2001 FINANCIAL CRISIS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND THE AGENCY COST: EVIDENCE FROM ISO 500 FIRMS

Year 2021, Volume: 23 Issue: 1, 107 - 121, 31.03.2021

Ömer Tuğsal Doruk

https://doi.org/10.31460/mbdd.788086

Cited By: 1

Abstract

Agency cost is a behavioral corporate finance problem that has an important place in finance literature. While it is often discussed in the current literature, Turkey oriented relative literature is quite limited. In this study, the agency costs before, during, and in the post-2001 financial crisis era are examined between companies with foreign owners and others by using cross-section regression analyzes and marginal effects based on these analyzes. The obtained findings show that there is a significant difference between the two firm groups in terms of agency costs during the 2001 financial crisis, before and after the crisis. The findings obtained do not show any change in different robustness checks.

Keywords

Agency Cost, 2001 Financial Crisis, ISO 500 Firms

2001 FİNANSAL KRİZİ, KURUMSAL YÖNETİM VE VEKALET MALİYETİ: İSO 500 FİRMALARINDAN BULGULAR

Abstract

Vekalet maliyeti, finans literatüründe oldukça önemli bir yer tutan bir davranışsal kurumsal finans sorunu olma özelliğindedir. Vekalet maliyeti uluslararası literatürde sıkça tartışılmasına rağmen Türkiye eksenli literatür göreli olarak oldukça sınırlıdır. Bu çalışmada 2001 finansal krizi öncesi, kriz esnasında ve kriz dönemlerinde vekalet maliyeti yabancı ortakları olan firmalar ile diğerleri arasında yatay kesit regresyon analizleri ve bu analizlere dayalı marjinal etkiler vasıtasıyla test edilmektedir. Elde edilen bulgular vekalet maliyeti açısından 2001 finansal krizi döneminde, kriz öncesi ve sonrasında iki firma grubu arasında önemli bir farklılaşma olduğunu göstermektedir. Elde edilen bulgular farklı sağlamlık kontrollerinde bir değişiklik göstermemektedir.

Keywords

Vekalet Maliyeti, ISO 500 Firmaları, 2001 Finansal Krizi

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