Uluslararası Örgütler, Koşulluluk ve Demokratik Temsil: Yunanistan’ın IMF Deneyimi

Year 2023, Volume: 15 Issue: 1, 54 - 79, 15.02.2023

Saliha Metinsoy Merih Angın

https://doi.org/10.53376/ap.2023.03

Abstract

IMF programlarının demokrasi üzerindeki etkisi, uluslararası örgütler yazınında sıklıkla tartışılan bir konudur. Bir müzakere sürecinde IMF’nin kendine ait bir gündemi varken, seçmenler de hükümete kendi tercihleriyle ilgili işaretler verir. Bu ikisi örtüştüğünde demokrasi etkilenmez fakat birbirlerinden farklı olduklarında demokrasi üzerindeki etkiler, borç alan hükümetin IMF karşısındaki göreli gücüne bağlıdır. Bu makale, IMF programlarının yerel temsili kurumlar üzerindeki etkisine odaklanmaktadır. Çalışmada, IMF etkisinin uç bir örneği olarak 2010-2015 yılları arasında uygulanan Yunanistan programları analiz edilmiş, eski bakanlar, parlamento temsilcileri ve Troyka yetkilileri ile yapılan mülakatlara yer verilmiştir. Yapılan analiz, borç alan hükümetin IMF karşısında zayıf olduğu ve iktidar partisi ile IMF arasında bir anlaşmazlık olduğu zaman, IMF programlarının demokratik kurumların temsili işlevini kısıtladığını iddia etmektedir. Bunun, 2010-2015 yılları arasında Yunanistan’da yaşandığı gibi, borç alan ülkelerde parti sistemleri ve demokrasinin geleceği üzerinde sağ ve sol popülist partilerin “egemenlik” ihlalinden yararlanarak yükselişi ve temsili kurumlara olan güvenin azalması gibi önemli etkileri vardır.

Keywords

Uluslararası Örgütler, Demokratik Temsil, IMF, Koşulluluk, Yunanistan

International Organizations, Conditionality and Democratic Representation: The IMF Experience of Greece

Abstract

The impact of IMF programs on democracy is frequently debated in the international organizations literature. During a negotiation process, while the IMF has its own negotiation agenda, the public signals its preference to the government. Democracy is unaffected when the two overlap. When they diverge, however, the impact depends on the relative power of the borrowing government vis-à-vis the IMF. This article focuses the impact of IMF programs on domestic representative institutions. The study analyzes an extreme case of the IMF impact, namely Greece between 2010 and 2015, and using findings from the interviews with the former ministers, parliamentary representatives, and Troika officials. The analysis claims that whenever the borrowing government is weak vis-à-vis the IMF and there is a disagreement between the governing party and the IMF, IMF programs curtail the representative function of democratic institutions. This has significant implications for the party systems and the future of democracy in borrowing countries such as the rise of right-wing and left-wing populist parties capitalizing on the violation of “sovereignty” and reduced trust in representative institutions, as demonstrated in Greece between 2010 and 2015.

Keywords

International Organizations, Democratic Representation, Conditionality, Greece

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