ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS: KNOWLEDGE, MOTIVATIONAL AND POWER DYNAMICS

Yıl 2015, Cilt: 2 Sayı: 4, 27 - 42, 26.12.2015

Ayşe Saime Döner

Öz

There are various forms of organizations acting as platforms for economic activities. While the existing theoretical studies in economics analyze organizations in relation to “the firm” and mostly focus on distinguishing between firms and markets, they don’t propose the sufficient variety that can explain the observed organizational forms. This paper attempts to re-conceptualize the organizational forms in business by studying the necessary coordination mechanisms related to knowledge and motivational dynamics of intra-organizational relationships. Acknowledging also the role of power distribution among the actors, organizational forms are specified as different combinations of these mechanisms. Business organizations are essentially loci for interactions between economic actors during economic activities. In view of the fact that today knowledge is the critical resource in the production of all goods and services, economic activities are mainly viewed as knowledge activities i.e. sharing, integrating and creating knowledge. Since these activities need to be regulated for efficiency, interacting actors should coordinate their actions with each other. More precisely, they need to adjust their collaboration degree according to the needs of knowledge activities given the characteristics of actors –absorption capacity–and the characteristics of “transacted” knowledge –codifiability, observability, teachability, complexity, systemic dependency, and newness–. Another dimension to consider is the fact that the economic actors involved in these interactions may behave in an opportunistic way and have potentially conflicting interests which would hinder the performance of their collective activities. If the actors have intrinsically aligned interests, they are already motivated to coordinate their productive efforts without questioning the intentions of the others. In this case the control mechanisms are fairly informal, and the interactions occur on equal ground. However, if the individual interests are conflicting, actors need some coordination mechanisms to solve these conflicts and to continue on with their interactions. Finally, the process of reaching agreement gives rise to power plays. As a result of power distribution, the institutions are put in place in order to extrinsically align actors’ interests. Hence, interactions during knowledge activities occur both in a technical division of labor referring to knowledge governance and in a social division of labor related to management of social conflicts and rivalries. Thus, coordination mechanisms in a business organization have to take into consideration the knowledge, motivational and power dynamics. In this sense, we attempt to define organizational forms based on these three dimensions.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Organizational form, Knowledge-based economy, Cognitive coordination, Motivational coordination, Power distribution

ORGANİZASYON FORMLARI: BİLGİ, MOTİVASYON VE GÜÇ DİNAMİKLERİ

Öz

Ekonomik faaliyetler farklı organizasyon formları dahilinde yürütülmektedir. Sanayi ekonomisi literatüründe varolan teorik çalışmalar, bu organizasyonları çoğunlukla “firma” ile ilişkilendirerek ve firma-piyasa ayrımına odaklanarak incelerken, gözlemlenen organizasyon formlarının çeşitliliğini açıklayan tek bir çerçeve sunmamaktadır. Bu çalışma, organizasyon içindeki farklı dinamiklerin yarattığı koordinasyon gerekliliklerini öne çıkararak gözlemlenen bu çeşitliliğe kavramsal bir çerçeve sunma amacındadır. Organizasyon içi dinamiklere dair üç boyut incelenmektedir: (1) bilgi yaratımı ve transferi, (2) birimler arası çıkar çatışmaları, ve (3) birimler arası güç dağılımı. Günümüzde bilgi, ekonomik faaliyetlerde kullanılan kaynakların en önemlisi olarak kabul edilmektedir. Dolayısıyla ekonomik faaliyetler de temelinde bilgi faaliyetleri olarak ele alınmalıdır. Farklı ekonomik birimlerin kontrolünde olan bilgilerin paylaşımını, transferini ve yeni bilgilerin yaratımını içeren bilgi faaliyetleri etkinlik açısından düzenlenmelidir. Aktörler bu faaliyetler sırasında şekillenen ortak çalışmalarını, hem kendi özelliklerine göre –dışardan gelen bilgiyi emme kapasiteleri- hem de paylaşılan bilginin özelliklerine göre –kodlanmışlık, gözlemlenebilirlik, öğretilebilirlik, karmaşıklık, sisteme bağımlılık ve yenilik- eşgüdümlemelidir. Bu çalışmada, bilgiye dayalı ekonomi literatürü takip edilerek, bilgi yaratımı ve transferinin koordinasyonu, ortaya çıkan organizasyon formunun birinci ve en önemli bileşeni olarak ele alınmaktadır. Ancak bilişsel düzeydeki bu koordinasyon tek başına yeterli değildir. Zira ortak bir bilgi faaliyetinde çalışan ekonomik aktörler fırsatçı davranabilir ya da çıkar çatışması içerisine girebilirler. Eğer aktörlerin çıkarları kendiliğinden birbirleriyle çatışmıyorsa, bu aktörler birbirlerinin niyetlerini sorgulamadan ekonomik faaliyetler içindeki görevlerini eşgüdümlemeye hazır olurlar. Bu durumda ilişkilerin koordinasyonu güven esaslı gayri resmi kontrol mekanizmalarıyla sağlanabilir. Öte yandan, çıkarların çatışması durumunda, aktörler ekonomik faaliyetler içindeki görevlerini yerine getirmeden önce kendi haklarını korumak isteyeceklerdir. Bu da, ortak çalışmaya başlamadan önce bir anlaşmaya varmalarını ve aralarındaki ilişkileri resmî kural ve kanunlarla düzenlemelerini gerektirmektedir. Sonuç olarak, ekonomik faaliyetler sırasında ortaya çıkan organizasyonların şekillenmesinde, resmi ya da gayri resmi kurumlarla ekonomik aktörlerin çıkarlarının korunmasına yönelik koordinasyon mekanizmaları ikinci bir bileşen olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. En son bileşen de ekonomik birimler arası güç dağılımıyla ilişkilidir. Her ne zaman iki ya da daha fazla taraf arasında sözleşme ihtiyacı ortaya çıkarsa, güç oyunları da kendini gösterecektir. Her aktör kendi çıkarlarını koruyacak şekilde anlaşmayı düzenlemek isteyeceğinden, aktörler arasındaki güç dağılımı, ortaya çıkan koordinasyon mekanizmasının şekillenmesinde önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Özetlenecek olursa, temelinde bilgi faaliyetleri olan bütün ekonomik faaliyetler üç boyutlu bir dinamik çerçevesinde sürdürülmektedir ve buna bağlı olarak ortaya çıkan organizasyonların formları da bu üçlü dinamiğe uygun olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu çalışmada da, farklı organizasyon formları, bu dinamiklerin gerektirdiği koordinasyon mekanizmalarının farklı bileşimleri olarak önerilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Organizasyon formları, Bilgiye dayalı ekonomi, Bilişsel koordinasyon, Motivasyonların koordinasyonu, Güç dağılımı

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