



# Post-earthquake Housing Policy in Van: An Evaluation from a Social Policy Perspective

\*

Cansu Ertürk<sup>1</sup>

ORCID: 0000-0001-6007-1706

Çağatay Topal<sup>2</sup>

ORCID: 0000-0001-5323-8440

## Abstract

*2011 Van Earthquake was the initiator of an urban reconstruction wave across Turkey primarily targeting disaster-risky areas. Since then, it was mostly through mass housing and urban regeneration projects that the state aimed at the compensation of past damages and the mitigation of future ones. Relying on a social policy background, this paper aims to analyze whether the housing policies implemented during the post-earthquake recovery process of the city of Van were directed towards the benefit of citizens or towards the interests of the private sector. In the paper, three interrelated processes are analyzed: mass housing, reconstruction of the city center, and housing problem of vulnerable groups. Along with the examination of the related laws, reports and policies, the paper also benefits from the expert interviews, site observations, and media sources. Our findings demonstrate that the post-earthquake housing policies and practices in Van were not consistent with welfare principles and did not meet the requirements of participatory social policy approaches. The housing policy in question did not prefer a participatory and welfare-oriented path and ignored the vulnerabilities of those in need the most. In this sense, it became an example of an exclusionary top-down policy practice.*

**Keywords:** *Van Earthquake, housing policy, mass housing, reconstruction of the city, vulnerability.*

---

<sup>1</sup> Bielefeld University, E-mail: cansucan.erturk@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup> Assoc. Prof., METU, E-mail: catopal@metu.edu.tr



## Van'da Deprem Sonrası Konut Politikası: Sosyal Politika Perspektifinden Bir Değerlendirme

\*

Cansu Ertürk<sup>3</sup>

ORCID: 0000-0001-6007-1706

Çağatay Topal<sup>4</sup>

ORCID: 0000-0001-5323-8440

### Öz

2011 Van Depremi, ülke geneline yayılan ve öncelikli olarak afet riski taşıyan alanları hedefleyen kentsel dönüşüm akımının tetikleyicisi olmuştur. 2011 Depremi sonrası genel resme bakıldığında, kamu tarafından, geçmiş hasarların onarımı için yapılan çalışmaların ve gelecekte ortaya çıkabilecek hasarların önlenmesi için alınan önlemlerin çoğunlukla toplu konut ve kentsel yenileme projeleri etrafında şekillendiği görülmektedir. Sosyal politika arka planına yaslanan bu çalışma, Van şehrinin deprem sonrası toparlanma sürecinde uygulanan konut politikalarının vatandaşların yararına mı yoksa özel sektörün çıkarlarına mı yönelik olduğunu analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Analizimizde birbiriyle ilişkili üç süreç yer almaktadır: toplu konut, şehir merkezinin yeniden inşası ve kırılğan grupların konut sorunu. Analizimiz ilgili yasaların, raporların ve politikaların incelenmesinin yanında, uzman görüşmelerinden, saha gözlemlerinden ve medya kaynaklarından yararlanmaktadır. Bulgularımız Van'da deprem sonrası uygulanan konut politikasının sosyal refah ilkeleri ve katılımcı bir sosyal politika yaklaşımı ile bağdaşmadığını göstermektedir. Söz konusu konut politikası katılımcı ve refah odaklı bir yolu tercih etmemiş ve en ihtiyaç sahibi olan kesimlerin kırılğanlıklarını görmezden gelmiştir. Bu anlamda dışlayıcı ve yukarıdan inmececi bir politika örneği olarak okunabilir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler.** Van Depremi, konut politikası, toplu konut, kentin yeniden inşası, kırılğanlık.

<sup>3</sup> Bielefeld University, E-mail: cansucan.erturk@gmail.com

<sup>4</sup> Doç. Dr., ODTÜ, E-mail: catopal@metu.edu.tr

## **Introduction**

Both 1999 Marmara and 2011 Van earthquakes had crucial impacts on governmental agendas for housing. Following these events, we observed mass housing and urban regeneration projects as the public actions aiming at the compensation of past damages and the mitigation of future ones. This work aims to explore whether the housing policies in question are directed towards the benefit of citizens or towards the interests of private sector. Given that the existing academic studies mostly covered metropolitan cities, this paper addresses housing policies conducted in the city of Van after the 2011 Earthquake. For this purpose, policy practices are analyzed in order to observe whether housing policies of the state promoted the interests of construction sector or the sheltering needs of citizens.

Neoliberal policies became the main agenda of the Turkish State under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) during the early 2000s. While privatization was accelerated in this period, the government centralized housing policies in the hands of the Mass Housing Administration (TOKİ), as “the highest physical planning authority” (Eliçin, 2014, p.151). This centralization, however, aimed to support the construction sector towards profit maximization and to improve economy through investment in built environment and it did not promote the living conditions of urban dwellers (Ünsal, 2009, p.16). Hence, the legal arrangements following 1999 Marmara and 2011 Van Earthquakes for disaster-mitigation through urban regeneration were criticized to serve the interests of the construction sector instead of citizens’ needs. Saraçoğlu and Demirtaş-Milz (2014, p.180) argued that disasters were used as a justification of urban reconstruction projects. Similarly, Yılmaz (2013, p.40) says that “with the intensification of discussions around the earthquake threat in the beginning of 2000s, ‘urban transformation’ was presented as an obligation and an unavoidable process.”

The aim of this study is to give a concise picture of housing policies initiated after the 2011 Earthquake in Van in terms of social policy. Mass housing and the reconstruction of the city center are the focal points of our analysis. We also address container cities, as initially temporary but gradually being permanent shelters for vulnerable groups. Accordingly, we ask whether the policies and implementations in question were consistent with welfare principles and met the requirements of participatory social policy approaches.

## **Methodology**

For our analysis, we first looked at the laws concerning post-earthquake recovery and future protection and their implications on policy decisions of public authorities. Disaster houses were built within the scope of the Law no. 7269, the legal basis of damage assessment, beneficiary and indebtedness issues. The Law no. 6306 was the other legal arrangement that we examined in terms of its implications on post-earthquake housing policies. Respectively, the bill of law passed from the parliament in 2015 was also mentioned to see the reflection of the disaster law on the housing policies in Van.

Policy implications were investigated upon the reports of governmental bodies responsible for the post-earthquake housing recovery (TOKİ and the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority) and upon the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> term reports of the Chamber of Architects of Van. The Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) has important missions in a post-disaster context including response, recovery and reconstruction. AFAD and TOKİ work in collaboration in post-disaster housing reconstruction as it was seen in the case of Van. In order to support written documents, we conducted expert interviews in public institutions, local professional chambers and non-governmental organizations that actively took part in the reconstruction process. Snowball technique was used to reach informants and eight interviews were conducted in total. Four interviewees were public officials assigned by the central public institutions in Ankara. Two interviewees were the members of a local professional chamber; one interviewee a member of the city council of Van; and one interviewee a member of a local non-governmental organization working for women. Benefiting from the media news, interview questions included the following issues: the post-earthquake reconstruction, the role of public institutions, differences between the approaches of central and local authorities, inclusion and exclusion of various stakeholders in decision-making process, the situation of the local economy and environment, housing and affordability, target and vulnerable groups.

News sources included the newspapers of mainstream (Cumhuriyet, Habertürk, Milliyet, Hürriyet, Al Jazeera Türk, Radikal), local (HaberVan, GazeteVan, ŞehriVan Gazetesi) and alternative (Bianet, SiyasiHaber) media channels. We scanned two categories of news between November 2011 and November 2017. These were the statements of public authorities and the reflections of policy implementations on the sheltering needs of local dwellers. Besides, we carried out observations at three locations: mass housing regions

located at the peripheries of the city; the city center where urban reconstruction activities took place; and the Anadolu Container City as the last container city in which 15 households remained as dwellers as of August 2017.

In order to examine how the AKP government used its executive and legislative power to put public lands to the service of the construction industry, we first specify the housing policies following 2011 Earthquake. Respectively, we discuss top-down policy-making of the government in mass housing. This discussion includes the analysis of site selection criteria, location and costs of mass houses, property rights, and the issues of displacement, affordability, and sustainability. In this analysis, we also touch upon the relations between mass housing and local economy. Then, we examine the reconstruction of the city center by focusing on the overall approach in the process. Within this focus, we evaluate the position of target groups. Accordingly, we mention the housing problems of vulnerable groups. The issues we discuss here are shelter needs, requirements for a permanent housing, the situation of the tenants, and the exclusionary character of the policy approach. Finally, throughout our analysis, we try to observe whether participatory characteristics of social welfare principles are implemented or not. Among these are inclusion of local forces in the process and participatory decision-making, affordability and indebtedness issues, and reproduction opportunities. This overall evaluation is necessary to see whether the policy implementations are in favor of profit-oriented construction industry or of citizens' welfare. In the end, we present overall results and alternatives for post-earthquake housing recovery from a social policy perspective.

## **Conceptual Framework**

The Habitat II Agenda states that right to adequate housing "means more than a roof over one's head". It includes privacy, security, physical durability, environmental quality and many more at affordable prices. Moreover, regional differences as well as gender and age factors are significant considerations (United Nations, 1996, p.34). In order to ensure urban dwellers' rights, a city should increase individual and social reproduction opportunities and city dwellers must be able to access recreation facilities regardless of age, sex and income (Tekeli, 2011, p.196-197). Public services like transportation and healthy environment are integral parts of housing policy. One way to improve housing provision is community participation in decision making. This refers to the inclusion of locals into decision making processes and especially

the empowerment of vulnerable groups. Participation can provide democratic and pluralistic policy structures although it may come with costs regarding time, money and politics. It is also a social learning process among policy makers (Maginn, 2007).

The protection of right to housing and provision of participatory policies become more critical in a post-disaster context. Davidson et al. argue that problems experienced in a post-disaster environment have similarities with those of low-cost housing projects in developing countries. Some other challenges also emerge, such as chaotic environment, scarce resources, simultaneity of local and international projects, and the urgency of completion. However, these projects may be a good opportunity to initiate several activities that will contribute to the development of the region and the reduction of the vulnerability (Davidson, Johnson, Lizarralde, Dikmen and Sliwinski, 2007, p.101). Coburn and Spence (2002) recommend “sectoral recovery plan” since it requires different skills to reconstruct different facilities such as houses, schools, and hospitals. Reconstruction is more than the physical construction of damaged environment. It can be an opportunity to start economy from the scratch and to revitalize it. Thus, a recovery program should reflect the economic structure of the disaster region and contribute to economic and physical recovery simultaneously (Coburn and Spence, 2002). Zhang, Lindell and Prater (2009, p.38) mention the significance of local businesses and examine their vulnerability to environmental disasters. They argue that the possible vulnerabilities of local businesses must be specified. Then the possible impacts of the disaster must be defined. The third step is to generate a return plan to the pre-disaster level. The necessary measures must be taken by individual firms and community planners together. Finally, based on these local considerations, a public policy must be formulated in order to reduce business vulnerability of local sectors (Zhang, Lindell and Prater, 2009, p.38).

The exclusion of local sectors from construction activities may create loss of skills and emigration that eventually result in the downturn of local economy. In contrast, reconstruction may attract capital investments which may relieve the effects of uneven development in the long run. Regarding the cost of reconstruction, disaster victims, especially low-income groups, should be supplied with financial support. This is necessary to protect them in front of repayment obligations (Coburn and Spence, 2002, p.141-175). It is also important to create familiar spaces for communities to protect the senses of identity and place (Coburn and Spence, 2002, p.161). In their analysis of the Northridge Earthquake, Bolin and Stanford (1998) mention that disasters can

create prospects to reevaluate the existing approaches, to observe vulnerabilities in the community and to enhance the situations of the most vulnerable groups. A vast literature proposes disaster recovery through local opportunities. It is argued that communities should be allowed to decide their own representatives and to shape their own future. The representation of disaster victims as the ones in need of state aid does not help them return to pre-disaster lives; on the contrary, such a representation passivates them. Central administration can utilize disasters to strengthen local authorities and civil society. Respectively, local units can support the central government when it remains incapable in the field (Habitat, 2001, p.187-188).

### ***Earthquakes as a Pretext for Urban Regeneration***

Following 1999 Marmara Earthquake, in 2001, the National Earthquake Council was established as an independent organization composed of experts from different fields. The aim was to provide the public with scientific data, to offer suggestions to the authorities and to support necessary legal arrangements. However, the Council was dissolved in 2007 by the Prime Minister. İstanbul Earthquake Master Plan prepared in 2003 by four major universities of Turkey (İstanbul Technical University, Yıldız Technical University, Boğaziçi University and Middle East Technical University) was laid aside as well (İstanbul Deprem Master Planı, 2003).

“Disaster-risk” became the main concept of urban regeneration throughout the country especially after the 2011 Van Earthquake. Although the reconstruction of disaster risky areas came to the agenda along with 1999 Marmara earthquakes, disaster-oriented urban regeneration gained legal status in May 2012, with the law No. 6306. On October 2012, at a public ceremony where the big reconstruction was started, the Prime Minister said:

First of all, we will construct new buildings, living spaces with an environment-friendly approach protecting natural resources with considerations of energy efficiency and green spaces. ... This new reconstruction approach is also directed towards economic recovery, and alleviation of unemployment and poverty.<sup>5</sup>

It is clearly seen that urban regeneration is a method the government purposively chose to cope with disaster risk. The disaster law not only acted as a legal foundation but also as a pretext which was difficult to resist. In her study

---

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.csb.gov.tr/gm/altyapi/index.php?Sayfa=haberdetay&Id=5129> (last accessed on July, 2018)

analyzing Marmara Earthquake and urban politics in İstanbul, Elizabeth Angell remarks that earthquake acted not only as a destructive disaster but also as a productive phenomenon in providing social and political bases of the reconstructing the cities throughout the country (2014, p.676). Çılgın, Strutz and Çavuşoğlu argue that housing is seen as a symbol of prestige and a real estate investment with its exchange value. Its use value as a living space is ignored. The use value of neighborhoods as well as houses are subordinated by the so-called imaginary of modern city; housing becomes a tool in enhancing one's social class (2011, p.10-17).

The law no. 6306 narrowed down the concept of "transformation" and restricted it to disaster prevention in accordance with "risk identification, vulnerability, resilience" (Güzey, 2016, p.41; Keleş, 2015, p.413). On the other hand, it expanded the scope of implementation in terms of geographical area. The Ministry of Environment and Urbanization was authorized in making surveys, maps, plans and subdivision plans at all kinds and scales. The Ministry and TOKİ emerged as the most powerful authorities in enforcing the law (Keleş, 2015, p.413-414). Thanks to the law, being free from taxes and charges and from the control of the Exchequer and Audit Department, TOKİ had a special status within the state (Bilecen, 2015, p.157). According to the law, citizens do not have a right to choose; decisions are given on their behalf. Hence, Özdemir (2011, p.1109) states that, as a result of the top-down decision making, "existing residents could become targets of the policy, rather than participants in policy formation." In her study evaluating the disaster management system of Turkey, Orhan (2015) argues that the security concerns dominated the approach of Turkey in the case of Van Earthquake. In line with the traditional disaster paradigms, the government focused almost entirely on the production of "permanent housing in geologically safer districts". This focus came with an ignorance of secondary effects and possible other problems. Among these were "fragmentation of urban bodies, alienation of new settlements from historicity of existing town and isolation of urban public culture" (Orhan, 2015, p.685).

Under these conditions, TOKİ was accused of extracting rent from disasters through opening urban lands to construction industry and ignoring the needs of urban dwellers. Moreover, the displaced dwellers experienced certain difficulties in adapting to new conditions due to economic, social and environmental challenges. Eranil Demirli, Tuna Ultav, and Demirtaş-Milz (2015) analyze the urban regeneration in İzmir resulting in the relocation of Kadifekale inhabitants from the old inner-city neighborhood to the TOKİ



houses at the periphery. They concluded that the project was initiated against landslide risk in 2005. However, it failed in responding the socio-spatial needs of the former Kadifekale inhabitants. This was because Kadifekale was a space of social interactions becoming a “place” for the people while TOKİ Uzundere became a space of its producers than a space for its users (Eranul Demirli, Tuna Ultav and Demirtaş-Milz, 2015, p.159). Although initiated long before the enactment of the Law no. 6306, Kadifekale project can be taken as a case in point. Saraçoğlu and Demirtaş-Milz (2014, p.196-197) state:

The importance of this case lies in the ways in which the discourse of “urgency” and that of “natural disasters” has served to conceal these structural problems and to depict the project as an unquestionable technical intervention to address the imminent dangers posed by a landslide. The notion of “natural disasters” plays a significant ideological role in this respect, “naturalizing” the number of problems that are social in origin, such as inequality and urban poverty.

Beginning from the enactment of the disaster law, the government took 191 decisions and identified more than 400 neighborhoods as risky throughout Turkey. Moreover, all areas of squatter settlements were deemed as disaster-prone area since they were mostly built in risky zones. Housing qualifications in these areas were poor also since the owners were mostly lower-income people who could not afford necessary changes in mitigating disaster hazards (Güzey, 2016, p.44-49). According to Balyemez (2012), disaster law served to increase the production capacity of construction sector in the shortest time possible. It transformed the majority of the population into customers through home ownership. In this process, masses were charged with long-term debts regardless of their needs or purchasing powers. Hence, the construction sector was to be financed by would-be homeowners who did not want to lose their property rights (2012, p.69).

To sum up, beginning from the 2000s, the urban regeneration was used as a principal tool in reorganizing Turkish cities in favor of capital accumulation. The successive legal arrangements strengthened the central administration and promoted revenue-generating activities particularly within the construction sector. After 2008, TOKİ was reorganized in line with the interests of construction and real-estate sectors. TOKİ was expected to reduce housing deficit by affordable costs especially for lower income groups. Nevertheless, partnerships with subsidiary firms, such as Emlak Konut, and large-scale urban regeneration projects, contracted to private companies, pushed this social mission aside. Housing issue was dealt with the top-down decisions of the


central government excluding local platforms such as NGOs, professional chambers and the city councils. Consequently, participatory decision-making remained unfulfilled and social side of the regeneration was ignored.

## **2011 Van Earthquake**


Forced migration, stemming from the armed conflict between the Turkish State and Kurdish separatist groups, is a core issue of the city of Van, which has had profound changes on urban spaces. Forced migration comes with “forced urbanization” (Keskinok, 2009, p.216). Keskinok (2009) argues that, along with forced migration, the economic impacts of capitalist integration during the 1990s and liberal policymaking complicated urbanization processes across the region. Sustainable development models could not be implemented since rural economy was totally collapsed after forced migration. State subsidies were cut for agricultural production, which worsened the poverty of the city dwellers. Although the 1993 master plan of Van predicted the requirements of anticipated population growth in 2005, expected environmental reconstruction could not be realized. This was primarily because the production costs of projected urban areas became a real burden for the poor (Keskinok, 2009, p.224-226). Van was gradually pushed back in socio-economic development. In a field research in 2014, it was found that the 52.7% of the urban dwellers came to the city by migration. Unemployment was the most important problem and monthly household income of two thirds of the city was below the hunger threshold (Tümtaş and Ergun, 2014). According to Turkstat’s well-being index, Van was ranked the 71<sup>st</sup> among 81 provinces in 2015.

Located on an earthquake-prone region, Van had experienced serious earthquakes throughout the history (see Figures 1 and 2). Ali Özvan, İsmail Akkaya, Mucip Tapan and Alper Şengül (2005) made earthquake hazard analysis of Van city center and found that there was liquefaction risk for settlement areas. They argued that buildings on the Van plain would experience the earthquake longer due to soil properties. Moreover, since these buildings did not conform to the standards, loss of life and property were expected to be high. Therefore, Erdemkent neighborhood (location of the current TOKİ area in Edremit) was suggested as the new settlement area as it was composed of rock soil eliminating the risk of earthquake and flood (Figure 3). This study also showed that active faults of the region are close to the breaking


point increasing the risk of a possible earthquake (Özvan, Akkaya, Tapan and Şengül, 2005).



**Figure 1:** Turkey Earthquake Zoning Map, modified and translated from Turkish to English by the author (Retrieved on July, 2018 from <https://deprem.afad.gov.tr/deprem-bolge-leri-haritasi>)



**Figure 2:** Van Earthquake Zoning Map, modified and translated from Turkish to English by the author (Retrieved on July, 2018 from <https://deprem.afad.gov.tr/deprem-bolgeleri-haritasi>)



**Figure 3:** Edremit TOKİ Houses & Erdemkent Neighborhood (Source: Google Earth)

In 2011, two earthquakes hit the city of Van on 23 October and 9 November. The Department of Earthquake of AFAD (2011) reported that 644 people died, 1966 people injured and 252 people were saved alive from the debris. Material needs and aids were supplied by the Governorship of Van, other local governorships, the central government, NGOs in order to increase post-earthquake resilience. According to the information obtained from the interview with a social worker from AFAD (sociologist, public official, personal interview, May 2018), certain recovery strategies were applied with a particular focus on psychosocial support in order to prevent the negative consequences of the earthquake. Social workers from state institutions as well as civil society organizations such as Turkish Psychological Association provided support both for the affected communities and for the staff responsible from the provision of material aids such as food. For meeting urgent needs of victims, emergency telephone lines were put into service by AFAD. Social workers from the Ministry of Family and Social Policies also visited households.

Yet, some degree of inefficiency in aid distribution was observed. Political differences between the central authorities and the Municipality of Van were mentioned as one of the reasons for this inefficiency (Doğulu, Karancı and İkizer, 2016, p.110-111). Başbuğ Erkan et al. (2015) stated that search and rescue activities were more successful during the Van earthquake compared to the 1999 Marmara earthquake. However, initial damage assessment process was found inadequate as demonstrated in the Bayram Hotel case.<sup>6</sup> Authors argued, in addition, that the expert support from the professional chambers should have been utilized in earlier stages (Başbuğ Erkan et al., 2015).

17005 dwelling units collapsed or heavily damaged after the earthquakes (AFAD Department of Earthquake, 2011). The severity of damage and increased loss were due to the magnitudes of the earthquakes. They were also related to lithologic character of the ground on which the houses were built and the construction material. The city center had been built on a risky area composing of made-up grounds. Moreover, old and high-rise buildings as well as the lack of inspection increased the loss (Alaeddinoğlu, Sargin and Okudum, 2016, p.136). Besides, in 1998, the architect Yonca Hürol Al (1998)

---

<sup>6</sup> Bayram Hotel located at the city centre of Van was collapsed in the second earthquake occurred in November 9 causing 24 deaths. It was claimed that the building was assessed by AFAD and reported as “damaged yet habitable” right after the first earthquake.  
<http://www.diken.com.tr/vanda-24-kisiye-mezar-olan-bayram-oteline-hasarli-oturulur-raporu-verilmis/> (last accessed on July, 2018)

had stated that the armed conflict and forced migration impelled the victims towards illegal housing. This made poor neighborhoods more vulnerable since houses were mostly built on risky places with nondurable materials (Al, 1998, p.46). Yet, Alaeddinoğlu, Sargın and Okudum (2016) found that death toll and physical damage were less severe in lower income neighborhoods thanks to their low-rise buildings.

Özceylan (2011) mentioned that Van was ranked as the seventh most vulnerable city in Turkey in terms of social and economic aspects. Negative responses to call for aid during the recovery period after the earthquake revealed this vulnerability (Özceylan and Coşkun, 2012). The physical vulnerability of Van had been studied well such that the estimation of the Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute for the possible number of dead and injured had been almost exact. Yet, there had not been any study for social and economic vulnerability that could estimate the huge damage given that the earthquake's impact area was relatively small (2012, p.178). After the earthquake, opposition parties suggested declaring Van as disaster-area. The Prime Minister rejected this suggestion and argued that, in such a case, it would not be possible to initiate any public work or housing. The authorities preferred to reconstruct Van through TOKİ, that is, an extensive mass housing construction across the city. The Minister of Environment and Urbanization stated that they intended to build a new city by making the people of Van homeowners.<sup>7</sup>

### *Post-earthquake Housing Reconstruction*

With respect to the collaboration and coordination between central and local authorities, our interviewees from public institutions did not mention any problem. One interviewee (civil engineer, public official, personal interview, May 2018) indicated:

It was a huge disaster such that local bodies could not handle by themselves. Besides, decisions had to be made within a very short period. Thus, in general, decisions were taken by the center; representatives of the central in-

---

<sup>7</sup> [http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/297214/\\_Van\\_afet\\_bolgesi\\_ilan\\_edilsin\\_\\_cagrisi.html](http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/297214/_Van_afet_bolgesi_ilan_edilsin__cagrisi.html)

<http://www.haberturk.com/yasam/haber/687480-van-neden-afet-bolgesi-ilan-edilmedi> (last accessed on July, 2018)

<http://siyasihaber3.org/van-depreminin-uzerinden-6-yil-gecti-afet-bolgesi-ilan-edilsin-onerisi-reddedilmisti> (last accessed on July, 2018)

stitutions were in the field. Yet, local conditions were known by local authorities better and their opinions were also considered. I saw that there was a special effort for the collaboration between the center and the local. The governor tried to make decisions with the mayor. There was not any serious opposition or conflict. Professional chambers and NGOs also participated in the process. For instance, professional chambers and universities took part in the damage assessment process. When state means were inadequate, the support of NGOs and universities were received.

In contrast, the representatives of local professional chambers complained since their suggestions were disregarded. One informant from a public institution (geological engineer, public official, personal interview, May 2018) acknowledged this point:

In our technical tasks, we do not have a close contact with NGOs. Indeed, it should be. As a self-criticism, we should improve ourselves on this issue.

On the collaboration between central and local governments, one interviewee (survey engineer, member of the City Council of Van, personal interview, August 2017) stated that:


...the local government held meetings with the local professional chambers and NGOs. I also participated. The major emphasis was on the necessity of a scientific approach in meeting shelter needs. Although this would extend the time, a livable city could be built after the completion of reconstruction. Yet, the center chose to build TOKİ houses in a year.

It is understood that non-governmental bodies could have been integrated into the reconstruction process more efficiently. Although both central and local governments put certain efforts, these could not have reflections on implementation. Besides, political differences between central and local authorities had negative effects on the process. The local institutions could not be effectively included in the formulation and execution of the post-earthquake housing policy. The policy lacked a participatory decision-making background. This lack became evident in the case of mass housing projects in Van.

### ***Mass Housing***

Since 2004, 92 mass housing projects were initiated in Van by TOKİ and 43 of them comprise disaster homes. Prior to the earthquake, one project had been completed in the category of “disaster home” in Hangediği Village after

the flood that occurred in June 2007. Other 42 projects followed 2011 Earthquakes. In order to solve housing deficit stemming from the earthquake, the construction of disaster-homes started in a month. The plan was to deliver the houses after 10 months of the start.<sup>8</sup> Site selection was conducted by AFAD and construction works were carried by TOKİ. Accordingly, mass housing regions were located in 4 regions around the city center: Edremit, Bostaniçi, Kalecik and Kevenli (Figure 4). Social reinforcements were also provided within mass housing projects. Infrastructure works were carried out by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization and the municipality.



**Figure 4:** Locations of Kalecik, Bostaniçi, Kevenli and Edremit TOKİ regions (Source: Google Maps, last accessed on July, 2018)

Based on our field observations and knowledge obtained from media sources, we can say that the selected sites for mass housing regions were relatively far away from the city center. Besides, the prices of houses were a significant problem in terms of dwellers' economic power. These raised questions for the social welfare of the inhabitants. Hence, the interviewees were asked about site selection, displacement and affordability issues.

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.afad.gov.tr/tr/2146/Van-ve-Ercis-Deprem-Konutlari-Teslim-Edildi> (last accessed on July, 2018)



An interviewee (geological engineer, public official, personal interview, May 2018) who took part in the site selection process stated:

Three main criteria were considered when choosing the site of mass houses. First, the chosen areas were earthquake resistant and composed of firm soil. The distance to the city center was the second to protect socio-economic conditions of the dwellers. The third was property relations to protect legal rights. Although most of the construction works were carried out on public lands, certain private lands had to be expropriated. Expropriation mostly covered the areas for the construction of roads and routes of the infrastructure. Finally, development lines of the city were also considered.

On the other side, the informants from local professional chambers asserted that houses were constructed at the distant peripheries of the city center and local dwellers were displaced. One interviewee (architect, member of the Chamber of Architects of Van, personal interview, August 2017) stated:

In my opinion, the only criterion in site selection was to choose public lands at the peripheries of the city. This not only increased the distance between the homes and workplaces but also transportation expenses.

As it was confirmed in field observations, some homeowners chose to rent or sell these houses (Figure 5). This was expressed by an interviewee (survey engineer, member of the City Council of Van, personal interview, August 2017):

Today, it is seen that, the spending done for the houses would not have been wasted if a proper, well-organized planning had been conducted. TOKİ houses are not expected to remain as permanent living spaces. Current TOKİ owners want to rent these houses and turn back to the city center.



**Figure 5:** A real estate advertisement from Kalecik TOKİ (Photo by the author, August, 2017)

In spite of several problems arising out of the location of mass housing regions such as transportation and isolation from the city center, the discourse of homeownership was highlighted by the public officials and TOKİ houses were presented as a golden opportunity for those who wanted to be homeowners in the short run. One informant (civil engineer, public official, personal interview, May 2018) said:

Turkey is comparable to Japan in terms of the earthquake frequency. Even in there, they cannot construct new houses immediately. Since some social conditions are important in our country, we provide the right to shelter within a very short time through permanent houses.

All public officials who were interviewed agreed that disaster houses were affordable. They emphasized the advantage of the long-term loans. One of them (public official, personal interview, May 2018) stated:

What was done in Van was unique in terms of the prices of houses and indebtedness. They sold the houses at their cost, infrastructure expenses were covered by the state, and loans were given for a 20-year-period without any payment for the first two years. This was never done anywhere else in Turkey.

Another interviewee (civil engineer, public official, personal interview, May 2018) said:

It would be wrong to consider the price of disaster houses as a price of a normal house. In this respect, what was provided by the state was quite advantageous compared to buying a house under normal circumstances.

However, an interviewee (architect, member of chamber of Architect of Van, personal interview, August 2017) criticized high margins of the houses since housing prices were the twofold.<sup>9</sup> Another informant (financial advisor, member of a non-governmental organization, personal interview, August 2017) highlighted a similar point:

TOKİ dwellers once resided in the city center; they now have to use two means of transportation to commute to work every day, which means extra financial burden. Most dwellers work for minimum wage. Transportation expenses and monthly costs of heat and cleaning create economic difficulties for lower income groups. Those economically well-off do not live in TOKİ.

Among the contractor companies charged with housing construction by TOKİ after the earthquakes, only one company was local; other contractors were mostly based on Ankara and İstanbul (TOKİ, 2018). This was criticized by one of the informants (architect, member of the Chamber of Architects of Van, personal interview, August 2017) on the ground that the already damaged local firms in the earthquake were not given a chance to involve in the reconstruction of the city which would contribute to the recovery of local economy. Construction sector was also interrupted with the decision to remake the master plan of the city. Meanwhile, since TOKİ could act independently from construction plans, numerous houses were built at the peripheries of the city right after the earthquake without the contribution of or to the local sectors. This caused cash outflow from the city in the long run through the repayment of mortgage loans.<sup>10</sup> But, public officials argued that

---

<sup>9</sup> Housing cost per unit determined by Ministry of Environment and Urbanization was 560 Turkish liras for a square meter in 2012. For TOKİ houses, this cost was calculated as 1050 Turkish lira. For the earthquake victims, a discount of 300 Turkish liras was made per square meter and houses in 98 square meter size were sold to people 75000 Turkish liras in total (about 42000 USD according to the average rate of exchange in 2012). This meant a profit around 60%. Data was obtained from the announcement of Ministry of Environment and Urbanization published in the website of the official gazette no. 28277 dated April 28, 2012. <https://www.milliyetemlak.com/dergi/vandaki-toki-konutlari-indirimli-verilecek/> (last accessed on July, 2018)

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.habervan.com/van-haberleri/vanda-insaat-sektoru-can-cekisiyor-van-haberleri-h1654.html>  
<http://www.gazetevan.com/STKlardan-Insaat-Sektorundeki-Sorunlar-Icin-Cagri-68040.html>

the reconstruction process supported economic recovery. One informant (geological engineer, public official, personal interview, May 2018) stated:

The policies brought about employment opportunities to locals. Thanks to state funds, infrastructural facilities were also provided. In this manner, we not only built resistant buildings against future disasters, but also regenerated the city.

It was seen that the approaches of the public officials and non-governmental bodies differed. Public officials emphasized the priority to produce the required housing units in the shortest time. To this end, the majority of the means were provided from the external sources, which was justified with the damage being substantial. Similarly, decisions were made by the center excluding the local non-governmental organizations and professional chambers. Consequently, the post-disaster mass housing schemes were to be implemented in line with the common housing provision method of the government with top-down decisions. The possible contributions of local institutions, professionals, and even firms were effectively ignored. A centralized and assumingly quick path was preferred instead of an integrated participatory housing policy. This preference produced adverse implications in the reconstruction of the city center and in the housing conditions of the vulnerable groups.

### *Reconstruction of the City Centre*

Some earthquake victims chose to construct their own houses in the city center. However, since the Law no. 6306 passed after the Van earthquake, the buildings in Van were not covered by urban reconstruction as defined in the law. Thus, those who pulled down their damaged buildings could not benefit from the credits identified by the law. In order to solve this shortfall, a new law was issued in the parliament right before the 7 June 2015 general elections with the proposal of Van deputies of the ruling party.<sup>11</sup> An interviewee (survey engineer, member of the City Council of Van, personal interview, August 2018) stated:

Municipalities and local governments were insufficient in terms of resources. Thus, the central government could use the Law no. 6306 as a rent-

---

(last accessed on July, 2018)

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.radikal.com.tr/van-haber/vanli-depremezdelere-kentsel-donusum-mujdesi-1328794/>

(last accessed on July, 2018)

generating tool. After the earthquake, monetary issues of tradesmen came to the fore pushing urban issues back.

Another informant (financial advisor, member of a non-governmental organization, personal interview, August 2017) argued that lower income groups were pushed to the city periphery as a result of reconstruction:

Newly built shopping malls appeal to tourists, mostly coming from Iran, which makes the center more crowded and the traffic problem worse.

After 2017, there was a construction boom in Van's city center. According to the field observations, the construction mostly comprised high-rise buildings and shopping malls (Figure 6). This reduced the size of public spaces and prevented certain groups from benefitting the social and recreational facilities. Although the governor of Van stated in October 2017 that the traces of the earthquake were totally removed from the city, there still existed some vacant buildings (Figure 7).<sup>12</sup> The city center was mainly reconstructed with a logic of rent generation rather than a logic of welfare distribution. The city reproduced its center at the expense of the displacement of low income and vulnerable groups. They were not included as the agents of the post-earthquake reconstruction of the city and its center. They were also disregarded and not contained within the new meaning of the sustainable city center.



**Figure 6:** High-rise buildings under construction beside a new shopping mall (Photo by the author, August 2017)

---

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.trthaber.com/haber/turkiye/van-depremin-izlerinden-kurtuldu-338888.html> (last accessed on July, 2018)



**Figure 7:** Damaged building at the city center (Photo by the author, August, 2017)

### *Housing Problem of Vulnerable Groups*

35 container cities (31 in the city center and 4 in Erciş district) were built by TOKİ in Van to meet temporary shelter needs of those who lost their houses or whose houses were severely damaged (AFAD, 2014). After the completion of construction works, beneficiaries started to move from container cities to TOKİ houses. However, those who were not in the status of beneficiary under the Law no. 7269 were not eligible for TOKİ houses and they continued to live in container cities. 3 years after the disaster, 64 families were still living in temporary shelters which were already turned to be permanent homes.<sup>13</sup> The container dwellers mostly comprised of vulnerable groups (woman, children, elderly) demanding permanent social housing as well as employment.

---

<sup>13</sup> <https://kdk.gov.tr/haber/van-depremi-sonrasi-gerceklestirilen-calismalar/498> (last accessed on July, 2018)

2000 families who were tenants before the earthquake were given TOKİ houses by lot. 92 families accepted rent allowance provided by the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation and moved from containers to rental housing. Those who did not accept this option continued to dwell in containers.<sup>14</sup> One interviewee (high-school graduate, public official, personal interview, May 2018) described these dwellers as occupants:

They do not have the right to stay in the containers; they have occupied them. Nevertheless, they were provided with electricity and water. Even those who were tenants before the earthquake were provided with TOKİ houses with the directions of the central government. This implementation was unique to Van.

On the other side, an interviewee (financial advisor, member of a non-governmental organization, personal interview, August 2017) mentioned certain issues causing gender discrimination among beneficiaries:

One of the requirements of being beneficiary for woman was being married. This meant that single woman living with their parents were not eligible. Thus, there were many women who could not be beneficiary and no special policy was available for them. As an NGO, we managed to buy only four houses for the most disadvantaged families; yet a selection among them was quite difficult. Those who insisted to stay in containers were criminalized. In order to force them to quit containers, authorities cut their electricity and water.

It is seen that, although the government could provide alternative housing solutions for those who were not homeowners before the earthquake, certain groups were ultimately excluded from the process. According to field observations, 15 families were still living in the Anadolu Container City as of August 2017 without basic infrastructural facilities like water and electricity. From a short, informal conversation with two of the container dwellers, we learned that remaining households were mostly comprised of widow or divorced women and their children (Figure 8 and 9) confirming the above cited point made by the informant. Containers became the only affordable housing

---

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/44-aile-hala-konteyner-kentte> (last accessed on July, 2018)  
<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/van-valisi-feyzioglundun-aciklamalari-gercegi-yansitmiyor-26392472> (last accessed on July, 2018)

option for these people who were struggling to provide their own sustainability. This struggle was harsh since they were already displaced not only from the center but also from the overall process of reconstruction.



**Figure 8:** Anadolu Container City (Photo by the author, August, 2017)



**Figure 9:** A household in the Anadolu Container City (Photo by the author, 2017)

Although the priority must have been given to the most vulnerable and needy after the earthquake in Van, the solution of the government appeared to produce more and more housing units sold in return for a long-term loan. Those who did not want to be indebted lost their basic right to shelter. Those



who bought TOKİ houses had to live at the periphery of the city. Even though the construction was the main engine of Turkey's economy under the AKP rule, Van could not get its share from the process since the firms outside the city dominated the building after the earthquake. This perpetuated uneven development damaging the economic recovery of a ruined city. Mass housing schemes promoted home ownership with affordable prices. However, additional expenses (transportation, monthly dues) of the TOKİ dwellers were not considered within affordability issue. Large-scale urban regeneration was not implemented in Van. On-demand regeneration was carried out on land-parcel base. High-rise buildings gradually dominated the urban fabric of the city center increasing traffic and decreasing public spaces. Housing policies were not inclusive of all groups in need, which contrasted with social welfare provision. Those who were not identified as beneficiaries were excluded from the process.

## **Conclusion**

For effective policy outcomes, community participation in the relevant policies seems crucial for both reconstruction and regeneration processes. Municipalities, NGOs, professional chambers and city councils must be recognized as legitimate participants with knowledge at the local level. This may reduce the negative effects of top-down policy making. The Van case shows the importance of proactive measures before disasters. Although the city is located on an earthquake prone region, a specific action plan for housing reconstruction had not been available for Van prior to the 2011 Earthquake. As a result, mass housing became the only solution to meet the permanent needs of sheltering for the local dwellers. Since disaster houses had to be delivered in the shortest possible time with affordable prices, the costless public lands were chosen as new settlement areas on which construction works were carried by private companies contracted by TOKİ. Yet, this could not ensure the housing welfare of the urban dwellers due to several issues including displacement and long-term indebtedment.

It is clear that proactive plans for post-disaster housing recovery must be developed in advance for such regions. To this end, government proposed the Law no. 6306 as a solution. However, as demonstrated by the Van case and other studies, methods prescribed by the law tend to ignore local conditions and remain incapable of ensuring the collaboration among the stakeholders. In order to articulate the different opinions, needs and demands

within the community, it is necessary to strengthen the position of local stakeholders within decision making and implementation processes. The city councils have potential in achieving participatory policies as they can represent the interests of the local groups. These councils are also crucial for the knowledge exchange between the local experts and the policy makers of the central institutions. Therefore, community participation is essential in the city councils where future plans can be developed through the collaborative work of public institutions, professional chambers, NGOs and civil society representatives. This is also useful to mobilize local sources and means for a more efficient reconstruction for the provision of familiar living spaces to local dwellers (Coburn and Spence, 2002). Affordability is another requirement for social housing provision. Housing stock in the city should be affordable and sufficient in diversity, especially for those who cannot afford housing under market conditions. Yet, as the Van case demonstrated, most of the TOKİ owners were suffering from the loan payments as well as extra charges such as monthly dues (see Erman, 2016).

The mission of TOKİ seems to be in line with the requirements of a welfare state. It is asserted that housing production by TOKİ comprises not only shelter needs but also the projects for the social reinforcements, environmental planning and aesthetics. In this process, lower-income groups who cannot afford home ownership under market conditions are said to be the target group. On the other hand, the legal arrangements are frequently justified within a discourse of “disaster risk” asserting urban reconstruction as an obligation. At this point, “home ownership” is overemphasized in order to make the projects more attractive. This helps to cover the problems generated by construction-driven policy-making and top-down implementations.

This paper questioned whether the housing policies implemented in Van after the 2011 Earthquake were mainly in favor of the citizens or of private sector. It concluded that urban regeneration projects strengthened the construction with the primary motivation of economic improvement and gave little concern to the living conditions of the earthquake victims. The Earthquake was exploited to justify the urban reconstruction. This study tried to give a brief picture of housing policies in Van by focusing on three interrelated processes: mass housing, reconstruction of the city center, and housing problems of vulnerable groups. Mass housing came out as a result of a top-down approach. Reconstruction of the city center was carried out with a logic of profit maximization. Both processes were controlled by TOKİ as a centralized governmental institution. Finally, housing problems of vulnerable

groups were overshadowed by mass housing and the reconstruction. That is, the policies and implementations in question were not consistent with welfare principles and did not meet the requirements of participatory social policy approaches. This study suggests that policies aiming at provision of affordable social housing should be distinguished from the policies promoting home ownership through mass housing and urban regeneration schemes. Housing policy should be revised in the direction of redistributive methods in which construction sector has a subordinate role vis-à-vis social housing provision. That is, policy approaches focusing on quantitative concerns should be replaced with people-oriented policy goals.

### References/Kaynakça

- AFAD (Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı). (2014). *Müdahale, iyileştirme ve sosyoekonomik açıdan 2011 Van Depremi*. Ankara. Retrieved in March 2018 from [https://www.afad.gov.tr/upload/Node/17944/xfiles/mudahale\\_iyileştirme-ve-sosyoekonomik-acidan-2011-van-depremi-raporu\\_2\\_.pdf](https://www.afad.gov.tr/upload/Node/17944/xfiles/mudahale_iyileştirme-ve-sosyoekonomik-acidan-2011-van-depremi-raporu_2_.pdf)
- AFAD Deprem Dairesi Başkanlığı. (2011). *Van depremi (23 Ekim 2011) raporu*. Retrieved in March 2018 from <http://www.deprem.gov.tr/depremdokumanlari/416>
- AFAD. (2018). Earthquake Zoning Map. Retrieved on 30 July 2018, from <http://www.deprem.gov.tr/en/Category/earthquake-zoning-map-96531>
- Al, Y. (1998). *Van dosyası: Teknolojik afet, zorunlu göç, yoksulluk ve mimarlık*. Ankara: TMMOB Mimarlar Odası Yayınları.
- Alaeddinoğlu, F., Sargın, S., ve Okudum, R. (2016). 2011 Van depremi ve kentsel nüfusta mekansal farklılaşmalar. *SDÜ Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 39, 133-149.
- Angell, E. (2014). Assembling disaster: Earthquakes and urban politics in Istanbul. *City* 18(6), 667-678.
- Balyemez, S. (2012). Afet yasası neyin tasası? *Planlama* 52, 67-69.
- Başbuğ Erkan, B., Karancı, A., Kalaycıoğlu, S., Özden, A., Çalışkan, İ., and Özakşehir, G. (2015). From emergency response to recovery: Multiple impacts and lessons learned from the 2011 Van earthquakes. *Earthquake Spectra* 31(1): 527-540.
- Bilecen, T. (2015). Yeni afet yasasında hukuksal ve demokratik esneklik. *Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 15(3), 145-158.
- Bolin, R. and Stanford, L. (1998). *The Northridge Earthquake: Vulnerability and Disaster*. Routledge: New York.
- Coburn, A., and Spence, R. (2002). *Earthquake Protection* (2nd ed.). Chichester: John Wiley.

- Çılgin, K., Strutz, J., and Çavuşoğlu, E. (2011). Kentsel dönüşüm baskısı altındaki mahallelerdeki güç ilişkilerinin Bourdieucu bir okuması. In 7. *Türkiye Şehircilik Kongresi "Herkes İçin Kent, Herkes İçin Planlama: Akıllıca, Adaletle, Yeniden"* (pp. 167-206). Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi-İstanbul: TMMOB Şehir Planları Odası.
- Davidson, C., Johnson, C., Lizarralde, G., Dikmen, N., and Sliwinski, A. (2007). Truths and myths about community participation in post-disaster housing projects. *Habitat International* 31: 100-115.
- Doğulu, C., Karancı, A., and İkizer, G. (2016). How do survivors perceive community resilience? The case of the 2011 earthquakes in Van, Turkey. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction* 16, 108-114.
- Eliçin, Y. (2014). Neoliberal transformation of the Turkish city through the Urban Transformation Act. *Habitat International* 41, 150-155.
- Eranul Demirli, M., Tuna Ultav, Z., and Demirtaş-Milz, N. (2015). A socio-spatial analysis of urban transformation at a neighborhood scale: The case of the relocation of Kadifekale inhabitants to TOKİ Uzundere in İzmir. *Cities*, 48, 140-159.
- Erman, T. (2016). "Mış Gibi Site": Ankara'da Bir TOKİ-Gecekondu Dönüşüm Sitesi (1st ed.). İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık.
- Güzey, Ö. (2016). The last round in restructuring the city: Urban regeneration becomes a state policy of disaster prevention in Turkey. *Cities* 50: 40-53.
- İstanbul Deprem Master Planı. (2003). Retrieved in September 2019 from [http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/SubSites/DepremSite/Pages/IstanbulDepremMasterPlani.aspx?utm\\_campaign=DonanimHaber&utm\\_medium=referal&utm\\_source=DonanimHaber](http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/SubSites/DepremSite/Pages/IstanbulDepremMasterPlani.aspx?utm_campaign=DonanimHaber&utm_medium=referal&utm_source=DonanimHaber)
- Keleş, R. (2015). *Kentleşme politikası* (14th ed.). Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.
- Keskinok, Ç. (2009). Van kenti'nin kentleşme sorunları. In *Van Kent Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitabı* (p. 205-226). Ankara.
- Maginn, P. (2007). Towards more effective community participation in urban regeneration: the potential of collaborative planning and applied ethnography. *Qualitative Research*, 7(1) 25-43.
- Muhcu, E. (2008). Deprem gerçeği ve kentsel dönüşüm. In H. Eyidoğan, *İstanbul depremini beklerken: Sorunlar ve çözümler sempozyumu* (1st ed., p. 85-93). İstanbul: CHP.
- Orhan, E. (2015). The consequences of security cognition in post-disaster urban planning practices in the case of Turkey. *Natural Hazards* 76(1), 685-703
- Özceylan, D. (2011). *Afetler için sosyal ve ekonomik zarar görebilirlik endeksi geliştirilmesi: Türkiye'deki iller üzerine bir uygulama*. Doktora Tezi. Yükseköğretim Kurulu Başkanlığı Tez Merkezi 296220.
- Özceylan, D., ve Coşkun, E. (2012). Van depremi sonrası yaşananlar ışığında sosyal ve ekonomik zarar görebilirlik çalışmalarının önemi. *Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi*, 7(1), 167-186.

- Özdemir, D. (2011). The role of the public sector in the provision of housing supply in Turkey, 1950-2009. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 35(6), 1099-1117.
- Özvan, A., Akkaya, İ., Tapan, M., ve Şengül, M. (2005). Van yerleşkesinin deprem tehlikesi ve olası bir depremin sonuçları. In *Deprem Sempozyumu* (p. 1386-1393). Kocaeli: Kocaeli Üniversitesi. Retrieved from <http://yubam.kocaeli.edu.tr>
- Saraçoğlu, C. and Demirtaş-Milz, N. (2014). Disasters as an ideological strategy for governing neoliberal urban transformation in Turkey: insights from Izmir/Kadifekale. *Disasters*, 38(1), 178-201.
- Tekeli, İ. (2011). *Kent, kentli hakları, kentleşme ve kentsel dönüşüm* (1st ed.). Eminönü, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- TOKİ (Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı) (2018). İllere göre projeler. Retrieved from <https://www.toki.gov.tr/illere-gore-projeler>
- TOKİ. (2017). TOKİ konut üretim raporu. Retrieved on 20 November 2017 from <http://toki.gov.tr/AppResources/UserFiles/files/FaaliyetOzeti/ozet.pdf>
- Tümtaş, M. S. and Ergun, C. (2014). Göç ve yoksulluk kıskacında yıkılan bir kent: Van. *Akademik Yaklaşımlar Dergisi* 5(2), 1-23.
- Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu. (2013). *Seçilmiş göstergelerle Van*. Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu Matbaası.
- Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu. (2015). *İllerde yaşam endeksi il sıralamaları ve endeks değerleri*. Retrieved from <http://www.tuik.gov.tr>
- United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat). (2001). *Cities in a globalizing world*. London: Earthscan Publications.
- United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II). (1996). In *United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II)*. İstanbul. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/istanbul-declaration.pdf>
- Yılmaz, E. (2013). Urban transformation policies and the Irrepressible Rise of TOKİ. *Perspectives Turkey (Heinrich Böll Stiftung Derneği Türkiye Temsilciliği)* 3: 40-43.
- Zhang, Y., Lindell. M. K., and Prater. C. S. (2009). Vulnerability of community businesses to environmental disasters. *Disasters*, 33(1), 38-57