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SERBEST YATIRIM FONLARININ AKTİVİST İŞLEMLERİN HİSSE FİYAT PERFORMANSLARININ ANALİZİ

Year 2020, Volume: 12 Issue: 23, 672 - 692, 31.07.2020

Serkan Ünal

https://doi.org/10.14784/marufacd.785894

Abstract

Bu çalışmada aktivist serbest yatırım fonlarının işlemleri ve bu işlemlerden elde edilen getiriler incelenmiştir. Çalışma kapsamında tespit edilen serbest yatırım fonlarına ait 1994 ve 2014 yılları arasında yayınlanmış olan 1634 adet 13D formu ABD Menkul Kıymetler Borsa Komisyonu (SEC) web sitesinden indirilmiş ve gerekli kriterleri sağlayan 574 adet işlem çalışmaya dahil edilmiştir. Her bir aktivist hisse alım işleminden sonra hissenin fiyatının nasıl hareket ettiğine bakılarak farklı zaman aralıklarında aktivist işlem uygulanan şirketlerin performansları incelenmiştir. Çalışmaya dahil edilen 574 farklı işleme ait hem kısa hem uzun vadeli performans verisi, son 20 yılda aktivist işleme uğrayan şirketlerin kısa ve uzun vadede endeksin üstünde performans sergilediğini göstermiştir.
Çalışmada aktivist serbest yatırım fonlarının, son dönemde endekse kıyasla daha kötü hisse fiyat performansı sergilemiş olan şirketlerde işlem yaptıkları görülmüştür. Aktivist işleme dair form yayınlanmadan dokuz gün öncesine kadar ilgili şirketlerde ortalamada negatif performans tespit edilirken, bu tarihten sonra pozitif getiriler saptanmıştır.
Bu çalışma sonuçlarına göre literatürdeki diğer çalışmaların elde ettikleri sonuçlar 2008 finansal krizinden sonra da geçerliliğini korumaktadır ve hem kısa hem de uzun vadede aktivist serbest yatırım fonlarının işlem yaptıkları şirketlerin fiyat performansına etkileri pozitiftir.

Keywords

kurumsal yönetim vekalet savaşları serbest yatırım fonları 13d formları aktivist işlemlerin getirileri

References

  • ANDRES, Christian. (2008). “Large shareholders and firm performance--An empirical examination of founding-family ownership”, Journal of Corporate Finance, 14, issue 4, p. 431-445.
  • BEBCHUK, Lucian A., BRAV, Alon ve JIANG, Wei. (2014). “The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 114, Baskıda (Paper No. 13-66).
  • BECHT, Marco, BOLTON, Patrick ve Röell, Ailsa. (2002). “Corporate Governance and Control”. NBER Working Paper No. w9371. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research.
  • BECHT, Marco, FRANKS, Julian, GRANT, Jeremy ve WAGNER, Hannes F..(2017). “Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study”, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 30, Issue 9 Pages 2933–2971,
  • BESSLER, Wolfgang, DROBETZ, Wolfgang ve HOLLER, Julian. (2008). “Capital Markets and Corporate Control: Empirical Evidence From Hedge Fund Activism in Germany,” Working Paper, Giessen: Justus-Liebig University.
  • BETHEL, Jennifer E., LİEBESKİND, Julia Porter ve OPLER, Tim C.. (1998). “Block Share Purchases and Corporate Performance,” Journal of Finance 2, 605-634.
  • BOYSON, Nicole M. ve MOORADIAN, Robert M.. (2011), “Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism,” Review of Derivatives Research Vol. 14, No. 2, 14(2), 169-204.
  • BRAV, Alon, JIANG, Wei, PARTNOY, Frank, ve THOMAS, Randall S.. (2008). “The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism,” ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 098/2008, Durham: Duke University
  • BRAV, Alon, JIANG, Wei ve KIM, Hyunseob. (2010). “Hedge Fund Activism: A Review,” Foundations and Trends in Finance, 4(3), 185-246.
  • BRAV, Alon, JIANG, Wei, MA, Song, ve TIAN, Xuan (2014). “Shareholder power and corporate innovation: Evidence from hedge fund activism”. SSRN Electronic Journal.
  • CHEN, Clara Xiaoling, LU, Hai ve SOUGIANNIS, Theodore (2011). “The Agency Problem, Corporate Governance, and the Asymmetrical Behavior of Selling, General, and Administrative Costs,” Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting Paper, Illinois: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
  • CHENG, C.S. Agnes, HUANG, Henry, LI, Yinghua ve STANFIELD, Jason. (2012). “The Effect of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Tax Avoidance,” The Accounting Review 87, 1493-1526.
  • CLIFFORD, Christopher P.. (2008). “Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists,” Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 14, No. 4
  • COLLIN-DUFRESNE, Pierre ve FOS, Vyacheslav. (2012). “Do prices reveal the presence of informed trading?,” Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 13-69, Lausanne: Swiss Finance Institute.
  • EDMANS, Alex, FANG, Vivian W. ve ZUR, Emanuel. (2013). “The Effect of Liquidity on Governance,” Review of Financial Studies 26(6), 1443-1482.
  • FAMA, Eugene F. (1998). "Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance." Journal of financial economics 49.3: 283-306.
  • FALEYE, Olubunmi. (2004). “Cash and Corporate Control,” Journal of Corporate Finance, 5 2041-2060
  • HALL, Curtis ve TROMBLEY, Mark A. (2012). “Accounting Responses to Hedge-Fund Activism,” Working Paper, Philadelphia: Drexel University
  • HE, Zhongzhi Lawrence, QIU, Jiaping ve TANG, Tingfeng. (2014). “Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate Innovation,” Working Paper Ontario: Brock University
  • GILLAN, Stuart L. ve STARKS, Laura T.. (2007). “The evolution of shareholder activism in the United States,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 19(1): 55-73.
  • GREENWOOD, Robin M. ve SCHOR, Michael. (2009). “Investor Activism and Takeovers,” Journal of Financial Economics 92(3): 362-375.
  • GROSSMAN, Sanford J. ve HART, Oliver D.. (1980). “Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corparation,” Bell J. Econ. 11: 42-64.
  • GUJARATI, Damodar N. ve PORTER, Dawn C. (2009). "Basic Econometrics Mc Graw-Hill International Edition.".
  • K. BRUNNERMEIER, M. A. R. K. U. S. ve NAGEL, Stefan (2004). “Hedge funds and the technology bubble,” The Journal of Finance, 59(5), 2013-2040.
  • KARPOFF, Jonathan M.. (2001). “The impact of shareholder activism on target companies: A survey of empirical findings,” Working Paper, Seattle: University of Washington
  • KATELOUZOU, Dionysia. (2013). "Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some Empirical Evidence," 7 Virginia Law & Business Review 459
  • KLEIN, April ve ZUR, Emanuel. (2006). “Hedge Fund Activism,” NYU Working Paper No. CLB-06-017, New York: New York University (NYU)
  • KLEIN, April ve ZUR, Emanuel. (2011). “The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target Firm's Existing Bondholders” The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 24, No. 5 (May 2011), pp. 1735-1771
  • MITNICK, Barry M., (2013). Origin of the Theory of Agency: An Account By One of the Theory's Originators
  • MURPHY, Kevin J. ve JENSEN, Michael C.. (1990). “Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol.98, No. 2 (Apr. 1990), 225-264
  • O'HALLORAN, Rory B. (2004). “Overview and Analysis of Recent Interest in Increased Hedge Fund Regulation,” Tulane Law Review, 79: 461.
  • PARTNOY, Frank ve THOMAS, Randall. (2007). "Gap filling, hedge funds, and financial innovation." Brookings-Nomura Papers on Financial Services, Washington: 101-140.
  • ROSE, Nancy L. ve SHEPARD, Andrea. (1997). “Firm diversification and CEO compensation: Managerial ability or executive entrenchment?,” The RAND Journal of Economics 28 (3): 489–514.
  • SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, (2004) “Fed. Reg. 72054-01, 72055,” Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 237
  • SHLIEFER, Andrei ve VISHNY, Robert W.. (1986). “Large Shareholders And Corporate Control,” Journal of Political Economy, 94, 461-488.
  • STOCKMAN, Nick W. A.. (2007). “Influences of Hedge Fund Activism on the Medium Term Target Firm Value,” Working Paper, Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam
  • ÜNAL, Serkan. (2014). “Aktivist strateji ile hareket eden serbest yatırım fonlarının getirileri”, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara: TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji Üniversitesi.
  • WHEELWRIGHT, Steven, MAKRIDAKIS, Spyros ve HYNDMAN, Rob J. (1998). “Forecasting: methods and applications,” John Wiley & Sons.
  • ACTIVIST INSIGHT (2014). “The Activist Insight Activist Investing Review 2014”, https://www.activistinsight.com/research/Activist%20Insight%20Annual%20Review%202014-final%20web%20pdf.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 13.09.2019.
  • ACTIVIST INSIGHT (2018). “The Activist Investing Annual Review 2018”, https://www.activistinsight.com/resources/reports/, Erişim Tarihi: 13.09.2019.
  • FRENCH, Kenneth R. (2019). Fama/French 5 Factors (2x3) [Daily] XLS file, https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html, Erişim Tarihi: 02.05.2019.
  • TOONKEL, Jessica ve KIM, Soyoung. (2013). Activist Investors Find Allies in Mutual, Pension Funds, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/us-funds-activist-idUSBRE9380DU20130409, Erişim Tarihi: 15.02.2019
  • VAUGHAN, David A. (2003). “Selected Definitions of "Hedge Fund",” SEC, Elektronik Veri Dağıtım Sistemi, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.htm, Erişim Tarihi: 13.09.2019.

Year 2020, Volume: 12 Issue: 23, 672 - 692, 31.07.2020

Serkan Ünal

https://doi.org/10.14784/marufacd.785894

Abstract

References

  • ANDRES, Christian. (2008). “Large shareholders and firm performance--An empirical examination of founding-family ownership”, Journal of Corporate Finance, 14, issue 4, p. 431-445.
  • BEBCHUK, Lucian A., BRAV, Alon ve JIANG, Wei. (2014). “The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 114, Baskıda (Paper No. 13-66).
  • BECHT, Marco, BOLTON, Patrick ve Röell, Ailsa. (2002). “Corporate Governance and Control”. NBER Working Paper No. w9371. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research.
  • BECHT, Marco, FRANKS, Julian, GRANT, Jeremy ve WAGNER, Hannes F..(2017). “Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study”, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 30, Issue 9 Pages 2933–2971,
  • BESSLER, Wolfgang, DROBETZ, Wolfgang ve HOLLER, Julian. (2008). “Capital Markets and Corporate Control: Empirical Evidence From Hedge Fund Activism in Germany,” Working Paper, Giessen: Justus-Liebig University.
  • BETHEL, Jennifer E., LİEBESKİND, Julia Porter ve OPLER, Tim C.. (1998). “Block Share Purchases and Corporate Performance,” Journal of Finance 2, 605-634.
  • BOYSON, Nicole M. ve MOORADIAN, Robert M.. (2011), “Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism,” Review of Derivatives Research Vol. 14, No. 2, 14(2), 169-204.
  • BRAV, Alon, JIANG, Wei, PARTNOY, Frank, ve THOMAS, Randall S.. (2008). “The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism,” ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 098/2008, Durham: Duke University
  • BRAV, Alon, JIANG, Wei ve KIM, Hyunseob. (2010). “Hedge Fund Activism: A Review,” Foundations and Trends in Finance, 4(3), 185-246.
  • BRAV, Alon, JIANG, Wei, MA, Song, ve TIAN, Xuan (2014). “Shareholder power and corporate innovation: Evidence from hedge fund activism”. SSRN Electronic Journal.
  • CHEN, Clara Xiaoling, LU, Hai ve SOUGIANNIS, Theodore (2011). “The Agency Problem, Corporate Governance, and the Asymmetrical Behavior of Selling, General, and Administrative Costs,” Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting Paper, Illinois: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
  • CHENG, C.S. Agnes, HUANG, Henry, LI, Yinghua ve STANFIELD, Jason. (2012). “The Effect of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Tax Avoidance,” The Accounting Review 87, 1493-1526.
  • CLIFFORD, Christopher P.. (2008). “Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists,” Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 14, No. 4
  • COLLIN-DUFRESNE, Pierre ve FOS, Vyacheslav. (2012). “Do prices reveal the presence of informed trading?,” Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 13-69, Lausanne: Swiss Finance Institute.
  • EDMANS, Alex, FANG, Vivian W. ve ZUR, Emanuel. (2013). “The Effect of Liquidity on Governance,” Review of Financial Studies 26(6), 1443-1482.
  • FAMA, Eugene F. (1998). "Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance." Journal of financial economics 49.3: 283-306.
  • FALEYE, Olubunmi. (2004). “Cash and Corporate Control,” Journal of Corporate Finance, 5 2041-2060
  • HALL, Curtis ve TROMBLEY, Mark A. (2012). “Accounting Responses to Hedge-Fund Activism,” Working Paper, Philadelphia: Drexel University
  • HE, Zhongzhi Lawrence, QIU, Jiaping ve TANG, Tingfeng. (2014). “Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate Innovation,” Working Paper Ontario: Brock University
  • GILLAN, Stuart L. ve STARKS, Laura T.. (2007). “The evolution of shareholder activism in the United States,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 19(1): 55-73.
  • GREENWOOD, Robin M. ve SCHOR, Michael. (2009). “Investor Activism and Takeovers,” Journal of Financial Economics 92(3): 362-375.
  • GROSSMAN, Sanford J. ve HART, Oliver D.. (1980). “Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corparation,” Bell J. Econ. 11: 42-64.
  • GUJARATI, Damodar N. ve PORTER, Dawn C. (2009). "Basic Econometrics Mc Graw-Hill International Edition.".
  • K. BRUNNERMEIER, M. A. R. K. U. S. ve NAGEL, Stefan (2004). “Hedge funds and the technology bubble,” The Journal of Finance, 59(5), 2013-2040.
  • KARPOFF, Jonathan M.. (2001). “The impact of shareholder activism on target companies: A survey of empirical findings,” Working Paper, Seattle: University of Washington
  • KATELOUZOU, Dionysia. (2013). "Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some Empirical Evidence," 7 Virginia Law & Business Review 459
  • KLEIN, April ve ZUR, Emanuel. (2006). “Hedge Fund Activism,” NYU Working Paper No. CLB-06-017, New York: New York University (NYU)
  • KLEIN, April ve ZUR, Emanuel. (2011). “The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target Firm's Existing Bondholders” The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 24, No. 5 (May 2011), pp. 1735-1771
  • MITNICK, Barry M., (2013). Origin of the Theory of Agency: An Account By One of the Theory's Originators
  • MURPHY, Kevin J. ve JENSEN, Michael C.. (1990). “Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol.98, No. 2 (Apr. 1990), 225-264
  • O'HALLORAN, Rory B. (2004). “Overview and Analysis of Recent Interest in Increased Hedge Fund Regulation,” Tulane Law Review, 79: 461.
  • PARTNOY, Frank ve THOMAS, Randall. (2007). "Gap filling, hedge funds, and financial innovation." Brookings-Nomura Papers on Financial Services, Washington: 101-140.
  • ROSE, Nancy L. ve SHEPARD, Andrea. (1997). “Firm diversification and CEO compensation: Managerial ability or executive entrenchment?,” The RAND Journal of Economics 28 (3): 489–514.
  • SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, (2004) “Fed. Reg. 72054-01, 72055,” Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 237
  • SHLIEFER, Andrei ve VISHNY, Robert W.. (1986). “Large Shareholders And Corporate Control,” Journal of Political Economy, 94, 461-488.
  • STOCKMAN, Nick W. A.. (2007). “Influences of Hedge Fund Activism on the Medium Term Target Firm Value,” Working Paper, Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam
  • ÜNAL, Serkan. (2014). “Aktivist strateji ile hareket eden serbest yatırım fonlarının getirileri”, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara: TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji Üniversitesi.
  • WHEELWRIGHT, Steven, MAKRIDAKIS, Spyros ve HYNDMAN, Rob J. (1998). “Forecasting: methods and applications,” John Wiley & Sons.
  • ACTIVIST INSIGHT (2014). “The Activist Insight Activist Investing Review 2014”, https://www.activistinsight.com/research/Activist%20Insight%20Annual%20Review%202014-final%20web%20pdf.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 13.09.2019.
  • ACTIVIST INSIGHT (2018). “The Activist Investing Annual Review 2018”, https://www.activistinsight.com/resources/reports/, Erişim Tarihi: 13.09.2019.
  • FRENCH, Kenneth R. (2019). Fama/French 5 Factors (2x3) [Daily] XLS file, https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html, Erişim Tarihi: 02.05.2019.
  • TOONKEL, Jessica ve KIM, Soyoung. (2013). Activist Investors Find Allies in Mutual, Pension Funds, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/us-funds-activist-idUSBRE9380DU20130409, Erişim Tarihi: 15.02.2019
  • VAUGHAN, David A. (2003). “Selected Definitions of "Hedge Fund",” SEC, Elektronik Veri Dağıtım Sistemi, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.htm, Erişim Tarihi: 13.09.2019.
There are 43 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Journal Section Makaleler
Authors

Serkan Ünal

Publication Date July 31, 2020
Submission Date September 15, 2019
Published in Issue Year 2020 Volume: 12 Issue: 23

Cite

APA Ünal, S. (2020). SERBEST YATIRIM FONLARININ AKTİVİST İŞLEMLERİN HİSSE FİYAT PERFORMANSLARININ ANALİZİ. Finansal Araştırmalar Ve Çalışmalar Dergisi, 12(23), 672-692. https://doi.org/10.14784/marufacd.785894