Abstract
How are we to distinguish epistemic justification for believing a
proposition from other sorts of justification one might have for believing it?
According to what I call the received view about the differentia of epistemic
justification, epistemic justification is intimately connected to “the cognitive goal
of arriving at truth” in a specific way no other sorts of justification can possibly
be. However, I will argue that the received view is mistaken by showing that there
are cases in which pragmatic justification for believing a proposition is related to
the cognitive goal of arriving at truth in a way epistemic justification is supposed
to be. The paper will close with a brief assessment of two possible rejoinders the
received view might make to my objection.
References
- Armstrong, D. 2000. “The Thermometer-Model of Knowledge,” In S. Bernecker and F. Dretske (Eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 72-85.
- BonJour, L. 1978. “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?” American Philosophical Quarterly, 15 (1), pp. 1-13.
- BonJour, L. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- David, M. 2001. “Truth as the Epistemic Goal,” In M. Steup (Ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 151-169.
- Feldman, R. 2002. Epistemology. Michigan: Prentice Hall.
Abstract
Epistemik gerekçelendirmeyi diğer tür gerekçelendirmelerden nasıl
ayırmalıyız? Hâkim görüş diyebileceğimiz bir fikre göre, epistemik gerekçelendirme
“doğruya varma” diyebileceğimiz bilişsel hedefe diğer tür gerekçelendirmelerin
olamayacağı şekilde yakın bir biçimde irtibatlıdır. Bu yazıda, hâkim görüşün
yanlış olduğunu iddia edeceğim. Bu iddiam, bazı olası durumlarda pragmatik
gerekçelendirmenin de doğruya varma hedefiyle olan irtibatının epistemik
gerekçelendirmenin o hedefle kurduğu iddia edilen irtibatın aynısı olduğunu
gösteren bir düşünce deneyine dayanıyor. Yazı, hâkim görüşün sunduğum itiraza
karşı geliştirebileceği iki yanıtın kısa bir değerlendirmesi ile sonlanıyor.
References
- Armstrong, D. 2000. “The Thermometer-Model of Knowledge,” In S. Bernecker and F. Dretske (Eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 72-85.
- BonJour, L. 1978. “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?” American Philosophical Quarterly, 15 (1), pp. 1-13.
- BonJour, L. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- David, M. 2001. “Truth as the Epistemic Goal,” In M. Steup (Ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 151-169.
- Feldman, R. 2002. Epistemology. Michigan: Prentice Hall.
Details
| Journal Section | Makaleler |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Publication Date | January 31, 2017 |
| Published in Issue | Year 2017 Issue: 1 - 2017 |