Rekabet SoruşturmasınınBankaların Piyasa Değerine Etkisi: BirOlay Çalışması Analizinden Kanıtlar

Year 2017, Issue: 631, 75 - 90, 01.09.2017

Fatih Cemil Özbuğday

Abstract

Bu makalede, Türkiye’de fiyatın belirlenmesinde uyumlu eylemde bulunan firmalar hakkında yapılan bir olay çalışması sunulmaktadır. Söz konusu olay çalışmasında, pay piyasasının Rekabet Kurulu’nun bankalar hakkında yürüttüğü rekabet soruşturmasına gösterdiği reaksiyon analiz edilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda, standart bir Piyasa Modeli tahmin edilerek, günlük anormal getiriler hesaplanmıştır. Sonuçlar, örneklemdeki bankaların paylarının kümülatif ortalama anormal getirilerinin soruşturma açılması aşamasında –%2,6, nihai karar aşamasında ise –%0,8 olduğunu göstermektedir. Hesaplanan kümülatif ortalama anormal getirilerin karşılığı olarak, haklarında rekabet soruşturması açılmasından ötürü, örneklemdeki bankaların toplam piyasa değerlerinde 2011 Kasım fiyatlarıyla 1,9 milyar TL’lik bir kayıp; soruşturmanın tamamlanarak bankaların faizler üzerinde uzlaştığı kararına varılmasının örneklemdeki bankaların toplam piyasa değerlerinde 2013 Mart fiyatlarıyla 1,3 milyar TL’lik bir kayıp hesaplanmıştır. Bankaların piyasa değerinde yaşanan bu düşüşün önemli bir kısmı, itibarlarının zarar görmesinden ve uzlaşmanın sona ermesinden ötürü gelecek kârlılıklarındaki düşüş beklentisinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Son olarak, Rekabet Kurulu’nun bankalar için yürüttüğü soruşturma süreçlerinin gelecekte olası anti-rekabetçi davranışlar üzerinde caydırıcı etkileri olacağı söylenebilir.

Keywords

Rekabet politikası, bankacılık piyasası, olay çalışması

The Impact of Antitrust Investigation on Banks’ Market Value: Evidence from an Event Study Analysis

Abstract

In this paper, an event study on firms involved in concerted practices in pricefixing in Turkey is presented. In the study, the stock market response to the antitrust investigation conducted by the Competition Board on banks is analyzed. To this end, a standard Market Model is estimated. The results indicate that the cumulative average abnormal return of banks in the sample is –2.6% around the opening phase and –0.8% around the final decision phase. These numbers correspond to a total market value loss of 1.9 billion TRY (in 2011 November prices) around the opening of the investigation and 1.3 billion TRY (in 2013 March prices) around the final decision. A significant part of this decline in the market value of the banks is due to reputation loss and the expectation of a drop in future profits. The antitrust investigation will also have deterrent effects on possible anticompetitive behavior in the future.

Keywords

Antitrust policy, banking market, event study

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