TÜRK ANTİ-DAMPİNG POLİTİKASINDA YÜKSELEN YENİ BİR FAKTÖR: İLAVE GÜMRÜK VERGİSİ

Year 2022, , 494 - 513, 30.09.2022

Serdar Akbaş

https://doi.org/10.17065/huniibf.995300

Abstract

Bu çalışmanın amacı Dünya Ticaret Örgütü (DTÖ) üyeleri arasında anti-damping soruşturmalarını en sık kullanan ülkelerden biri olan Türkiye’de anti-damping soruşturmalarının belirleyicilerini açıklamaktır. 2012 yılından sonra dünyada artan korumacılık önlemlerinin ardından Türkiye de İlave Gümrük Vergilerini (İGV) yaygın olarak kullanmaya başlamıştır. Çalışmada anti-damping belirleyicileri incelenirken bu politika aracı literatürde ilk defa dikkate alınmaktadır. 1989-2019 dönemi için çeşitli makroekonomik göstergelerden oluşan bir veri setini birleştiren araştırmada Negatif Binom Regresyon modelleri kullanılmıştır. Analiz bulguları, misilleme motivasyonları, dış ticaret açığındaki bozulma, imalat sektörünün verimliliği ve reel GSYİH büyümesi gibi farklı değişkenlerin damping soruşturmalarını etkileyen en önemli faktörler olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu sonuçlar Türkiye’de anti-damping soruşturmalarında haksız rekabet dinamiklerinden ziyade bazı korumacı motivasyonların daha baskın olduğunu ve İGV’lerin zamanla bazı ülkelere yönelik anti-damping soruşturma taleplerini azaltacağını ortaya koymaktadır.

Keywords

Türkiye, anti-damping, ilave gümrük vergisi, ticaret politikası

AN EMERGING FACTOR IN TURKISH ANTI-DUMPING POLICY: ADDITIONAL CUSTOMS DUTY

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to explain the determinants of anti-dumping investigations in Turkey, which is one of the most frequent users of anti-dumping investigations among World Trade Organization (WTO) members. Following rising global protectionism after 2012, the implementation of new measures gained prominence among many countries. Most notable of these new changes is the extensive use of Additional Customs Duty (ACD) in Turkey. The study examines this policy tool for the first time in the literature regarding anti-dumping determinants. Negative binomial regression models used for 1989-2019 period to illustrate different variables such as retaliation motives, deterioration in trade deficit, productivity of the manufacturing sector and real GDP growth as important factors affecting investigative efforts. The findings indicate that certain protectionist motives matter more in anti-dumping investigations rather than unfair competition dynamics. Thus, ACD policy seems to keep its importance to reduce anti-dumping investigation initiations against some countries over time.

Keywords

Turkey, anti-dumping, additional customs duty, trade policy

References

• Aggarwal, A. (2003). Patterns and Determinants of Anti-Dumping: A Worldwide Perspective. Working Paper No: 113, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi, October. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195689273.003.0004 Avşar, V. (2009). Türkiye’nin Antidamping Soruşturmalarını Etkileyen Faktörler: Sanayi Verileri ile Ekonometrik Bir Analiz. Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, 9(1), 41–54. https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/oguiibf/issue/5712/76466
• Ba, H., & Coleman, T. (2021). Deindustrialization and the Demand for Protection. Business and Politics, 23(2), 264-281. https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2020.17
• Blonigen, B. A., & Prusa, T. J. (2016). Dumping and antidumping duties. In Handbook of commercial policy, Vol. 1, 107-159. https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hescop.2016.04.008
• Bodkhe, N. R. (2017). Anti-dumping: Indian experience and World Perspectives. GIPE Dissertations and Ph D Theses, 360. https://doi.org/10.4135/9789354792694.n11
• Bown, C. P. (2012). Temporary Trade Barriers Database, The World Bank. Retrieved 16 September 2021 from http://econ.worldbank.org/ttbd
• Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (2013). Regression Analysis Of Count Data (Vol. 53). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1002/sim.768
• Darvas, Z. (2012). Real effective exchange rates for 178 countries: A new database. Working Paper No: 2012/06, Bruegel, March.
• Dişbudak, C., & Türkcan, K. (2005). Antidamping Uygulamalarının Ekonometrik Analizi: Türkiye Örneği. İktisat İşletme ve Finans, 20(233), 149–64. https://doi.org/10.3848/iif.2005.233ek.9332
• Evenett, S. J., & Fritz, J. (2015). The Tide Turns? Trade Protectionism, and Slowing Global Growth. The 18th GTA Report, CEPR Press. https://doi.org/10.1108/oxan-db196964
• Feinberg, R. M. (2005). U.S. antidamping enforcement and macroeconomic indicators revisited: Do petitioners learn?. Review of World Economics, 141(4), 612-622. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-005-0047-3
• Feinberg, R. M., & Reynolds, K. M. (2018). How do countries respond to anti‐dumping filings? Dispute settlement and retaliatory anti‐dumping. The World Economy, 41(5), 1251-1268. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12601
• Finger, J. M., & Artis, N. T. (Eds.). (1993). Antidumping: How It Works And Who Gets Hurt. University of Michigan Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/20045743
• Firme, V. D. A. C., & Vasconcelos, C. R. F. (2020). Main Determinants of Opening Antidumping Cases: A Poisson Analysis Using Panel Data. The International Trade Journal, 34(4), 387-414. https://doi.org/10.1080/08853908.2020.1727385
• Hansen, W. L., & Prusa, T. J. (1997). The economics and politics of trade policy: an empirical analysis of ITC decision making. Review of International Economics, 5(2), 230-245. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9396.00053
• International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2021). International Financial Statistics. Retrieved 16 September 2021 from IMF website.
• International Trade Commission. (2007). Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook. US International Trade Commission, Washington, DC, USA. https://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/documents/handbook.pdf
• Kaplan, R., & Türkcan, K. (2020). Türkiye’nin Açtığı Antidamping Soruşturmalarının Makroekonomik Belirleyicileri. Doğuş Üniversitesi Dergisi, 21(1), 1-19. https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/doujournal/issue/66682/1043190
• Knetter, M. M., & Prusa, T. J. (2003). Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries. Journal of International Economics, 61(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-1996(02)00080-6
• Li, R. (2018). The Research on Factors Which Affect Anti-Dumping Investigation: Based on Probit Model. International Journal of Business and Management, 13(3), 252-261. https://doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v13n3p252
• Nielsen, J. U. M., & Svendsen, G. T. (2012). EU lobbying and anti-dumping policy. Journal of World Trade, 46(1). https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2012007
• Özer, H., & Erkal, G. (2016). Türkiye'nin Antidamping Uygulamalarinin Ekonometrik Analizi. Ataturk University Journal of Economics & Administrative Sciences, 30(2). https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/atauniiibd/issue/29907/322103
• Ticaret Bakanlığı, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti. (2019). Damping ve Sübvansiyon Rehberi. Retrieved 16 September 2021 from MoT website.
• Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (TUIK). (2021). TÜİK Veri Portalı. Retrieved 16 September 2021 from TÜİK website.
• World Bank (WB). (2020). World Development Indicators. Retrieved 16 September 2021 from The World Bank website.
• World Trade Organization (WTO). (2020). Statistics on Antidumping. Retrieved 16 September 2021 from WTO website.