Turkey, the importance of Turco-British relations, especially since the creation of the Turkish Republic, and the close sympathy between the two countries which had been made clear during his visit. He said that it would be a great pleasure to see Her Majesty the Queen and the Prime Minister in Turkey. He proposed to explain to the Prime Minister the main features of the present situation in Turkey and then to explain the Turkish attitude over the European Economic Community, NATO, the Middle East and the problem of Cyprus.¹³

As regards the situation in Turkey, President Sunay said that two centuries of efforts to have a lasting democratic government were now

¹⁰ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. *Milliyet*, 4 Kasım 1967.

¹¹ *Milliyet*, 6 Kasım 1967.

¹² For more information about Cevdet Sunay see Faik Yeni, *Cevdet Sunay*, Ankara 2008. Also see Ercüment Ercan, *V. Cumhurbaşkanı Cevdet Sunay (1899-1982)*, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Kırıkkale 1998. For Cevdet Sunay's speeches and states see *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Beşinci Cumhurbaşkanı Cevdet Sunay'ın Söylev ve Demeçleri (28 Mart 1966-28 Mart 1973)*, Ankara 1978.

¹³ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. *Milliyet*, 6 Kasım 1967; *Cumhuriyet*, 6 Kasım 1967.

yielding results. The Demirel Government of that time was very stable and economic development was taking place rapidly. Turkey had become a factor of stability, and this opened for the country the opportunity to do useful services not only in its own region, but in the world as a whole.¹⁴

Turning to the European Economic Community, President Sunay said that Turkey, herself indisputably a western country, regarded the Community as very important for the future of the European continent of which she was part. The United Kingdom should be included in the Community and Turkey herself wished to obtain soon the status of full membership.¹⁵

Regarding NATO, President Sunay said that the reasons for the defensive system of the alliance still existed, despite signs of détente between East and West. The economy of the Soviet Union was now more focussed on the needs of the Soviet people than it ever had been. This, together with the Sino-Soviet dispute, made it much less easy for the Soviet Government to embark on aggressive ventures. Yet Turkey did not consider that the Russians were “purged of their historical ambitions” or that they had become harmless.¹⁶ Soviet tactics were different, but not their aims. It was therefore important to maintain the defences of the West and the military integration achieved in NATO.

President Sunay then spoke about the Middle East.¹⁷ Turkey had been watching the situation very closely since the Arab-Israel war in June 1967. Not only was Turkey closely concerned with the region for geographical reasons, but Turkish security would also be endangered if tensions in the area grew and peace was once more upset. Besides, if the extreme instability of the region continued, relations between the West and the countries of the region would deteriorate, which would help the Soviet Government in their aims. Turkey had therefore attached great significance in 1960s to its relations with Middle Eastern countries. A solution to the Middle East problem was necessary and would be helpful to world peace, but the situation was worsening from day to day. The attitude of Israel was uncompromising and its policies were based on force. It seemed determined to resort to retaliation at every opportunity. This could be harmful to its

¹⁴ For more information about Demirel’s government see Feroz Ahmad, **Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye, 1945-1980**, Hil Yayınları, İstanbul, 2010, pp. 287-399.

¹⁵ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. Britain’s adherence to the European Economic Community see Rıdvan Karluk, **Avrupa Birliği (Kuruluşu, Gelişmesi, Genişlemesi, Kurumları)**, Beta Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011, pp. 85-88.

¹⁶ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614.

¹⁷ For Turkey’s policy towards the Middle East see Baskın Oran (ed.), **Türk Dış Politikası**, C. I: 1919-1980, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003, pp. 784-808.

long-term interests. Turkish contacts with the Arab leaders, during the King of Jordan's visit to Turkey and the Turkish Prime Minister's visit to Iraq, and during the Turkish Foreign Minister's visit to New York in September 1967, had left the Turkish Government with the impression that the Arab leaders were much more moderate than previously.¹⁸ This factor made the Turks feel justified in refusing to accept the uncompromising attitude of Israel.

President Sunay expressed fears about a new crisis in the Middle East. The Arabs were rapidly re-arming themselves or being armed. It was high time to achieve a just peace through elimination of the factors which had caused the last war, and the Great Powers and others interested should make every effort in this direction. But an imposed solution could not succeed. One acceptable to both parties must be found. It was advantageous that Britain had been showing more understanding towards the Arab countries, because, if the Western countries seemed opposed to, or uninterested in, the Arab position, it would have a bad effect.¹⁹

Turning to Cyprus²⁰, President Sunay said that the meeting in September 1967 between the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers had been helpful in enabling each government to learn the views of the other at a high level. The Turkish Government was sincere in its desire for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem, in accordance with the principles which had been stated previously. However, the Greek Government seemed uncompromising on their insistence on Enosis. In fact the agreements still in operation precluded both the proposals for Enosis which the Greek Government had previously advanced, and those for partition which the Turkish Government had advanced. After going on to say that he saw no future in the idea of a solution imposed by the "victory" of one side over the other, President Sunay observed that Turkey's interest in a peaceful solution and its willingness to talk did not mean that her patience would be endless. Provocations, efforts to create *faits accomplis* and inhuman pressures all created difficulties for Turkey. President Sunay then said that any government which trampled on its own constitution stood condemned, and that he thought that Turkey and Britain both considered that the relevant

¹⁸ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614.

¹⁹ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614.

²⁰ For more information about Cyprus issue see Cihat Göktepe, **British Foreign Policy towards Turkey, 1959-1965**, Frank Cass, London, 2003. Oran, Op. Cit., pp. 718-749. **Cumhuriyet**, 7 Kasım 1967.

international agreements were still in full force.²¹

Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, thanked President Sunay for his exposition. The manner of his speech like the State Visit itself (which was by common consent a great success) had underlined the close ties between Britain and Turkey and the wide areas of common interest. Britain and Turkey were allies in CENTO²² as well as in NATO. Wilson had welcomed President Sunay's expression of loyalty to NATO, and agreed with him that the need to keep the alliance strong was as great as ever. Wilson also said that he had been encouraged by President Sunay's remarks about the Turkish attitude to the European Economic Community, which the British Government shared.²³

Wilson said that the gravest problem which Britain and Turkey faced together was that of the Middle East. Britain and Turkey had a common interest in bringing about a peaceful and early solution, and it had to be a comprehensive solution which would remove the causes of tension, not just patch things up temporarily. Wilson said that he agreed that more moderation and restraint was being shown by the significant leaders of the Arab countries, but that some were still taking an uncompromising line.²⁴

One of the most important developments had undoubtedly been the attitude adopted by President Nasser at the Khartoum Conference and the clear indications that some of the leading Arab countries, notably the United Arab Republic (UAR) and Jordan, might agree to a balanced Security Council Resolution on the Middle East, not very far removed from that tentatively agreed by the Russians and the Americans at the end of the Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. There was a clear change from the Arab attitude towards this in July 1967. Arab acquiescence in such a Resolution would have meant that they were accepting the right of Israel to live in peace and security.²⁵

Wilson continued to say that moderation had carried the day at

²¹ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, London, 1980, pp. 160-167.

²² For the Baghdad Pact and CENTO see Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, *The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defence Policies in the Middle East, 1955-1959*, Routledge, London, 2013. Also see Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, *Ortadoğu'da Soğuk Savaş ve Emperyalizm*, IQ Yayınları, İstanbul, 2007.

²³ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614.

²⁴ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614.

²⁵ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. Lenczowski, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 536-549.

Khartoum only on the basis that early results could be expected. If these were not obtained there would be a return to extremism with all its attendant dangers. In New York, Britain was urging the need for quick agreement in the Security Council on the basis of a balanced Resolution. An Israeli withdrawal would be balanced by a real acknowledgment on the part of the Arabs of the right of Israel to live in peace and security. If such a resolution were to be more than a mere declaration and were to constitute a means of reaching a settlement, the British Government thought it essential that a Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations should proceed to the Middle East at the earliest possible moment.²⁶

Wilson mentioned the desirability of an early re-opening of the Suez Canal, saying that any permanent settlement should include the right of all nations to pass through the Canal, and a settlement of the refugee problem. Wilson added that there were problems of oil supplies still to be settled, involving the attitude of Syria and Iraq. Concluding his remarks on the Middle East, Wilson said that he hoped that the general stability of the area would be helped by the recent decision which Brown, the British Foreign Secretary, had announced on Aden. This matter had long poisoned relations between Britain and the UAR, but Brown would be able to tell Çağlayangil, the Turkish Foreign Minister, later something about the prospect of a resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries following the visit of Sir Harold Bealey to Cairo.²⁷

Regarding Cyprus, Wilson said that the meeting between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers had been disappointing; adding that he hoped the Turkish Government would not be too discouraged. It seemed clear that no quick solution was going to be found, and the British Government thought that the Turkish Government should closely maintain their relations with Greece. Meanwhile, the British Government saw other possibilities to progress, especially anything which would improve the local situation in Cyprus.²⁸ The British Government had been glad to see that the communiqué after the Greek-Turkish talks mentioned the importance of taking measures to prevent the increase of tension in Cyprus.

Wilson knew that there had been a recent incident which had aroused anxiety and had already been discussed by Brown and Çağlayangil. Wilson said that the British Government continued to support, as did the Turkish Government, the efforts being made by Sir Bibiano Osorio-Tafall, UN Special Representative in Cyprus, for “normalization” in the island.

²⁶ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614.

²⁷ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. Lenczowski, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 556-561, 707-727.

²⁸ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. Lenczowski, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 160-167.

Although limited, Archbishop Makarios' "peace plan" seemed to the British Government a useful first step in this context. Meanwhile, the work of the United Nations force in Cyprus was still vital. Its size could not safely be reduced at this time, but there was increasing difficulty in maintaining support from the contributors.²⁹

Taking up President Sunay's reference to the Treaties, Wilson said that the British Government regarded the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee as valid. He added that, as a commonwealth partner of Cyprus and the ally of Turkey and Greece, Britain's position remained that the British Government was ready to help in promoting any settlement that seemed likely to prove acceptable to all the parties concerned.³⁰

After Wilson had enquired whether Brown would like to say anything at this point, Brown said that there were two matters on which he would like to comment briefly. First, he had three points regarding NATO. He agreed very much with the way President Sunay had formulated the problems facing the alliance, and thought that Britain and Turkey should work through the *Harmel* exercise to rationalise the alliance without weakening its military capacity. Secondly he thought the British should make a reality of the new NATO Nuclear Planning Group, the meeting of which at Ankara had gone off well. Thirdly, the British should watch closely on future developments in view of the uncertainty (to put it no higher) about what would be the French attitude in 1968/1969.³¹

On the Middle East, Brown said that he had been very worried a few days previously over the time being lost as a result of disputations between members of the Security Council, and that a consensus on an acceptable Resolution could not emerge. However, the situation was decidedly more promising. It seemed possible that a balanced Resolution would emerge in which both sides might acquiesce if pushed hard enough by those close to them, and on the basis of which effective operations on the ground, should be possible. Much depended on two things: The Israelis were not to "toughen it up"; and King Hussein was to maintain his "partnership" with President Nasser and carry him along. The British Government were in touch with all the parties concerned and would be grateful for all the help which their Turkish colleagues could give in New York in bringing home to members of the Security Council the urgency of reaching agreement.³²

4. Some remarks on the visit

²⁹ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614.

³⁰ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614.

³¹ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614.

³² PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. Lenczowski, Op. Cit., pp. 448-470.

Generally speaking, the Turks were pleased and greatly impressed by the excellent planning of the whole trip and, once preliminaries had been settled, by the remarkable absence of fuss. A comment by the President illustrates one aspect of this: he remarked to Allen on the contrast between the smooth but almost silent passage cleared for his car by the police motorcycle escort and the “appalling din and confusion” which had accompanied him everywhere in the United States. The President, indeed, took an intelligent interest in everything shown to him, and his observations were, according to Roger Allen, usually very much to the point. For example, in replying to Brown’s speech at Hampton Court, Sunay was quick in picking up Brown’s allusion to Nasrettin Hodja and casting his own Foreign Minister as the Hodja’s wife. Indeed, his own speeches throughout the visit, though not in any way outstanding, contained a certain amount of substance and Roger Allen believed he was pleased that the Queen in her speech at the state banquet included a number of allusions not only to past history but also to current and recent events in Turkey. Reverting for the moment to the planning the visit, Roger Allen remarked that he should pay tribute to the efforts made by the visitors to conform to the arrangements and in particular to display punctuality that is not always to be found in Turkish life.³³

The Turkish press reported positive accounts of the British. Before and during the visit, the papers published a large number of photographs and articles on different aspects of Anglo-Turkish relations through which ran the theme that, in spite of differences in the past, the two countries regarded each other as reliable allies. For this, credit belonged to the careful preparations made by Allen’s information officer and his section. The information officer could be especially pleased that the two biggest Istanbul papers, usually difficult to penetrate, took the lead. Each day’s events in the programme were well reported and comment throughout was extremely friendly and, on the whole, realistic.³⁴

Conclusion

Roger Allen stated that the British may therefore hope that some impact has been made on the Turkish people as a whole. He was quite certain that an “ineffaceable impact” was made on the President and his suite and believed they have come away with quite a different impression of Britain from that which they had previously. The excellence of the planning, and the traditional splendour of many of the occasions during the visit, which the

³³ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. *Milliyet*, 6 Kasım 1967.

³⁴ PREM13/1884. FCO9/614. *Milliyet*, 1-8 Kasım 1967.

visitors greatly appreciated, were not entirely unexpected by them. However, the friendliness with which they were met throughout, and the ease of the relationships which they formed, was something that George Allen believed did surprise them. They returned to Turkey with a lot to think about and George Allen believed that the results of this visit would help both sides in maintaining Anglo-Turkish relations. "Perhaps I may conclude with the comment to me of one of the political visitors, who comes from a remote corner of Eastern Turkey and who was one of the more prickly members of the party. While we were waiting in the hall of Buckingham Palace before the President left the Palace on the third day, he came up to me and said: "There is one thing I particularly want to say to you. Hitherto, I have never really understood the purpose of a monarchy; now, I see the point."³⁵ Roger Allen concluded that the Turks would be impatient to welcome the Queen to Turkey and have an opportunity of returning hospitality. In return for President Cevdet Sunay's visit to the United Kingdom in 1967, the Queen Elizabeth II visited Turkey on 18-25 October 1971.

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