Can Private Governance Create Economic and Social Order without a Formal Legal System?

Year 2022, Issue: 105, 29 - 60, 23.03.2022

Bahar Baysal Kar

https://doi.org/10.36484/liberal.959112

Abstract

This paper is about private governance or private legal systems. In addition to the inherent constraints (difficulty to access to information, limited enforcement mechanisms, etc.) emphasized by advocates of transaction cost economics, the inadequacy of the legal system in developing countries increases the importance of private governance. There are two different forms of private governance, spontaneous and centralized. In spontaneous private governance, since information is easily disseminated through social networks, the behavior of parties is mostly controlled by social norms. Those who engage in undesirable behavior are subject to collective punishment. The characteristics of the group in centralized governance make it difficult to obtain accurate information and collective punishment. Thus, economic and social order is provided under the leadership of various organizations such as associations and market intermediaries. Despite their advantages, the common consensus on whether private forms of governance can provide effective governance is that they can complement, not replace, the formal legal system.

Keywords

Private governance, Formal Legal System, Transaction Cost, Institutions

Özel Yönetişim Formel Yasal Sistem Olmadan İktisadi ve Toplumsal Düzen Oluşturabilir mi?

Abstract

Bu makale özel yönetişim veya özel yasal sistemler hakkındadır. İşlem maliyeti iktisatçılarının vurguladığı doğal kısıtların yanı sıra (bilgiye erişim kısıtları, uygulama mekanizmalarının sınırlı olması vb.) gelişmekte olan ülkelerde yasal sistemin yetersizliği özel yönetişimin önemini arttırmaktadır. Spontane ve merkezileşmiş özel yönetişim olarak iki farklı biçiminden bahsedilmektedir. Spontane özel yönetişimde bilgi toplumsal ağlar aracılığı ile kolaylıkla yayıldığından tarafların davranışları çoğunlukla toplumsal normlar aracılığı ile kontrol edilmektedir. İstenmeyen davranışlarda bulunanlar kolektif bir cezalandırmaya maruz kalmaktadır. Merkezileşmiş özel yönetişimde topluluğun nitelikleri, doğru bilginin elde edilmesini ve kolektif cezalandırmayı güçleştirmektedir. Bu nedenle birlikler, piyasa aracıları gibi çeşitli organizasyonlar öncülüğünde ekonomik ve toplumsal düzen sağlanmaktadır. Üstün yanlarına rağmen, etkin bir yönetişim sağlayıp sağlayamayacağına ilişkin ortak uzlaşı
özel yönetişim biçimlerinin formel hukuk sistemin ikamesi değil, tamamlayıcısı olabileceğidir.

Keywords

özel yönetişim, formel yasal sistem, işlem maliyeti, kurumlar

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