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## HEIDEGGERCİ SAHİH KENDİLİĞE GİDEN YOLDA ZAMAN, VARLIK VE AŞKINLIĞIN ÖNEMİ

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**Öz:** Bu çalışmada amaçladığımız şey, Heidegger'in kendilik anlayışını zaman temelinde ortaya koymaktır. Bunu yaparken, Heidegger'in zaman, kendilik, dünya ve Varlık gibi terimlerini ele alıyoruz. Mevcut çalışmada, kaygı, ölüm, celp, özgürlük, aşkınlık, kapalılığı açma kararlılığı ve zamansallık (zaman) gibi kavramlar Dasein'in sahilliğini (*authenticity*) aydınlatmada bize gerekli çerçeveyi sunuyor. Hâlihazırda bize sunulmuş bir şey olmaktan ziyade, başarılması gereken bir şey olduğu için, sahil kendiliğe giden yol oldukça çetindir. Dasein bu sahil varoluşunu, yaşamı kendinin kılarak elde edebilir. Bunun için, Varolanların Varlığının anlamı, Dasein'in kavranmasında ilk basamağı oluşturur. Zira, Varlığın anlamı sorusuna cevap verebilecek olan yegâne varlık Dasein'in kendisidir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Kendilik, Zaman, Sahihlik, Varlık, Aşkınlık

## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TIME, BEING AND TRANSCENDENCE ON THE ROAD TO THE HEIDEGGERIAN AUTHENTIC SELF

**Abstract:** This paper attempts to reveal the meaning of Heideggerian self on the basis of time. In the course of this, it examines Heidegger's following terms: time, the self, the world and Being. In the present paper, the notions of anxiety, death, the call, freedom, transcendence, resolution and temporality (time) constitute a frame for articulating the meaning of the authenticity of Dasein. The road to the authentic self is challenging since it is not something already given; rather, the self is something to be accomplished. Dasein must accomplish it by making life its own. To achieve this, the elaboration of the meaning of "the Being of beings" in the exploration of Dasein must be the first step. For it is Dasein who can give an answer to the question of the meaning of "Being".

**Keywords:** The Self, Time, Authenticity, Being, Transcendence

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## 1. Introduction

Heidegger uses the term Dasein to refer to the human existence in general. Yet, inquiring into Heidegger's understanding of the self, one finds that the self has two modes of existence: inauthentic and authentic. In the Division One of Being and Time, Heidegger treats the mode of inauthenticity. However, in the book's Division Two, he deals with the authentic<sup>1</sup> mode of the self. Inauthentic existence of Dasein is understood in terms of its Being-in-the-world. That is, in this mode Dasein is depicted as an entity who is pre-determined by the society, culture and history, by being in the world among others. Nevertheless, authentic mode of Dasein demands individualizing, i.e., (existential) detachment from all the context into which the self is thrown. As Guignon says, Heidegger uses authenticity "to refer to a possible way of life or mode of existence"; the term indicates a way of life which unfolds the meaning of being human in a distinctive way. (2015, p. 8)

Heidegger's main aim is to unfold the meaning of "Being" ("the forgotten question"). On closer inspection, we see that his inquiry concerning "the meaning of Being" (specifically "Being-in-the-world") is oriented to the inquiry concerning Dasein. Since Dasein is interpreted as temporality, the inquiry concerning Dasein, accordingly, is oriented to the inquiry concerning time. With the aim of grasping the authentic self, grounded in time, let us delve into this threefold inquiry.

## 2. Heidegger's Criticism of Substance Ontology (Metaphysics of Presence)

Heidegger's ontology must be distinguished from his predecessors', whose ontology is called "substance ontology" or "metaphysics of presence". (Frede, 1993, p. 69; Guignon, 1993, p. 4)

Because of its emphasis on enduring presence, this traditional ontology is also called the "metaphysics of presence." It is found, for example, in Plato's Notion of the Forms, Aristotle's primary substances, the Creator of Christian belief, Descartes's *res extensa* and *res cogitans*, Kant's noumena, and the physical stuff presupposed by scientific naturalism. (Guignon, 1993, p. 4)

Up until now, this "substance ontology" has given rise to misinterpretations of "Being". It generated the problems in metaphysics, the most important of which, as Heidegger suggests, is to understand "Being" in terms of that which remains permanent, i.e., substance. However, Heidegger rather concerned himself with the lived, primordial experience of life:

Heidegger hoped to recover a more original sense of things by setting aside the view of reality we get from theorizing [or thematizing] and focusing instead on the way

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<sup>1</sup> In the daily use, German word "'eigentlich' means 'real' 'actual' or 'genuine'. But the adjective 'eigen' means 'own'". (McManus, 2015, p. 5) In Heidegger, the term authentic seems to signify the individual and genuine mode of existence.

things show up in the flux of our everyday, prereflective activities. (Guignon, 1993, p. 5)

Rather than being a static entity, in Heidegger, the self comes forth as an active, dynamic entity. He takes the departure of the ontological research (the question of "Being") from what is "prereflective activities" or pre-theoretical<sup>2</sup>. This research is called "fundamental ontology". Heidegger describes it as the analysis of the finitude of *Dasein* which is "to prepare the foundation for the metaphysics which 'belongs to human nature'" (1997, p. 1). Thus, fundamental ontology is also considered as the metaphysics of *Dasein*. After all, it is *Dasein* who will carry out the ontological inquiry. Therefore, fundamental ontology questions what the self (human being) is.

### 3. The Fundamental Ontology: Being, Dasein and the World

The essential task of fundamental ontology is to bring the meaning of "Being" into light. The understanding of Being "belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein itself" (2001, p. 28). Also, Dasein is "the condition for the possibility of any ontologies" (2001, p. 34). This is why Dasein is where the interrogation of the meaning of "Being" will start.

The traditional metaphysical dogmas generate problems. For instance, Cartesian metaphysics creates an impassible rift between the "I" and the world, taking the (inner) subject as the starting point and differentiating it from the (outer) objects. Heidegger throws aside the "I" of Cartesian/traditional metaphysics and substituted Dasein for this "inner self". Heidegger treats the self as it is in the midst of everyday activities, i.e., in the "pre theoretical" level. So, Dasein (being-there) becomes the point of departure. It is noteworthy that in "I think, therefore I exist", Descartes recognizes the existence of "I" "as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind" (McClean, 2006, p. Iv). The existence of the Cartesian "I" is grasped immediately. Hoffman (1993) calls this "the instantaneity of the Cartesian cogito" by distinguishing it from "the temporality of Dasein" (to this I will turn later). By the fundamental ontological research the solipsism vanishes; the traditional subject-object distinction is bypassed; and finally, Heidegger's understanding of the self is disclosed.

Traditional solipsism<sup>3</sup> is where the self grasps its own existence (inside) with certainty; yet, when it comes to prove the existence of others and the outer world (outside) it faces a trouble. Heidegger states that, "Being with Others belongs to the Being of Dasein" (2001, p. 160). By considering "Being-with" as a constitutive element of Dasein, Heidegger gets rid of "any problem of solipsism, since the need to explain how the individual knows of the existence of the other individuals vanishes" (Mansbach, 1991, p. 74). In clarifying Dasein's relation to the world, Heidegger remarks:

(Dasein) does not [...] first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but [...] it is always 'outside' alongside entities which it encounters

<sup>2</sup> "Pre-theoretical" means the direct experience of life, experience before any reflection or conceptualization.

<sup>3</sup> Heidegger makes a distinction between the traditional and the existential solipsism. See, 2001, p. 233.

[...] any inner sphere [is not] abandoned when Dasein dwells alongside the entity  
[...] the Dasein [...] remains outside, and it does so as Dasein [being-there]. (2001,  
p. 89)

Heidegger takes Dasein as the point of departure. In his understanding, the self does not find an insurmountable abyss separating it from the external world. Rather, what self comes across is a situation where it is thrown into the midst of beings. To characterize Dasein as such allows of its direct relation with the world and others. World is identified with the relational (referential) totality or “the totality of the contexts of involvement” (McCumber, 2011, p. 169). This totality helps us disclose the “Being” of Dasein – to a certain extent – as being relational and absorbed in daily activities:

[W]ith this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a “hammer”, there is an involvement in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement in making something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement in protection against bad weather; and this protection ‘is’ for the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for Dasein-that is to say, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein’s Being. (2001, p. 116)

“Being” of human consists in its existence. The “Being” of Dasein must be looked for in its direct, pre-theoretical encounter with entities in the world which Dasein “copes with, appropriates and finally shapes”. Dasein is the only entity which makes its Being essentially an issue (2001, p. 117). It cares about both its “Being” and the “Being” of the world. In so doing, it also provides a basis for the understanding of being in general such as hammer, pen, keys, numbers and so on (Guignon, 1993). In its undisturbed daily concerns with beings (entities), Dasein does not reflect upon them. These unthematized beings are called “ready-to-hand” entities, treated as equipment. Nevertheless, when this direct relation is interrupted, entities lose their practical use or function. So, they are, for the first time, seen as “mere objects” which gives rise to Dasein’s reflecting upon them. When they are stripped of their practical use, entities are called “present-at-hand” (Manschach, 1991; McCumber, 2011). As a result, the entities are encountered theoretically as “objects” distinct from the subject. This thematized engagement with the world is what gives the impression of the traditional subject-object distinction. Yet, at the pre-theoretical relation, there is no such distinction. Instead, there is a mere involvement.

Concerning the problem of the existence of the external world. Heidegger refers to Kant (1929), who states that it is “a scandal of philosophy and of human reason in general” that we still could not come up with a well-grounded and inconvertible proof for the existence of (the objects of) the external world that would rule out skepticism. However, the “real scandal of philosophy”, Heidegger (2001) argues, is not that the proof has not been given yet. Rather, it is that this proof is still being expected. Having considered the self (“inside”) and the external world (“outside”) as different in kind, asking for “the proof” is to ask for the impossible. For Heidegger, this is “the real problem” with the existence of the external world. He argues that if the correct understanding of Dasein [as “Being-in-the-world” and “Being alongside entities within-the-world”] can be grasped,

then the need for such a proof would disappear; since, by “being-there [in the world]” Dasein already is the proof itself.

#### 4. Interwovennes of the Self and Time

Time is essential in Heidegger’s overall philosophy. He takes time as the condition of the possibility of the understanding of entities (1992, p. 302). Thus, fundamental ontological investigation – the inquiry of what human [self] is – can be carried out on a temporal basis alone. The problem of metaphysics (of Dasein) is the finitude (temporality) of the self. To unfold this, Heidegger makes a distinction between the ordinary time, the world-time, and the original time (originary temporality). In so doing, Heidegger traces time back to its origin, venturing into its ontological investigation for the very first time.

In Heidegger, ordinary (traditional) time corresponds to the succession of moments, i.e., the flow or stream of “nows”:

We say: 'In every "now" is now; in every "now" it is already vanishing.' In every "now" the "now" is now and therefore it constantly has presence as something selfsame, even though in every "now" another may be vanishing as it comes along! Yet as this thing which changes, it simultaneously shows its own constant presence. (2001, p. 475)

The “now” as “the present moment” does not change; it is permanent. That is, it has a substantial character. Ordinary time is also considered as continuous, irreversible and linear time, composed of the series of infinitely many “now” points. The problem with this view of time – which is flowing from the future passing through the present and sinking into the past – is that the three fundamental elements of it can be defined in terms of “now” (present). That is, the future (coming along) is regarded as the “not-yet-now”; the past (passing away) is taken as the “no-longer-now”; whereas, the present (present-at-hand) is directly defined as the “now” (2001, p. 424). This is clearly nothing but another manifestation of substance ontology (metaphysics of presence).

By referring to Aristotle, Heidegger remarks that ordinary time “is what is counted in connection with motion which is experienced with respect to before and after” (1984, p. 246). The ordinary time is engaged with the phrase “present-at hand”. As indicated, when our uninterrupted dealing with the ordinary everyday activities in a pre-theoretical level is broken, we thematize (theoretize) “the ready-to-hand” entities and encounter them as “present-at-hand”. So, when we start contemplating time, we face it as “present-at-hand”.

The world-time can be characterized in terms of “ready-to-hand” entities. When we are ordinarily dealing with those entities of the world (in the pre-theoretical level) what we encounter is the world-time. Contrary to ordinary time which has no significance or relation to human’s everyday practices within the world, world-time refers to “the sequence of meaningfully articulated, everyday times” (Blattner, 2005, p. 316) on the basis of which we can arrange and measure our daily works, such as waking up, having

breakfast, going to work, giving a lecture, going to sleep and so on. The world-time is in this sense deeply engaged with what we are doing as "Being-in-the-world".

Heidegger attaches to the world-time four special characteristics. World-time must be datable, significant, spanned and public. The first two is explained together, showing that daily activities of human can be dated in terms of its contents. These pre-theoretical activities of world-time must be datable and significant, i.e., contentful. "The spannedness of time" suggests that "now" is not a strictly frozen moment; but instead, it is "duration". That is, by the world-time, we must understand that it is "stretched from a before to an after" (Blattner, 2005). The "now" of world-time stretches from the no-longer-now (world-time past) to the not-yet-now (world-time present). While a person is absorbed in any activity in a "spanned now", s/he "reaches out into the future and touches the then [...] and reaches back into the past" (Blattner, 1999, p. 131). In Dasein's life, therefore, "now" is not an isolated instant disengaged from before and after; rather, "now" is related to Dasein's completed experiences and to its projected ones.

The last characteristic of world-time is that it is public. "The accessibility of the now for everyone" is what Heidegger calls the publicity of time (1982, p. 264). After being made public, the time possesses a worldly character. It is possible only when it refers to Dasein's "Being-in-the-world".

There is a connection between ordinary time, world-time and originary temporality. In fact, originary temporality is the ontological condition of the other two. When we recall that Dasein is interpreted as "temporality" and "historical", the current investigation of time then leads us back to Dasein. To unfold the originary temporality, it is necessary to look into the structure of Dasein's Being, i.e., the structure of "care".

There is a relation between the three kinds of "Being" and three versions of time. It appears that to three modes of "Being", – 1- being present-at-hand, 2- being ready-to-hand, 3- Being of Dasein (existence) –, there corresponds three versions of time – 1- the ordinary time, 2- the world-time, and 3- originary temporality, respectively (Blattner, 2005, p. 323). On Heidegger's account, original time is the ontological foundation of Dasein's existence (its average everydayness). On the basis of original temporality alone, "the articulated structural totality of Dasein's Being as care first becomes existentially intelligible". (2001, p. 277)

Time must be brought to light – and genuinely conceived – as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being. (2001, p. 39)

Heidegger neither thinks of time as a conceptual unity nor conceives it as a flux. In his account, time, the originary temporality, is an ontological structure. The ontological-structural unity of Dasein is made up of three elements, namely, existence (being-ahead-of-itself), facticity ("Being-already-in"), and falling ("Being-alongside"). The unity of the

three constitutive elements of Dasein is called ontological care-structure. This is why the "Being" of Dasein is considered as "Care". Accordingly, the meaning of the "Being" of Care is interpreted as temporality. The structure of care is deeply engaged with what Heidegger (2001) calls the three ecstases of temporality, namely the past (having-been), the present and the future. This engagement is to reveal the "Being" of Dasein (the self) as temporality.

The first element of the care-structure is existence. As indicated, "[t]he essence of Dasein lies in its existence". That is, the essence of the self unfolds itself in the course of self's life story, i.e., in its existence over time (Guignon, 1993, p. 9). To make sense of this, the terms "understanding", "thrownness", "projection" and "being-ahead-of-itself" play important roles. Human existence can be described as being in a world concernfully dealing with it. In this dealing, Dasein finds itself thrown into the world which is made up of practically shared activities. In "being-ahead-of-itself", Dasein "comports [relates; projects] itself towards its potentiality-for-Being"; there is always "a potentiality-for-Being for Dasein itself, [which] has not yet become 'actual'" (2001, p. 236). "Being-ahead-of-itself" thus signifies "not-yet", i.e., the future. Within the world to which it has been thrown, Dasein projects itself upon possibilities. This projection or thrown-projection is what Heidegger relates to understanding (2001, p. 188, 232). In projecting itself upon possibilities, Dasein copes with the world by trying to understand the world and itself at the same time. Given this, the existence, as the first element of the ontological care-structure, unfolds itself on the basis of a specific ecstasis of time: the future.

The second element of the care-structure of Dasein is characterized as facticity. It can be understood in the light of the following terms: the mood (state of mind), thrownness, and "Being-already-in". By getting in a certain mood such as fear or anxiety, Dasein is brought face to face with its facticity, i.e., that it is thrown into existence as a being-already-in. Dasein faces this situation as a brute fact since it cannot flee from it authentically. Facticity refers to what is given to Dasein prior to any conceptualization. It points out that "Dasein remains in the throw, and is sucked into the turbulence of the 'they's' inauthenticity" (2001, p. 223). That is, Dasein finds itself in the middle of the pre-determinedness. Facticity can be understood then as concreteness and definiteness of life. It is Dasein's social, cultural and historical background, i.e., Dasein's "being-already-in" (the past). Heidegger asserts that a state of mind always brings us back to something, i.e., to some mood of having been. For instance, in fear, we are brought back in a certain mood in which we face what we have been afraid of. By facticity, we realize that thrownness is not something that we have chosen freely; instead, it is what we inherited unwillingly. Moreover, the world wherein we have been thrown is where we stuck with (Hall, 1993, p. 137). This explains why Dasein's existence must be factual. For Dasein projects itself upon its possibilities from where it has been thrown. The facticity is where Dasein's existence is grounded. The connection between existence and facticity, shows that the future and the past as the two ecstases of temporality must be interlocked. From its "having-been" (the past), Dasein can project itself upon possibilities (the future). Therefore, facticity is unfolded in terms of past.

The third constitutive element in the ontological care structure is falling. Heidegger clarifies falling in terms of Being-alongside entities which Dasein concerns itself with. He associates the phrase "Being-alongside" with the present. Fallenness can be described as Dasein's tendency to fall "away [abgefallen] from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and [to fall] into the 'world'" (2001, p. 220). This shows that Dasein gets deeply absorbed in the world for the purpose of "fleeing from the anxiety of a confrontation with death" (Blattner, 2005, p. 313). In so doing, Dasein loses itself in "the publicness of the "they", so it is determined by it. The fallenness of Dasein is also linked with existence and facticity. Here, the present is not the frozen moment; rather, it is a spanned (stretched) present, which carries the past and the future within.

Thus, the three elements of care-structure make up Dasein's structural unity. Heidegger's understanding of originary temporality runs parallel to this unity. Contrary to the succession of the past, the present and the future as in ordinary time; the originary temporality is considered as an ecstatic unity:

Temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a 'succession'. The future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been. (2001, p. 401)

Heidegger calls the past, the present and the future, the ecstases of time (raptures). The root meaning of 'ecstasis' is 'standing out' (2001, p. 377). Keeping that in mind, we can see why the present can reach out into the future and reach back into the past. This going beyond itself is what Heidegger sometimes calls "the transcendence of time and transcendence of Dasein" (Dostal, 1993, p. 156). Likewise, by the term existence, Heidegger sometimes understands "ek-sistence" which means "standing out" (Siegel, 2005, p. 571). It means that Dasein is not the self who can be captured in a certain "now". On the contrary, "Dasein always exists in [the] three moments at once" (Siegel, 2005, p. 571), such that as thrown into the world (facticity) it is always "having-been"; as fallen among others, it is always the present; and finally, as projected upon its possibilities (existence), Dasein is futural. Dasein moves from its having-been through its present to its future. By this movement, "Being" of Dasein as a whole – along with the "Being" of the world – is disclosed (Siegel, 2005, p. 592). That is why Heidegger treats the self as "Being-in-the-world" and so grasps it as temporality.

### **5. The Inauthentic Self: The "They-Self" [*das Man*]**

In the inauthentic mode of existence, we encounter "the Self of everydayness" which is called "one" or the "they" [*das Man*]. In this inauthentic mode, *Dasein* is dominated by "averageness, levelling down, publicness, the disburdening of one's Being, and accommodation" (2001, p. 166). In this mode, *Dasein* is not yet itself and can by no means be regarded as individualized yet. Thereby, it can never be treated as the (authentic) self. The characteristics attributed to it by the "they" are not genuinely its own. Since *Dasein* is absorbed in the world and more importantly dissolved in the others, it is simply lost.



Therefore, to regain its authentic existence, *Dasein* must first come back to itself, i.e., “find itself”.

The Self of everyday *Dasein* is the *they-self*, which we distinguish from the *authentic Self* – that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way [eigens ergriffenen]. As they-self, the particular *Dasein* has been *dispersed* into the “they”, and must first find itself [...] If *Dasein* is familiar with itself as they-self [...] the “they” itself prescribes that way of interpreting the world and Being-in-the-world ... (2001, p. 167)

The ontological care structure – grounded in temporality – discloses the whole “Being” of *Dasein*. It has an individualizing role as far as it presents to *Dasein* its whole “Being” as a unity. The average everyday *Dasein* is an entity among “Others”<sup>4</sup>. In its everydayness, *Dasein* is dispersed into the “they”. So, it gets more and more absorbed in the “Being” of others (2001, p. 164). As being dispersed, the “Being” of its genuine (authentic) self is covered up and thus suppressed by the “they”. In the first item of the care-structure, i.e., in existence, *Dasein* can disclose only the “Being” of the “they”. For it is the publicness or “the dominion of others” which *Dasein* is delivered over (Mansbach, 1991, p. 75). In the dominion of the “they”, *Dasein*, falls away from itself, getting lost in the others. Thus, Fallenness might be understood as fallenness into inauthenticity. Here, *Dasein* is sheltered by the “they”, so that it is disburdened of its responsibilities. Eventually, the “they” has the dominion over the “Being” of *Dasein*; the “they” clearly takes over. In the end, *Dasein* loses itself in the others by turning into “nobody”. To underscore this fact, Heidegger states: “Everyone is the other, and no one is himself” (2001, p. 165). That is, in everyday level “proximally and for the most part” (primarily and usually), *Dasein* is the other (inauthentic self); in other words, no *Dasein* is an authentic self yet. Thus, the “who” or the “I” of everyday *Dasein* is not a certain self, not one’s self. Neither is it a group of people, nor the totality of them all. The “‘who’ is the neuter, the ‘they’ [*das Man*]” (2001, p. 164). The effect of *das Man* is felt so significantly upon everyday *Dasein* that it for the most part follows up the exact same path which has already been opened up by *das Man*:

In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the “they” is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they* [*man*] take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *they* see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‘great mass’ as *they* shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what *they* find shocking. The “they”, which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness. (2001, p. 164)

*Dasein* cannot be regarded as free since its acts are drifted back and forth by the “they-self. Regardless of *Dasein*’s potential projections, so long as the dominion of the “they”

<sup>4</sup> By “Others” Heidegger does not “mean everyone else but me – those over against whom the ‘I’ stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does *not* distinguish oneself – those among whom one is too”. (2001, p. 154)

persists, *Dasein* is condemned to the inauthentic mode of freedom, i.e., the “supposed freedom of the they-self”.

## 6. The Authentic Self

The dimension on the basis of which the authentic selfhood comes to the fore is originary temporality. Heidegger argues that unfolding the authentic self requires turning away from the “they”, by “hearkening” the voice coming from the depth of our inner self, i.e., “the voice of conscience”<sup>5</sup>.

How can the absorption in the “they” be avoided so as to provide the basis for *Dasein* to turn back to itself? In Heidegger’s view, *Dasein*’s realization that it is a being inevitably marching towards its own death alone can furnish this possibility.

In the face of “Being-towards-death” (throwness), the first and the general reaction of *Dasein* is to flee from the authentic mode of existence into the inauthentic “they-self” (2001, p. 399). The “at-home of publicness” and “the idle talk”<sup>6</sup> of the “they” take *Dasein* away from realizing the “uncanniness” of being “not-at home”, i.e., “being-towards-death”. The phenomenon of death is anchored in the structure of care, as well as in time. As being-ahead-of-itself, *Dasein* is futural; it is towards the death. One way or another, authentic or inauthentic, *Dasein* has been delivered over to its death as the most unique, individual and unshareable experience of all:

[Authenticity] describes the fulfillment of the potentiality each human being nonetheless possesses to take responsibility for itself and for the world, to win itself back out of its original loss by comporting itself “towards its being as its ownmost possibility” [death]. (Siegel, 2005, pp. 570-71)

*Dasein* stretches along between birth [the past] and death [the future]. In the course of its life time, the unique possibility that is to unfold its authentic self is the full realization of its mortality. Yet, “the idle talk” of the “they” attempts to turn this unique possibility into a communally shared experience. Yet, no matter what the “they” does, the fact remains: “death is in each case mine” (2001, p. 232); that is, “nobody can die another’s death” (Mansbach, 1991, p. 76). This is the clearest declaration of the individualizing role of death. In the face of death alone *Dasein* can capture “its existence in its totality and thus focuses on its own existence as it belongs to the individual *Dasein* rather than on the inauthentic ‘they’”. (Mansbach, 1991, p. 77)

Anxiety has also a central role to play in getting access to the authentic self. The mood that we get into after realizing our mortality is anxiety felt in the face of death:

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<sup>5</sup> By the call, Heidegger seems to refer to the “silence”. Presumably, in order to escape from the paralyzing or numbing voice of the “they”, *Dasein* must hearken its inner voice, namely, “the voice of silence”.

<sup>6</sup> The idle talk is the groundless talk of the inauthentic they-self. This talk prevents *Dasein* to hear its inner voice and disclose its authentic mode of existence. See Heidegger, 2001, pp. 211-14.

Anxiety makes manifest in *Dasein* its *Being towards* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – that is, its *Being-free* for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings *Dasein* face to face with its *Being free for* [...] the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is. But at the same time, this is the Being to which *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world has been delivered over. (2001, pp. 232-33)

Anxiety felt in the face of death sets *Dasein* free to choose its authentic mode of existence. So, the inauthentic mode of “Being” is something *Dasein* is capable of stepping over. Yet, there is the third notion which has an essential role in the authenticity of the self: “the call”. As soon as *Dasein* hears (heeds) “the call of conscience”, and acts accordingly, the authentic mode of selfhood can be accomplished. After having asked, “to what is one called” in the call? Heidegger responds:

To one's *own Self* [...] And because only the *Self* of the they-self gets appealed to and brought to hear, the “they” collapses [...] Precisely *in passing over* the “they” [...] the call pushes it into insignificance [Bedeutungslosigkeit]. But the *Self*, which the appeal has robbed of this lodgement and hiding-place, gets brought to itself by the call. (2001, p. 317)

Dissolved in the “they” and numbed by the idle talk, *Dasein* cannot hear the call coming from the depth of its very self (Mansbach, 1991, p. 82). “The call of conscience” thus has an individualizing effect such that when taken notice of, “the call” turns *Dasein* away from the “they”, by calling it to itself so as to break the link attaching *Dasein* to the publicness of the “they” (Mansbach, 1991, p. 82). “The call” therefore brings *Dasein* face to face with its thrownness into the world, i.e., its groundlessness and nullity. Yet, Heidegger states that: *Dasein* “has been *released* from its basis, *not through* itself but *to* itself, so as to be *as this basis*”. (2001, p. 330)

## 7. Conclusion

Freedom for choosing and taking hold of the authentic self is understood in terms of “resoluteness”. *Dasein* is set free for choosing from the past, among various possibilities which has been delivered over to it throughout the history. Now, “*Dasein* may choose its hero” (2001, p. 437). “[I]t is in resoluteness that one first chooses the choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated” (2001, p. 437). The resolute *Dasein* stands up for its freedom; instead of fleeing into the conformity of the “they”, it takes the responsibility of its own life. As Siegel writes: “Whereas in the world of *das Man* no one takes responsibility, where authentic existence is achieved any single resolute individual can take responsibility for all”. (2005, p. 578)

The authentic selfhood is accomplished through the understanding of time, Being and transcendence. Indeed, transcendence opens up a way for *Dasein* to possess the freedom of choosing itself. Ecstatic character of the self, i.e., its being “transcendence”, (“standing out” and “being-ahead-of-itself”) can be made possible on the basis of the ecstatic unity of time.

Heidegger states that transcendence finds its meaning in human finitude. That is, it finds its meaning in that human is “being-towards-death”, i.e., temporal. That is why “transcendence” is identified with “finitude” (1997, p. 64). Heidegger seeks the origin of transcendence in *Dasein*. He says: “Time provides the basis for leaping off into what is 'outside of me'[...].” (2001, p. 248). That is, original time opens up a horizon or a transcendence through which the self can take a step into what is (seemingly) outside itself. In Heidegger’s understanding, transcendence is clearly indicative of the selfhood. It is not a kind of addition attached to the self afterwards. On the contrary, it is constitutive element of *Dasein* which it possesses beforehand:

Transcendence is rather the primordial constitution of the subjectivity of a subject. The subject transcends qua subject; it would not be a subject if it did not transcend. To be a subject means to transcend. This means that *Dasein* does not sort of exist and then occasionally achieve a crossing over outside itself, but existence originally means to cross over. *Dasein* is itself the passage across. (1992, p. 165)

Originary temporality, that which opens up a transcendence (horizon), discloses itself as “the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being” (1992, p. 302). The ecstatic unity of originary temporality serves as a basis upon which the whole “Being” of *Dasein* is held together as the entire care-structure, namely existence (being-ahead-of-itself), facticity (“Being-already-in”), and falling (“Being-alongside”). Given this, *Dasein* can freely oscillate between its past and its future through its present. *Dasein* is transcendence and it is in this sense “stepping over”.

*Dasein* is an entity who “stretches along between birth and death [historizing]” (2001, p. 425). This is why Heidegger interprets *Dasein* as “temporality” and treats it to be “historical” (2001, p. 278). Thus, *Dasein* can be characterized as “happening”; as a/n (dynamic) entity in constant making; under construction. It can be taken as an entity whose life story discloses itself “between birth and death”. *Dasein* is “Being-towards-the-end” i.e., “Being towards one’s ownmost [the most genuine] potentiality-for-Being, which is non-relational and is not to be outstripped” (2001, p. 299) and also which is “not-yet”. Only by anxiety in the face of death, that *Dasein* “can develop an “*impassioned freedom towards death*,” which releases it from the illusions of the “they” (2001, p. 311). The full disclosure of “Being” of *Dasein* as temporality, reveals the meaning of the authentic self.

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