DÜNYADA DEVLET BAŞKANLARININ GÖREV SÜRESİNİN UZUNLUĞU ve DÖNEMSEL SINIR -Karşılaştırmalı Analiz ve Optimal Süre/Dönem Üzerine Tespit ve Öneriler-

Year 2021, Volume: 13 Issue: 2, 128 - 153, 31.12.2021

Coşkun Can Aktan , Ahmet Ekinci

Abstract

Başkanlık adı verilen hükümet sistemlerinde yürütme yetkisi geniş ölçüde seçimle göreve gelmiş olan başkana verilmiştir. Başkanın görevde kalma süresi ve dönemsel sınır konusunda ülkeler arasında bir standart söz konusu değildir ve ülkelerde birbirinden farklı uygulamalar geçerlidir. Bu çalışmamızda devlet başkanlarının ne kadar süre ve kaç dönem görev yapmaları gerektiği konusu mukayeseli olarak analiz edilmektedir.

Keywords

Görev Süresi Sınırlaması, Görev Değişimi, Rotasyon, Dönemsel Sınır, Görev Süresini Uzunluğu, Optima Süre, Optimal Dönem

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