The Anthropology of Dominance: The Ruler’s Choices against the Primary Constraints Concerning Extermination of Dissidents

Year 2017, Issue: 33, 79 - 107, 30.06.2017

Muhsin Altun

https://doi.org/10.1501/antro_0000000342

Abstract

This article, with a particular reference to the rise of early states and civilizations in southern Mesopotamia besides some relevant historical and anthropological finding, focuses on the main constraints that a “Ruler” confronts when he committed to exterminate dissidents. Such a Ruler needs to go beyond the constraints which largely derive from centralized state functions such as judiciary, security, and redistribution. We then suggest this heavy-cost project could be achieved through distortion of original purposes of institutions particularly courts, police-army, and financial-economic units. To this end, Ruler should first adopt dialectically an antagonistic character on his behalf to destruct the ground of legitimacy on which he stands (1), introduce his plans on a “state-making” basis (2), and should invoke guidance of “gastro-politics”, and revelations of priests and wizards in interaction with his dependents which are more than simple followers (3). However, both textual and archaeological records provide little to suggest all these led the way to the goal concerned, but more to existence of an opposition balancing Ruler’s destructive tendencies. Furthermore, they imply that Ruler, instead still remaining as a real ruler, should equip himself with some “gangster-style” skill in this vein. Relying on this, we suggest thinking about the nature and the limits of Ruler’s power under any regime may allow us to understand possible challenges and degree of success to which such an assertive goal is vulnerable

Keywords

Political Violence, Gastro-politics, Dependency, Dominance, Militarization.

Tahakkümün Antropolojisi: Muhaliflerin İmhasına İlişkin Başlıca Sınırlılıklar Karşısında “Hükümdar”ın Seçenekleri

Abstract

Bu çalışma, ilgili bazı tarihsel ve antropolojik bulgular yanında Güney Mezopotamya’daki ilk devlet ve uygarlıkların yükselişine atfen, muhalifleri yok etmeye azmetmiş bir “Hükümdar”ın karşılaşacağı başlıca sınırlılıklara odaklanmaktadır. Böyle bir Hükümdar, büyük ölçüde yargı, emniyet ve yeniden dağıtım gibi merkezi devlet işlevlerinden kaynaklanan sınırlamaların ötesine geçme gereği duyar. Dolayısıyla bu yüksek maliyetli projenin mahkemeler, emniyet-ordu ve mali-ekonomik kurumların özgün amaçlarından saptırılmasıyla başarılabileceğini öne sürmekteyiz. Hükümdar bu amaçla, önce üzerinde durduğu meşruiyet zeminini yıkmak için diyalektik olarak kendi karşıtı bir karakteri benimsemeli (1), planlarını bir “devlet kurma” temelinde yürürlüğe koymalı (2), basit takipçilerden daha fazlası olan bağımlılarla etkileşiminde “gastro-politik”in rehberliğinden, büyücü ve rahiplerin ilhamlarından yararlanmalıdır (3). Yine de yazılı ve arkeolojik kayıtlar, bütün bunların söz konusu amaca ulaştırdığına dair çok az, Hükümdar’ın yıkıcı eğilimlerini dengeleyen bir muhalefetin varlığına dair daha fazla bilgi sağlamaktadır. Dahası, kayıtlar Hükümdar’ın hala gerçek bir hükümdar olarak kalmaktansa bu yolda kendisini bazı “çetevari” becerilerle donatması gerektiğini ima etmektedir. Buna dayanarak, herhangi bir rejimdeki Hükümdar’ın iktidarının doğası ve kapsamı üzerinde düşünmenin, böylesine iddialı bir hedefin maruz bulunduğu olası zorlukları ve başarı derecesini anlamamızı mümkün kılabileceğini öne sürmekteyiz

Keywords

Siyasal Şiddet, Gastro-politik, Bağımlılık, Tahakküm, Militarizasyon

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