Abstract
The issue of human actions is among the subjects that almost all scholarly and philosophical schools of thought focus on staidly. This issue is directly or indirectly related to many issues such as the morality of human actions, the fairness of juristic propositions, the reasonableness of religious responsibility, the possibility of causal explanation of God’s acts and judgments, whether there is a necessary and causal relationship between natural phenomena. The disciplines of kalām, philosophy and sufism in Islamic thought have examined the issue from their own peculiar perspectives and developed solutions to the problems related to the subject. Basically, two problems draw attention in the evaluation of all three disciplines on the subject. The first problem is the absoluteness and limitlessness of God’s attributes of knowledge, will and power. The second problem is whether a person has the power to affect the actualization of his act in order to ground the religious responsibility. Shams ad-dīn as-Samarqandī, the 14th century Māturīdī theologian, finds a solution to the problem by considering both problems. According to him, both natural phenomena have the power to act and man has a forceful power in his natural structure. In addition, God is the source of the forces of natural cases and human actions. Because he is the source of all forceful forces. According to this explanation, while God’s power covers all actions, man also has the power to bring about his action.
This approach of Samarqandī is examined under two headings in the study. Under the first title, his thoughts on divine attributes are discussed within the framework of His relationship with the issue of human actions. Regarding adjectives, he dwells on some issues. Firstly, he argues that God is not a necessary cause for the universe, on the contrary, he is a maker with willpower. In this context he criticizes philosophers. Samarqandī says that God’s being a necessary cause will cause no motion to occur in the world. For, in this case, motion cannot occur, since what is first created will always be present because of the necessary cause.
Samarqandī associates God’s willpower with His competence (kamāl) and argues that God’s willpower encompasses everything. A willful maker prefers the superior things; and this is an indication of competence in action. Willpower also requires knowing what is willed. Accordingly, God must know in advance/ previously what He wills and creates. However, according to him, God’s foreknowledge of all the things He will create does not necessitate the actions of people. Because, as it is generally accepted in the kalām, knowledge is subject to event. God knows the actions of human made at all times in the way they prefer and do the actions.
Under the second title of the study, according to Samarqandī’s original and eclectic approach to the relationship between divine power and human power has been examined. Samarqandī also accepts that God’s power is causing the all human actions. However, this does not mean that people do not have forceful power over their actions. According to him, the actions of people occur with two powers. Samarqandī explains this situation through the concept of chain of causes (silsila). As in the functioning of all natural structures in the world, human actions also occur with natural force. All actions in the world occur with forces in nature. In this direction, the creation of man is endowed with the power to do certain acts and leave them. However, the forces that exist in nature and in the natural structure of man are in need of divine power that overflows from the generosity of God at every moment. Accordingly, while God’s power is causing on natural forces, natural forces are also forceful on actions in the realm of being. Samarqandī example this situation of the pain inflicted by a stick on the body. Even though the cause of the pain is really the stick, it is the person holding the stick who gives the force to the stick with the act of hitting. Similarly, although man’s actions are truly dependent on man’s power, it is God who gives man this power. In this context, Samarqandī also criticizes the theory of kasb (effort), which includes the idea that man does not have the power to create the act, and expresses that man only directs the power created by God to a certain event at the moment of action.