Abstract
In this paper, I will point to the temporality of the everydayness in Zbigniew Rybcynski’s Tango in comparison to Heideggerian notion of temporality and handiness. Firstly, I will discuss the Heideggerian subjectivity as agency and show that subjectivity for the philosophy of life is in a temporal mood of intentionality, Sichbewegen as Heidegger says. I will point to the temporal functionality of objects as tools through which their extentional existence is negated and respond to our goal directedness as handy equipment. The availability of the handy tools is nothing but a temporal span in which objects are no longer meaningful for us as isolated extant beings but parts of an undifferentiated functional totality. The handy tools are available for us as parts of handiness in this temporal functionality. Heidegger sees this functionality as a possibility of proximity with the original temporality as a special coming to presence in repetition and says that, in repetition the meaning of life as a whole calls for our awareness.
Subsequently, I will discuss the Tango characters in relation to the Heideggerian understanding of everydayness and repetition. I will state that in Tango, the inhabitants of the room are absolutely disentangled and ignorant of one other despite their apparent closeness. Even though they spatially share the small room, all the characters act as if the others do not exist. Tango characters are stuck in the repetition of the same moment and cannot let the temporalization of life flow in its spontaneity. I will refer to the Heideggerian understanding of the moment of vision in repetition out of which the meaning of life as a whole outstands and conclude that, unlike the Heideggerian interpretation of repetition, Tango characters remain in a Sisyphosian vein.
Keywords
Abstract
In this paper, I will point to the temporality of the everydayness in Zbigniew Rybcynski’s Tango in comparison to Heideggerian notion of temporality and handiness. Firstly, I will discuss the Heideggerian subjectivity as agency and show that subjectivity for the philosophy of life is in a temporal mood of intentionality, Sichbewegen as Heidegger says. I will point to the temporal functionality of objects as tools through which their extentional existence is negated and respond to our goal directedness as handy equipment. The availability of the handy tools is nothing but a temporal span in which objects are no longer meaningful for us as isolated extant beings but parts of an undifferentiated functional totality. The handy tools are available for us as parts of handiness in this temporal functionality. Heidegger sees this functionality as a possibility of proximity with the original temporality as a special coming to presence in repetition and says that, in repetition the meaning of life as a whole calls for our awareness.
Subsequently, I will discuss the Tango characters in relation to the Heideggerian understanding of everydayness and repetition. I will state that in Tango, the inhabitants of the room are absolutely disentangled and ignorant of one other despite their apparent closeness. Even though they spatially share the small room, all the characters act as if the others do not exist. Tango characters are stuck in the repetition of the same moment and cannot let the temporalization of life flow in its spontaneity. I will refer to the Heideggerian understanding of the moment of vision in repetition out of which the meaning of life as a whole outstands and conclude that, unlike the Heideggerian interpretation of repetition, Tango characters remain in a Sisyphosian vein.
Details
| Journal Section | Makaleler |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Publication Date | July 1, 2016 |
| Published in Issue | Year 2016 Volume: 2 Issue: 3 |
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