Özel Mülkiyet Haklarının Korunması ve Gelir Eşitsizliği: OECD Ülkeleri için Ampirik Bir Analiz

Year 2023, Volume: 13 Issue: 2 - Cilt 13, Sayı 2, 179 - 204, 28.12.2023

Bahar Baysal Kar

https://doi.org/10.32331/sgd.1408478

Abstract

OECD ülkelerinde 1996-2020 dönemi için mülkiyet
haklarının korunması ile gelir eşitsizliği arasındaki
ilişki bu çalışmanın analiz konusudur. Gelir eşitsizliği
göstergesi olarak iki farklı değişken kullanılmıştır: Gini
katsayısı ve en üstteki %1’lik kesimin ulusal gelirden
aldıkları pay. İçselliği kontrol etmek için mülkiyet
haklarının korunmasına ilişkin göstergeye ek olarak araç
değişkenler de modele dahil edilmiştir. Heterojen panel
veri modellerinden ¨genişletilmiş ortalama grup (AMG)¨
tahmincisi ile tahmin edilen iki farklı modelde, OECD
ülkelerinde mülkiyet haklarının korunmasının toplumun
tüm kesimleri için uygun bir kurumsal ortam yaratarak gelir
eşitsizliğini azaltıcı etki yarattığını ileri süren yaklaşımları
destekleyen sonuçlar elde edilmiştir. Diğer bir ifade ile
ampirik bulgular mülkiyet haklarının korunmasının gelir
eşitsizliğini uzun dönemde azalttığını ortaya koymaktadır.
Ancak eğimin heterojenliğine izin veren AMG tahmincisi
ile tahmin edilen modellerde tek tek ülke parametreleri
bazı ülkelerde mülkiyet haklarının korunmasının gelir
eşitsizliğini arttırıcı etkisi olduğunu göstermektedir.
Panel veri analizi sonuçları gelir dağılımını azaltıcı etkisi
nedeni ile mülkiyet hakları kurumunun güçlendirilmesini
politika önerisi olarak ortaya koymaktadır. Ancak ülke
parametrelerinin heterojenliği spesifik olarak ülkelere
özgü faktörler ile diğer kurumsal etmenlerin incelenerek
gelir dağılımını bozucu veya iyileştirici kanalların neler
olduğunu daha ayrıntılı araştıran analizlerin gerekliliğini
ortaya koymaktadır.

Keywords

Özel mülkiyet hakları, gelir eşitsizliği, formel yasal sistem, heterojen panel modelleri, AMG

Protection of Private Property Rights and Income Inequality: An Empirical Analysis for OECD Countries

Abstract

The relationship between the protection of property rights
and income inequality in OECD countries for the period
1996-2020 is the subject of analysis of this paper. As an
indicator of income inequality, two different variables are
used: the Gini coefficient and the national income share of
the top 1%. To control endogeneity, instrumental variables
are also included in the model in addition to the indicator
for the protection of property rights. In the two different
models estimated with the ¨augmented mean group
(AMG)¨ estimator from heterogeneous panel data models,
results have been obtained that support approaches that
argue that the protection of property rights reduces
income inequality by creating a favourable institutional
environment for all segments of society in OECD
countries. In other words, empirical findings reveal that the
protection of property rights reduces income inequality in
the long run. However, the individual country parameters
in the models estimated with the AMG estimator, which
allows for the heterogeneity of the slope, show that the
protection of property rights increases income inequality
in some countries. The results of the panel data analysis
present the strengthening of the property rights institution
as a policy recommendation due to its reducing effect
on the income inequality. However, the heterogeneity
of country parameters presents the necessity of more
detailed analyses of the channels that distort or improve
the income distribution by examining country-specific
factors and other institutional elements.

Keywords

Private property rights, income inequality, formal legal system, heterogeneous panel models, AMG

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