Abstract
Descartes duyulur her şeyin varlığından şüphe ettiğinde kendi varlığının şüphe götürmezliğini “Düşünüyorum o halde varım” diye ifade eder. Daha sonra kendisinin ne olduğunu sorgular ve düşünen bir töz yani ruh veya zihin olduğu sonucunu çıkarır. Diğer taraftan Kant ise “düşünüyorum”dan benim düşünen bir töz yani bir ruh olduğum sonucuna ulaşılmasının mantıksal yanlış çıkarım olduğunu iddia eder. Çünkü Kant’a göre bu çıkarım, yargıda özne olarak kullanılan sezgi nesnelerinin tözselliğinden hareketle, benim yani düşünen şeyin de yargıda özne olarak kullanıldığı için töz olduğu sonucunu çıkarsar. Dolayısıyla Kant’a göre bu çıkarımda orta terim çift anlamlı olarak kullanılmıştır. Bununla birlikte Kant’ın verdiği çıkarımda orta terimin çift anlamlı olarak kullanıldığı gözlenmez. Dahası Descartes’ın benim ruhsal bir töz olduğum sonucu, sezgisel içerik gerektiren böyle bir akıl yürütmeye dayanmaz. Çünkü Descartes, şüphe edilmeyecek kendi varlığını, şüphe ettiği sezgi nesnelerinin tözselliğinden çıkarsamaz, aksine onlardan ayırt etmek için ruhsal bir töz olarak ifade eder.
Keywords
References
- Ameriks, Karl. Kant’s Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. google scholar
- Bennett, Jonathan. Kant’s Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. google scholar
- Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Replies. Çev. Michael Moriarty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. google scholar
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Abstract
When Descartes doubted the existence of everything sensible, he expressed the indisputability of his own existence as “I think, therefore I am.” He then questioned what he is and deduced that he is a thinking substance, namely a soul or mind. Meanwhile, Kant claimed to concluding that I am a thinking substance (i.e., a soul) from “I think” is a paralogism because, according to Kant, this inference starts from the substantiveness of intuitional objects used as subjects in judgment and deduces that I, namely the thinking thing, is also a substance due to being used as a subject in judgment. Therefore, according to Kant, the middle term is used with a double meaning in this inference. However, it is not observed how the middle term is used with a double meaning in Kant’s inference. Moreover, Descartes’ conclusion “I am a spiritual substance” is not based on any such reasoning that requires intuitive content. Because Descartes did not deduce his undoubted existence from the substantiveness of the objects of intuition he was doubting, on the contrary, he expressed it as a spiritual substance in order to distinguish between them.
References
- Ameriks, Karl. Kant’s Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. google scholar
- Bennett, Jonathan. Kant’s Dialectic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. google scholar
- Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Replies. Çev. Michael Moriarty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. google scholar
- Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Çev. Paul Guyer ve Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. google scholar
- Kitcher, Patricia. “Kant’s Paralogisms.” The Philosophical Review 91, no. 4 (1982): 515-547. google scholar
- Melnick, Arthur. Kant’s Theory of the Self. New York: Routledge, 2009. google scholar
- Powell, C. Thomas. Kant’s Theory of Self-Consciousness. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. google scholar
- Proops, Ian. “Kant’s First Paralogism.” Philosophical Review 119, no. 04 (2010): 449-495. google scholar
- Smith, Norman Kemp. A Com mentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. google scholar
- Strawson, Peter F. The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London: Routledge, 2006. google scholar
Details
| Primary Language | Turkish |
|---|---|
| Subjects | Philosophy |
| Journal Section | Articles |
| Authors | |
| Publication Date | December 30, 2023 |
| Submission Date | March 8, 2023 |
| Published in Issue | Year 2023 Volume: 34 Issue: 2 |
