Yeni Kurumsal Siyaset

Year 2015, , 559 - 583, 01.12.2015

Buğra Kalkan

https://doi.org/10.21547/jss.256757

Cited By: 1

Abstract

Yeni kurumsal siyaset, kurumsal siyaset yaklaşımını yeniden siyaset biliminin merkezine almayı hedefleyen disiplinler arası bir akımdır. Eski kurumsal siyaset yaklaşımının kullandığı formel-yasal analizin sınırlılıklarının, 1950’lerden itibaren davranışsalcı, rasyonel tercihçi ve neo-Marksist yaklaşımlar tarafından yoğun bir şekilde eleştirilmesinin ardından, devlet, bağımsız bir değişken olarak siyasal çalışmaların merkezinden uzaklaştırılmıştır. Bu gelişmeye tepki olarak doğan yeni kurumsal siyaset çalışmaları, eski kurumsalcılığın formelyasal analizinin sınırlarını aşan yeni bir kurum tanımı ve anlayışını 1980’lerden itibaren geliştirmektedirler. Siyasal kurumların doğuşu, değişimi ve siyasal kurumlar ile failler arasındaki ilişkiler, formel olduğu kadar informel kurallara ve konvansiyonlara dayanılarak, yasal olduğu kadar kültürel faktörlere dikkat çekerek yeniden teorileştirilmektedir. Bu akım içinde ekonomi, sosyoloji ve tarih disiplinlerinin yöntem ve bulgularından geniş bir şekilde yararlanılmaktadır. Bu nedenle bu çalışmada, yeni kurumsal siyasetin üç farklı ekolü olan, rasyonel tercih, sosyolojik ve tarihsel yeni kurumsal siyaset ayrı ayrı ele alınarak, söz konusu farklı ekoller arasındaki çatışma ve kesişmeler üzerine tartışma yapılacaktır

Keywords

Yeni kurumsal siyaset, kurumsal değişim, rasyonel tercih, kültürel yaklaşım, izlek bağımlılık

New Institutional Politics

Abstract

New institutional politics is an interdisciplinary movement that tries to reinstate the institutional politics to the center of the political science. After the limits of formal-legal analyze, used by old institutional politics, have been criticized by behaviorists, rational choice and neo-Marxist movements, since 1950, the state was alienated from the center of the political studies as an independent variable. Since 1980, neo institutional politics, raised as a reaction to this development, has been developing a new description and understanding of the institution which goes beyond the limitations of the old one. The rise and change of the political institutions and the interactions between political institutions and the actors, are being retheorized, by depending on informal rules and conventions as much as formal rules, and pointing out cultural factors as much as legal factors. So, in this study, rational choice, sociological and historical new institutional politics, as the three different school of new institutionalism, will be examined separately and there will be a debate on colliding and overlapping points of these schools

Keywords

New institutional politics, institutional change, rational choice, cultural approach, path dependance

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