

AIRPORTS AS HETEROTOPIAS: POLITICS AND RESISTANCE UNDER DISCIPLINARY POWER

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ABSTRACT

The private/public space dichotomy still holds a significant place in the Western political thought tradition. Hannah Arendt's idealization of the distinction of the private and public realms in the Ancient Greek polis is no doubt one which essentializes the location with a strict division providing the possibility of the politics and resistance. However, there are certain spaces such as airports moving beyond the classical distinction. Then this paper modifies Arendt's strict distinction of private/public by focusing on airports as heterotopias. The article admits international airports as heterotopic spaces by following Foucault's heterotopia and his insight of modern power under the discussion of disciplinary society. This Foucauldian modification of space is presented with the Scene I within the framework of disciplinary power. Even though the Foucauldian insight of power illustrates how it functions by producing and shaping subjects through the assemblage of strategies and techniques, it is limited in terms of the emergence of resistance and politics. By reading the Scene II from Bakhtin's carnival notion, the article with the argues that there are other spaces beyond private and public spaces in which politics as well as resistance can occur spaces beyond public by benefiting Jacques Rancière's notion of politics as the disruption of the order.

Key words: private/public space, airports, heterotopia, carnival, disciplinary power, disruption.

HETEROTOPYA ALANLARI OLARAK HAVAALANLARI: DİSİPLİN EDİCİ İKTİDAR ALTINDA POLİTİKA VE DİRENİŞ

ÖZ

Özel alan-kamusal alan ayrımına ilişkin tartışmalar Batı siyasal düşüncesindeki önemini korumaktadır. Bu tartışmalara sunulan katkılardan en önemlilerinden biri kuşkusuz Hannah Arendt'in mekânı, siyasetin ve direnişin, yani, söylev ve faaliyetin olanaklılığını sağlayan katı bir ayrımla özelleştiren Antik Yunan polisindeki özel ve kamusal alan ayrımı idealleştirmesidir. Gelgelim çağdaş siyaset dünyasında, havaalanları gibi kimi alanlar bu klasik ayrımın ötesine geçer. İşte bu makalede, havaalanlarına heterotopik alanlar olarak odaklanılarak Arendt'in özel ve kamusal alanlar arasında yaptığı katı ayrımın tadil edilmesi hedeflenmektedir. Bunun için, Michel Foucault'nun *Öteki Mekanlara Dair* makalesi bağlamında uluslararası havaalanları heterotopik mekanlar olarak kavramsallaştırılmakta ve disiplin toplumu tartışması kapsamında geliştirdiği modern iktidar anlayışı çerçevesinde disipline edici iktidar Sahne I üzerinden tartışılmaktadır. Ne var ki Foucaultcu iktidar anlayışı, iktidarın çeşitli strateji ve tekniklerle yoluyla nasıl özneleri üreterek ve biçimlendirerek işlediğini gösteren önemli bir kavrayış oluştursa da direnişin ve politikanın belirliğini açıklamakta sınırlı kalmaktadır. Bakhtin'in karnaval kavramı üzerinden okunabilecek Sahne II ile makale, özel/kamusal alanlar dışında başka alanların da olduğunu ve kamusal alanın dışında da direniş ve politik olanın olanaklılığı, Jacques Rancière'in düzenin kesintiye uğraması olarak politika nosyonuna başvurularak tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: özel/kamusal alan, karnaval, havaalanları, heterotopya, disipline edici iktidar, kesinti.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Whatever the term -like *oikos, res publica*, private/public space or sphere- is attributed to, it is still relevance in political theory regarding themes like political debate and action, free and critical debate, and privacy (Benhabib, 1992). Private/public dichotomy is still one of the long and highly contested subjects in the tradition of Western political thought. The dichotomy has been diversely interpreted by various approaches, disciplines, and methodologies even within the disciplines. Despite their point of differences in their search of ideal democratic political space, Arendt is no doubt a key political theorist among many contributed to the debate on the private and public space dichotomy what I call the classical dichotomy. In her formula while Arendt treats the Greek distinction as ideal one, the article claims that the Arendtian formulation features not only spatial but also discursive boundaries of the public/private. In this paper, I argue that there are certain spaces that cannot be easily located into the private and public dichotomy in relation to the spatial and discursive characteristics. I contend that there are certain practices and actions in such places which do not simply fall into the classical dichotomy and its attributed characteristics. To say in the Arendtian sense of dichotomy, some spaces may fit well into both private and public space distinction; however, the very same spaces can be neither private nor public.

Think about a ship, an aircraft, or an airport. These spaces are difficult ones to conceptualize within boundaries of the Arendtian public/private realm and the practices/acts realizing in them. Even a simple question like what an airport is in relation to public/private distinction confuses our imagination about the public and private spaces. Shortly, is an airport private space or a public space? Certainly, the answer does not have to be a strict yes or no since there are some spaces that do not fit into the classical dichotomy. Accordingly, this article is three-folded: first, it contends that the strict dichotomy of private/public articulated by Arendt is spatially and discursively limited to understand other spaces like airports and politics occurring in such spaces like airports. I then suggest that Foucault's *heterotopia* notion is appropriate in approaching spaces that can be neither public nor private, and both private and public to overcome the spatiality issue loosely approached by the classical dichotomy. For Foucault, heterotopia as a space is "in relation with other sites, but in such a way to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect" (Foucault, 1986: 24). In this article, I use the term in the sense of both between and beyond public and private space. However, the term heterotopia's adoption does only cover the issue of spatiality in relation to the public/private distinction with no reference to the political

action and speech realizing within such spaces. Second, I bring two different scenes on airports as heterotopia. The reason in bringing two scenes from airports at play is to illustrate that even though these scenes seem to be exception of daily life and politics, they are increasingly becoming part of daily life and politics with a lesser possibility of resistance and a greater chance of surveillance. In doing so, the Scene 1 discusses the extreme surveillance and control techniques and technologies at the airports from Foucault's analysis of disciplinary power. The third pillar of the article is to bring the Scene 2 in line with Bakhtin's carnival-grotesque image in order to problematize the disciplinary power approach due to its restriction on the possibility of resistance and politics. Regarding the Scene 2 presented below, I purport that the Foucauldian disciplinary power analysis can be modified by following Rancière's notion of politics as the disruption of any subjects against the established police order to argue that there are such spaces, airports as heterotopias beyond private/public dichotomy. This is to say that even though the Foucauldian disciplinary power is at work in its operation, there is possibility of politics and resistance through the disruption of the order.

It is within this context that the article consists of four sections as follows. The following section discusses the Arendtian public/private dichotomy to reconsider the conceptualization regarding heterotopic spaces like airports. The claim is that some spaces such as airports cannot be easily located into the classical dichotomy. Section three, which portrays airports as heterotopic spaces by following Foucault's article *Of Other Spaces*, includes two different cases. The first case is from the Istanbul Ataturk Airport which presents how the disciplinary power is at work through technologies, strategies, and techniques. The second case is a Bakhtian carnival-grotesque realism that portrays the possibility of politics and resistance. It brings Berlin-Tegel and Portland Airport protests to argue that subjects are not always docile bodies reproduced and shaped by the disciplinary power. Rather, they are subjects who can disrupt the established order and oppose to the *police* as the "partition of the sensible" (Rancière, 2001). The last section is the concluding remark of the article.

2. The private and public dichotomy in Hannah Arendt

Heterotopic spaces pose a challenge to the classical public/private dichotomy. In this section, the paper lays out the spatial tendency of the Arendtian distinction by documenting the key

characteristics of what public and private spaces correspond to. While some scholars argue that most societies considered “modern” have successfully separated the public space from the private (Weintraub, 1997), some are inclined to underline the public space with the idea of the privatization, loss, or end (Sennett, 2002; Mitchell, 1995). What does the public/private dichotomy correspond to? Does each signify spatially and discursively certain features in terms of the possibility of politics and resistance?

In the light questions presented above, I postulate that Arendt’s strict dichotomy signifies the spatial character as well as the deeds within the spatial boundaries of the private and public space (Debarbieux, 2017). In *Human Condition* Arendt attempts to provide a phenomenological depiction of what she sees three activities of human beings as crucial for their existence. She signals out the term *vita activa* corresponding to three human activities which are labor, work, and action (Arendt, 1998: 7-9). Each activity corresponds to the certain aspect of human existence. While labor stands for the vital biological necessities such as eating, drinking, biological reproduction, etc., and work that is distinct from natural environment designates artificial artifacts produced through worldly human activities. Action, on the other hand, as the human condition of plurality, speech and political activity, as well as capacity of human beings to start something new (Birmingham, 2011), is the one that distinguishes human beings as political animal (ibid.). In other words, Arendt identifies public domain as the “world of appearances” is the integral component of being human (Gordon, 2002). This is the spatial dimension of the classical dichotomy. As Arendt argues that this sort categorization of human activities depends upon the categorical distinction of space where *vita activa* takes place. In other words, *vita activa* is, first of all, spatially organized with the distinction of private space and public space distinction. In this spatial organization, while labor and work are associated with the private domain of human existence, *action* realizes within the domain of the public as the most distinguished human condition with features of plurality and appearance as what distinguishes human beings from other creatures. Arendt adheres to the organization of the Greek *polis* which is based on the strict distinction between private and public space. According to the spatial organization of *polis*, the *oikos*, i.e., household is the private realm where biological needs served and met as well as the reproduction of worldly artifacts. Then, activities conducted by women and slaves leads to the containment of slaves and women into the borders of household. The containment of women and slaves in the

private realm in return provides a room for masters of households to appear and to display *action* as autonomous citizens at the public space (Calhoun, 1992). Thus, public space functions as the realm of participation, equality, appearance, and freedom. In other words, the realization of *action* depends upon the existence of the labor and work to be restricted in private space. The containment of biological necessities and violence within the boundaries of household leads *action* to be displayed and revealed in *polis* in dealing with the political/public matters. Arendt's attempt of the separation between private and public space aims to distinguish what the political is from the private and social activities by associating the public realm with the political.

If labor and work feature certain activities conducted at the private space, what sort of features does action revealed at the public space have? In other words, what makes the action as well as public space special in Arendt's thought? I contend that the question is linked to the discursive dimension in which action and speech matter within the spatial boundaries of the private/public space. Arendt (1998: 50) associates the realm of public with the appearance in which to appear requires to "be seen and heard by others". Beside the existence of others which underlines the plurality, while being seen requires the existence of others, i.e., a plural environment, being heard by others also necessitates one's speech irrelevant to the private matters in the domain plurality. Then, Arendt arrives a point of speech and plurality as key characteristics of the public domain in which plurality gains the relevance through the deed and speech of singular individuals/citizens (Barbour & Zolkos, 2011). For their realization, they need to be free from the deeds of private realm which are left to shoulders of slaves and women; then one can freely appear and display *action*. Public space refers to "live together" by gathering free citizens, and by both separating and relating them in matters of permanence and "authentic concern with immortality" (Arendt, 1998: 54-55). The condition for permanence and immortality lies in action and speech which should be unforgettable, recognizable with excellence, fame, heroism, and greatness as a remark in history. Action as heroic and remarkable deed leads one to be immortal through the course of history. Then, action what Arendt sees as the distinguished feature of public space, signals out the realm of politics and reality where debates freely appear and the visibility is a requirement for politics as well as resistance (Gordon, 2002) Something has to be new like the natality and initiative and unexpected to be seen as action by Arendt (Pitkin, 2000). This is to say that not every issue is the matter of public realm including family relations and issues related to the household.

The Arendtian idealization of action as public display and political in its nature is closely related to her critique of modernity and modern age. The ideal division of public and private in the polis has been lost under modernity with what she calls “the rise of social” (Arendt, 1998). Therefore the political has lost its true meaning through the concerns related to the private domain due to the domination of market in which the social, for Arendt, is “neither a private nor public” in the sense of Ancients; rather, a “new phenomenon” of the modern age (Arendt, 1998, p. 28). The reign of social over almost every dimension of life is a “negative account” due to the transformation of “the agonistic political space of the Greek *polis*” from the one we have been today experiencing (Benhabib,1992: 75). This pessimism underlines of what the political is to be as the way of living in *polis* through speech with words, and therefore through persuasion rather than force and violence (Arendt, 1998: 26-30). The decline of public or political with the elimination of *action* due to the rise of social has transformed the domain of violence and force from private or household to today’s blurry public domain by making them the property of governments. Arendt’s distinction and idealization of that distinction hardly make sense for what she critically used *moderns* (Pitkin, 2000). The essence of public as plurality and freedom has been blurred with the rise of capitalism and consumerism, or social, leading to the loss of reasoned speech and politics.

The strict private/public dichotomy restricts the resistance and action since both resistance and action belong to the public space in Arendt’s thought. The action and speech to be political should discursively matter for the public in which subjects concerning private realm is excluded from Arendt’s formulation of action. In other words, should an activity to be seen as politics occur spatially and discursively designated realm? The question refers to certain limitation of the strict dichotomy in finding a room for possible resistance at spaces beyond private/public dichotomy, i.e., heterotopic spaces. The following section discusses the possibilities of other spaces, i.e., airports as heterotopias as well as possibility of action there as opposed to the strict Arendtian dichotomy.

3. Airports as Spaces of heterotopia

This strict division leads firstly to neglect the possibilities of ‘other spaces’, and secondly to designate each space as property of some, i.e., private as the realm of women and slaves, and public as the appearance of the free citizens. However, there are spaces which can be both private and

public space, and/or that can be neither private nor public. Not only spatial boundaries are difficult to situate, but also actions within the boundaries of such spaces cannot be easily located into the Arendtian private and public conceptualization. I argue that the existence of such spaces as heterotopias, and actions occurring within there cannot be easily explained through the strict dichotomy or the rise of social as what Arendt articulated.

Think of an airport as a site is more than a location of transportation. How can we locate airports into private/public debate based on the Arendtian account? I think that Foucault's lecture "Of Other Spaces" is stimulating to locate airport as a site of the juxtaposition, the near and far, side-by-side, and the dispersed. In the lecture Foucault speaks of the twentieth century as the epoch of space which is "the form of relations among sites" and simultaneity rather than the history in the nineteenth century (Foucault, 1986: 22-23). Foucault sees the space we live as "a set of relations that delineate sites which are irreducible ...and not superimposable on one another" (ibid.: 23). A set of relations can give clues in describing the features of different sites. Foucault is interested in other spaces: utopias which reflect perfection with no real existence and heterotopias which are contrast to utopias by having "mixed, joint experience" with utopias. What makes these spaces intriguing is that even though they are "in relation with all other sites", they "suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror or reflect" (ibid.: 23).

Foucault provides six main principles of heterotopias by proposing heterotopias as contrary to non-real character of utopias. The principles of heterotopias are apt to airports in terms of their certain web of relations, different functions over time and from one site to another, the different perception of time at airports, distinct sites within the space, the system of inclusion and exclusion, and relations of the spaces that are outside of heterotopias by creating both real and illusory (Foucault, 1986). These principles are, for me, valuable examples on heterotopic spaces as challenges to the classical dichotomy. For instance, the second principle regards the change in functions of heterotopias in time as well as from one site to another with a web of relationships. Considering airports, they were simply built as the sites of transportation where aircrafts take off and land. Incumbents and employees are in extreme motivation to fulfil their duties. Passengers in a hurry come and go by being dissociated from the traditional time. Every step is arranged in accordance to the flight.

There is much more to these constructions in which not only they are sites of mobility, but also they are a laboratory form and technique of surveillance and discipline as the concentration of power with an absolute “complexity, speed and mobility”, as well as technologies of control and body checks (Lisle, 2003: 4). Today, as we cannot imagine an airport without shopping malls with duty free zone, airports involve distinct sites within their borders in which each site is incompatible to another. More concretely, we find an assemblage of market like casinos, museums, spa hotels, renting firms, shopping malls in which this transformation signals out the neoliberal shift in governance through the privatization of many sites in it (Salter, 2007). The meaning of airport has transformed into more than movement of passengers. In other words, it connotes not simply the site of transportation and movement, but also the site of commercialization and management by turning into a vast industry (Graham, 2008). Then, airports juxtapose three types of sites: a site of the extremities of control and surveillance, a site of leisure activities, and a site of transportation. As Salter (2007) claims that airports are both an example of confessionary society and the sites of multiple governmentalities in which governmentality refers to “the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of the very specific complex form of power” (Foucault, 1991: 102).

The Scene I: Istanbul Ataturk Airport

From the perspective of Foucauldian disciplinary power, airports present extremities of surveillance and control sites in which governmentalities function to produce docile bodies who are ready to do anything ordered by the security officers. Passengers as docile bodies who are disciplined through the assemblage of techniques are convinced to do anything due to the inflicted fear arriving from the international via airports like terror. They are persuaded to be docile passengers who are, apart from shopping at duty free zones and killing time at spa hotels, banned from doing some activities even making jokes about some issues like bombs or guns; otherwise the result can be arrest or detainment (Martin, 2010). For instance, the United States Transportation Security Administration states that “making jokes or statements regarding bombs and/or threats during the screening process may be grounds for both civil and criminal penalties and could cause you to miss your flight” (Martin, 2010: 17). There are two incidents on how making ‘dangerous’ jokes -the one is a humorist Samantha Marson’s joke about bombs and the other is Rosalind Baez’s bomb joke under screening- can pose a problem for passengers is revealing.

In relation to Foucault's confessionary society, Salter (2007) makes the claim on airports as the "confessionary complexes" in which subjects are also ready to tell anything they are asked by the professionals by avoiding anything suspicious gestures leading their detention or ban from the mobility. Passengers should be ready to reply the questions including personal information and the purpose of trip in addition to travel documents like visa, hotel reservation, financial status, and so on. This is to say that having a passport and other documents may not be enough, the traveller should persuade the border securities to move one step forward. In its aim of facilitating speed and mobility, international airports exclude individuals who do not have access to the passport and failed ones to obtain the visa. Even if an individual has a passport, there are restricted zones not to be entered at the international airports. It pinpoints the illusory aspect of airports which is ideally constructed for mobility; however, it imposes immobility of the unwanted and undesirable ones like the poor, criminals, and so on. The Scene 1 belongs the experience of refugee that I witnessed during my fieldwork on the journeys of refugees in 2015, Istanbul. Accordingly, Hassan X applied for asylum in Turkey by fleeing Iraq. After spending several years in Turkey his case was accepted by UNHCR and his file was sent to the US authorities for examination to be resettled to the United States due to Turkey's geographical restriction. Based on Turkey's restriction, the country does not guarantee refugee status for applicants who are non-European country of origin. After the examination the US accepted Hassan's settlement to the country. Up until this point, there are several filtering mechanisms at work: Turkey's border control, UNHCR's interrogation in determining refugee status, and the US examination for eligibility of individual's resettlement. This is a clear illustration how the border is deterritorialized by extending it into the boundaries of Turkey through certain interrogations as well as examinations in the process of inclusion of the desirable and exclusion of the undesirable. The resettlement refugees who have been cleared from examinations of the UNHCR and resettlement countries like the United States, Canada and Australia were escorted by the IOM Turkey to the Ataturk airport to take the flight to their countries of resettlement. Hassan whose travel documents were handed by the IOM at the airport was stopped at the main security point of the aircraft to the US. Apparently, the inclusionary exclusion power in which a person is included to the site to be excluded, is at play at the airport by banning Hassan with a warning from US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) system as a potential security risk for the country.

The tragedy was not only the ban of Hassan from the plane. Rather, as he already passed to the international zone within the airport he could not return to site where IOM officers had left him. Therefore, he had to stay overnight at the international zone until the close examination of the case. When I asked the IOM fieldworker regarding the case, he informed me that he had only been held up on a misunderstanding—it was another Hassan that was on the CBP list as a potential risk—and that he had been able to continue on his travels the very next day. The surveillance technology that I witnessed in Hassan’s case is indicative of the proliferation of security concerns within the rise of *governmental unease* after the 9/11, functioning as “a type of ban-opticon dispositive” (Bigo, 2008, p. 10).

Thus, in fulfilling its function of connecting domestic to the international and domestic itself airports do also carry and mirror the significant features of the contemporary politics of exclusion and inclusion for the sake of public which should be defended, politics of constant anxiety and fear from the outside/outsider and foreign/foreigner (Salter, 2007). Airports serve not only to transport passengers from domestic to international, but also play the role of ban-opticon with the latest surveillance and body scan technologies to prevent the possible threats who may have infectious diseases like the recent new type Coronavirus case or whose name may appear on the black list of customs and border protection agencies. Scene 1 presents an example on how international airports function as sites of the surveillance, externalization of borders, multiple governmentalities, and spaces of inclusion and exclusion. I agree with Nancy Fraser (1981) that it is limited in a sense how certain subjects can move beyond the discursive practices formulated through power relations. Therefore, it is limited in grasping the possibility of alternative politics as well as resistance to the power. The question of whether there is a room for any resistance at such scene is discussed in the Scene II.

The Scene II: Naked Bodies against Scanners

Following Arendt’s private/public dichotomy and Foucault’s disciplinary power poses a certain restriction on the occurrence of politics at heterotopic spaces. Even though Foucault contends the possibility of resistance in the exercise of power within a web of power relations, his analysis in disciplinary power in a way freezes conditions for the resistance of subjects due to firstly subjects’ transformation and formation through power and its techniques, and second, Foucault’s suspension

of normative claims.² Considering Foucault's analysis of power and disciplinary power which produces docile bodies through distinct techniques and governmentalities, I agree with Nancy Fraser's (1981) position on the normative ambiguities, related to the genealogical method used by Foucault, in the description of modern power. The Scene I can be an example on what the power expects from subjects through the disciplinary and control techniques. Under such circumstances, there is no carnival in the Bakhtinian use of the term or no politics/action. The Scene II with two images presented below presents body scanner protests which are compatible with the Bakhtinian carnival and grotesque realism. They are also demonstrations in line with Rancière's thought on politics and the *distribution of the sensible* in the context of the resistance in heterotopic spaces. This Rancierian notion politics is significant to reconcile the limitations of the Arendtian private/public dichotomy and Foucault's insight on the disciplinary power.

Why Bakhtinian? For Bakhtin, "carnival does now footlights...it does not acknowledge any distinction between actors and spectators" (Bakhtin, 1984: 7). What we see in the naked protests is the reversal of actor and spectators by refusing the existed and established order and laws. Carnival knows only its laws, "the laws of its own freedom" by putting aside "all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions" (ibid.: 7-10). The grotesque image is transgression for the authorities and truth makers. It is a transgression since "it suspends a taboo without suppressing it" due to the prescribed boundaries of what makes an action is transgression (Bataille, 1962, p. 36). Considering naked protests, the transgression is "continually structured, legitimated and dissolved by reference to the vertical symbolic hierarchy" in the operation of the state's control and surveillance practices (Stallybrass & White, 1986: 3). However, through the carnival's suspension, it opposes to the imposed rules and discourses as well as the authoritarian speech representing itself "the high", official culture, and a carnival thus provides a situation of *heteroglossia* with the coexistence of multiple speeches and actions (Holquist, 2002).

The Bakhtinian carnival-grotesque image can be aptly followed by Rancière's notion of politics which relies on dissensus, disagreement and disruptions. In this sense, I contend that politics with

² There is a vivid debate among scholars on Foucault's position about the possibility for resistance against the power. Others see that Foucault's depiction in the analysis of disciplinary power tranquilizes the room for resistance of subjects (Fraser, 1981). The other side interprets that Foucault does not denounce the possibility of resistance by differentiating Foucault's power relations into two -liberating and dominating relations- and highlighting Foucault's view of power as both repressive and productive facility (Jon Heller, 1996; Picket, 1996).

the possibility of resistance can occur at heterotopic and in-between spaces, i.e., independent from the spatial feature of the public and private realm. It is also crucial to underline that approaching airports from the Foucauldian disciplinary power and simply as sites of surveillance techniques and governmentalities in which power exerts itself in producing docile passengers may lead to neglect the capacity of individuals to act of resistance. In other words, if the power is not a thing centered at one certain site, but a set of relations involving techniques and governmentalities on individuals, the question is then the possibility of resistance at airports.

It would be useful to accentuate that Rancière differs from Foucault in terms of notions of subjectivity, power, and politics. While Foucault's subjectification underlines the self, who is exposed to certain types of institutions and practices functioning in the production of docile bodies (May, 2008), Rancière's view has rather positive connotation by framing subjectification as "the production through a series of actions of an instance and a capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable within a given field of experience, whose identification is of a pair with the reconfiguration of experience" (Rancière, 2004: 35). In other words, Foucault's interpretation underlines the formation of subjects as well as objects as the result of certain sort of tactics, strategies, and techniques through power relations. If we adhere to the Foucauldian insight on subjects who are shaped and disciplined by the power, knowledge, and discourse, it would be hard to admit subjects as the capable agents of resistance and politics.

Rancière like Arendt follows Aristotle's formulation of what politics is with an emphasis on speech by seeing the politics as the activity based on the principle of equality which "is transformed by the distribution of community shares" (Rancière, 1999: ix). As opposed to the general tendency on politics as procedures in which "the distribution of places and roles, and the systems of legitimizing in this distribution" realize, Rancière (ibid.: 28-29) sees this legitimizing and distribution system as *the police* and *policing* which is not in the sense of "state apparatus". The police in his formula functions to separate the one who has parts in it from the one who is excluded by taking no part (Rancière, 2004). In other words, the police refers to the *distribution of the sensible* that does not allow to the ability of those of part who have no parts to supplement the polis with a claim of equality and it imposes status quo by managing, eliminating disputes and limiting political participation in the name of politics (Rancière, 2001). Then, the question Rancière is interested is on how politics as relational thing is defined. Politics accordingly is not the consensus on a matter

imposed on individuals. It is rather the break that “is manifest in a series of actions that reconfigure the space where parties, parts, or lack of parts have been defined” by making “visible what had no business being seen, makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse what was once only heard noise” (Rancière, 1999: 30). Therefore, the basis of the politics lies in his depiction of the distribution of the sensible in which it occurs “when there is a part of those who have no part, a part or party of the poor...when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part” (ibid.: 11).

Even the occurrence of politics is rare, Rancière’s formulation makes it possible to broach the politics at spaces which cannot be easily seen as public and private as well as airports as spaces of heterotopia. His approach on politics as the interruption is key to elicit the traces of resistance under the disguise of disruption. Demonstrations at two airports –Portland and Berlin-Tegel Airports– reflect rather a different portray from the one presented in the Scene I as the Foucauldian disciplinary power image.



Figure 1: Nude but not lewd (Huffpost, 2012). Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/18/travel/oregon-airport-naked-protest/index.html?eref=rss_travel&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2F+cnntv%28RSS%3A+Travel%29&utm_content=Google+Reader, accessed at February 27, 2020.

In 2012, John Brennan -a fifty-year old traveller- was at the Portland International Airport with the intention of flying California. When he was at the body scanners section Brennan felt that he was harassed by the extreme pat-down of Transportation Security Administration. The extremity during the pat-down has led him to step forward by getting fully naked as a way of expressing his act of free speech. This image can be read from Rancière’s perspective politics in a sense that the policing as the established order assigns a role of no voice and passive subjectivity which is

disrupted through the moment when he got naked. Not only the nakedness is the sign of politics with his demonstration, but his refusal to get dressed upon the command of police is the disruption of police order as the beginning of politics and resistance at the precise moment.



Figure 2: No need to scan, Already naked. Retrieved from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/article-1243439/Naked-Germans-protest-body-airport-scanners.html> accessed at February 27, 2020.

While Brennan’s protest is a one-man unplanned demonstration, the Image 2 portrays a planned demonstration at the Berlin-Tegel Airport and same protest at other airports including Frankfurt and Dusseldorf Airports. The demonstration was organized by the German Piraten Partei (Pirate Party) with the participation of the Party members to the protest in 2010. Although the Party which was founded in 2006, does not hold any seats in any states in Germany, it gained popularity in 2012 by reaching more than thirty thousand members and obtaining seats at Regional Parliaments with tantalizing promises including online privacy, digital democracy and radical transparency (Haunss, 2013). In line with demonstrations at airports, according to William Boston the Party is a “new style” in German politics with their anti-status quo stand by aiming to “bring digital revolution to politics” and to “make government and politics more transparent accessible” (Boston, 2012). Going back to the discussion, the image of the naked protest illustrates the interruption of the police order in which airport security officers seem to transform into bystanders and spectators as opposed to demonstrators who are willing to take part. This is in line with Rancière’s approach

to politics as “an extremely determined activity to policing: whatever breaks with the tangible configuration” (Rancière, 2004: 29). In other words, images present the police order and the occurrence of politics with the disruption of those who are assigned to have no part in it.

4. CONCLUSION

It is possible to claim that the spatial organization of politics takes the public/private dichotomy for granted. The classical dichotomy in its Ancient Greek form has been idealized in Arendt’s theoretical formulation in which the polis is space of appearance and speech as the public space as opposed to private space necessities met by slaves and women. The paper has argued that the classical dichotomy does effectively grasp spaces which cannot be easily associated with public and private spaces including airports. In contemporary world of politics, any matter can be concern of politics and any space independent from private of public can be scene where politics can emerge. Moreover, it is no need to appear in a public space to proceed a speech as subjects can be political with full anonymity without the requirement of recognition and appearance to be politically engaged.

In doing so the paper followed Foucault’s discussion of heterotopia in the case of airports as neither public nor private, and both public and private spaces. I contended that Foucault’s heterotopia discussion is a way of modification of private/public distinction by providing the utility to rethink the limitation of the Arendtian strict dichotomy. It depends our perception on how certain spaces can be beyond the classical dichotomy. The paper also benefited from Foucault’s views on power in airports by presenting the execution of disciplinary power through technologies of body scanners and surveillance by creating docile travellers. The disciplinary power at work functions as a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion to filter and eliminate those who are not eligible as presented in Scene I.

In certain respects, Foucault lays out how spaces whether private/public or heterotopic pose the disciplinary techniques of the power. However, if one adheres to the Foucauldian disciplinary power and its function through multiple techniques, strategies, and technologies, it is to admit that the politics associated with resistance by Arendt is less chance to emerge. In other words, there is almost no exit from the power technologies as it discovers new technologies of governing and disciplining. Therefore, the resistance seems to be empty signifier. However, the Scene II presents the Bakhtinian carnival-grotesque realism by suspending existing rules and liberating itself from

the predominant discourse with a clear opposition. This opposition presented through two demonstrations at airports is disruption in the Rancierian notion of politics. They ask us to rethink the possibility of resistance and politics as a rare activity which requires the distribution of the sensible and disruption in the established police order by those who are assigned no part in the police.

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