An Application of Expected Utility Modeling and Game Theory in IR: Assessment of International Bargaining on Iran’s Nuclear Program

Year 2019, , 205 - 230, 01.07.2019

Özgür Özdamar

https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.476858

Cited By: 2

Abstract

This article provides an introduction to the theoretical underpinnings
of expected utility and game theory approaches in IR studies. It goes on to
explore their application to a specific research subject, international
bargaining on Iran’s nuclear program. In this application, the article presents
forecasts about Iran’s nuclear program using a game theoretic, bounded
rationality model called the expected utility model (Bueno de Mesquita 2002). Three
analyses were made in December 2005, September 2006 and March 2007. All three
forecasts appear to be in line with real-life developments regarding the issue.
The results show that Iran has been losing international support since the
analyses started, and the last forecast suggests a pro-US position supported by
all major international actors. Also, all three analyses suggest that Russian
and Chinese support is vital to curb the Iranian nuclear program. 

Keywords

Expected utility theory, game theory, dynamic median voter model with coercion, forecasting, Iran, nuclear program, the Middle East

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