Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Are New Institutions Needed?

Year 2019, Volume: 7 Issue: 1, 115 - 131, 27.03.2019

Hasan Saygın , Özüm Sezin Uzun

https://doi.org/10.14782/ipsus.539196

Abstract

The existence of nuclear weapons, including the increasing of tactical nuclear weapons, is the major cause

of a current nuclear threat at both the international and regional levels. In addition to the continuation

of political and military motivations of states to acquire nuclear weapons, the institutional challenges

of nuclear nonproliferation do also complicate this current problem. Even though the political and

military motivations of states to acquire nuclear weapons are examined by the vast amount of studies,

the effectiveness of international nuclear regime is rarely analyzed. Regarding the continuation of

nuclear energy importance and the dual nature of nuclear technology, the necessity for reliable and

effective institutions to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons became more apparent. Therefore, this

article aims to shed light on the ineffectiveness of the current international nuclear regime and the need

for new institutional mechanism. This article analyzed the effectiveness of international nuclear regime

measuring its capability of problem-solving, reducing nuclear motivations of states, providing legal

framework and verification process, and creating and consolidating normative principles. While the

nuclear regime could partly be seen as effective regarding the low number of current nuclear weapon

states than the expected numbers in 1960s, it faces with serious challenges in solving the nuclear

problem. One of the challenges emerges because of the lack of universal acceptance of the international

treaties and organizations. The regime has also not effectively addressed to reduce the nuclear

motivations of states. Even though it has provided legal framework and verifying process, there are still

difficulties to detect nuclear activities for military purposes. Lastly, the regime has effectively created

the non-use and deterrence norms, while failed to create and consolidate the nonproliferation norm,

based on total elimination of nuclear weapons. In fact, this article argues that the current institutional mechanism should be revised considering the causes of threats; furthermore, new mechanisms should

be established in order to meet the newly emerged challenges in the post-Cold War era. In that respect,

this article firstly analyzes the ineffectiveness of current international nuclear regime in order to

demonstrate the urgent need for a paradigm shift. Then, it suggests a new multilateral mechanism, as

an attempt to contribute to create a discussion platform for alternative institutional mechanisms.

Keywords

international nuclear regime, effectiveness of nuclear regime, nuclear weapons, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

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