İktisat Teorisinde İki Taraflı Piyasalar

Year 2021, Volume: 6 Issue: 4, 581 - 592, 31.12.2021

Mikail Kar

https://doi.org/10.29106/fesa.948372

Cited By: 1

Abstract

İki taraflı piyasalar talep yapısı birbirinden farklı ve aralarında dolaylı ağ etkileri bulunan iki farklı guruba eş anlı olarak hizmet veren piyasa yapılarıdır. Teknolojik yenilikler ve internet ekonomisindeki ilerlemelerle ekonomilerin önemli bir parçası haline gelen bu piyasalar geleneksel iktisat teorisi kabullerinden oldukça farklı özellikler gösterebilmektedirler. Geleneksel analizlerde zararlı olabilecek bazı stratejiler, iki taraflı piyasalarda herhangi bir zarar vermeyebilir. Aynı şekilde geleneksel analizlerde olumlu olarak değerlendirilebilecek bazı stratejiler, bu piyasalarda kullanıldığında ters etkiler gösterebilir ve tüketici refahını olumsuz yönde etkileyebilirler. Yani netice itibari ile iki taraflı piyasaların analiz ve değerlendirilmesi kendine has karakteristikleri dikkate alınarak yapılmalıdır. Bu bağlamda bu çalışma iki taraflı piyasaları ele alarak tanım, sınıflandırma, ağ etkileri, fiyatlandırma, piyasa başarısızlıkları ve kamu müdahalesi gibi öne çıkan temel iktisat teorisi konularını bu piyasalar özelinde tartışmaktadır.

Keywords

İki Taraflı Piyasalar, Platformlar, İktisat Teorisi, Dolaylı Ağ Etkileri, Fiyatlandırma Yapısı

Two-Sided Markets in Economic Theory

Abstract

Two-sided markets are market structures that simultaneously serve two different groups with different demand structures and indirect network effects between them. These markets, which have become an important part of economies with technological innovations and advances in the internet economy, may exhibit quite different characteristics from traditional economic theory acceptances. Some strategies that may be harmful in the traditional analysis may not cause any harm in two-sided markets. Likewise, some strategies that can be considered positively in traditional analyzes, when used in these markets, may have adverse effects and negatively affect consumer welfare. As a result, the analysis and evaluation of two-sided markets should be made taking into account their unique characteristics. In this context, this study deals with two-sided markets and discusses prominent basic economic theory issues such as definition, classification, network effects, pricing, market failures, and public intervention in these markets.

Keywords

Two-sided Markets, Platforms, Economic Theory, Indirect Network Effects, Pricing Structure

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