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Free-Rider Problem in the Provision of Public Goods and Evaluation from Perspective of Experimental Economics

Year 2010, Volume: 28 Issue: 2, 221 - 256, 31.12.1899

İ. Erdem Seçilmiş , M. Cahit Güran

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigate the free rider problem which is explained as the essential behavior pattern of individuals in the provision of public goods in terms of theoretical and experimental economics literature. For this reason, field of study is restricted the applications of experimental economics which is one of the relatively new methods of positive economics. In the study, pubic goods and free rider problem are defined at first, the development of experimental economics is considered and experimental studies focused on the provision of public goods are reviewed next. Study is concluded with the policy repercussions of experimental economics analysis on the provision of public goods. Unlike theoretical propositions, the inferences of experimental studies show that participators contribute voluntarily almost the percentage of 50. Additionally, it is determined that communication of group members, equal income distribution, adopting of ethical and identity values, democratic participation, and designation of goals are the critical policy variables on voluntary contributions.

Keywords

Public goods free-rider problem experiment experimental economics

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KAMUSAL MALLARIN SAĞLANMASINDA BEDAVACILIK PROBLEMİ VE DENEYSEL İKTİSAT UYGULAMALARI PERSPEKTİFİNDEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ

Year 2010, Volume: 28 Issue: 2, 221 - 256, 31.12.1899

İ. Erdem Seçilmiş , M. Cahit Güran

Abstract

Bu
çalışmanın amacı; kamusal malların sağlanmasında bireylerin temel davranış
kalıbı olarak açıklanan bedavacılık problemini teorik ve deneysel iktisat
literatürü açısından incelemektir. Bu nedenle çalışmanın inceleme alanı;
pozitif iktisadın göreli olarak yeni yöntemlerinden biri olan deneysel iktisat
uygulamaları ile sınırlandırılmıştır. Çalışmada öncelikle kamusal mallar ve
bedavacılık problemi tanımlanmış, ardından deneysel iktisadın gelişim süreci
özetlenerek, kamusal malların sağlanması üzerine geliştirilen uygulamalar
incelenmiştir. Çalışma deneysel iktisadi analizin kamu mallarının sunumuna
ilişkin olarak politika yansımalarının tartışılması ile sonuçlandırılmıştır.
Teorik önermenin aksine deneysel çalışmaların sonuçları, katılımcıların
yaklaşık yüzde 50 gibi önemli düzeylere ulaşan gönül katılım davranışı
gösterdiklerine işaret etmektedir. Ayrıca grup üyelerinin iletişiminin, eşit
gelir dağılımının, etik değerlerin, aidiyet ve kimlik değerlerinin
benimsetilmesinin, demokratik katılım ve ulaşılmak istenen hedeflerin
tanımlanmasının gönüllü katılım üzerinde önemli politika değişkenleri olduğu
tespit edilmiştir.



 

Keywords

Kamusal mallar bedavacılık problemi deney deneysel iktisat

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There are 138 citations in total.

Details

Journal Section Articles
Authors

İ. Erdem Seçilmiş

M. Cahit Güran

Publication Date December 31, 1899
Submission Date May 10, 2017
Published in Issue Year 2010 Volume: 28 Issue: 2

Cite

APA Seçilmiş, İ. E., & Güran, M. C. (1899). KAMUSAL MALLARIN SAĞLANMASINDA BEDAVACILIK PROBLEMİ VE DENEYSEL İKTİSAT UYGULAMALARI PERSPEKTİFİNDEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 28(2), 221-256.
AMA Seçilmiş İE, Güran MC. KAMUSAL MALLARIN SAĞLANMASINDA BEDAVACILIK PROBLEMİ VE DENEYSEL İKTİSAT UYGULAMALARI PERSPEKTİFİNDEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi. December 1899;28(2):221-256.
Chicago Seçilmiş, İ. Erdem, and M. Cahit Güran. “KAMUSAL MALLARIN SAĞLANMASINDA BEDAVACILIK PROBLEMİ VE DENEYSEL İKTİSAT UYGULAMALARI PERSPEKTİFİNDEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ”. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 28, no. 2 (December 1899): 221-56.
EndNote Seçilmiş İE, Güran MC (December 1, 1899) KAMUSAL MALLARIN SAĞLANMASINDA BEDAVACILIK PROBLEMİ VE DENEYSEL İKTİSAT UYGULAMALARI PERSPEKTİFİNDEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 28 2 221–256.
IEEE İ. E. Seçilmiş and M. C. Güran, “KAMUSAL MALLARIN SAĞLANMASINDA BEDAVACILIK PROBLEMİ VE DENEYSEL İKTİSAT UYGULAMALARI PERSPEKTİFİNDEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ”, Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 221–256, 1899.
ISNAD Seçilmiş, İ. Erdem - Güran, M. Cahit. “KAMUSAL MALLARIN SAĞLANMASINDA BEDAVACILIK PROBLEMİ VE DENEYSEL İKTİSAT UYGULAMALARI PERSPEKTİFİNDEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ”. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 28/2 (December 1899), 221-256.
JAMA Seçilmiş İE, Güran MC. KAMUSAL MALLARIN SAĞLANMASINDA BEDAVACILIK PROBLEMİ VE DENEYSEL İKTİSAT UYGULAMALARI PERSPEKTİFİNDEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi. 1899;28:221–256.
MLA Seçilmiş, İ. Erdem and M. Cahit Güran. “KAMUSAL MALLARIN SAĞLANMASINDA BEDAVACILIK PROBLEMİ VE DENEYSEL İKTİSAT UYGULAMALARI PERSPEKTİFİNDEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ”. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, vol. 28, no. 2, 1899, pp. 221-56.
Vancouver Seçilmiş İE, Güran MC. KAMUSAL MALLARIN SAĞLANMASINDA BEDAVACILIK PROBLEMİ VE DENEYSEL İKTİSAT UYGULAMALARI PERSPEKTİFİNDEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ. Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi. 1899;28(2):221-56.

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