Para Politikasının Büyüme Üzerindeki Etkisinde Kurumsal Yapının Rolü: Farklı Gelir Düzeyindeki Ülkeler Üzerine Bir Uygulama

Year 2023, Volume: 31 Issue: 58, 61 - 80, 26.10.2023

Murat Eren , Selim Başar

https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2023.04.03

Abstract

Bu çalışmada, para politikasının büyüme üzerindeki etkisi, farklı gelir düzeyindeki ülkeler için kurumsal çerçevede araştırılmıştır. GMM tahmincisinden elde edilen bulgular, daraltıcı para politikasının büyüme üzerindeki etkisinin tüm ülkelerde negatif olduğunu göstermiştir. Öte yandan, yüksek ve üst orta gelirli ülkelerde tüm kurumsal göstergelerin etkilerinin olumlu olduğu ve kurumsal kalitedeki artışın daraltıcı para politikasının büyüme üzerindeki olumsuz etkisini azalttığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Alt-orta gelirli ülkeler açısından ise bazı kurumsal değişkenlerin etkilerinin istatistiksel olarak anlamsız olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Keywords

Kurumsal İktisat, Para Politikası, Ekonomik Büyüme, Sistem GMM

Supporting Institution

Bulunmamaktadır

Project Number

Bulunmamaktadır

The Role of Institutional Structure in the Effect of Monetary Policy on Growth: An Application on Countries at Different Income Levels

Abstract

In this study, the impact of monetary policy on growth is discussed within the institutional framework for countries with different income levels. The findings from the GMM estimator showed that the effect of contractionary monetary policy on growth is negative in all countries. On the other hand, it is concluded that the impact of all institutional indicators is positive in high and upper-middle-income countries and that the increase in institutional quality reduces the adverse effects of contractionary monetary policy on growth. In terms of lower-middle-income countries, the effects of some institutional variables are found to be statistically insignificant.

Keywords

Institutional Economics, Monetary Policy, Economic Growth, System GMM

Project Number

Bulunmamaktadır

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