Carrhae Yenilgisi ve Roma’nın Doğu Politikasına Etkileri

Year 2013, Issue: 29, 261 - 272, 01.02.2013

Ercüment Yıldırım

Abstract

Crassus, Roma’da önemli bir devlet adamıve zengin bir soylu olmasının yanısıra hayatıboyunca kazanacağızaferlerle de adınıtarihe yazdırmak isteyen bir asker olmuştur. Roma kentinin önemli siyasi simalarından olan Crassus Roma’nın cumhuriyetten imparatorluğa geçmesinde önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Crassus, başkent Roma’da kalmaktansa kendisine daha fazla ün ve zenginlik getirecek bir doğu seferine çıkmak amacıyla Suriye Eyaleti’ne yönetici olmuşve Hindistan’a kadar uzanacak bir seferin hazırlıklarına başlamıştır. Crassus, seferine başladığında ilk büyük sorunu Zeugma yakınlarından Fırat Nehri’ni geçerken yaşamışbunun sonucunda askerlerinin bir kısmınıkaybetmişve ordusu da moral olarak çökmüştür. Carrhae’ye ulaşan Crassus burada Parth generali Suren’in yaptığıani bir baskınla yenilmişve barışgörüşmeleri esnasında tuzağa düşürülerek öldürülmüştür. Bu yenilgi Roma’nın doğuya ilerleyişini geciktirdiği gibi daha sonra bölgeye sefer düzenleyen komutanlar için önemli bir ders olmuştur. Bu çalışmada Crassus’un doğu seferi ile Carrhae’de uğradığıyenilgi ve bunun Roma’nın doğu siyasetine yaptığıetkiler açıklanmaya çalışılacaktır

Keywords

Roma, Crassus, Carrhae, Parth, Antik Yazarlar

Carrhae Defeat and The Effects of Rome To East Policy

Abstract

When the Roman Empire completely contained the West of Anatolian Peninsula, East of it was under control of Pontus and The Armenia Kingdoms. For nearly half a decade, Lucullus, and then Pompeius had struggled to seize the land of Pontus and Armenia, thinking of the fame and the property they would gain. These two generals, who had succeeded in the wars, widened the borders of Rome to the land of Parth. Pompeius settled Roman culture and hegemony in eastern part of Asia Minor and in Syria, and this caused the Parthians to feel the need of taking precautions against the extention of Rome. After this success of Pompeius, Marcus Licinius Crassus, appointed as a governor of Syrian State, came to the region to save the honor of the land. Besides being an important statesman and a wealthy noble, Crassus had been a soldier who wanted to write his name to the history with the victories he had gained throughout his life. Crassus, who is an important character of the Roman City, played an important role in Rome’s passing from being a republic to an empire. Among Roman people, Crassus raised by his ambitious character in a short time. Although Crassus, in his first political attempt, supported Sulla’s offend against Lucius Cornelius Cinna, he failed in this attempt. Crassus was sent into exile to Hispania by Cinna, and this period deeply affected his future plans. After Sulla gained the power, Crassus soon raised his wealth and political power. Besides his political rise, Crassus was accepted as a military genius by the Romans, with his achievements in the Slave War III. Crassus was elected as a consul in 73, and he took place in the government of the first triumvirate, with the participation of Gaius Julius Caesar ve Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus in 63. Instead of staying at Rome, he became a governor at the Syrian State in order to start a campaign that would bring him much more fame and wealth; and he started the preparations of a campaign that would reach over India. Many of the Roman wellknown people stood against the campaign Crassus would set on the Parthians. After the defeat of Crassus, it was claimed by the ancient writers that the supernatural events occurred during his ruin was related with this defeat. Ignoring the protests and the fearful signs, Crassus left Rome on 14th November 55 BC. While he was spending the winter days between 54 and 55 BC., approximately one thousand elite Kelt cavaliers also joined his army. Crassus managed to gather a rather crowded army also by using his wealth. This army nearly reached the number equal to seven legion powers. In addition to this powerful army, Artavastes, the Armenian King, charged 6000 cavalier to company Crassus. Artavasdes advised Crassus not to use the desert areas, but to use the route passing by Armenia. Furthermore, he told he would send reinforcement troops for him not to come across difficulties while going forward that route. Crassus rejected this suggestion by pointing that he had enough self-confidence and he did not need any enforcement. While Crassus was carrying on his preparations, the Parthian King, Orodes II divided his army into two pieces against the enemy coming with a great power. By sending the bulk of the army to Armenia, he wanted to punish Artavasdes, who was obviously supporting Rome. More than a Roman campaign only coming from the south, Orodes II was anxious about the attacks coming over the Armenian Kingdom and that his power on this area would end. By giving a small part of his army to his commander Suren, Orodes II wanted him to keep the Roman army busy, or at least abuse them. When he started the campaign, Crassus experienced the first big problem in crossing the Euphrates River near Zeugma; and he not only lost some of his soldiers, but also the army’s morale. In spite of the disaster he experienced, Crassus ignored the proposal of the Armenian King Artavesdes and went forward to Surena, waiting for him near Carrhae. Learning that the Parthian army had been preparing for a war, Crassus gathered his generals in a panic. His generals advised him to make his army to behave according to the classical war position, and to set the armoured infantries at the center, and make the chivalries wait at the wings for sudden attacks. At first, Crassus accepted the war position, but then, he set twelve troops he had an a large area standing away from each other. Although this settlement averted the army to be bounded from back, the army’s mobility was limited. Another fault of Crassus was that he rejected the idea to rest the tired army, coming from a long way, by pitching a camp, and he ordered them to attack immediately. The soldiers in Parthian army got loud voice to frighten and unsettle the Roman army. Another factor that unsettled Roman soldiers was that the Parthian soldiers with clear armours had attacked suddenly and then stood away. When Surena realized that the chivalries he had been insufficient to corrupt the order of Roman troops, he withdrew them and sent the archer chivalries. These chivalries could quickly enter the range of enemy, and they could send arrows and withdrew. Though Crassus sent his own chivalries to stop the archer chivalries giving dreadful harm to infantries, they had to withdraw because of the arrow rain they witnessed. To get rid of arrow attacks, Roman legions took the formation called “turtle arrangement” by which they protected most of their bodies with huge shields. This arrangement not only gave them the chance to attack by providing defense facility, it also caused Roman legions to give severe loss because of the panic they had when Surena, controlling the Parthian chivalries with light armours with the ability of throwing arrows, renewed the attacks by realizing this gap immediately. After the severe loss, the legions, losing the position lines, started to withdrew. Surena, watching the Romans’ to withdraw, put his second plan in circuit, and sent his warriors using camels, over the legions withdrawing half-coordinated. With the aim of responding this attack, Crassus ordered 1300 Gaul chivalries to attack in commend of his son, Publius. Parthian chivalries, accustomed to fight in open air, started to slain the Gaul’s by suddenly encompassing them. By the way, Crassus ordered all of his army to go forward. While Roman army was going forward, the head of Publius on a spearhead was wandering around. After his son’s death and the severe defeat, Crassus ordered his army to withdraw to a town near Carrhae in the evening. On the other day morning, a massage offering convention reached to Crassus, the commander of Roman army that had severe defeat. In his massage, Surena pointed that he could safely return Syria if he renounced all the lands in the east of Euphrates River. Although Crassus was eager to continue to fight instead of a treaty, he had to debate because of the rumor of rebellion among the army. Crassus and his generals were died during the debate that was set as a trap. Parthians dropped melted gold over the throat of Crassus, gibing his famous greedy. Parthians, feeling great anger to Crassus, cut his head and his right hand, sent them to Armenia as a memory of their victory. This defeat delayed the expansion of Rome, and also became an important lesson for the generals who set a campaign to this region. In this research, the defeat of Crassus in his campaign to East and its effects to the East Policy of Rome will be explained

Keywords

Roman, Crassus, Carrhae, Parthian, Ancient Authors

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