TÜRKİYE’DE DEMOKRATİK AVANTAJ ARGÜMANININ İNCELENMESİ

Year 2020, Issue: 28, 155 - 166, 21.06.2020

Mehmet Ela

https://doi.org/10.18092/ulikidince.709873

Abstract

Devlet borçlarına ilişkin göstergeler çeşitli faktörlerden etkilenmektedir. Bu anlamda devlet borçları, ekonomik, mali ve politik faktörlerden etkilenmektedir. Develet borçlanma göstergelerini etkileyen faktörlerden bir tanesi ise demokrasidir. Demokrasinin devlet borçlarının önemli bir açıklayıcısı olduğuna ilişkin temel savlar ise ancak 1990’lı yıllarda ortaya atılmıştır. Bunlardan bir tanesi ise demokratik avantaj argümanıdır. Demokrasinin birtakım borç göstergelerinin önemli bir belirleyicisi olduğunu savunan demokratik avantaj argümanına göre, demokrasideki artış borç göstergelerini güçlendirmektedir. Bu argümana göre, demokrasideki artış, borçlanma maliyetlerini, temerrüt ve kriz olasılığını ve borçlanma düzeyini düşürmektedir. Demokratik avantaj argümanının Türkiye için geçerliliğini söylemsel bir yöntemle sınayan bu çalışmanın sonucuna göre, demokrasideki artış, borçlanma maliyetlerini, temerrüt ve kriz olasılığını ve borçlanma düzeyini azaltmaktadır. Çalışmada, elde edilen söz konusu sonuçlara göre birtakım politika önerileri sunulmuştur.

Keywords

Demokratik Avantaj, Demokrasi, Devlet Borçları, Türkiye

INVESTIGATION OF DEMOCRATIC ADVANTAGE ARGUMENT IN TURKEY

Abstract

Indicators related to government debt are affected by various factors. In this sense, government debts are affected by economic, economic and political factors. One of the factors affecting government debt indicators is democracy. The basic arguments that democracy is an important explanatory of government debts were made only in the 1990s. One of them is the argument for democratic advantage. According to the argument of democratic advantage, which argues that democracy is an important determinant of some debt indicators, the increase in democracy strengthens debt indicators. According to this argument, the increase in democracy reduces borrowing costs, probability of default and crisis, and borrowing level. According to the results of this study which test the validity of a democratic advantage argument for Turkey, the increase in democracy, reduces borrowing costs, the probability of default and borrowing level. In the study, some policy suggestions are presented according to the relevant results obtained.

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