

Perception Patterns: The Case of Armenia and Azerbaijan The Missing Component of the Security Dilemma Concept

Algılama Kalıpları: Ermenistan ve Azerbaycan Vakası

Güvenlik İkilemi Konseptinin Eksik Bileşeni

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Abstract

This article seeks to contribute to the security dilemma concept by exploring ideational components of its mechanism. To achieve this goal, it focuses on the effects of the formative events on the cultural products, motivational dynamics (fear, hatred, and enmity), and identity formation by conducting a case study. The article examines the construction of anarchy by employing a constructivist approach, which was regarded as the source of ‘uncertainty’ driving to the security dilemma by the realist mainstream. It demonstrates that the ‘perception patterns,’ which is the result of the accumulation of the past lessons, play a key role in recognition of other actors’ intent and construction of anarchy and offers a more explanatory concept.

Keywords: Security Dilemma, Past Lessons, Fear, Hatred, Enmity, Identity Formation, Threat Construction.

Öz

Bu makale, Güvenlik İkilemi konseptinin işleyiş mekanizmasının düşünsel faktörleri araştırarak söz konusu konseptin geliştirilmesine katkı sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu maksatla, toplum hayatını şekillendirici tarihsel olayların kültürel araçlar, yönlendirici dinamikler (korku, nefret ve düşmanlık) ve toplumsal kimlik oluşumuna etkilerine vaka analizi yöntemi ile odaklanmaktadır. Realist akımın, Güvenlik İkileminin sebebi olarak gördüğü ‘emin olamama-belirsizlik’ durumunun kaynağı olan anarşinin oluşmasını konstrüktivist yaklaşımla irdeleyen makale, geçmiş olaylardan alınan derslerin zaman içerisinde birikmesi sonucu oluşan ‘algı kalıplarının,’ diğer aktörlerin niyetlerinin belirlenmesinde ve anarşinin oluşmasında anahtar bir rol oynadığını ortaya koyarak Güvenlik İkilemi mekanizmasının işleyişini daha iyi açıklayabilecek bir konsept sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler:Güvenlik İkilemi, Tecrübeler, Korku, Nefret, Düşmanlık, Kimlik Oluşumu, Tehdit Algılama.

Introduction

The security dilemma is a central theme of security studies and is also an important aspect in the examination of threat construction and alliance formation. Although many scholars have extensively studied the security dilemma, we cannot say that its mechanisms have been fully explored.

Scholars have examined its motives (anarchy, uncertainty, fears about each other’s intentions, and power accumulation) and outcomes (insecurity spiral, conflict, alliance formation, war). However, they usually fail to explore the causal and constitutive relations between these driving factors. Most studies examine the material aspects of the security dilemma; comparatively, little effort has been devoted to studying its ideational aspects. This approach has prevented us from developing a more thoroughly explanatory concept.

Jervis (1976, p.62) specified ‘the anarchic context of international relations’ as the ‘heart of the security dilemma’ and underlined the role of mutual beliefs in the perception of threat.¹ Many successive scholars have pointed to ‘uncertainty,’ ‘fear of being exploited’ and ‘power aggregation’ as the primary basis of a security dilemma. However, they also fail to explain the construction/development of anarchy, beliefs, and fears. Moreover, they do not provide insight into the source of the state’s motives and the rationale behind the classification of states as ‘security seeker’ or ‘greedy.’

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In this context, the realist approaches depict a world where states do not consider unit-level characteristics and regional dynamics. They assume that states are operating in a vacuum with no past interactions, and neglect the formation of collective memory, culture, beliefs, and identities. However, it is apparent that each state has a personality defined by various attributed labels, as well as preconceived impressions of other states. Therefore, we cannot argue that there simply exists an ‘uncertainty,’ and any changes in material capacity or action will automatically trigger a security dilemma. By considering Wendt’s argument that ‘anarchy is what states make of it,’ focus should be placed on analyzing the construction of anarchy, beliefs, and knowledge to identify and define the missing component of the concept.

The process behind the identification of ideational factors needs to investigate the effects of past lessons on the formation of a state’s culture, identity, and motivational dynamics (fear, hatred, and enmity). This study assumes that past experiences impact the development of the cultural products that shape motivational dynamics and identities (enmity/amity, fear, and hatred). The interplay of these factors then generates patterns of ‘standard reasoning’ that are employed to interpret the behavior of other societies/groups. The study suggests that each society and state have these pre-constructed ‘sets of knowledge’ called ‘perception patterns,’ which play a decisive role in the formation of a security dilemma. Exploring it as a new component of the operational mechanism opens new avenues to advance present concepts and research on threat construction as well as securitization.

Method/Research Design

To identify the construction of the perception patterns and their roles in the formation of the security dilemma, I will employ a case study method and analyze the derived data through Qualitative Content Analysis and Objective Hermeneutics. This study’s research question aligns with the research goal, asking how to affect past lessons the threat perception. Since the trigger of security dilemma is the sense of threat arising, according to the realist understanding, from the material factors, this research question fits my purpose that seeks to identify the role of ideational factors in the threat construction. In this regard, this study will strive to shed light on the causal and constitutive links among past lessons, motivational dynamics (fear, hatred, and enmity) and identity formation. The article will be developed according to the following steps:

In the first part of this section, the article will briefly study the existing literature on the security dilemma and past lessons (learning from history) before proceeding to the case study. In the second part of this section, I will conduct an exploratory case study by examining formative events which affected Armenian and Azerbaijani societies throughout the last century. The case study aims to derive insights by employing in-depth analysis that will constitute empirical evidence for the explanation of the perception patterns and their role in the formation of the security dilemma. During the analysis phase, I will also examine the speeches of the prominent elites and use data derived from several interviews as well as surveys by performing the content analysis to increase the reliability of research.

In the third section (findings), the implications of these past lessons derived from the formative events will be interpreted with the help of insights derived from constructivist research to demonstrate the effects of the past lessons on identity formation and motivational dynamics.

In the final section (discussion), the study will define the causal and constitutive mechanism of the security dilemma and suggest an explanatory concept for the operating mechanism of the security dilemma.

The Historical Progress of The Security Dilemma Concept

In broad terms, the security dilemma is a concern for an actor's own security. Different scholars refer to various descriptions and aspects of it as explained below:

Herz (1951, p.157), who first coined the term 'security dilemma,' claims uncertainty and anxiety as to his neighbors' intentions as the source of a security dilemma. Herz asserted that the instinct of self-preservation fostered by uncertainty leads states to accumulate more power.

Butterfield's work (1951, pp.19-22) contains six propositions about security dilemma: a. its ultimate source is fear, which is derived from the 'universal sin of humanity,' b. it requires uncertainty over others' intentions, c. it is unintentional in origin, d. it produces tragic results, e. it can be exacerbated by psychological factors, and f. it is the fundamental cause of all human conflicts.

Jervis (1976) defines the security dilemma as follows: 'The heart of the security dilemma argument is that an increase in one state's security can make others less secure, not because of misperceptions or imaged hostility, but because of the anarchic context of international relations.'

According to Jervis (1976, pp. 62-76; 1978, pp. 172, 211-213), the source of the security dilemma is the anarchical structure of international politics (the fear of being exploited). According to him, the offense-defense balance and differentiation determine the magnitude and nature of a security dilemma. In this sense, Jervis (1976, p.76) describes the security dilemma as 'a spiral model' that arises from the competition for more security. The most fundamental contribution of Jervis is that he considers both material factors and perceptual factors as the drivers of a security dilemma.

Glasser (1997) examines some critique raised against Jervis's concepts and states that the greedy-states criticism should be taken into account for refinement of the concept.

Adler and Barnett (1998b) argue that the existence of a security community in a region prevents the formation of a security dilemma due to the formation of a collective identity and shared security interests.

Mitzen (2006, p.342) relates the security dilemma to ontological security needs and explains the effects of identity on the construction of a security dilemma. According to Mitzen (2006, p.343), realists fail to show the effects of identity on conflicts, since they cannot recognize the socially constructed dimension of identity.

Tang (2009) attempts to promote a more rigorous definition of the security dilemma and points out anarchy, lack of malign intentions, and power accumulation as the three essential aspects of a genuine security dilemma. Tang (2009, p.622, 623) also suggests that scholars should conduct further research on the role of fear and analogical reasoning in the construction of a security dilemma.

Wendt (1999, p. 261, 281) argues that the domestic/regional/systemic culture of anarchy plays a determinant role in the perception of other's intentions and the construction of a security dilemma. He (1999, p. 247, 250) calls these structures Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures of anarchy respectively. According to him (1999, p.269), a Hobbesian situation, where states sense aggressive intention, is prone to compel states 'to engage in the deep revisionist behavior.'ⁱⁱ Based on Wendt's concept, Table 1 below shows that the regional and systemic cultures of anarchy and the dominant security paradigm are the key factors in the formation of a security dilemma and perception of others' intentions. As can be inferred from the table, a Hobbesian culture tends to create the necessary conditions for the prevalence

of the security dilemma, while a matured Lockean and Kantian culture restrains the generation of such conditions and has the potential to prevent the formation of a profound and lasting security dilemma.

Table 1: The Relationship between Culture and Security Dilemma, Source: Wendt, 1999

Culture of Anarchy	Hobbesian	Lockean	Kantian
Security Dynamics/ Constructed Belief	Enmity, fear, and hatred	Mistrust and caution	Trust and cooperation
Security Paradigm	Self-help	Other-help	Common-help
Interpretation of other's intention by	Worst Case	Common sense	The rule of law

Past Lessons and Effects on Culture, Dynamics, and Identities

As Houghton (1996, p.545) rightly puts forth, drawing on experience is commonly used by humans to comprehend present problems. This phenomenon is known as ‘learning from history’ in international politics (Khong, 1992, p.6). Individuals use specific cognitive shortcuts and schemata to facilitate comprehension of the developments affecting them. Individuals use them as a comparison vehicle to make correct decisions. Once schemata are constructed in mind, it is hard to erase even in the face of contradicting evidence (Khong, 1992, p.223). Like individuals, societies also are prone to refer and internalize collective schemata and analogies generated from past lessons. They persevere them even in the face of disconfirming evidence (Reiter, 1996, p.30, 31).

Reiter (1996, p.1, 35) and Levy (1994, p.279) argue that past lessons and inferences from experience are the most determinant factors shaping international political actions and rhetoric since past lessons directly affect the belief systems of politicians and polity. How do policymakers use past experiences? Khong (1992, p.34, 35) articulates that they have ‘a repertoire of analogies.’ When policymakers face a problem, they turn to the repertoire of analogies and use the most fitting analogy that presents superficial similarities to the current problem. In this regard, politicians tend to attach great importance to the similarities and neglect to recognize the objective nature of certain situations, since their belief systems are manipulated by cognitive biases.ⁱⁱⁱ These cognitive biases are the primary causes of threat misperception by leaders since they distort the logical interpretation of the environment (Larson, 1985, p.53). Over the years, the inferences (sometimes false views) have acquired the power of myth, which generate implications for the conduct of the contemporary state foreign policies and perception of others (Hunter, 2006, p.14). Thus, we can conclude that myths, analogies, and schemata constitute the basis for the other cultural products and motivational dynamics.

Negative past lessons accumulate throughout years and serve in the construction of the conflicting cultures and identities, since actors generate non-compatible values and belief systems that determine their motivational dynamics and interests thus they affect the exercise of national foreign policy (Faure, 2009, p.507; Katzenstein, 1996, p.2; Sampson, 1987, p.384). On the contrary, positive past lessons pave the way for the generation of the similar cultural products that enable the prevalence of a cooperative security paradigm reducing states’ motivation for power maximization as well as it drives them to form a collective identity (Kupchan, 2010, p.65).^{iv} Culture also plays a key role in the formation of the type of decision-making unit in a state (Crawford, 2000, p.139). Some cultures tend to generate a

‘predominant decision maker,’ whereas other cultures tend to generate a ‘single-group decision maker’ (Sampson, 1987, p.404). Therefore, culture affects in many ways the foreign policymaking.

Wendt (1999, p.141, 246, 274) claims that culture creates causal and constitutive effects on the formation of a state’s various identities. Analysis of the culture of anarchy provides us with a new and beneficial angle of approach. The keystone of this analysis is the addition of structures classified by dominant role identity (such as enemy, rival, and friend). The prevailing culture of anarchy defines the context of the interplay among actors in a political system because it gives meaning to their beliefs, power, and interests.

Case Study

Considering the assumptions of Khong and Reiter on the past lessons as well as Wendt’s conceptualization of identity, this study seeks to explore the effects of the successive formative events on the construction of motivational dynamics and identities. Thus, I expect to identify linkages leading to a security dilemma. In this regard, the article will examine Armenian and Azerbaijanian past interplays with a focus on the formative events and their effects.

The investigation of the interplay between Armenia and Azerbaijan offers many advantages. First, the region is and was an arena of imperial/Great Powers clashes which created sensitiveness to the past events and unique linkages between small states and Great Powers; second, the region and people are culturally sensitive and emotional, thus, this peculiarity seems promising to explore the effects of the past lessons on the fear, hatred and enmity construction; third, the South Caucasus nations are still in an evolving process they form new identities or change their identities; finally, the existence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict functions such as mirror that reflects visibly the contradicting motivational dynamics and identities.

In the next part, I will review the main literature on the formative events and underline only their major effects due to the space limitation.

Formative events

1877-78 Ottoman-Russo war (ignite)

This event made an enormous impact on the life of ordinary people. The consequences of this war shaped the course of the following events.

1894-6 Uprisings (flare up). The riots and uprisings continued in a chain of events that lasted for two years in different places (Dadrian, 1995, p.156). The figure of exterminated people varies between 50,000 and 300,000 Armenians (Melson, 1982, p.489).

1905 Crisis and 1905-7 ‘Tatar -Armenian War’ (spill out)

The oil boom that began in the mid-19th century in Baku caused social fragmentation due to the uneven distribution of wealth. The simmering antagonism between the two communities turned into full-scale fighting.

1915 Incidents (burn)

The rapid advance of Russian troops on the eastern front excited some radical Armenians, and they initiated a general uprising throughout Eastern Anatolia in January 1915 (Van der Leeuw, 1998, p.91). Under these circumstances, the Ottoman government decided to deport the Armenian population living in Eastern Anatolia into other provinces of the Empire to secure the rear area of the army. However, the implementation of the executive order of the Ottoman government was problematic.

Sovietization (suppression of nationalism)

Both nations experienced a short period of independence between 1918 and 1920. The Red Army had gradually invaded Azerbaijan and Armenia between April and December 1920 respectively (Kazemzadeh, 1951, p.285).

The Disintegration of the Soviet Union (revitalization of the nation-state)

The disintegration of the Soviets in 1991 created many economic, social, and political problems. The political environment in the Caucasus was similar to the political atmosphere in 1917 (Forsyth, 2013, p.647).

Nagorno Karabakh (awakening of a suppressed conflict)

After the collapse of the Soviets, frequent clashes between the two ethnicities intensified, and the mutual hatred reached a critical mass that led to a full-fledged war. According to various reports, the death toll varies between 15,000 and 25,000 people and even as high as 50,000. The number of Armenian displaced persons (DPs) is estimated at 345,000 while the number of Azerbaijani displaced persons is estimated at 732,000.

Sumgait pogrom (renewal of atrocities)

The inter-communal violence flared up on February 27, 1988, in Sumgait. The result was terrifying. The number of murdered Armenians and Azeris was 26 and six respectively (Altstadt, 1992, p.197; Van der Leeuw, 2000, p.156).

Khojaly pogrom (revenge)

On February 26, 1992, the Armenian Forces attacked Khojaly, a small town on the road between Stepanakert and Agdam. The Azeri population (most of them women, children, and elderly), were tortured and slaughtered. The number of murdered civilians is estimated as high as one thousand.

Isolation (deepening of hatred)

As it happened during the period between the end of WWI and the Soviet occupation in 1920, once again, Armenia was faced with isolation in the region imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Derived lessons from the formative events

In the following paragraphs, the effects of these formative events will be summarized:

The consequences of 1877-78 Turko-Russo war shaped the course of the following events. Millions of people were forced to emigrate. Enormous migrations caused many social and economic problems. Thus, it negatively affected the collective memory of the Turks, who experienced dislocations and severe suffering (Bloxham, 2005, p.47). As Van Gorder (2006, p.186) underlined, ‘the 1878 Berlin Treaty fueled such resentment and animosity toward Armenians, in such a way that its net effect was negative.’ Turks and Muslims started to see Armenians as traitors and spies of the external powers.

The pogroms of 1894-6 affirmed the discontent initiated by the Ottoman-Russo War from 1877 to 78. The pogroms of 1894-6 swelled the scratch into a wound among ethnicities in Eastern Anatolia. The exodus of Armenians from Eastern Anatolia towards the Caucasus and Turks from the Caucasus towards Eastern Anatolia deteriorated Muslim-Armenian relations in both regions (Arkun, 2005, p.68). As a result, the existing tension paved the way for the conduct of new pogroms that reinforced hostile feelings.

The 1905-7 Tatar (Azeris) -Armenian War deepened the enmity between the two groups by shaping the national consciousness.^v Therefore, it also served to strengthen Armenian and Azeri nationalism and incited the idea of self-determination in the minds of the people. This event served to evolve the 75 years-old antagonisms stemming from discrimination^{vi} and social tension into a deadly conflict through de-legitimization of the other group.

The paramount moment and most important formative event were the serial pogroms that occurred in 1915. Turks perceived Armenians' insurgent activities as 'the fifth column' operation that turned existing animosity into hatred and led to mass killings. Today, the deportation and its consequences function as a 'chosen trauma' and a myth that symbolizes the victimhood of the Armenian nation. Such a strong myth and symbol complex paralyzed the collective psyche of the Armenian people and made Armenians' enmity irreversible (Libaridian, 2004, p.202). Armenians constructed a belief of insecurities while Turks created a 'disloyal society' image for Armenians.

Towards the end of the Soviets, the Soviet suppression operations such as 'Black January' and 'Operation Ring' stimulated the same dynamics of identities as did the 1905 clashes. The collapse of the Soviet Union had a similar impact on Azeris as the Tatar-Armenian War by awakening once again the national feelings of Azeris (Swietochowski, 1995, p.194).

During the escalation period of the Conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, many atrocities took place. Hovannisian (1994, p.242) relates the cause of these atrocities to their interracial or inter-religious aspect. For example, Sumgait pogrom served to 'harden each side's disposition' and further escalated the conflict in the upcoming days. Armenian elites presented it as a renewed 'Pan-Turkish threat to the whole nation.' It reinforced the analogy of 'cruel Turks' through the juxtaposition of Azerbaijan with Ottoman Turkey in the Armenian collective minds (Kurkchian, 2005, p.154).

On the other hand, the impact of Khojaly was tremendous on the Azeri population residing in the other parts of Karabakh; it initiated an Azeri exodus towards the east that completed ethnic cleansing of the area (Cornell, 2001, p.95). The date of the atrocity coincided with the date of the Sumgait pogrom. According to De Waal (2003, p.171), the Khojaly massacre intimidates the Azeri population in Karabakh.^{vii} These atrocities led to the ultimate form of hatred and revitalized old enmities. They and consequent exoduses (ethnic cleansing of territories) fostered the construction of a strong enemy role identities and conservative type identities.

During the war, elites used old symbols and myths to mobilize their nations and fueled the discourse of danger. They sought to create new myths and symbols such as the Sumgait^{viii} and Khojaly^{ix} pogroms. For example, Azeri elites intentionally called the pogrom of Khojaly as 'genocide' to accelerate the formation of the Azeri national consciousness and mobilize the dormant Azeri masses. These efforts by the elites turned the Sumgait and Khojaly pogroms into new myths that were symbolized by Karabakh. Accordingly, those myths facilitated the de-legitimization of both societies that enabled the continuation of the clashes of 1918-20 through reformulation of the existing animosity (Hovannisian, 1994, p.244).

The isolation of Armenia by Azerbaijan reminded Armenians once again of the vivid experiences of 1915 (Hovannisian, 1994, p.242) and affirmed their negative feelings towards Turks and Azeris. As a result, the isolation of Armenia has served to augment the existing hatred and enmity between the two states and constitutes a formidable obstacle to regional cooperation.

We can best define the present situation as a stalemate and an intractable conflict (Forsyth, 2013, p.652), since neither side is willing to compromise (Walker, 2000, p.179). The violation of the ceasefire increases the death toll on the line of contact and deepens the hatred and enmity between the two societies.

As explained, societies and elites used the derived lessons from these formative events to produce new cultural products to shape the motivational dynamics and identities, which will be analyzed in the next section.

Findings

Construction of the Motivational Dynamics

The case study revealed that both states are operating like cognitive actors, and they learn from the past lessons. The politicians and elites, who were influenced by past incidents, played a non-negligible role in nurturing the enmity, fear, and hatred between the two nations. Many politicians regularly refer to past events and use them as analogies to interpret present-day events. Consequently, past lessons play a paramount role in the construction of their subjective security interests and exercise of foreign policy (Mirzoyan, 2010, p.14).

As underlined before, the most crucial analogy used by Armenians to interpret the present-day developments is the tragic events of 1915. The other relevant analogy is Pan-Turkism.^x Both analogies constitute analogical reasoning for the Armenian politicians to interpret the contemporary relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan.

The contagious ideas of politicians also affected the masses through narratives, textbooks, newspapers, and ceremonies. In this regard, the narratives of 1915 are decidedly different in both societies. Each society uses a biased version of the events and portrays themselves as the victim and creates negative stereotypes concerning the other society (De Waal, 2003, p.274). These biases, past traumas, fear, hatred, and enmity are transferred from one generation to another generation through the cultural products used in the education and socialization of children (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, p.6).

Authors from both sides published books serving in the cultivation of fear, hatred, and enmity.^{xi} The memories of the past have also been kept fresh through monuments, sculpture, painting, drama, and poetry. Armenians endeavored to transfer their connection with Eastern Turkey to the next generations by naming the villages, city quarters, and districts in Armenia after places of antiquity in Eastern Turkey (Dudwick, 1997, p.482; Hovannisian, 1994, p.251).

The findings of media monitoring conducted in Armenia and Azerbaijan during three months in 2008-2009 revealed many stereotypes used in both countries. Armenian media describe Azeris with stereotypes such as 'vandals,' 'barbarians,' 'impudent,' 'dishonorable,' 'rough-mannered people,' 'murders,' and 'genocidal.' Armenians label Azeris as the ancient enemy and executor of anti-Armenian policies (Doc-1, 2009, 28, 31, 92).^{xii} In the same manner, Azerbaijani media use clichés like 'Armenian brutalities/Armenian barbarities,' 'Armenian band/bandit groups,' and 'Armenian terrorists.' On the other hand, they describe themselves as 'victim of aggression' (Doc-1, 2009, 36). The above-mentioned public discourses cultivated the following motivational dynamics:

Fear dynamic

Suny (2000, p.140) suggests investigating the fears of states to understand their threat construction. In this regard, scholars explain fear as 'combined physiological and psychological reactions programmed to maximize the probability of surviving in dangerous

situations in the most beneficial way' (Bar-Tal, 2001, p.603). According to Wendt (1999, p.132), it is a 'socially constructed' phenomenon.

The most significant side effect of fear on society is its 'freezing of beliefs.' Societies exposed to prolonged fear fail to entertain alternative ideas and become 'politically blind' and unable to generate novel solutions. The collective fear orientation of society diminishes its ability to interpret cues and information appropriately and leads to an environment where mistrust and the de-legitimization of others prevails.

A major Armenian collective fear is the recurrence of mass massacres. After conducting interviews with some members of the Diaspora, Anderson (2000, p.38) concludes that 'the genocide is important because the events in Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh arouse fear in Armenians that the events of 1915 could be repeated.' De Waal (2003, p.78) also underlines the decisive role of the tragic events of 1915 in fear construction. He quoted from Lyudmila Harutunian, a well-known Armenian sociologist, the following interesting passage: 'Fear of being destroyed, and destroyed not as a person, not individually, but destroyed as a nation, fear of genocide, is in every Armenian. It is impossible to remove it.'

The second driver of the collective fear is the sense of vulnerability and siege mentality. The betrayal of the Great Powers and present isolation led the Armenians to construct such a mentality. Armenians collectively believe that they are alone in the region and the Turks are looking for an opportunity to wipe them out. A high-level OSCE diplomat defined this fear of the Armenians as follows (Interview, 2014):

Their fear is that if they give up some territories, then they would lose their defensive positions that they have been creating for years. Then they would be at the mercy of states that would guarantee their security. Moreover, they are not sure that these states can really fulfill their promises. So, in the minds of Armenians, they should be able to protect themselves by themselves basically. And then comes some form of alliance.

The analogy of Pan-Turkism constitutes another source of the fear of extinction that was disseminated among Armenians. Hovannisian (1994, p.251) explains that fear as follows:

Most of the Armenian population saw in the Turkish strategy the logical continuation of the long-term policy to keep Armenia helpless and vulnerable and perhaps, at the convenient moment, to seize upon an excuse to eliminate the little that is left of historic Armenia.

Armenian elites exploit the existing animosity towards Turkey to amplify fear of extermination as a mean of gaining public support. The collective fear orientation is a useful tool in their hand.

As for Azerbaijan, the most significant fear is the return to Russian domination. Like the Armenians, Azerbaijani society also feels that their independence is vulnerable (De Waal, 2003, p.97). The politicians and scholars frequently remind the population of the experiences of the first republic which was annexed by Soviets. The other significant fear is the multi-ethnic structure of the Azerbaijani society and weak corporate identity. In this context, the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict inflicts the fear of breaking up the fragile state (type identity). The Russian manipulation of the Lezghin minority in 1993 was proof of the fear of Azerbaijani politicians.

Hate dynamic

Hatred is also an essential factor in the construction of threat since it incites aggressive intentions. It arouses extreme negative feelings leading to the de-legitimization of other societies. According to Bar-Tal (2001), the de-legitimization process is justified by creating stereotypes and putting the opponent into a position where the opponent is regarded as not human (Halperin, 2008, p.732; Herrmann, 1988, p. 185; Orena and Bar-Tal, 2007, p.112).

Hatred is different from anger and fear. A person or group may be alarmed by fear, which will inspire them to take measures to overcome it. However, such measures are not enough to cope with hate; those who actively hate will wish to harm the person or group (Halperin, 2008, p.729).

The study of Halperin (2008, p.719) offers some insights to understanding specific characteristics and features of ‘group-based hatred.’ In this regard, hatred is constructed through a cognitive process in which ideological, moral, and cultural differences are heightened, and this leads to the generation of negative feelings towards the out-group. Hence, the exploitation of the relevant myth-symbol complexes reinforces negative feelings between the two groups, and this paves the way for the emergence of deep-seated hatred (Kaufman, 2001, p.11, 12). The resulting narratives are passed down the generations, consequently serving to construct and perpetuate enmity (Volkan, 1999, p.30). The similar process occurred after the independence and led Armenians to think that historical discourse continues unchanged (Anderson, 2000, p.29; Barseghyan, 2004, p.14). Papazian (2001, p.79) elaborates the role of hatred in the construction of enmity as in the followings:

The deep-seated hatred emanated from the Armenian memory of being victims of Turkish and Azeri resentment, persecution, and massacres. The presence of this hatred and the determination not to be vulnerable to such humiliations produced bullish Armenian behavior and increased the level of violence.

The contemporary discourses held in Armenia disclose the hatred towards Turkey. Johnson explains his experiences on Armenians made during his extended stay in Yerevan in 1995. He (2000, p.160) points out that the ‘collectively self-serving interpretation’ of the past events by Armenians rests on the deep hatred towards the Turks. He (2000, p.161) articulates that they relate all evil things to the Turks. According to them, establishing any relationship with Turkey is treasonous. The following paragraph derived from his book perfectly depicts the mentality of the Armenians and their social construction of the hostility:

Most said they could not stand to hear the Turkish language. They hate them with all of their souls. They now say that even an official apology by Turkey will not settle the account. Most I met say they are in favor of their government's recent open trade policy with the Turks- "We have to eat" but would rather have nothing to do with a Turk personally.

Many Armenian elites strived to reinforce the negative perception towards Turks. According to them, ‘the patriotism of Armenians is the love of Russians and hatred of Turks’ (cited in Ishkhanian, 1991, p.5). The selected part of the speech made by Gerard Libaridian, the national security adviser to President Ter-Petrossian, at the Second Congress of the Armenian National Movement in 1990 explicitly underlines the efforts and motives of the elites and Diaspora to promote fear and hatred (cited in Libaridian, 1991, p.160, 161,162):

... Both in Armenia and in the diaspora, participation in that fear and hatred came to replace participation in collective thinking and decision-making. Reactions were confused with principles; promoters of fear and hatred became the strategists and perpetuated the collective paralysis... Did a strategy of liberation based on anti-Turkism and anti-communism, on fear of Pan-Turkism and hatred of the Turk, cause the return of an inch of Western Armenian territory or bring us any closer to Turkish recognition of the Genocide?

The past orientation and siege mentality of the Armenian society lead them to accumulate hatred against Turks and Azeris. For Armenians, ‘Turk’ (i.e., Azeri) conjures up ideas of ‘the invader, the killer, and the denier.’ Therefore, an Armenian is inclined to hate Turks and those who are in relations with Turks.

For Azeris, on the other hand, Armenians are the number one agent of Imperial and Soviet Russia, who relinquished their sovereignty in 1828 and 1920 (Kaufman, 2001, p.56). They label Armenians with the following stereotypes: ‘troublemaker, slanderer, and terrorist’

to express their hatred (Libaridian, 2005, p.4). The prevalence of these expressions in the daily discourse of both societies can be considered tell-tale signs of simmering hatred.

Enmity Dynamic

Societies inherently tend to categorize each other in relation to their past interactions, culture, and identity. Thus, they use labels (stereotypes) such as ‘barbarians,’ ‘infidels,’ ‘torturer’ to define other societies and legitimize their hostile actions (Orena and Bar-Tal, 2007, p.114; Wendt, 1999, p.261). Soon, the enemy image of another group becomes a part of public discourse and part of the culture by dissemination of cultural products such as ‘leaders’ speeches, news, public narratives, literary books, theatrical plays, films, and school textbooks’ (Orena and Bar-Tal, 2007, p.115).




Chart 1: The Perception of Actors' Role Identities by Armenia and Azerbaijan

In this context, the studied formative events constitute a major source of fear and hatred that fuel enmity pattern. According to Hovannisian (1994, p.238) ‘train years of hatred, distrust, trauma, and enervating sentiments of betrayal and injustice’ resulted in animosity that is also proven by many surveys. According to the Caucasus survey conducted in 2013, both societies perceive each other as the main enemy (Chart 1). In the second place, Armenians and Azeris label Turks (28%) and Russians (7%) as their enemies respectively (Doc-2, 2013).

Presently, the efforts of elites and public clichés stimulate and strengthen the enemy image and play a decisive role in the sustainment of enmity. The signs of enmity noticeably are seen in the anti-Turkish writings and publications, which diffused into the brains of Armenians the slogan: ‘Turkey is our enemy, and Russia is our permanent friend’ (cited in Ishkhanian, 1991, p.12).

The prevailing culture of anarchy in the region also exerts significant effects on the construction and magnitude of enmity. The special character of the South Caucasus' culture and its emotionally driven social structure created a Lockean culture of anarchy which is sometimes reversing to Hobbesian one. Such a culture of anarchy paves the way for the emergence of ‘domestic interest groups,’ ‘in-group solidarity,’ ‘discourse of danger,’ and ‘in-group bias,’ and serves as ‘a cognitive resource’ for enmity (Wendt, 1999, p.275, 276). Moreover, it amplifies the existing animosity and generates a none-cooperative security paradigm that facilitates the rise of the security dilemma.

The Impact on Identity Formation

Hopf (1998, p.193) contends that identities are much more than just a label. According to him, identity functions as a shorthand definition of self and others in the international

system. Owing to its key role, state identities have been subject to a substantial body of research.^{xiii}

According to constructivists, national identity is neither a fixed nor infinitely malleable concept. It is reproduced continuously through the interpretation of internal and external events by succeeding generations (Valdez, 1995, p.86). Hence, the formation of identity is a dynamic process, and three determining factors affect this process: a. myths, symbols, and invented traditions, b. the formation of nationality, and c. structural realities (Panossian, 2002, p.123; Smith, 1992, p.438). Myths and symbols serve to define the group and its boundaries (Adler and Barnett, 1998a, p.47). In this regard, Ringmar (1996, p.79) emphasizes the role of 'constitutive stories' in the construction, preservation, and transformation of the identities. He (1996, p.128) argues that the stories are a predominant factor to construct 'self' and 'other.' These stories help societies to generate their 'ontological security' understanding (Green and Bogard, 2012, p.281).

By arguing that 'identities are constituted of both internal and external structures,' Wendt (1999, pp. 198, 224-229) offers four kinds of identity: a. corporate, b. type, c. role, and d. collective. In this context, each person or state has an 'unshaped' base identity (corporate), this identity is shaped through dynamics of the internal or external context and retains some characteristics (type identity). When the shaped identity interacts with another shaped identity from a dissimilar social context, they undertake different identities such as 'friend' or 'enemy' (role identity) depending on some shared characteristics (i.e., belief system, religion, state system such as democratic or capitalist). If they construct similar role identities, then they may merge these into one identity called 'collective identity.'

Identity, if it is collective, makes an impact on the foreign policy of actors in the system (Jepperson et al., 1996, p.51). Thus, social constructivists in international relations (Hopf, 1998; Wendt, 1999) and Social Identity Theory (Bar-Tal, 1998; Tajfel and Turner, 1986) propose that a collectively shared sense of identity can reduce the threat. In this context, Sjöstedt (2013, p.148, 153) underlines the crucial role of identity by pointing out the two aspects of identity in threat construction: a. being the source of a threat image (identity itself can be regarded as a threat), b. the identity constructions of actors operate as 'a catalyst or gate-keeper in accepting a particular idea as a threat.'

In this sense, we should put particular emphasis on religion since it plays a vital role in the formation of group identity (Huntington, 1996, p.254; Volkan, 2005, p.25). Anderson (2000, p.24, 26) emphasizes that ethnic interest groups use religion as a catalyst to prompt their members and adds that religious and ethnic identities are mutually reinforcing. When different religions entrench themselves in various corporate identities (such as Catholic Poland, Jewish Israel, Muslim Turkey, and Orthodox Greece), then we witness potent patterns of fear, mutual hatred, and insecurity (Huntington, 1996, p.266).

In this regard, our case, study affirmed that actors' culture nourished by past lessons formed different and conflicting corporate and type identities as depicted in table 2. As seen, both states' corporate identities have some competing elements (i.e., religion and contested territory). The study also affirmed that the Nagorno Karabakh functions as a symbol^{xiv} for both corporate identities endeavoring to preserve themselves by the acquisition of self-determination or territory (O'Lear, 2011, p.271).^{xv} Therefore, the ongoing conflict might be regarded as a manifestation of identity conflict.

Table 2: The Aspects of the Corporate and Type Identities

Nation	Corporate Identity	Type Identity
Armenia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First Christian nation, Orthodox sect • Consist of the east and west Armenia (in Turkey) • Root-oriented • Reference to the historical territories of Armenia • Humiliation or threatening of a large-group identity • Affection of Russia • Fear of Turkey 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partly free Democracy • Supremacy of the Nagorno-Karabakh clan • Influence of Diaspora and religion • Military intervention in domestic politics • Past-oriented political leadership • A little resentment of the Russian dominance • Submissive to Russia
Azerbaijan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moslem, Shiite sect consists of the northern and southern Azerbaijan (in Iran) • Karabakh is the cradle of the Azeri civilization • Rich and complex cultural legacy, but very recent notion of Azerbaijani nationhood • Weak sense of identification with the Azeri nation • Fear of Russia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secular state system • Not free Democracy • Military aspect • Leader-centric regime • Deep resentment from being under the Russian rule

In this context, Armenian corporate identity regards the past massacres and the loss of an ancient land as a humiliation of self-esteem. This belief generates subjective security needs, which are expressed by the discourse of Genocide (Barseghyan, 2004; Panossian, 2002). Consequently, the unfilled security needs of the Armenian corporate identity promote the already existing negative perception pattern.

As for Azerbaijan, the Armenian atrocities and the loss of 15-20% of the Azeri land in the war (1992-1994), accelerated the development of the Azeri corporate identity. The self-esteem of Azeris aspires to rectify the misconducts of the past and to recover its losses in the past. Thus, nourished by the negative perception of Armenians, Azeri corporate identity puts the recovery of lost territories at the core of its subjective security needs.

The constitutive effects of culture on identities and interests determine the generation and reproduction of enemy role identities over time (Wendt, 1999, p.274). The study of formative events confirms that role identity changes over “time” and “space” (Sjöstedt, 2013, p.153). The table 3 below shows identity changes over time: Consequently, the emergence of the ‘enemy’ role identities led to the construction of conflicting interests and paved the way for aggressive nationalism.^{xvi}

Table 3: The Role Identity Change over the Time

Periods and Culture	1877-1904 Hobbesian Culture	1905-1921 Hobbesian Culture	1922-1988 A mixture of Lockean and Hobbesian Cultures	1989-1994 A mixture of Lockean and Hobbesian Cultures	1995-2018 Mostly Lockean Culture
Actors					
Armenia	Az: Friend Tu: Rival Ru: Friend	Az: Rival to Enemy Tu: Enemy Ru: Friend to Rival	Az: Friend Tu: Rival Ru: Ally	Az: Enemy Tu: Enemy Ru: Friend	Az: Enemy Tu: Enemy Ru: Ally
Azerbaijan	Ar: Friend Tu: Friend Ru: Rival	Ar: Rival to Enemy Tu: Friend to Ally Ru: Enemy	Ar: Friend Tu: Friend Ru: Ally	Ar: Enemy Tu: Ally Ru: Rival	Ar: Enemy Tu: Ally Ru: Rival

Construction Progress of the Perception Patterns

There are many events in our case, which function as ‘chosen traumas’ (Volkan, 2005, p.52, 55). Societies use them to draw lessons and generate cultural products such as analogies, schemata as well as myths and symbols. As explained before, large groups refer to cultural products to build a protective shield against the external effects directed to the aspects of their identities. The frequent use of the cultural products in daily discourses and elites’ speeches serve to the accumulation of negative perceptions towards another group.

Finally, long-lasting and oft references to the negative memories will transform negative perceptions into stable perception patterns and foster or activate motivational dynamics such as fear, hatred, and enmity. The construction of permanent negative perception patterns is likely to contribute to the formation of the conflicting identities. If there exist both negative perception pattern and conflicting identities, then, we might expect the emergence of a deep security dilemma.

In our case, successive formative events steadily nourished the formation of the negative perception patterns. In this regard, table 4 shows the stimuli generated by formative events that affected each group’s perception of another group. Today, both sides easily tend to exaggerate and misjudge the objective situation. The lack of the factual knowledge of each other and little interaction exacerbate the problem. Therefore they are prone to make false assumptions about the other’s intention and action. Under these circumstances, societies reproduce self and enemy images in relation to their identities (Rother, 2012, p.58). Particularly, Armenia interprets sensitively any developments in Azerbaijan and represents them as threatening by connecting to a myth or symbol. For example; they called the damage to the ancient Armenian monuments in Karabakh as ‘cultural genocide,’ the decrease of the Armenian population in Karabakh as ‘white genocide,’ and the air pollution in Erevan as ‘ecological genocide’ (Kaufman, 2001, p.55).

Table 4: Formative Events and their Impacts on the construction of Perception Patterns

Events	Stimuli of the Armenians` Perception Patterns	Stimuli of the Azeris` Perception Patterns
1877-78 Ottoman-Russia War	Worse social and economic conditions	Loss of land and resentment of immigrating Muslims
1894-6 Clashes	The sense of extinction	Deterioration of political and economic status
1905 Armeno-Tatar Clashes	Economic supremacy of Armenian society	The sense of oppression under the Armenians` economic dominance
1914-21 WWI	The sense of insecurity and vulnerability	The Sense of treachery
Sovietization	The Russian occupation and the Loss of sovereignty	
Conflict and War on Karabakh	Elites` mobilization and construction of new narratives, myths, and symbols	
	<u>Sumgait 1988</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A renewed fear of a new massacre • Desire for revenge 	<u>Khojaly 1992</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resentment caused by the exodus • Rectifying historical injustice
Disintegration and Isolation 1993	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recall of memories of the tragic events of 1915 • The rise of the siege mentality 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russia`s protection of Armenia • The belief of injustice risen among Azeris

Discussion: A New Approach to the Security Dilemma

According to realist scholars, there exists a causal link between anarchy and security dilemma and they explain the mechanism of the security dilemma as follows: anarchy generates uncertainty which leads to fear, and fear triggers power competition that activates a latent security dilemma. This explanation does not paint the entire picture since it fails to explain the essence of the problem. Namely, the construction of anarchy and fears. Moreover, it assumes the existence of pure and stable uncertainty.

However, as the case study showed, actors progressively accumulate knowledge of each other and operate in an environment (culture) shaped by their interactions with various identities. Thus, a pure and stable uncertainty does not exist. Societies transfer their beliefs and knowledge about others by means of various cultural products such as narratives, analogies, schemata, norms, operational logic, myths, and symbols to other members of the group or the out-groups. Such socialization processes generate ‘knowledge sets’ and ‘standard reasoning patterns’ about others that I named as ‘perception pattern.’

The perception patterns can be regarded as ‘impressions’ of other groups. They are powerful enough to determine the scope of future interactions and possible role identity labels

which will be attributed to others. Based on their significant effect, they also shape motivational dynamics such as fear, hate, and enmity. The case study empirically demonstrated that Armenian and Azeri societies interpret others' actions with the help of their pre-existing perception patterns rather than they do it case by case. Thus, this study shed light on the linkage that the emergence and strength of the security dilemma depend on the type and magnitude of the 'perception patterns.'

The Mechanism of the Security Dilemma

Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998, p.59, 60) underline the adverse effect of a conflicting past with a neighbor in the construction of threat. Bilali (2013, p.21) articulates that 'historical memories serve to identify one's current foes and allies, as well as identify and anticipate future threats.' The unique culture of the Caucasus compels the societies to put particular emphasis on the memories that complicate mutual relations (Zarifian, 2008, p.150). The lessons derived from the successive formative events fomented a biased collective memory full of negative analogies, collective fear orientation and group-based hatred that are used in any interaction within the region (Lebow, 2008, p.480). In this context, Cornell (1998, p.56) points out the security dilemma as the main reason for the Conflict over the Nagorno Karabakh by underlining the role of domestic dynamics:

the main determinant of the conflicts is a security dilemma based on fear; or one could say, on the development of nationalisms mirroring each other, fueling and directed against each other, and scarcely able to develop without each other.

Considering Cornell's argument, we can explain the formation of the security dilemma as follows (figure 1): a. both states' lessons derived from past interactions created an in-group culture which was characterized by chosen traumas, negative analogies, schemata, blaming narratives, and contradicting myth-symbol complexes, b. these biased cultural products created progressively an inherently 'negative perception pattern,' c. Armenian and Azeri in-group cultures led to the construction of corporate identities such that they steadily produced enemy role identities with the contribution of negative perception patterns, d. negative perception patterns also shaped and fostered motivational dynamics such as fear, hatred, and enmity, e. the motivational dynamics generated a regional security paradigm with a 'self-help' and 'zero-sum' logic that prevented cooperation and decreased trust, f. consequent sense of malign intention led both sides to be entrapped in a security dilemma.^{xvii}




Figure 1: The True Mechanism of the Security Dilemma

Based on that depiction of the security dilemma, the general mechanism of the security dilemma can be formulated as follows: a. each society draws lessons from the formative events, b. those lessons are materialized in various cultural products that generate negative or positive perception patterns and affect the formation of corporate and type identities, c. cultural products and perception patterns generate or nourish motivational dynamics (fear, hatred, and enmity), d. the interplay of various identities and motivational dynamics produces various security paradigms embedding different cooperation logics, e. as shown in figure 1, the prevalence of negative perception pattern under a less cooperative security paradigm leads inevitably to the interpretation of other's intention as malign/foe/greedy/revisionist. However, the positive perception patterns serving to the sense of benign intention, even under non-cooperative security paradigm, f. consequently, the sense and strength of malign intention trigger threat perception and security interests that determine the potency of motives for competition, g. the comparison of the mutual material capacities whether leads to a security dilemma at a various magnitude or not depending on the type of perception pattern and security paradigm, h. actors exercise diverse strategies (revisionist or status quoist) depending on the strength of the security dilemma, i. finally, being entrapped in a severe security dilemma, actors tend to securitize various referent objects such as identity or territory to mobilize the state's capacity or form alliances.

Conclusion

Jervis (1978, p.211) proposes a 'four possible worlds' concept to explore the security dilemma. His conceptualization sounds similar to the Wendtian concept of culture (Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian). As he depicts, each world has its own cooperation logic and security paradigm. When his approach is advanced with the help of the Wendtian cultural concept, we can best explain the formation of the security dilemma. Thus, this article sought to bridge both approaches by discovering a new aspect for the concept development.

According to the present concept, states cannot identify with which states they can cooperate or compete due to the spiral resulting from the uncertainty over others' intentions, worst-case orientation, and offense-defense balance; thus, they are captured by security dilemma. In this sense, most realist approaches focus on the causal link between uncertainty and security dilemma by focusing on material factors. Even though Jervis (1976, 1978) emphasized the role of perception, he failed to elaborate on its construction and operation. Consequently, realist approaches fail to provide a more explanatory concept due to their ignorance of the ideational factors.

We can develop a comprehensive concept only when we can identify the constitutive links by explaining the construction of anarchy and intent. Contrary to the realist accounts, this study sought to explain the neglected ideational factors by employing a constructivist approach that allows us to explore the constitutive effect of the past interactions on identities and motivational dynamics.

The case study provided empirical evidence that states do not behave mechanically and there is no absolute 'uncertainty' as advocated by realist scholars, since actors know each other to certain degrees and can make some predictions about other's intent/action due to past lessons, prevailing motivational dynamics and, shared regional/systemic cultures. Therefore, we cannot argue that an increase in one state's security drives others in a law-like manner to increase their security. Similarly, the fear of being exploited might not always emerge in a region if positive knowledge sets (positive perception pattern), shared identities and cooperative security paradigm materialize there.

As explained in figure 1, a complicated mechanism, made up by many factors, gives rise to the sense of insecurity or threat perception, instead of a simple rationale emanated from

uncertainty or shift in offense-defense balance. In this context, the analyses of motivational dynamics and identity formation disclosed that perception patterns are the most significant factor since they provide the necessary knowledge and reasoning to decide whether one's action (i.e., power aggregation) or identity is threatening or non-threatening. The perception patterns also directly affect the construction and operation of the motivational dynamics. We can consider them as 'intent detector' and driver of the anarchy. In this regard, they appear in two forms: either negative or positive, depending on the type of past lessons and interactions. If negative perception pattern operates, it initiates the sense of aggressive intent and 'self-help' security paradigm. On the contrary, the positive perception pattern prevents or mitigates the sense of threat.

EU and USA relations constitute the best example of the operation of the perception patterns. We observe that the huge discrepancy in the military capacity does not activate a security dilemma automatically as advocated in the realist literature. EU does not strive to balance the USA through exercising internal and external balancing strategies. The operation of the positive perception pattern (due to the positive past lessons), the existence of the compatible identities, and the prevalence of a cooperative security paradigm avert the activation of a security dilemma. This situation indicates that ideational factors play a decisive role in the construction of the anarchy, security dilemma and securitization process.

As Adler and Barnett (1998b), as well as Mitzen (2006), indicated, identity is the key issue to focus for the further development of the present concept. Moreover, as claimed by Tang (2009), scholars need to conduct further research on the role of fear and analogical reasoning to capture the essence of the security dilemma. Therefore, this study can be considered a step that aimed to conceptualize perception patterns by examining the constitutive effects of the past interactions (lessons) on the construction of motivational dynamics (fear, hatred, and enmity/amity) and identities (corporate, type, role identities). In this sense, the depicted mechanism of the security dilemma (figure 1) based on the perception pattern should be regarded as a preliminary effort. Thus, the propositions of this study need to be advanced by further research to develop a more cohesive and holistic concept.

Notes

ⁱ "Indeed, when a state believes that another not only is not likely to be an adversary but has sufficient interests in common with it to be an ally, then it will actually welcome an increase in the other's power." (Jervis, 1978: 175).

ⁱⁱ For example; any power shift in Hobbesian and Lockean cultures inflicts the sense of vulnerability and fear that promote an overestimation of threat (Stein, 1988:260). However, any power shift in a Kantian culture generates less tension due to the internalized security paradigm collective action.

ⁱⁱⁱ "The concept of the image of the enemy helped to explain and sustain international conflict and war during the Cold War. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's hostile image of the Soviet Union resisted change, regardless of changes in Soviet behavior." (Rosati, 2000:60).

^{iv} "Britain successfully pursued lasting rapprochement with the United States rather than with Japan in part because of the ready availability of a narrative of Anglo-Saxon unity." (Kupchan, 2010: 65).

^v "... perhaps indirect, results of 1905 were the addition of a territorial dimension to the two peoples' enmity." (Croissant, 1998: 9).

^{vi} "Armenian and Russian and generally looked down upon the Muslims as 'dark,' 'inferior' people. In 1905 and again in 1918, Baku's Muslim poor turned on the local Armenians as the most convenient target. Social, religious, and cultural differences, resentments, and memories of past violence kept these two Caucasian peoples distant from each other." (Suny, 2000: 160, 161).

^{vii} De Waal (2003: 172) refers to the statement of an Armenian police officer, Major Valery Babayan who suggested revenge as a motive: "He told the American reporter Paul Quinn-Judge that many of

the fighters who had taken part in the Khojaly attack originally came from Sumgait and places like that.”

^{viii} Armenians considered it as the recurrence of the mass killing of 1915 and encouraged separatist Karabakh Armenians to fight against Azerbaijan for the independence (De Waal, 2003: 44).

^{ix} It initiated the domestic dynamics of the Azeri community by triggering mass fear of extermination (Cornell, 2001: 96).

^x Zori Balayan defined Pan-Turkism as the greatest threat to Armenia as well as to Russia in his speech during the June 23-25, 1989 session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet (Libaridian, 1991: 154).

^{xi} For instance, the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences re-published the book of Russian racist Vasil Velichko, called ‘Caucasus,’ in 1904. It humiliates Armenians while praising Azeris. On the other hand, Zori Balayan’s book ‘Ochag’ (The Heart), published in 1984, portrays Turks (implying Azeris) as enemies of Russia and Armenia (Bölükbaşı, 2011: 65).

^{xii} “ALM,” “Day by Day,” October 5, 2009: “Audience is said that the main aim of Azerbaijan is not to search possible ways of reconciliation but to annihilate all Armenian nation.” (Cited in Doc-1, 2009).

^{xiii} See Druckman, 1994; Horowitz, 1985; Mercer, 1995; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Volkan: 1988, 1999, 2005, 2009.

^{xiv} “For Armenians, Karabakh is the last out-post of their Christian civilization and a historic haven of Armenian princes and bishops before the eastern Turkic world begins. Azerbaijanis talk of it as a cradle, nursery, or conservatoire, the birthplace of their musicians and poets.” (Cited in De Waal, 2003: 3).

^{xv} “In a survey of 1,200 adults across Azerbaijan, nearly 90 percent of the respondents ranked the Karabakh conflict as a major area of concern for Azerbaijan, even above material well-being, unemployment, access to healthcare, and crime.” (O’Lear, 2007:271).

^{xvi} Wendt (1999: 275) suggests three reasons of enemy construction in the Hobbesian culture: a. domestic interest groups such as lobbies for arms race (Karabakh clan), b. “discourse of danger” formed by elites for “in-group solidarity” (pan-Turkish threat), c. projective identification (genocidal identity of Armenia).

^{xvii} Crawford (2000: 133) points out that the antagonist perception patterns drive to security dilemma.

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