Alacak Karşılıklarını Belirleyen Faktörlerin İncelenmesi: Alacak Yönetimi, Muhafazakârlık ve Kazanç Yönetiminin Etkileri

Year 2023, , 97 - 130, 16.10.2023

Serdar Benligiray , Ahmet Onay

https://doi.org/10.33203/mfy.1290589

Abstract

Bu çalışma Borsa İstanbul şirketlerinin finansal tablolarında raporlanan alacak karşılıklarının karakteristiğini belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bunun için alacak yönetiminin etkisi ve diğer finansal faktörler kontrol edilerek muhafazakâr raporlama ve kazanç yönetiminin etkisi incelenmiştir. Analiz bulgularına göre alacak karşılıklarının esas belirleyicisi alacak politikaları ve şirketin finansal durumudur. Alacak karşılıklarının kazancı kayda değer ölçüde etkilediği gözlenmiştir. Buna karşın bu tahakkukların kazanç hedeflerine ulaşmak için kullanıldığı söylenemez. Toplam ihtiyari tahakkukların artık karşılıklara etkisi alacakların kazanç yönetiminin bir aracı olduğu görüşünü desteklemektedir. Analiz firmalarında alacaklar için karşılık ayırma ve kayıttan silme prosedürünün etkin olmadığı söylenebilir. Bulgular muhafazakârlığın ayrılan alacak karşılığını artırdığına işaret etmektedir.

Keywords

Alacak Yönetimi, Muhafazakârlık, Finansal Sıkıntı, Kazanç Yönetimi

Examination of Factors Determining Bad Debt Provisions: Effects of Receivables Management, Conservatism and Earnings Management

Abstract

This paper aims to identify the characteristics of the provision for bad debts reported in the financial statements of firms listed on Borsa Istanbul. For this purpose, the effects of conservative reporting and earnings management are examined by controlling the effect of receivables management and other financial factors. According to the findings, the receivables policy and the firm’s financial condition are the main determinants of the provisions. The provisions are observed to affect the earnings significantly. However, these accruals can not be argued to be used to achieve earnings targets. The observed effect of total discretionary accruals on residual provisions supports the argument that receivables are used as a tool for earnings management. For the analysis firms, it can be argued that the provisioning and write-off procedures for accounts receivables are ineffective. Findings indicate that conservatism increases the provision for debts.

Keywords

Receivables Management, Conservatism, Financial Distress, Earnings Management

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