

EXEMPLARITY OF DIFFÉRANCE

Enis Emre MEMİŞOĞLU*

ABSTRACT

Since his early investigations on Husserl's phenomenology, Derrida's reading of the texts refers as *différance* to the difference of writing to speech and logos. And if the *différance* is reference, it is because every time it finds its instance in a text, it finds that as an example. Be it Husserl's geometry, Plato's pharmakon or Kant's parergon, difference bears itself as the example of *différance* in which these concepts are deferred to other concepts by means of the delay of their signification. That is why in Husserl, the difference of signification to meaning makes the living presence of the voice deferred. Derrida shows how Husserl suspends this difference that is incorporated in the writing itself, though this difference is deferred for the sake of living presence. For Plato too, the difference of living presence this time to logos finds its example in the pharmakon that the writing is. In pharmakon the *zoë* [life] of living voice is deferred as a substitute *zoë*, which means also painting, a relegate representation of logos. As to Kant, the parergon, although exemplifying the difference of the beauty to the sublime in an exemplary way, and although there the examples serve as "clarification" itself for the beauty, cannot but point to the example of sublime law through which Derrida meticulously delineates how the law itself is positioned in and through the difference of the example of law to law. It was only by the exemplarity of these examples that Derrida could call this difference as the "example without example". And it was only after the deferral of those examples offered by Derrida that this paper could propose to pose this exemplarity of *différance* as the "example of example". And whence it is offered as a hypothesis to come (for future analysis) that, from Husserl to Kant, the example of life was also the example of exemplarity through which the paradigm of the "example without example" deferred and differed the example of the example" that Derrida's text exemplified.

Keywords: Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl, *différance*, example, *epokhē*.

DIFFÉRANCE'IN MİSALSİLİĞİ

ÖZ

Husserl'in fenomenolojisi üzerine erken dönem araştırmalarından itibaren Derrida'nın metin okumaları yazının söze ve logos'a farkına *différance* olarak gönderme yapar. Ve eğer *différance* gönderme ise, bu, onun her bir metin kertesinde bulunuşunda kendini misal olarak bulmasından ileri gelmektedir. İster Husserl'in geometrisinde, ister Platon'un pharmakon'unda ya da Kant'ın parergon'unda olsun, fark, bu kavramların kendilerini anlamlarının ertelenmesi vesilesiyle başka kavramlara tehir ettikleri *différance* misali olarak kendini taşır. Bu yüzdendir ki Husserl'de göstergesel anlamın manaya olan farkı sesin canlı olarak huzurda oluşunu tecil eder. Derrida Husserl'in kendini yazıda mücessem kılan bu farkı nasıl muallaka/askıya aldığı gösterir — her ne kadar bu fark huzurda olan canlı mevcudiyetin yararına tecil edilse de. Platon için de, canlı olarak huzurda oluşun bu sefer de logos'a olan farkı yazının olduğu pharmakon'da misalini bulur. Pharmakon'da canlı sesin (yaşam olarak) *zoë*'si bir nevi vekil *zoë* olarak, bu sefer aynı zamanda resim demek olan *zoë* anlamında, logos'un sürgün edilmiş temsili olarak tefrik eder. Kant'a gelinceyse, parergon, her ne kadar güzelin yüceye olan farkını misalsi bir şekilde misallendirse/temsili etse de, ve her ne kadar orada misaller tam da güzelin "izahı" için kullanılsa da, neticede, yüce yasa misalinde, Derrida'nın titizlikle hatlarını çizdiği şekliyle, yasanın vaz edilmişinde yasanın, misalinin yasa ile olan farkı sayesinde tehir ve tefrik ettiğine işaret etmeye kadar gider. İşte ancak bu (nevi) misallerin misalsiliklerinden itibaren Derrida bu farka "misalsiz misal" diyebiliyordu. Ve işte ancak Derrida tarafından sunulmuş bu misallerin tehirinden sonradır ki bu makale de *différance*'in bu misalsiliğini "misalin misali" olarak vaz edebilirdi. Ve böylelikle de gelecek bir inceleme için hipotez olarak sunulabileceği kadaryla, Kant'tan Husserl'e ve de oradan da Derrida'ya dek uzanan yaşam misalinin, "misalsiz misal" paradigmasının (Derrida'nın metninin de misalini verdiği) "misalin misalini" tehir ve tefrik ettiği o misalin misalsiliğine tekabül ettiği söylenebildi.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Jacques Derrida, Edmund Husserl, *différance*, misal, *epokhē*.

* Faculty Member, Ph.D, Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University, Faculty of Art and Sciences, Department of Sociology, enismemisoglu@gmail.com, ORCID: 0000-0002-3084-316X
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Introduction

“[...] la philosophie en tant que gardienne de la vérité, en tant qu’elle est capable d’opérer la purification et de garder la vérité et l’authenticité (Echtheit) de la loi morale, la philosophie est justement la gardienne de ce qui se garde et comme elle est essentiellement la science de l’exemple, rapport de savoir à l’exemple en tous sens, [...], on peut dire de l’exemplarité en général qu’elle la forme même de la garde.”¹

[[...] the philosophy as the guardian of the truth, as that which is capable of operating the purification and guarding the purity and authenticity (*Echtheit*) of the moral law, the philosophy is justly the guardian of that which guards itself and just as it is essentially the science of the example, relation of knowledge to the example in every sense, [...], one can say of the exemplarity that it is the form itself of the guard.]”

*Jacques Derrida, excerpt from unpublished Seminar *Le respect*²*

If in Derrida’s texts the question of example gives itself in the exemplarity of the truth, it is, for example, not so much in order to ask why literature is an example for psychoanalysis (as in the case of Lacan or Freud)³, or why the history of psychiatric institutions finds its example in a philosophical discourse (as in the paradigmatic significance of Descartes’ text through Foucault), or even why philosophy itself follows the example of moral laws (as in the example of Kant), as much as in order to exemplify the *différance* and to differ the example. For, if “an example bears [*porte*] (itself) always beyond itself”⁴, it is maybe because it is not *for-itself*. Then, one may ask: Isn’t it what *différance* bears [*diapherein*]?

¹ All the citations made from the original French sources are translated by the author of this text. Besides the untranslated archive texts, all the other sources can already be found in English. Our aim in retranslating was to highlight what was relevant for our article in French but was nevertheless underestimated in existing translations. Although such was not the case for all the passages cited, for the sake of consistency we kept only our translations.

² Jacques Derrida, *Séminaire Le respect* (5th seance) [unpublished seminar], Jacques Derrida papers. MS-C001. Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California, 12.

³ *Ibid.*, 455.

⁴ Jacques Derrida, *Spectres de Marx: L’état de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle internationale*, Galilée, Paris, 1993, 64-5.

Giving examples about the “question of exemplarity” in Derrida’s text, this paper will situate itself on the margins of an indefinite and ongoing work (*parergon*) at the *Derrida Archives* at UC Irvine Libraries which takes the unpublished seminars of Derrida such as “*L’art* (Kant) [1973-74]”, “*Le respect* [1981]” and “*La représentation* [1981]” as its point of departure. The aim will not be to give a direction to Derrida’s concepts throughout *the exemplarity* of these texts, but to point to the exemplarity of Derrida’s text through which the *ontology of life* disorients itself and through which the position of any paradigm (of any discourse) disseminates itself. One can, then, hope to ask whether the exemplarity of the example that Derrida often generates in form of an undecided problem in some of his texts, does not designate to what *différance* postpones throughout the *example*: to deconstruct philosophy’s right to guard politics — to deconstruct politics’ right to guard life. Hence the *exemplarity of différance*.

[Whence one may, for example, be willing to begin, inaugurate, or authorize (or even *auteuriser*) — with the power of *auctoritas* — to put just right in the beginning, the example. Or instead one may be willing-less to will the power of any origin, any original example, or the originality of any example. Nonetheless, without any originality, but not without any less *originarity*, even more, with the supplementary difference of any origin, one might break through the origin: by the breach that text may create, by breaking up and suspending the authority of beginning and by transgressing the preliminary limit of origin as beginning.

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For example, though unwillingly, one would be giving the example, by the example, and by saying: *for example*. By saying “for example” and by *the* saying “for example”, even before the example and before any beginning with an example, the originality of the example disrupts itself by and in that prefix, which is “for”. One should perhaps suspend any relation of the example to its prefixes. Then the difference between an *example-in-itself* and an *example-for-itself* would be the theme, that is to say, supposed position of any thematic subject — let alone the subject of this text.

But, even before this thematization and position of the example, not *for* the example, not *in* the example, but through the example, and supposedly (as the greek term *para-deigma* evokes) *next to* example, and to put it simply (although in its complex references), *by* the example, example may bring forth its difference, the difference which is never its own — it can bring through, namely differ (as in greek term *dia-pherein*) the exemplarity of difference, by the examples that Derrida exemplifies in his texts, or, by Derridean examples, or, one should say maybe, by *Derrida-examples*. Yet for the moment, even in any moment, *Derrida* will be hanging upon the differential and referential relation (that he consistently insists while referring to exemplary texts posing the exemplarity of the example), and not without any reference to *hanging on to life*

[*survivre*] both qua example as model and example as sample. But first, before any beginning, before any position or supposition, one can propose to hang on.]

Exemplarity of the Text

Hanging about at the limits of Edgar Allan Poe's *Purloined Letter*, Derrida asks: "For example the truth. But the truth, is it an example? What happens – and whence? – when a text, an admittedly literary fiction – but is it still an example? – put the truth in the scene?"⁵. This letter, for example in *Facteur de la vérité* [Purveyor of Truth], while exposing the truth, while posing it in its purloined bareness, in the veiled transparency of an untold disclosure, serves to psychoanalysis with the exemplarity of metaphors through usage of the text – the text that posits the letter as an example. The exhibition of truth takes place in this "scene" on which the literary text brings its exemplarity through metaphors. For, after all, Derrida claims: "Exhibition or to render nude" is the "metaphor of truth"⁶.

Although not barely special to a decisive answer about the literary example, Derrida specifies, insofar as it concerns the scene of truth, that "a text is found in another [text]"⁷. For, "Psychoanalysis finds – all that it finds – in the text that it deciphers"⁸. But, before any exemplary *factor* of truth, before even the *exemplariness* of the *Facteur de La Vérité* as a text in which another text exhibits itself in an exemplarity, before the *Purloined Letter* as an example of this exemplariness, before any letter, or before the letter [*avant la lettre*], one can ask, if there is an exemplarity in writing, and if there is one, what this exemplarity brings forth the example of?

In the example of Husserl, for instance, in the *Origin of Geometry*, all along the introduction, Derrida insists upon the exemplariness of the geometry for Husserl. "It is here again, a matter of the status of the ideal objects of science – of which the geometry is an example"⁹. This "exemplary text"¹⁰ seems to yield the "privileged example"¹¹ in that, the consciousness taken by this particular eidetic science "will reveal us exemplarily the conditions and the sense of the historicity of science in general, and then the universal historicity as the latest

⁵ Jacques Derrida, *La carte postale. De Socrate à Freud et au-delà*, Flammarion, Paris, 1980, 442.

⁶ Ibid., 443

⁷ Ibid., 446.

⁸ Ibid., 448.

⁹ Jacques Derrida, "Introduction", in *L'origine de la géométrie*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1995, 3.

¹⁰ Ibid., 5.

¹¹ Ibid., 6.

horizon of every sense and every objectivity in general”¹². This historicity seems to be provided by particular moments in which the “experience” of a factual appearance, namely of a phenomenal reality poses an existence, not to give by this experience as experience¹³ the sense and the transcendental origin of the eidetic object as geometry, but to provide a particular example in which a reduction for an eidetic intuition is possible, and by which is yielded “the example model which orients the culture as its ideal”¹⁴. As “sample and model”¹⁵, example, namely the example of the historicity in which the eidetic and invariable object appears, is also the example of a transcendentially constructed ideal for the sciences. Any cultural example (as sample), say Galilee, with its exemplarity, will suffice to constitute this transcendental relation of geometry to its origin (as model) by the language that signifies the objects of science. Factual existence of an example is necessary in order to construct the non-real but transcendental objectivity of science. And this relation is possible only by writing:

Not only the possibility or the necessity of being incarnated in a graph is no more extrinsic and factitious with regard to ideal objectivity: it is the objective *sine qua non* of its internal completion. As long as it is not engraved in the world, or rather as long as it can't be, as long as it is not in the position of lending itself to an incarnation, which, in the purity of its sense, is more than a signalisation or clothing, the ideal objectivity is not completely constituted. The act of writing is therefore the highest possibility of all “constitution”. The transcendental depth of its historicity is measured by this.¹⁶

This constitution necessitates the *incarnation*, hence the *incorporation* and *corporality* of the sign in order to consign it to the intersubjective sense¹⁷. Yet this corporality of the written sign is not exemplary in that it is a sensible example of “individual events in space and time”¹⁸. According to this, “phenomenology of the written thing” takes the corporeal sign into a chain of “more or less ideal and necessary” significations. The moment the written thing necessitating the corporality of the written sign appears as a *non-sensible example*, an example of “a more or less ideality and necessity” for the phenomenology, Derrida evokes the *exemplary* status of the non-literary productions of cultural formations in the relation of the *exemplar* to the

¹² Ibid., 14.

¹³ Ibid., 28.

¹⁴ Ibid., 47.

¹⁵ Ibid., 120.

¹⁶ Ibid., 86.

¹⁷ Ibid., 93.

¹⁸ Ibid., 94

archetype, namely, of the sample to the ideal model, and points out to a citation of Husserl in *Erfahrung und Urteil*:

Thus, the *Faust* of Goethe has its event in so many real books you want, which are called the exemplars of *Faust* (It is a book inasmuch as it is produced by men and determined in the aim of reading: already in itself, it is not purely a-thing-being [*chosale*], but a determination of signification!). This spiritual sense that determines the work of art, the spiritual formation as such, is indeed incorporated in the real [*réal - chosal*] world, but it is not individualised by the incorporation.¹⁹

This spiritual formation which constitutes the object of art beyond corporality, and that, no less than as an ideal object of science, is that which gives the transcendental ideality its possibility of incorporation in a factual instance of historicity, through which this question of Derrida finds its significance: “What is the facticity of the fact that suppose the exemplarity of the fact?” Or even: ‘What is the originary unity of the sense and fact alone, of which neither of them can give an account’²⁰. The significance of this question in Husserl’s phenomenology, with regards to authentic sense of the “being as history”, and with regards to delay of the thought of pure consciousness over philosophy, appears for Derrida, in the *living present*: “This alterity of the absolute origin appearing structurally in my *living present*, and being able to appear and to be recognised in the originarity of something like *my living present*, this signifies the authenticity of the delay and of the phenomenological limitation”²¹. For “it is *present* only by differing unceasingly”, by “giving itself in an originary and pure consciousness of the *difference*” [our italic]²².

It seems then that the exemplarity of the historicity of the transcendental sciences relies upon a sense of being that presents itself in its difference, which exhibits itself on the delay of the presence to itself. Presence is “unceasingly differed” as a living present. Life of the present is that it is something which is more than the corporal existence of the written example; yet, on the other hand, the exemplarity of the history as the sense of being is constituted only by this exemplarity of the presence — living presence. Whence the difference of the example as sample to the example as model. And the exemplarity is of life — thus the *différance* is of life.

¹⁹ Ibid., 89.

²⁰ Ibid., 168.

²¹ Ibid., 170.

²² Ibid., 171.

Example without Example

The relation of writing to life and presence is exemplified in another text by Derrida. Again a text finds itself in another text. In the *Pharmacy of Plato*, Derrida shows that according to Plato *logos* is considered “like a living being [*hōsper zoōn*]”, as “having its own body”²³. And as to the *pharmakon*, this metaphor of writing, it substitutes “a breathless sign for the living voice”²⁴. Derrida, after pointing to *pharmakon*’s another connotation as “paint”²⁵, cites Plato:

I think, Phaedrus, that the strange thing (*deinon*) about writing, is that it has also many resemblances with the painting (*homoion zōgraphiai*). For this reason, the entities begotten by the latter make semblant of living entities (*hōs zōnta*) but if one asks them questions, they show off (*semnōs*) and shut up! It is the same with written words...²⁶

This quote brings forth the distinction between *mnēmē* and *hypomnēsis*, between “knowledge as memory and non-knowledge as remembrance[...], a repetition of truth (*alētheia*) which offers to sight and exposes the *eidōs*, and a repetition of death and oblivion (*lēthē*)”²⁷. But in the end, Derrida announces: “Writing is not the living repetition of the living”²⁸.

The truth is the truth of (the) life [*zoē*] that excludes the repetition of the representation and re-presence of the *zoē* through writing. For writing is “weakened speech, something not completely dead: a living dead, a reprieved corpse, a deferred life, a semblance of breathe”²⁹. Then the truth of life excludes also, in an interiorizing movement, the representation through image, which is also another connotation of the Greek word *zoē*. “Writing thus more seriously denatures what it claims to imitate. It does not even substitute an image for its model”³⁰.

So this substitute life, or, as it can be witnessed in the example of platonic eidetic life of *alētheia*, the *zoē*, this life as *zoē* (or image) is, in the instance of *pharmakon* that writing is, not a *paradeigma* of *eidōs*. Eidetic *zoē* as the truth of life does not exemplify the truth of *zoē* as writing and painting. Still, the truth in painting can be exemplified in another example.

²³ Jacques Derrida, *La dissémination*, Seuil, Paris, 1972, 98.

²⁴ Ibid., 111.

²⁵ Ibid., 160.

²⁶ Ibid., 169-70.

²⁷ Ibid., 168.

²⁸ Ibid., 169.

²⁹ Ibid., 179.

³⁰ Ibid., 171.

The Truth in Painting, as another exemplary text of Derrida's about the example, takes the *parergon* as the example of beauty in Kant, by means of "an example among examples, the clothing on statues"³¹. Derrida makes it clear: *parergon*, one of the senses of which is ornament, pertains, in this exemplary text of Kant, to a part entitled "clarifications by examples"³². Yet, Derrida offers for that example of Kantian beauty a painting in which columns as examples of the *sublime* are depicted as ornaments (namely *parergon*) of this painting. An example of the colossal *sublime* (in form of column) thus coincides with an example of *parergonal* beauty, both transposed in each other — transposing the position of exemplarity. Then, one may ask what the example of the *sublime* in Kant can be? It is, according to Kant, the law that is given "perhaps" in the "most *sublime* passage" — that of the *Old Testament* — which prohibits to depict: "You shall not make any graven image for yourself, nor the likeness of anything which is in heaven or on the earth or under the earth, etc."³³. This *sublime* law that prohibits to depict finds its example, this time, in the unveiling of the truth, more exactly in the truth of presence that one reads in the inscription on the temple of Isis, and about which Kant says that "nothing more *sublime* has ever been said" — it reads thus: "I am all that is, that was, and that will be, and no mortal has lifted my veil"³⁴.

So the image of truth as the image *qua* presence is prohibited by the law. This law is given as an example of the *sublime*. Nevertheless, reversely but reciprocally, the example of the moral law, as it is explained in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, is given through these "sublime feelings" that respect and admiration are deemed to be. Accordingly, one respects the law through the examples of it, through the respect and admiration to person who applies the law in its practicability, though without taking the person as the law itself³⁵. Yet when one asks what the example of the moral law that one must follow is, it seems, as Derrida puts it in its seminar *Le respect* (1980-81), that it is an *example without example*:

Without example: It is what just Kant says us about the person as a given example, as gift of the example, it even signifies that the example operates as example of the without example,

³¹ Jacques Derrida, *La vérité en peinture*, Flammarion, Paris, 1978, 66.

³² *Ibid.*, 79.

³³ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (P. Guyer, E. Matthews, Tr.), Cambridge University Press, New York, 2000, 156.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 194.

³⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* (M. Gregor, Tr.) (14th Ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015, 70.

example without example, as the example which subtracts itself from itself by giving itself.³⁶

Derrida infers: even God is an example without an example³⁷. But when, in the *Ends of Man*, Derrida refers to the Kantian anthropology in the sense that in it, “man is the only example”³⁸ for an idea of humanity that is founded on reason alone, and when the “exemplary being” of *Dasein* makes itself explicit in the same *ground* that puts man in an ontical proximity which renders it ontologically farthest from itself³⁹, does not the exemplarity of the example (be it man, *logos*, or science) find itself in another example? Not in the example without example but in the example of example?

Conclusion: Example of the Exemplarity

When the history, not as the (Husserlian) reduction of the exemplar to an exemplariness of the ideal object in an exemplary epoch and *epokhē*, but as the reduction of *the* example to *an* example with the delay and difference of the presence over life, finds in an exemplary position what Derrida reprieves and defers with the *ends of man*, namely its exemplary being, then the same history may appear, maybe in a postponed and unprepared question, as the *epochality* of the example of *life*, be it used By Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, Jean-luc Nancy, Alain Badiou and in many more contemporary examples⁴⁰ — and what is

³⁶ Jacques Derrida, *Séminaire Le respect* (7th seance) [unpublished seminar], Jacques Derrida papers. MS-C001. Special Collections and Archives, The UC Irvine Libraries, Irvine, California, 4. In the original typescript: “*Sans Exemple: cela même que Kant nous dit de la personne comme exemple donné, comme don de l'exemple, cela même signifie que l'exemple opère comme exemple du sens exemple, exemple sans exemple, l'exemple se soustrayant de lui-même en se donnant*”.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

³⁸ Jacques Derrida, *Marges de la philosophie*, Minuit, Paris, 1972, 146.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 152.

⁴⁰ In Michel Foucault, the question concerning life cannot be restricted to the aspect of his studies on biopolitics. It already stems from his early researches on the discursive analysis of the human sciences. Although the *human sciences* seem to counterweight any probable importance of another problematic in *Les mots et les choses* [Order of Things], life, with production and language, constitutes already one of the epistemic formations of the western paradigm of knowledge on the human subject in the passage to 19th century. (For a detailed discussion, it will be necessary to delineate the problematization of life in the last chapter of *Les mots et les choses*). Cf. Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses. Une archéologie des sciences humaines*, Gallimard, Paris, 1966, 355-398.

As to Agamben, the importance of the paradigm of life would not be emphasized less — just to mention the link constructed between the Aristotelian definition of *zoē* and the bare life, which is central to the paradigm of *homo sacer*, namely the life that is exposed to death without nonetheless ever being sacrificed. Cf. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita*, Giulio Einaudi editore, Torino, 1995, 112.

an example if it does not always bear the question of the contemporary and the contemporaneity of the question⁴¹? —, be it deconstructed by the Derridean examples or not. Is not this Derridean position an epochal example (like for instance “The Epoch of Rousseau”, a chapter in *Of Grammatology*, suggests its relation with the problem of exemplarity)⁴²? Is not it an epochal and (as the greek *epokhē* means) suspended — through the exemplary texts of Derrida — and hanging — on the edge of this text itself — example, namely an exemplary example that Derrida exhibits throughout the text, at least by the examples given here? Is not *life* as the exemplarity of the *différance*, as the example of example that differs and delays the presence of philosophy, is not it the example of the exemplarity in Derrida?

And if this epochal relation refers not only to those examples of exemplariness positioned in the difference between speech and writing, being and history, ontological and ontical, origin and supplement, but also to the position of the *exemplarity* between *différance* and its (Derridean) examples such as *pharmakon*, *hymen*, or *parergon*, then would not life both as the difference of

In Nancy, the being-already-sacrificed-of-life makes the life unsacrificable. That is the thesis of “l’insacrifiable [the insacrificable]”. Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, “Insacrifiable”, in *Une pensée finie*, Paris: Galilée, 1990.

Finally but not lastly, for Badiou, the philosophical question must reorient itself to life by asking the Platonic question: what is a life worth living? Cf. Alain Badiou, *Logiques des mondes*, Paris: Seuil, 2006, 529-37.

Including Derrida too, all the aforementioned examples of philosophers who put forth the question of life do so in a paradigmatic way, in the sense that, although they have different usages and conceptualizations concerning the question, life has an exemplary position. This exemplarity depends on the gesture that paradigmaticizes the life. Only with Derrida, it seems that the paradigmaticity of the concept of life exhorts itself — meaning the text and writing itself — as to its position on the paradigmaticity of life. That’s why, one may say, in Derrida the question concerning life takes the form of exemplarity, not paradigmaticity.

⁴¹ The contemporaneity of the question takes suspension of the question as its companion. The epochality of the question that sustains itself not by giving answers, but always by postponing the remnants and revenants of already deferred questions, is just its contemporaneity with the spectres of the past (to come) [à-venir]. In one of the many exemplary junctions concerning life, in the one that Derrida prepares to convoke the spectres of Marx, in *Spectres of Marx*, the question of life is reanimated, but without being reincorporated in an answer. The corpse of the problem of life is provoked in a question concerning “learning” — for one would be prepared to learn from spectres life. So life becomes suspended in questions. In questions that are contemporary of the spectres: “Learning to live [apprendre à vivre]. Strange watchword. Who will learn? From who? Teaching to live [apprendre à vivre], but to whom? Can we ever [saura-t-on jamais]? Can we ever know to live [saura-t-on jamais vivre], and firstly what it means to learn/teach to live [apprendre à vivre]?”. Cf. Jacques Derrida, *Spectres de Marx: L’état de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle internationale*, Paris: Galilée, 1993, 13.

⁴² Cf. Jacques Derrida, *De la grammatologie*, Minuit, Paris, 1967, 145: “What for granting an exemplary value to the epoch of Rousseau”.

zoē from *presence* and of living present from history, would not *zoē* as life be epochal, namely exemplary: not to evade and efface itself “like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea”⁴³, but to defer itself, maybe, like the epochal example of an epoch and an *epokhē*, always sustainable and suspend-able in its difference — not to disappear but to deconstruct itself? An *epokhē* hanged upon the example of life, the example as life.

Maybe then one day life, as an image, as a philosophical image, will find itself at the limits not only of humanity but also of the text, the examples of which this text tries to deconstruct or differ — *for example*.

⁴³ Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses. Une archéologie des sciences humaines*, Gallimard, Paris, 1966, 398.

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