İran’ın Şii Afgan Göçmenleri Militan Olarak Kullanması: Liva Fatımiyun Örneği

Year 2021, , 31 - 53, 30.06.2021

İbrahim Karataş

https://doi.org/10.33201/iranian.880171

Cited By: 2

Abstract

Bu çalışma, İran’a mülteci olarak veya kaçak yollarla gelen Şii Afganların İran tarafından nasıl vekil gruplara dönüştürüldüğünü analiz etmektedir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda Liva Fatımiyun örgütü detaylı olarak incelenmiştir. Liva Fatımiyun örgütü, Afgan Hazaralarından oluşturulan bir vekil örgüttür. Şii Hazaralar yıllardan beri devam eden iç savaştan dolayı Afganistan’ı terk edip İran’a yasal veya kaçak yollarla geçmek durumunda kalmışlardır. Herhangi bir sosyal hakları olmayan ve eğitim sistemine nadiren ulaşabilen mülteciler İran Devrim Muhafızları tarafından zorla, gönüllü veya para karşılığı Liva Fatımiyun örgütüne alınmışlardır. Suriye’de kutsal türbeleri korumak için gönderilen militanlar kendilerini çoğunlukla ileri cephelerde bulmuşlardır. İran’a sağ dönen militanlara oturum gibi çeşitli haklar verilirken, ölenlerin ailelerine vatandaşlık verilmiştir. İran Devrim muhafızlarının kontrolünde olan örgüt bilhassa Suriye’de rejimin yanında aktif olarak savaşmıştır. Çalışmamız yaptığı analiz sonucunda Devrim Muhafızlarının Afganistan’daki savaştan kaçan göçmen ve mültecileri gerek ikna, gerek para gerekse de zorla Liva Fatımiyun’a dahil ederek onların mağduriyetlerini kullandığını iddia etmektedir. Ayrıca, Suriye’de belli bir süre çatışmanın bedeli olarak İran’da oturum alan militanların Afganistan’a dönmeleri halinde İran’ın kontrolü altında çatışma ihtimallerinin olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Nitekim İran Dışişleri Bakanı Cevat Zarif Liva Fatımiyun üyelerinin Afganistan’a dönmeleri gerektiğini beyan etmiştir. Makale için literatür taraması yapılmasının yanısıra, bazı Afganlarla röportajlar yapılmış ve Farsça haber kaynaklarından istifade edilmiştir.

Keywords

Liva Fatımiyun, Vekil Gruplar, İran, Afganistan, Göç

Iran's Use of Afghan Shiite Migrants as Proxies: The Case of Liwa Fatemiyoun

Abstract

This study analyzes how migrants are militarized through analyzing an Iranian proxy, namely Liwa Fatemiyoun, as a case study. Liwa Fatemiyoun is a proxy group formed from migrants of the Shiite ethnic group of Afghan Hazaras by Iran. Shiite Hazaras immigrated to Iran due to ongoing civil wars in Afghanistan to find a safe haven. Numbering more than two million and crossing the borders illegally, Hazaras were recruited by the Iranian army either voluntarily or for a certain amount of money or by force. They were sent to Syria to protect holy shrines, but most of them found themselves in fronts. By analyzing the proxy group's formation, this study concludes that Iranian regime guards (IRGC) mostly conscript Afghan migrants and refugees to Liwa Fatemiyoun forcibly thereby exploiting their vulnerability and human rights. Besides, by referring to past experiences, the study asserts that Iran may also move the proxy group to Afghanistan if necessary after US troops' withdrawal. This study mainly wielded news, including those in Persian and institutional reports, and made interviews for its analysis. By examining Liwa Fatemiyoun, the study is expected to contribute to ethnoreligious migration literature from a security perspective.

Keywords

Liwa Fatemiyoun, Proxy Groups, Iran, Afghanistan, Migration

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