Öz
Bilimsel ilerlemenin ne demek olduğu ilk bakışta kolayca yanıtlanabilecek bir soru gibi görünmektedir. Bilimlerin ilerleme fikri olmaksızın düşünülmesi pek kolay değildir; neredeyse bilim ile ilerleme özdeş görülür. Bilimsel ilerlemenin doğasını betimlemek teorik olduğu kadar pratik sonuçlar doğuracak önemli bir görevdir. Bilimlerin yaslandığı arkaplanın pozitivist yoruma uygun olarak tarihsel, kültürel bir nitelik taşımadığını öne süren yaklaşım bilimleri büyük ölçüde gözlem ve deney verilerinin geçerliliğinin sınanması olarak kabul eder. Öte yandan bilim tarihinin karmaşık işleyişinin bilimsel kuramlar üzerinde silinmez bir damgası olduğunu vurgulayan eğilim ise bilimleri tarihsel, toplumsal bir zemin üzerine inşa etmeyi tercih eder. Her iki ana yaklaşımın bilimsel ilerleme fikrini temellendirme yolları, hem bilimsel bilginin doğasına ilişkin anlayışımızı hem de bilim yapma yöntemlerimizi derinden etkilemektedir. Bu yazıda özellikle yirminci yüzyılda öne çıkmış bilim felsefecilerinin görüşlerinden hareketle bilimsel ilerlemeye dair değerlendirme yapmak amaçlanmaktadır.
Kaynakça
- Agassi, J. (1981). Science and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Science. D. Reidel Publishing Company.
- Barnes, B. (2015). Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (Reprinted ed.). Routledge.
- Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imagery. University of Chicago Press.
- Bird, A. (2007). What Is Scientific Progress? Noûs, 41, 64–89.
- Bird, A. (2016). Scientific Progress. In P. Humphreys (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science (Reprint ed., pp. 544–563). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199368815.013.29
- Carnap, R. (2003). The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy (Revised ed.). Open Court.
- Dellsén, F. (2016). Scientific progress: Knowledge versus understanding. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 56, 72–83.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2008). Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States (Studies in Logic) (Revised ed.). College Publications.
- Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511814563
- Howson, C., & Urbach, P. (1999). Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach (2nd ed.). Open Court.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Second Edition, Enlarged ed.). University of Chicago Press.
- Latour, B. (1992). One More Turn after the Social Turn: Easing Science Studies into the Non-Modern World. In E. McMullin (Ed.), The Social Dimensions of Science (pp. 272-292). Notre Dame University Press.
- Levi, I. (2009). The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs through Inquiry (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press.
- Popper, K. R. (1957). The Aim of Science. Ratio, 1(1), 24-35.
- Popper, K. (2002a) Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Routledge.
- Popper, K. (2002b). The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2nd ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203994627
- Quine, W. V. O. (1963). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. In From a Logical Point of View: Logico-Philosophical Essays (Second Edition, Revised. ed., pp. 20–46). Harper Torchbooks.
- Quine, W. V. O., Follesdal, D., & Churchland, P. S. (2013). Word and Object, new edition (New ed.). The MIT Press.
Öz
At first glance, what scientific progress means seems to be a quickly answered question. It is not easy to think of the sciences without progress; sciences and the notion of progress seem identical in general. Describing the nature of scientific progress is an important task that will have practical and theoretical consequences. The approach, which argues that the background on which sciences are based does not have a historical or cultural character following the positivist interpretation, accepts sciences as testing the validity of observation and experiment data to a large extent. On the other hand, the tendency that emphasizes that the complex functioning of the history of science has an indelible mark on scientific theories prefers to build sciences on a historical and social basis. How both major approaches ground the idea of scientific progress profoundly affects both our understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge and the way we do science. This paper aims to evaluate scientific progress based on the views of prominent philosophers of science in the twentieth century.
Kaynakça
- Agassi, J. (1981). Science and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Science. D. Reidel Publishing Company.
- Barnes, B. (2015). Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (Reprinted ed.). Routledge.
- Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and Social Imagery. University of Chicago Press.
- Bird, A. (2007). What Is Scientific Progress? Noûs, 41, 64–89.
- Bird, A. (2016). Scientific Progress. In P. Humphreys (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science (Reprint ed., pp. 544–563). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199368815.013.29
- Carnap, R. (2003). The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy (Revised ed.). Open Court.
- Dellsén, F. (2016). Scientific progress: Knowledge versus understanding. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 56, 72–83.
- Gärdenfors, P. (2008). Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States (Studies in Logic) (Revised ed.). College Publications.
- Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511814563
- Howson, C., & Urbach, P. (1999). Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach (2nd ed.). Open Court.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Second Edition, Enlarged ed.). University of Chicago Press.
- Latour, B. (1992). One More Turn after the Social Turn: Easing Science Studies into the Non-Modern World. In E. McMullin (Ed.), The Social Dimensions of Science (pp. 272-292). Notre Dame University Press.
- Levi, I. (2009). The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs through Inquiry (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press.
- Popper, K. R. (1957). The Aim of Science. Ratio, 1(1), 24-35.
- Popper, K. (2002a) Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Routledge.
- Popper, K. (2002b). The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2nd ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203994627
- Quine, W. V. O. (1963). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. In From a Logical Point of View: Logico-Philosophical Essays (Second Edition, Revised. ed., pp. 20–46). Harper Torchbooks.
- Quine, W. V. O., Follesdal, D., & Churchland, P. S. (2013). Word and Object, new edition (New ed.). The MIT Press.
Ayrıntılar
| Birincil Dil | İngilizce |
|---|---|
| Bölüm | Makaleler |
| Yazarlar | |
| Yayımlanma Tarihi | 30 Nisan 2022 |
| Yayımlandığı Sayı | Yıl 2022 Sayı: 1 |