AN ASSESSMENT OF THE STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS OF THE WAGNER GROUP

Year 2023, , 111 - 130, 15.06.2023

Anıl Çağlar Erkan , Ahmet Ateş

https://doi.org/10.58702/teyd.1216725

Cited By: 2

Abstract

Using the relevant literature, reports and documents, this study examines the structure and operations of the Wagner Group, which has become increasingly important in international relations in the last decade. As a result of the analysis, it has been determined that Wagner is an actor which has a unique place both in the literature and in practice and should be analyzed in this manner. As a result of the systematic analysis of the relevant literature, it has been determined that it is wrong to conceptually classify Wagner as a mercenary or private military company due to the ambiguous legality of Wagner and its preference to work only with the Russian Federation unlike how other private military companies operate. Also, an analysis of Wagner's activities revealed that Wagner behaved differently from its national and international counterparts in practice. The main reasons for the difference are its hybrid management and personnel structure, Russian foreign policy-oriented activities, and its use of ideological motivations in recruitment and operations.

Keywords

Wagner Group, Russian Federation, Private Military Companies, Mercenaries, Privatization of Security

WAGNER GRUBU’NUN YAPISI VE OPERASYONLARI ÜZERİNE BİR İNCELEME

Abstract

Bu çalışma son on yılda uluslararası ilişkilerde önemi giderek artan Wagner Grubu’nun yapısını ve operasyonlarını ilgili literatür, raporlar ve dokümanlardan yararlanarak incelemektedir. Gerçekleştirilen analiz sonucunda Wagner’in hem literatürde hem de uygulamada kendine has bir yeri olan ve bu şekilde analiz edilmesi gereken bir aktör olduğu tespit edilmiştir. İlgili literatürün sistematik analizi sonucunda Wagner’i kavramsal açıdan paralı asker veya özel askeri şirket olarak sınıflandırmanın yanlış olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Bu durumun sebebi olarak Wagner’in yasallığının muğlak olması ve diğer özel askeri şirketler gibi çeşitli devlet kurum ve uluslararası örgütler ile çalışmak yerine tek müşterisinin Rusya olması belirtilmiştir. Wagner’in gerçekleştirdiği faaliyetlerinin analizi sonucunda ise Wagner’in uygulamada ulusal ve uluslararası emsallerinden farklı olarak davrandığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Bu durumun temel sebeplerinin ise, hibrit bir yönetim ve personel yapısına sahip olması, salt Rusya devletinin güdümünde ve Rus dış politikası çerçevesinde faaliyet göstermesi ve özel bir şirket olarak faaliyet ve işe alımlarından ideolojik motivasyonlarının olması olduğu saptanmıştır.

Keywords

Wagner Grubu, Rusya Federasyonu, Özel Askeri Şirketler, Paralı Askerler, Güvenliğin Özelleştirilmesi.

References

• Adams, T. K. (2002). “Private Military Companies: Mercenaries for the 21st Century”. Small Wars and Insurgencies, 13 (2), 54-67.
• Aning, K., T. Jaye, ve S. Atuobi (2008). “The Role of Private Military Companies in US-Africa Policy”. Review of African political economy, 35 (118), 613-628.
• Bax, P. (2021). “Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic”. International Crisis Group, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/russias-influence-central-african-republic (08.02.2022).
• Brooks, D. (2000). “Messiahs or Mercenaries? The Future of International Private Military Services”. International Peacekeeping, 7 (4), 129-144.
• Cotterill, J. (2021). “Mozambique Looks to Private Sector in War Against Islamists”. Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/2f35c5b0-7084-4bfd-b702-44769a6ac835 (16.02.2022).
• Dahl, R. A. (1957). “The Concept of Power”. Behavioral Science, 2 (3), 201–215.
• De Nevers, R. (2009). “Private Security Companies and the Laws of War”. Security Dialogue, 40 (2), 169-190.
• Gilpin, R. (1981). War and Change In World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Hauer, N. (2018). “Russia’s Favorite Mercenaries”. The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/russian-mercenaries-wagner-africa/568435/ (21.01.2022).
• Howe, H. M. (1998). “Global Order and The Privatization of Security”. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 22 (2), 1-10.
• Hungtington, S. (1957). The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations. Newyork: Random House.
• Krahmann, E. (2005). “Security Governance and The Private Military Industry in Europe and North America: Analysis”. Conflict, Security & Development, 5 (2), 247-268.
• Kuczyński, G. (2018). “Putin's Invisible Army”. The Warsaw Institute Review, https://warsawinstitute.org/putins-invisible-army/ (20.09.2021).
• Mackinnon, A. (2021). “Russia’s Wagner Group Doesn’t Really Exist”. Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/06/what-is-wagner-group-russia-mercenaries-military-contractor/ (19.10.2021).
• Mandel, R. (2001). “The Privatization of Security”. Armed Forces & Society, 28 (1), 129-151.
• Marten, K. (2019a). “Russia’s Back in Africa: Is the Cold War Returning?”. The Washington Quarterly, 42 (4), 155-170.
• Marten, K. (2019b). “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of The Wagner Group”. Post-Soviet Affairs, 35 (3), 181-204.
• Marten, K. (2020). “The GRU, Yevgeny Prigozhin, and Russia’s Wagner Group: Malign Russian Actors and Possible U.S. Responses”. Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment United States House of Representatives, https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110854/witnesses/HHRG-116-FA14-Wstate-MartenK-20200707.pdf (19.10.2021).
• Mcfate, S. (2019). Mercenaries and War: Understanding Private Armies Today. Washington D.C: National Defence University Press.
• O'Brien, K. A. (2000). “Pmcs, Myths and Mercenaries: The Debate on Private Military Companies”. The RUSI Journal, 145 (1), 59-64.
• Østensen, Å. G. ve T. Bukkvoll (2021). “Private Military Companies – Russian Great Power Politics on The Cheap?”. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 33 (1-2), 1-23.
• Pilgrim, S. (2014). “UN peacekeepers ‘look on’ as ‘Russia-backed’ war rages in Darfur”. France 24, https://www.france24.com/en/20141213-un-peacekeepers-darfur-sudan-look-on-russia-backed-war-rages-unamid (16.02.2022).
• Rabin, A. (2019). “Diplomacy and Dividends: Who Really Controls the Wagner Group?”. Foreign Policy Research Institute, https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/10/diplomacy-and-dividends-who-really-controls-the-wagner-group/ (23.08.2020).
• Reynolds, N. (2019). “Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner Group”. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/07/08/putin-s-not-so-secret-mercenaries-patronage-geopolitics-and-wagner-group-pub-79442 (12.11.2020).
• Rondeaux, C. (2019a). “Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare”. New America, https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/decoding-wagner-group-analyzing-role-private-military-security-contractors-russian-proxy-warfare/ (12.11.2020).
• Rondeaux, C. (2019b). “How the Wagner Group Helps Putin Expand -and Inflate- Russia’s Influence”. World Politics Review, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28329/how-the-wagner-group-helps-putin-expand-and-inflate-russia-s-influence (23.08.2020).
• Saner, R., A. Uchegbu, ve L. Yiu (2019). “Private Military and Security Companies: Legal and Political Ambiguities Impacting The Global Governance of Warfare in Public Arenas”. Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, 41 (2), 63-71.
• Siege, J. (2021). Russia and Africa: Expanding Influence and Instability. Russia’s Global Reach: A Security and Statecraft Assessment. (Ed. P. H. Graeme), Garmisch- Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 80-90.
• Singer, P. W. (2009). Kiralık Ordular: Özel Askeri Şirketler, (Çev. G. Aral ve İ. Yaman) İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları.
• Sixto, D. (2020). “Russian Mercenaries: A String of Failures in Africa”. Geopolitical Monitor, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russian-mercenaries-a-string-of-failures-in-africa/ (08.02.2022). Stoner, E. (2008). “Outsourcing the Iraq War: Mercenary Recruiters Turn to Latin America”. NACLA Report on the Americas, 41 (4), 9-12.
• Sukhankin, S. (2019). “Russian PMCs in the Syrian Civil War: From Slavonic Corps to Wagner Group and Beyond”. The Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/program/russian-pmcs-in-the-syrian-civil-war-from-slavonic-corps-to-wagner-group-and-beyond/ (20.09.2021).
• Tangör, B. ve H. Yalçınkaya (2010). “Güvenlik Yönetişimi Çerçevesinde Özel Askeri Şirketler”. Uluslararası İlişkiler, 7 (25), 127-154.
• The Soufan Center. (2020). “The Wagner Group: A Russian Symphony of Profit and Politics”. The Soufan Center, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-the-wagner-group-a-russian-symphony-of-profit-and-politics/ (09.02.2022).
• Turcan, M. ve N. Ozpınar (2009). ““Who Let The Dogs Out?”: A Critique of The Security for Hire Option in Weak States”. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 2 (3), 143-171.
• Voss, K. (2016). “Plausibly Deniable: Mercenaries in US Covert Interventions During The Cold War, 1964–1987”. Cold War History, 16 (1), 37-60.