Kurumsal Yönetişim Teorilerine Deontolojik Bir Eleştiri: Şirketlerin Amacı Çalışanların Çıkarlarıyla Bütünleşebilir mi?

Year 2018, Volume: 9 Issue: 16, 2480 - 2510, 30.12.2018

Mehmet Özyürek

https://doi.org/10.26466/opus.493876

Abstract

Bir işletmenin
amacı ne olmalı? Bu amacın içinde işletmenin çalışanlarının çıkarları ne ölçüde
rol oynamalı? Çalışanlar işletmeye sağladıkları faydanın ötesinde bir değere
sahip mi? Elbette bu sorulara şimdiye kadar bir çok teori farklı açılardan yanıtlar
aradı. Aşağıda okuyacağınız çalışma bu sorulara cevap ararken işletme
çalışanlarını kar maksimizasyonu doğrultusunda araç olarak gören kurumsal
yönetişim teorilerinin eleştirel bir analizini sunuyor ve bu teorileri görev
ahlakı açısından yeniden değerlendiriyor. Bu değerlendirme işletmenin amacını
ve işletme çalışanlarının çıkarlarını araçsal/sonuçsal olmayan normatif bir teori üzerinde yeniden tanımlıyor. Kant’ın görev
ahlakını temel alan bu teori, işletme çalışanlarını, yarattığı ekonomik faydanın
ötesinde değerlendiriyor. Bu çalışma aynı zamanda çalışanları sadece araçsal
değeri üzerinden değerlendiren kurumsal yönetişim modellerinin de bir
eleştirisini sunuyor. Yapılan eleştiride yaygın kurumsal yönetişim modellerinin,
çalışanlara sadece işletmeye ve hissedarlara sağladıkları fayda üzerinden yaklaştığı
üzerinde duruluyor. Bu nitel ve normatif eleştirinin ardından çalışanların
içsel değerlerine saygı gösterebilmenin ancak deontolojik bir paydaş teorisi
ile mümkün olabileceği savını öne sürüyor. 

Keywords

Kurumsal Yönetişim, İş Etiği, Paydaş Teorisi, Deontolojik Etik, Deontolojik Etik

A Critique of the Corporate Governance Approaches from a Deontological Perspective: Can the Corporate Objective Embrace the Interests of Employees?

Abstract

What should
the corporate objective be? How should the interests of employees feature in
said objective? Do employees have intrinsic value other than instrumental value?
There are, of course, a number of different arguments that have been advanced
in response to these questions; the majority of which have been built upon a
range of different theoretical positions. In order to answer such questions,
this study critically analyses the most prominent corporate governance
approaches, which mostly see employees as only means in the corporation’s
and/or shareholders’ ends. The study
argues that employees should not merely be treated as instruments to the ends
of the corporation or corporate shareholders. It argues that a normative approach to realise
the corporate objective can be found within a non-consequential stakeholder
theory. Thus according to this paper, employees can be respected genuinely only
if the objective of the corporation is redefined from an intrinsic perspective. 

Keywords

Corporate Governance, Business Ethics, Stakeholder Theory, Deontological

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