

## **ETHIOPIA AND KENYA: A FAR-FETCHED COLD WAR SECURITY PAIR (1974-1991)**

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### **Abstract**

The cold war era political and ideological rivalries had noticeable consequences on the Horn of Africa as countries acquire their freedom from European colonial administration and looked to establish their unregimented external relation with unregimented foreign policy. Prior to 1974 both Ethiopia and Kenya were pro-west countries and their shared ideological makeup created an easy platform for the security partnership between the two nations. Nonetheless, with the shift of ideology on the side of Ethiopia to Marxism-Leninism following the toppling of the Imperial era, 1974, many spectators supposed that the Ethio-Kenyan security partnership would weaken. But, unlike on looker's projection, in the face of their ideological disparity, the Ethio-Kenyan security partnership continued. In the light of this, this article intended to chart a new insight for the continuation of the Ethio-Kenyan security partnership regardless of ideological disparity. The outcome of the study reflects that the uninterrupted security partnership between the two nations, even with their ideological variance, was stemmed from the following three reasons: (i) the two countries a pat on the back nature for security and survival as a nation surpassed the value of the cold war era ideological disparity; (ii) the presence of peaceful boundary diplomacy and; (iii) the presence of viable cross-border partnerships between the two countries that stemmed from cross-border joint planning due to geopolitical proximity. In the process of analysis, untapped archival documents from the Ethiopian National Archive and Library Agency (ENALA) together with secondary works of literature are employed.

**Keywords:** Kenya, Ethiopia, Cold War, Security, Cooperation

### **Öz**

#### **Etiyopya ve Kenya: Zoraki Soğuk Savaş Güvenlik Ortaklığı (1974-1991)**

Soğuk savaş dönemi siyasi ve ideolojik rekabetlerinin Afrika Boynuzu üzerinde göze çarpan

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sonuçları bulunmaktadır. Bu durum, ülkelerin özgürlüklerini Avrupa sömürge yönetiminden edindiklerinde ve serbest dış politika kurmaya çalıştıklarında görüldü. 1974'ten önce Etiyopya ve Kenya batı yanlısı ülkelerdi. Ortak ideolojik yapılarından dolayı iki ülke arasında güvenlik ortaklığı için kolay bir platform oluşturdu. Ancak, 1974 yılında İmparatorluk döneminin sona ermesinin ardından Etiyopya'da ideolojinin Marksizm-Leninizm'e kayması, Etiyopya-Kenya güvenlik ortaklığının zayıflatacağı düşünüldü. Ancak, ideolojik eşitsizlik karşısında Etiyopya-Kenya güvenlik ortaklığı devam etti. Bu makale, ideolojik eşitsizliğe bakılmaksızın Etiyopya-Kenya güvenlik ortaklığının devamı için yeni bir içgörü çizmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmanın sonucu, iki ülke arasında kesintisiz güvenlik ortaklığının aşağıdaki üç nedenden kaynaklandığını göstermektedir: (i) güvenlik ve hayatta kalmaya olan ilgisinin ideolojik eşitsizliğin üzerinde olması; (ii) barışçıl sınır diplomasisinin varlığı; ve (iii) sınır ötesi ortak planlama ve jeopolitik yakınlık nedeniyle iletişim teknolojisinin geliştirilmesinden kaynaklanan uygulanabilir sınır ötesi ortaklıkların varlığı. Analiz sürecinde, Etiyopya Ulusal Arşiv ve Kütüphane Ajansı'ndan (EUAKA) kullanılmayan arşiv belgeleri ve ikincil edebiyat eserleri kullanılmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Kenya, Etiyopya, Soğuk Savaş, Güvenlik, İşbirliği

### **Context**

During the cold war era, the volatile essence of the geopolitical state of affairs in the Horn of Africa and the complex inter-state and intra-state relations of the Horn countries together with the Somali irredentism shaped the bilateral relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya.<sup>1</sup> Before 1974 the Ethio-Kenyan relation was shaped by historical and political spectrums. In line with the historical spectrum, the shared position of both states on the anti-colonial movement of Kenya against the British rule and their common stand against the anti-fascist resistance movement in Ethiopia could be taken as good rhetoric fodder for the latter era complimentary scenario between the two nations. In line with the political spectrum, the shared position of the two countries (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya) on the principles of OAU and UN as well as the similarity of ideology towards African socialism and non-aligned movement helped to promote the pre-1974 bilateral cooperation amid the two nations. The personal diplomacy of Emperor Hailesilase I of Ethiopia and President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya had also played a remarkable role in the institutionalization of the pre-1974 Ethio-Kenya cooperative relations. The other point in focus that promoted the pre-1974 cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya was the commitment of the two countries to promote pro-west political ideology. Thus, the anxiety and hate of socialism could also be taken as the other reason for the two countries' security cooperation during the pre-1974 era.<sup>2</sup>

However, the outbreak of the February 1974 Ethiopian popular revolution and the subsequent removal of Emperor Hailesilase I from power on September 12, 1974, resulted in the shift of political ideology in Ethiopia to Marxism-Leninism.<sup>3</sup>

The coming to power of the military council named Derg on September 12, 1974, and the subsequent socialist-oriented propagation and alignment with socialist

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<sup>1</sup> Kassa Mihiret, "A Survey of Ethiopia-Kenyan Relations," Addis Ababa University, 1989 p.14.

<sup>2</sup> Mihiret 1989, pp. 4-5.

<sup>3</sup> Samuel M. Makinda, "Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn of Africa," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Taylor & Francis, Ltd., (1982), p.93.

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states disappointed Ethiopia's pro-west regional security ally, Kenya. In the same vein, the National Democratic Revolution Program (NDRP) which was introduced to Ethiopia on April 21, 1976, further worried Ethiopia's regional security ally, Kenya. In other words, the introduction of NDRP that shifted the policy statement and political program of Ethiopia towards Marxism-Leninism contributed to further cooling the two countries' relations. Subsequently, many onlookers projected that the Ethio-Kenyan cooperative relations would stop without warning. Predominantly, most spectators supposed that Kenya would unequivocally weaken its bilateral security cooperation with Ethiopia.<sup>4</sup>

Nonetheless, contrary to the opinion of many spectators Ethiopia and Kenya were not in the state of totally breaking their bilateral security cooperation. But it is undeniable that there was provisional cooling of cooperation between the two countries. In the light of this, this paper tries to examine factors that enabled Ethiopia and Kenya to continue their security cooperation once Ethiopia embraced Marxism-Leninism as its line of political and economic thought since 1974 while Kenya remains as a pro-west state.

Therefore, in the process of document examination, it is understood that the Ethio-Kenyan cooperation continued, in the face of, ideological disparity for three major reasons. First, the understanding amid Ethiopia and Kenya that one is the pat on the back (praise) to the other for security and survival due to shared Somalia irredentist threat. Second, perhaps the biggest exception, from the general trend of Africa in common and the Horn region in particular, for the Ethio-Kenya security cooperation was the two countries' peaceful boundary diplomacy. Finally, the presence of viable cross-border strategic partnerships between the two nations in which stemmed from the cross-border joint planning and geopolitical proximity has also helped for the all-season cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya.

#### **The Security Factor**

Given the existence of ideological differences, one of the principal reasons that shaped the convenient relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya throughout the era of the cold war in general and between 1974 and 1991, in particular, was the security factor.<sup>5</sup> The changing political condition at national, regional, sub-regional, continental, and extra-continental levels that stemmed from the fluid cold war political situation together with the growth of the Somali irredentism threatened the territorial integrity and national status of Ethiopia and Kenya. Particularly, the challenge from the Somali irredentism was very high. In response to the irredentist challenge, Ethiopia and Kenya

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<sup>4</sup> Oduogo Cyprine Onyango, "Kenya-Ethiopia Relation: A Study of the Significance of Economic and Political Factors Contributing to the Cooperation, 1963-1991," MA Thesis in International Relation at University of Nairobi, 1995, p.168; Samuel M. Makinda, "From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War Politics: Kenya's Foreign Policy," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Africa: Tensions and Contentions, Taylor & Francis, Ltd, (1983), p.308; Mihiret 1989, p.9.

<sup>5</sup> Tena Betiru, "Ethio-Kenya Border Relation", Addis Ababa University, 1989, p.8; Mihiret 1989, p.7.

developed a common position that was sensed in various circumstances. Meaning, the condition encouraged for the augmentation of the security give-and-take or synergy between the two states was emanated from a common position for a common enemy, the Somali factor, and/or the synergy was stemmed from the run-of-the-mill ambition for survival.<sup>6</sup>

Especially, with the absence of Somalia's irredentism and the Somalia Militarism, the Ethio-Kenyan security cooperation would be pleasant during the reign of Hailesilase I and unpleasant and hostile during the time of Colonel Mengistu. But the policy convergence over the common Somali threat enabled the two neighboring Horn countries to synchronize throughout the cold war era. So, the situation of the Ethio-Kenyan security cooperation, being spectators of different political ideologies, clearly "displayed how regional relations during the cold war often failed to meet the expectations of geopolitically minded analysts due to the role played by local nationalist politics".<sup>7</sup>

Against this background, here, it is vital to understand that during the culmination of political unrest in Ethiopia following the unseating of the Hilesilase regime, despite the presence of inner ideological disparity, Kenya was the figurehead pro-west African nation to declare its partnership with the Marxist-Leninist Ethiopia.<sup>8</sup> Five major reasons slowed down Kenya to disengage its security partnership with Ethiopia.

First, President Kenyatta was well conscious of the risk of weakening security cooperation with Ethiopia for the statehood status of Kenya. Meaning, President Kenyatta well understood that the irredentist challenge from Somalia would be more severe and actual than the ideological challenge from socialist Ethiopia. Indeed, the extent of ideological challenge from the Soviet lead socialist camp towards Kenya was just speculation. But the irredentist Somali security threat towards Kenya was a real challenge for the national status of Kenya that was tasted at different circumstances.<sup>9</sup> Second, in the second half of the 1970s the relation of Kenya with the other neighboring states excluding Ethiopia and Sudan was practically run-down. For instance, in early 1976 Kenya was on the verge of war with Idi Amin of Uganda while the latter asserted territory from western Kenya. The spirit behind Idi Amin's anti-Kenyan militaristic move was his ownership of the Soviet-made military hardware. Concomitantly, there was understanding that Amin's territorial assertion was stemmed from the calculation to alter the cognition of Kenya from its grand security challenge in the north to its western frontier to create a favorable ground for Barry's irredentist quest towards the Somali dominant North Eastern Frontier District (NEFD) of Kenya. The other reason that

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<sup>6</sup> Onyango 1995, p.157.

<sup>7</sup> Douglas Woodwell, *Nationalism in International Relations*, Macmillan Publisher, New York, 2007, pp.117-18.

<sup>8</sup> Woodwell 2007, p.118.

<sup>9</sup> Louis Prentis Woodroffe, *"Buried in the Sands of the Ogaden": The United States, the Horn of Africa and the Demise of Détente*, London School of Economics and Political Science, ProQuest PLC, 2014, p.91.

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notably induced Kenya not to worsen relations with Ethiopia was its deteriorated relation with Tanzania. The hostility between pro-west Kenya and Marxist-Leninist Tanzania forced the closure of the frontier between the two countries in 1977.<sup>10</sup>

The third rationale that hindered Kenya to halt its security cooperation with Ethiopia was Kenya's subordinate or lower status in population size, number of army, and military hardware. In its security partnership with Ethiopia, therefore, Kenya benefits more than Ethiopia. For instance, in the 1970's the population size of Ethiopia (25.8 million) was twice that of Kenya (11.5 million). The number of military powers of Kenya (7,170) was six times lower than that of Ethiopia (42,750). In 1980, while Ethiopia owned 229,500 military powers, Kenya owned 14,750. The military strength of Kenya became more ill following the August 1, 1982, unsuccessful coup attempt because after the aborted coup the whole "air force was wiped out" and Kenya restructured the air force from the ground up or from square one.<sup>11</sup>

Fourth, the authority of Kenya was well aware that abandoning security cooperation with Ethiopia without securing another strong regional ally would endanger the interest of Kenya in case of external attack from neighboring hostile states. In fact, Kenya had had a security pact with the United States since 1970 but geographically the U.S is at a remote distance in a time of zero-hour danger. The nearby security allies of the United States (i.e., Saudi Arabia and Iran under the rule of Shah) were the advocator of the political thought of Somalia.<sup>12</sup>

The last but not the least reason for the continuation of the Ethio-Kenya security cooperation in the face of ideological disparity was stemmed from the fact that up to 1977 the influence of the Soviets on the politics of Somalia was not totally diminished. So, the authority of Kenya suspected that weakening security cooperation with Ethiopia might instigate the latter for rapprochement with Somalia per the mediation of the Soviets, which would cause political and economic isolation for Kenya.<sup>13</sup>

In the meantime, the domestic unrest in Ethiopia and the interim cooling of sense of security partnership between Ethiopia and Kenya prompted the authority of Somalia to declare a full-scale war against Ethiopia to take Ogaden by forces of the army. As a result, the 1977-78 Ogaden war breakout. The situation instigated the Ethiopian authority to approach more to its old regional security ally, Kenya, which had had the

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<sup>10</sup> Samuel M. Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn of Africa: Kenya's Role in the Somali-Ethiopian Dispute," *African Studies Association of Australia and Pacific*, (1982), p.10; Richard D. Hirtzel, "The Relations of Kenya with its Bordering States," US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1976, pp.6-7.

<sup>11</sup> Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation," 1982, p.10; Hirtzel 1976, pp.6-7.

<sup>12</sup> John Creed and Kenneth Menkhaus, "The Rise of Saudi Regional Power and The Foreign Policies of Northeast African States," *Northeast African Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2/3, Michigan State University Press, (1986), p.14; Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation," 1982, p.10; Hirtzel 1976, pp.6-7.

<sup>13</sup> Korwa Gombe Adar, *The Significance of the Legal Principle of 'Territorial Integrity' as the Model Determinant of Relations: A Case Study of Kenya's Foreign Policy Towards Somalia, 1963-1983*, Indiana State University Press, 1986, p.275; Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation," 1982, p.11.

same security challenge from the Somalia Republic. The positive approach of Ethiopia towards Kenya during the Ogaden war got bona fide concern among the authorities of Kenya because the Kenyan officialdom thought that the Ogaden aggression causes unfeeling danger not only to the statehood status of Ethiopia but also to Kenya. In the light of this, the Ogaden war had also helped to strengthen the two nation's security cooperation. Afterward, in the face of the ideological disparity, Kenya became the leading African state to show its potent support to Ethiopia by condemning the action of Somalia throughout the war and subsequent periods.<sup>14</sup>

### **Security Partnership during the Ogaden War (1977-78)**

In the panorama and general security platform of Kenya, any kind of security challenge towards Ethiopia to create "Greater Somalia" was conditioned as a high-security threat towards the integrity of Kenya as a nation sooner or well along. Concomitantly, the authorities of Kenya usually consider that a minor achievement of Somalia against Ethiopia would give a big initiation to the irredentist move of Somalia. Ethiopia on its line saw the political move of Somalia towards Kenya in a wary eye. Thus, since the vital mental setup of the invasion of Ogaden was to build "Greater Somalia" the officialdom of Kenya emphatically and straight away showed their support to Ethiopia and condemned the operation of Somalia against Ogaden.<sup>15</sup>

In the light of this, throughout the Ogaden war, setting aside their ideological disparity, the first act employed by Ethiopia and Kenya was to open diplomatic and military campaigns against a common enemy, Somalia.<sup>16</sup> For instance, on September 26, 1977, in the move to support Ethiopia and undermine the action of Somalia, a Kenyan radio transmission named "Radio Nairobi" stated the following:

*Somalia's expansionism is unacceptable; Somalia is an aggressor both in word and deed; she has invaded Ethiopia militarily and lays claim to large chunks of Kenyan territory; her expansionist adventures must not be allowed to succeed because they will set the continent (of Africa) and the world aflame.*<sup>17</sup>

In the same vein, throughout the war, the Kenyan intelligence service exchanged information with the Ethiopian intelligence office, mainly focusing on the activities of the Somalia army along the frontier between Kenya and Somalia.<sup>18</sup>

Likewise, in the course of the Ogaden war, while the Somalia army inflicted the railway line from Addis Ababa to Djibouti, Kenya allowed Ethiopia to use Mombasa port. It is also apparent that during the Ogaden war, despite ideological disparity Kenya

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<sup>14</sup> Onyango 1995, pp.164-165.

<sup>15</sup> Jira Valenta, "Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa: Impact and Lesson," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.34, No.2, Soviet-American Competition in the Third World, (1980/81), p.354.

<sup>16</sup> David D. Laitin, "Somali Territorial Claims in International Perspective," *Africa Today*, Vol. 23, No. 2, Tensions in the Horn of Africa, Indiana University Press, (1976), p.36; Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation," 1982, p.1.

<sup>17</sup> Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation," 1982, p.2.

<sup>18</sup> Mihiret 1989, p.13.

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freed up Soviet Russia to ship military hardware and troops from Cuba through Mombasa port. In the meantime, in March 1978, the Kenyan minister of foreign affairs, Munyua Waiyaki, paid a state visit to Ethiopia.<sup>19</sup> On his state visit, the Kenyan minister of foreign affairs forwarded the following motivational speech that reflects the commitment of Kenya to strengthen the security partnership of the two states against the common enemy. The speech of Waiyaki reads:

*Kenyans are over-joyed by your victory and just as your struggle was our struggle, so, we now feel that your success is our success. Kenyans stand is not merely concerned with defending the principle of territorial integrity, but more so with defending the integrity of the Organization of African Unity...Kenya is ready to jointly destroy anyone who wishes to annex territory.*<sup>20</sup>

Concomitantly, on his homecoming, the Kenyan foreign minister, Waiyaki, suggested the government of Kenya increase material and moral support to Ethiopia as well as employ a dress rehearsal for the Kenyan army in case of Somalia's shift of assault towards Kenya.<sup>21</sup>

The other way that the Ethio-Kenyan security partnership reviled was in the area of diplomatic campaigns opposing continental and extra-continental powers' involvement in providing military hardware and financial support to Somalia. For instance, in January 1978, Kenya under its foreign minister, Waiyaki, presented a call towards the government of Shah, Iran, to stop its military and financial aid to Somalia. However, the latter was not ready to welcome the call of Waiyaki. Subsequently, the relationship between Kenya and Iran deteriorated from bad to worst. In the end, the Iranian embassy at Nairobi was closed in February 1978.<sup>22</sup>

On the same line, aiming to dry the source of support for Somalia, the authority of Ethiopia and Kenya presented a call to the government of Saudi Arabia. Particularly, the Kenyan foreign minister, Waiyaki, asserted that "we don't want Saudis to pay for guns which in the present climate in the Horn of Africa could be turned against us".<sup>23</sup>

Besides, on the course of the Ogaden war, on February 15, 1978, the Kenyan authority intercepted the Egyptian cargo aircraft that was carrying armaments including 200 artilleries to Mogadishu. In the meantime, Egypt reacted to the action of Kenya by intercepting two Kenyan passenger aircraft.<sup>24</sup> Kenya objected to the action of Egypt in the following way:

*By supplying Somalia with arms, Egypt is encouraging continued conflict in the Horn of Africa... One would expect Egypt to be interested in continued peace in the area for her national interests... by continuing to support a poor nation whose leading*

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<sup>19</sup> Peter J. Schraeder and Jerel A. Rosati "policy Dilemmas in the Horn of Africa: Contradictions in the U.S- Somalia Relationship," *Northeast African Studies*, Vol.9, No.3, Michigan State University Press, (1987), p.38; Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation," 1982, p.7.

<sup>20</sup> Onyango 1995, p.166.

<sup>21</sup> Onyango 1995, p.166.

<sup>22</sup> Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation," 1982, p.8.

<sup>23</sup> Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation," 1982, p.8.

<sup>24</sup> Mihiret 1989, p.13.

*quality is aggression, Egypt is not only failing in her duties as a leading African nation, but it is also undermining her interests in the area.*<sup>25</sup>

On the other hand, the channel of military and financial aid to Somalia from western blocs such as the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany worried the Ethio-Kenyan security pair. As a result, pro-west Kenya under its vice president Moi paid an extended tour to different western bloc states aiming to halt the financial and military aid to Somalia.<sup>26</sup>

In the process of its diplomatic campaign, the Kenyan diplomatic crew under the headman of Moi met President Carter in March 1978. In their discussion, Moi insisted President Carter condemn the forceful action of Somalia over Ogaden. Above and beyond, Moi tried to explain the ramification of assisting Somalia in armament for the stability and order of the Horn region. Moi had also demanded Carter to work on convincing Somalia to relinquish its policy of "Greater Somalia". Then, President Carter pledged Moi to "maintain an arms embargo on Somalia".<sup>27</sup>

On August 14, 1978, the secretary of states for the U.S, R. Moose, remarked to the Somalia envoy at Washington DC about the short-term suspension of the military assistance to Somalia. The secretary of state also noticed the suspension was valid until the full evacuation of the Somalia army from the Ethiopian territory, Ogaden.<sup>28</sup> After a few weeks President Carter too detailed the following:

*...before the United States would be ready to discuss providing economic aid or selling defensive weapons to Somalia, there would have to be a tangible withdrawal of Somalia forces from the Ogaden and the renewed commitment not to dishonor the boundaries of Ethiopia or Kenya.*<sup>29</sup>

This reflects that the cold war era ideological difference did not halt the security partnership of countries in the Horn. Above all the situation remarks that national security and national integrity got priority than the ideological disparity in the Horn region during the cold war era.

Following the Ogaden war, on January 31, 1979, Ethiopia and Kenya signed a treaty called the "Ethiopia-Kenya treaty of cooperation". The accord comprised twelve articles that were primarily dedicated to the security and territorial integrity of the two nations. The January 31 treaty of friendship and mutual aid was also committed improving cooperation between the two countries in the field of politics, diplomacy, military, and economic matters.<sup>30</sup> Likewise, in the treaty of January 31, Ethiopia and

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<sup>25</sup>Onyango 1995, p.174.

<sup>26</sup>Abdisalam M. Issa Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout: Boundary Politics and Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, Haan Publishing, 2001, p.151; Oduogo 1995, pp.169-170.

<sup>27</sup>Harry Ododa, "Somalia's Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations since the Ogaden War of 1977-78," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3, (1985), p.290; James Mayall, "The Battle for the Horn: Somali Irredentism and International Diplomacy," *The World Today*, Vol. 34, No. 9, Royal Institute of International Affairs, (1978), p.342.

<sup>28</sup>Onyango 1995, p.173.

<sup>29</sup>Onyango 1995, p.173.

<sup>30</sup>Mihiret 1989, p.14; see also Hary Ododa, "Somalia's Domestic Politics," 1985, p.290.



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Kenya agreed to promote their cooperation in the areas of development of tourism and protection of wildlife as well as strengthening cooperation in the areas of culture, science, mass media, education, transport, trade, and economy.<sup>31</sup>

On the other hand, during January 31, 1979, Addis Ababa accord, President Moi and Colonel Mengistu insisted on the following four issues:

*i) that Somalia must unconditionally renounce claims on the territories of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti and declare null and void all instruments asserting such claims; ii) that Somalia must openly and solemnly declare its acceptance of the principles and decisions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, governing inter-state relations including the principles of the inviolability of state frontiers and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; iii) that Somalia should declare that it would scrupulously respect international agreements as well as the principles of non-use of force in the settlement of disputes; and iv) that Somalia should pay prompt and adequate reparations for the war damages inflicted on Ethiopia during the Ogaden war of 1977-78.*<sup>32</sup>

However, in September 1979 the authorities of Saudi who were instrumental in isolating the Somalia Republic from the Soviet influence started a new scheme to isolate Kenya from Ethiopia. It is largely understood that this move of Saudi was orchestrated by the United States. Being an active ally of the United States, the authorities of Saudi Arabia vigorously participated in the political life of the Horn aiming to undermine the domination and reputation of the Soviets in the Horn region. The other aim of Saudi was looking to build its sphere of domination around the Red Sea and the Horn regions. Accordingly, in September 1979, most likely with the instruction of the United States; Saudi Arabia prepared a mediation platform for the rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia at a city called Taif.<sup>33</sup>

Subsequently, at the 1981 OAU meeting in Kenya, Nairobi, President Moi, and President Barry forwarded a joint communiqué for the betterment of the two states' relationship.<sup>34</sup> As part of the rapprochement calculation, in July 1984 President Moi visited Somalia. The visit of Moi was the first at the level of President in history after the independence of Kenya from British rule. On the visit, the head of state of the two countries forwarded promising words to improve the relationship of the two countries. At this time, some spectators argued that Kenya was shifting its security front from Ethiopia to Somalia.<sup>35</sup>

However, the presence of President Moi in Ethiopia on the tenth anniversary of Dergu's coming to office, in September 1984, and the afterward talk between Colonel Mengistu and President Moi to work jointly to promote the security cooperation of the two countries affirmed the unwavering position of the Ethio-Kenyan security

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<sup>31</sup> Mihiret 1989, p.15.

<sup>32</sup> African Diary: Africa Publications, India, Vol. xix, No.2, 1979, p.298.

<sup>33</sup> Ododa 1985, p.290; Samuel M. Makinda "Conflict and Superpowers," 1982, p.98.

<sup>34</sup> Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation," 1982, pp.11-12.

<sup>35</sup> African contemporary Record, African Publishing Company, New York and London, Vol.17, 1985, p.276.

partnership.<sup>36</sup>

This marks that so long as Somalia persisted with its irredentist program and go all the way to take the Somali inhabiting lands from Ethiopia and Kenya the security partnership between the two states (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya) would not end merely through plain rapprochement or any other dispositions.

### **Boundary Diplomacy**

Kenya and Ethiopia possess virtually 860 KM of shared borderline. Apart from a teeny belt of Gadaduma and Goduma, the frontier between the two countries was delineated on paper in the 1907 accord. The delineation was conducted between Emperor Menelik II and Great Britain (as colonial ruler for Kenya). The controversy over Goduma and Gadaduma took a long time. It is also apparent that the long-awaited Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commissions study report in 1957 to iron out the complication at Gadaduma and Goduma strip of lands did not halt the deadlock. This has happened because the report was rebuffed by the Ethiopian officialdom asserting the study was against its national interest. Later, as a successor state, the authority of Kenya inherited the complication over Gadaduma and Goduma walls.<sup>37</sup>

Subsequently, Ethiopia under Emperor Hailesilase I and Kenya under its first president Jomo Kenyatta resumed the boundary discussion to iron out complications over the Gadaduma and Goduma teeny strip of lands. Finally, in 1970 President Kenyatta and Emperor Hailesilase I reached on consensuses to solve the complication at Gadaduma and Goduma walls. In the same year, the boundary between the two countries was demarcated. Based on the 1970 Ethio-Kenya boundary accord, the disputed teeny land belt named Gadaduma was transferred to Ethiopia in quid pro quo Goduma wall was disposed to Kenya. During the peaceful division of the conflicting Gadaduma and Goduma strip of land, the two countries were agreed that the pastoral communities of both nations use water for their cattle crossing frontier lines but not pasture.<sup>38</sup>

The nonviolent and amicable approach to iron out the boundary complication between the two states had helped for the promotion of the friendly political, economic and social relationship between the government and peoples of the two countries. This amicable approach between the two states was not challenged even during the cold war era in the face of disparity of political theory.

It is postulated that the officialdoms of Ethiopia and Kenya solved the long-awaited boundary complication over Gadaduma and Goduma for four reasons. First, both Ethiopia and Kenya had a common challenge from the Somalia Republic. This was true because Somalia claims the Northern Frontier District from Kenya (NFD). Here, it is vital to note that the NFD encompass provinces like Mandera, Moyale, Marsabit,

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<sup>36</sup> African contemporary Record, African Publishing Company, New York and London, Vol.17, 1985, p.276.

<sup>37</sup>Mihiret 1989, p.2.

<sup>38</sup>Ethiopian National Archive and Library Agency (hereafter ENALA), Ethio-Kenya Boundary, B17.02.14.02, see also Mihiret 1989, p.2.

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Wajir, Garissa, and Isolo that cover one-fifth of Kenyan territory. In the same way, the Somali nationalist asserted one-fifth of the Ethiopian territory that encompass provinces such as Ogaden, Haud, up to Arsi and Bale. So, both Ethiopia and Kenya favored to ward off fighting on two fronts and insisted to iron out their boundary complication peacefully through the principle of even the score through reciprocating the small strip of lands called Gadaduma (to Ethiopia) and Goduma (to Kenya).<sup>39</sup>

The second condition that whipped up Kenya and Ethiopia to promote peaceful boundary diplomacy was aiming to present the Ethio-Kenyan boundary issue as a model for Somalia against its boundary complication with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. The third point in focus that whipped up Kenya and Ethiopia to iron out their frontier disagreement was to show the applicability of the 1964 Cairo accord. The 1964 Cairo accord conditioned that in case of friction and ill will to welcome colonial frontiers as a legal frontier contradicting states can iron out their frontier complications through smooth and nonviolent political setup. Accordingly, Ethiopia and Kenya, which were the figurehead among those correspondents and advocates of the 1964 Cairo accord dedicated to ironing out their frontier disagreement peacefully. This amicable approach to the frontier disagreement was partly stemmed from the ambition to be considered as a model for the other African states that were under similar inter-state political longitude. The fourth aspect that brings out Ethiopia and Kenya to iron out their frontier problem peacefully was to buildup themselves as ardent and devoted instrumental states in realizing the principles of OAU.<sup>40</sup> For instance, the Ethio-Kenyan frontier accord on its introductory section states the following:

*...Wishing to offer the brotherly people of Africa a stimulating example, in the application of fundamental principles of fraternity. As laid down in the charter of the organization of the African Union have resolved and agreed to conceive treaty determining the boundary between the two countries and regulating certain matters pertaining.*<sup>41</sup>

The bed for the friendly boundary diplomacy between the two countries was not to shoot in the dark their sense of cooperation for a teeny strip of land. So, despite the cold war ideological disparity the presence of the amicable boundary diplomacy collectively helped the two nations to frame all-season synergetic relations in the Horn region. In fact, after the official commencement of the boundary accord, the authorities of the two countries made a deal to establish an organ that would further support the amicable boundary diplomacy between the two nations. In the light of this, the Ethio-Kenyan joint border commission was established at the 1970 Moyale summit to advance the amicable boundary relations of the two nations.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>Salwe 2001, p.27; Betru 1989, p.14.

<sup>40</sup>Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, "Middle East Conflicts and Middle Level Power Intervention in the Horn of Africa," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 3, Middle East Institute, (1996), 392; Donna R. Jackson, "The Carter Administration and Somalia," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 31, No. 4, Oxford University Press, (2007), p.707; Salwe 2001, p.27; Betru 1989, p.14.

<sup>41</sup> Ian Brownlie, *African Boundaries*, London: Oxford University Press, 1976, p.2.

<sup>42</sup>Betru 1989, p.15.

Since its formation, the joint boundary commission helped in promoting peaceful boundary relations between the two nations through regulating the traditional inter-state cross-border raids among tribal groups around the frontiers. Likewise, the joint boundary commission helped the cold war Ethio-Kenyan cooperation through researching and filling the gaps.

However, here, it is vital to note that keeping constant the presence of peaceful boundary diplomacy there were some undeniable complications around the frontier areas between Ethiopia and Kenya. These complications were mainly stemmed from the incompetent implementation of articles in the 1970 frontier accord on both sides. In the same tone, it is also evident that Kenya and Ethiopia crossed the complications of colonial boundary and solved their frontier issues peacefully, and carry out most of the settlements in the boundary accord. However, some concerns were not properly materialized on both sides with a full heart. Among concerns that were not materialized from heat and soul and later coasted the Ethio-Kenyan amicable boundary diplomacy was the issue of cross-border raids.<sup>43</sup>

So, even if the cross-border surprise attack was not in a possession to escalate to a higher scale of diplomatic complication between the two nations, the recurrent surprise attacks among tribal groups of the two states noticeable challenged the all-season cooperative relations between the two countries. For instance, in the mid-1970s while the cross-border surprise attack was discussed in the Kenyan legislative houses, some Kenyan parliament representatives accused Ethiopia of the raid. This Kenyan accusation had happened after Ethiopia accused Kenya of the same action during the joint boundary commission meeting at Ethiopia's western town, Awasa.<sup>44</sup>

Thus, throughout the cold war era, regardless of the peaceful boundary diplomacy at the level of government, the hostile cross-border assault among tribal groups recurrently challenged the peaceful boundary diplomacy between the two nations.<sup>45</sup>

To halt and shove aside the recurrent cross-border assault the officialdom of the two nations introduced a decree of gun registration that can be implemented on tribal groups inhabiting along the frontier between the two countries. Given that, in the mid-1970s the Ethio-Kenyan boundary consultative commission met at Nairobi to discuss the rising cross-border raids. Finally, on its Article 9, the joint boundary consultative commission's procès-verbal insisted and approved the necessity of gun registration among the tribal groups along the frontiers between the two countries.<sup>46</sup>

In the same vein, to further promote peaceful boundary cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya the officialdoms of the two countries bestowed the following four responsibilities for the security guards of the two nations along the frontiers: (i) safeguarding civilians of both nations from involving in the traditional exercise of cross-border assaults and killing; (ii) ensuring peace along the frontier during the seasonal

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<sup>43</sup> ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Agreements A.17.2.14.03.

<sup>44</sup> ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Agreements, B17.2.14.03.

<sup>45</sup> Betru 1989, p.27.

<sup>46</sup> ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Agreements A.17.2.14.03.

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movement of pastoral societies looking for pasture and water; (iii) creating knowledge and understanding to their particular citizens along the frontiers about the limit of their respective states boundary and; (iv) at last but not least the security guards of both states were asked to withdraw itself from taking rigorous actions on people who cross frontiers unconsciously or losing directions.<sup>47</sup>

On the other hand, to further undermine the recurrent cross-border assaults the Ethio-Kenyan authorities prepared a meeting between 7 and 11 August 1975 at Tika, Kenya. At this meeting, the representatives of hostile tribal leaders from both countries were invited to discuss and iron out their problems.<sup>48</sup>

In addition, at the Tika meeting, the Ethio-Kenyan joint frontier security commission agreed to start radio communication between the two nation's police forces along the frontier to halt the traditional cross-border raids. For instance, following the Tika summit the Kenyan authority stated that "the competent authorities of the Republic of Kenya have authorized the use of 5700 kHz frequency for radio communication between Kenya and Ethiopian police stations along the common borders".<sup>49</sup> This understanding between the two nations reflects that regardless of their cold war ideological disparity and recurrent cross-border raids the two countries were under a high state of commitment in promoting their security cooperation.

Likewise, the 1976 Ethio-Kenyan boundary council summit which was held at Addis Ababa, and the subsequent meetings by the two nations at the levels of heads of states and ministers further fortified their boundary diplomacy. For instance, in January 1979 while president Moi visited Ethiopia, he indicated that the peaceful boundary diplomacy between the two nations helped them to promote their security cooperation. At the end of Moi's visit, the two countries signed the Ethio-Kenyan treaty of friendship and cooperation. In the same year, the joint boundary commission meeting was held at Nakuru, Kenya. Later, the 28th Ethio-Kenyan joint ministerial summit was held at Mombasa, Kenya, in March 1980. In 1981 the two countries' joint boundary consultative summit was held in Awasa, Ethiopia. In the same manner, in 1983 and later years until the inception of the 1990s consecutive peaceful meetings were conducted between Ethiopia and Kenya to further build up the cooperative relations of the two nations along the frontiers.<sup>50</sup>

Therefore, despite the presence of cold war ideological disparity between Ethiopia (Marxist-Leninist) and Kenya (pro-west and capitalist) the presence of peaceful boundary diplomacy helped the two nations to create security cooperation in the Horn of Africa.

#### **Viable Cross-border Partnerships**

The dedication of Ethiopia and Kenya to build viable inter-state cross-border partnerships might also be taken as the other reason that has helped the two Horn

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<sup>47</sup> ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Agreements, A17.3.14.03.

<sup>48</sup> ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments, B17.2.14.02.

<sup>49</sup> ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments, B17.04.14.02.

<sup>50</sup> Mihiret 1989, p.15.

countries in promoting amicable security pair despite their ideological disparity. The inquiry in the process of examination reflects that the cross-border inter-governmental partnerships between Ethiopia and Kenya, in the face of their ideological divergence, were stemmed from two reasons: (i) communication matters that emanated from geopolitical proximity and; (ii) cross-border joint planning.

In other words, for all intents and purposes, the possibility of a country to access far-reaching waterways has the power to alter the foreign policy attitude and style of a nation against other nations that have the interest to use the waterway. The other antidote for the improvement of cooperative relations between geopolitically proximate countries is the development of land transportations such as railways and modern capacious road networks.<sup>51</sup>

The proactive policy advocacy by Nairobi and Addis Ababa on cross-border joint planning and communication has further deep-rooted as a result of the aggressive irredentist policy of Somalia against Ethiopia and Kenya. Directly affected by Somalia's irredentist policy setting, the Hailesilase-Kenyata administrations reasserted the strategic value of cross-border joint planning in their policy circle. More specifically, when Kenya got its independence in 1963 one of the first things that the officialdoms of the two countries committed was to improve the communication systems between the two countries. In 1964 while Emperor Hailesilase visited Nairobi, for instance, one of the matters discussed with President Jomo Kenyatta was to promote the communication between Ethiopia and Kenya.<sup>52</sup> In the same tone, in 1967 when the Ethiopian delegates under the superintendence of Foreign Minister Ketema Yifru arrived at Nairobi, the matter of improving communication through constructing modern capacious road networks was discussed explicitly.<sup>53</sup>

Similarly, in October 1967, during President Kenyatta's state visit to Ethiopia, comparable prominence was driven on improving the communication between the two nations. In that sense, in the joint press release, the leaders of the two countries vowed to complete the Nairobi-Addis Ababa modern capacious road as fast as possible.<sup>54</sup> Subsequently, the Nairobi-Addis Ababa highway was achieved in 1977. Here, it is vital to note that the Kenyan flank of the road was concluded in 1974 while the Ethiopian side was done in 1977.<sup>55</sup>

The accomplishment of the road has helped the two countries to increase their partnerships through improving the volume of import and export items from and to Ethiopia and Kenya. Following the construction of the Addis Ababa-Nairobi modern highway, Mombasa became one of the major outlets to the sea for Ethiopia. In this regard, for instance, during the 1977-78 Ethio-Somalia war (i.e. the Ogaden war) the service of the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway line and the port of Djibouti was temporarily weekend. As a result, the Mombasa port helped to cover the gap by

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<sup>51</sup> Onyango 1995, p.202.

<sup>52</sup> African Research Bulletin, Vol.1, African Research Ltd, London, 1964, p.89.

<sup>53</sup> African Research Bulletin, Vol.4, African Research Ltd, London, 1967, p.754.

<sup>54</sup> African Research Bulletin, Vol.4, African Research Ltd, London, 1967, p.754.

<sup>55</sup> Onyango 1995, p.202.

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providing a port facility to Ethiopia to import and export goods including armament. Above and beyond, whenever the port of Djibouti, Massawa, and Assab became crowded Ethiopia used to shift to the port of Mombasa to access the sea.<sup>56</sup> This reflects that environmental factors including geopolitical proximity helped to promote a bridge of cross-border partnerships between Ethiopia and Kenya, unlike their cold war ideological disparity.

The Ethio-Kenya cross-border joint planning and the ambition of the two nations to use their natural resources as a means of cooperation than as a means of conflict helped for the raise of their partnership in the face of their ideological disparity during the cold war era. The cross-border joint planning policy of the two nations (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya) to use their natural resources in a non-hostile manner, for instance, was seen on the approval of Ethiopia to the Kenyan proposal to raise fish for commercial purposes on Lake Rudolph. Here, it is vital to note that Lake Rudolph is one of the natural resources in which shared by both Ethiopia (the northern side of the lake) and Kenya (the southern side of the lake).<sup>57</sup>

The authority of Kenya introduced its interest to raise fish for a commercial reason under the title of a project named “Turkana Scheme”. The project was presented for the first time on June 21, 1972, during the Ethio-Kenyan joint boundary commission’s summit at Nakuru, Kenya. Kenya presented the same kind of interrogation on the subsequent Ethio-Kenyan joint boundary commission’s summit at Tika (Kenya) and Arbaminch (Ethiopia) in 1975 and 1976 respectively.<sup>58</sup>

In its proposal for the “Turkana Scheme” the representatives of Kenya insisted to include the Ethiopian side of the Lake and Omo River in the study of their project. This was done not only because Ethiopia and Kenya share the water of Lake Rudolph but also because of natural factors. Meaning, from the larval phase up to considerable size fishes in Lake Rudolph grow on the Ethiopian side of the Lake and Omo River. To further clarify the concept, for natural reasons, in Lake Rudolph, fishes grow on the northern (Ethiopian) side of the Lake at their early stage and migrate to the southern (Kenyan) side of the Lake at their average age. Thus, to accomplish the “Turkana Scheme” effectively it was necessary for Kenya to work and plan together with Ethiopia. The situation in turn helped the two nations to straighten their cooperation and to promote the policy of cross-border joint planning, unlike their cold war ideological divergence.<sup>59</sup>

As a price to further strengthen their cross-border cooperation policy against Somalia’s common irredentist security threat, Ethiopia had also shown green light for Kenya to implement the “Turkana Scheme”, but, demanded the following three commitments from Kenya: (i) to confirm the same kind of project proposal that would be prepared by Ethiopia on Lake Rudolph. Meaning, Ethiopia insisted Kenya allow the

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<sup>56</sup> African Contemporary Record, Vol.10, Africa Publishing Company, New York and London, 1978, p.253.

<sup>57</sup> ENALA, Ethio-Kenya Boundary, B17.02.14.02.

<sup>58</sup> ENALA, Ethio-Kenya Boundary, A17.03.14.02.

<sup>59</sup> ENALA, Ethio-Kenya Boundary, B17.02.14.02.

Ethiopian staff to employ the same kind of study on the Kenyan side of the Lake; (ii) be aware that Ethiopia would employ different projects including irrigation on the Omo River, which is the major source of water for Lake Rudolph, that in return might reduce the flow of Omo River to the lake, and; (iii) Ethiopia had also insisted Kenya to share the copy of the study result with Ethiopia.<sup>60</sup>

Yet again, the cross-border joint planning for wildlife conservation between the two nations in the face of their cold war era ideological disparity had also helped for the promotion of cooperative security pair between Ethiopia and Kenya. Having been challenged by the irredentist policy of Somalia and allies of Somalia, in many ways, their cross-border joint planning to establish a new national park along the shore of Lake Rudolph had a valuable outcome in promoting the Ethio-Kenyan cross-border cooperation. The new park was intended to protect flora and fauna in the viable area along the frontier between the two nations and the shore of the Lake. It is also apparent that in the surrounding of Lake Rudolph and Omo River there are reasonable herds of Oryx, Zebra, Kudu, Topi, Elephant, and many more. So, the two countries' joint planning in 1974 at Nairobi, Kenya, to develop a new park and to make it open for tourism stemmed from the desire to use the resources along the border of the two nations without going into any diplomatic battle on the cross-border resources. For the functionality of the cross-border national park project, the authority of Kenya showed its commitment by reserving the eastern shore of Lake Rudolph for the new park. The same kind of suggestion was already made by the Ethiopian authorities in the western bank of the Omo River for the park.<sup>61</sup>

More importantly, there was also understanding on both sides of the border to manage hunting, and where necessary special sanctuaries should be created for the protection of the special habitat of rare species such as Nyala. Here, it is vital to note that the joint cross-border wildlife conservation act recommended that the two states should regularly exchange information on any person engaged in activities concerning wildlife in any capacity, and who gets disqualified for committing an offense of engaging in activities that are contrary to the interest and wildlife of the state. Likewise, the joint plan affirmed that confidential information when supplied should be kept secret if success is to be expected out of such cooperation.<sup>62</sup>

The joint wildlife conservation project along the Kenya-Ethiopian border and the development of a positive attitude between the two nations to establish a new national park along the border area between the two nations reflects that the cold war era ideological disparity amid Addis Ababa and Nairobi did not affect the interstate security cooperation between them. So, one of the reasons for the cooperative approach between Ethiopia and Kenya in the face of ideological disparity was stemmed from the joint cross-border planning between the two nations on the areas such as natural resources, education, wildlife conservation, illegal trade, or contraband and health.

The other cross-border joint planning that helped for the Ethio-Kenyan security

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<sup>60</sup> ENALA, Ethio-Kenya Boundary, B17.02.14.02.

<sup>61</sup> ENALA, Ethio-Kenya Boundary, A17.03.14.02.

<sup>62</sup> ENALA, Ethio-Kenya Boundary, B17.02.14.02.



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cooperation in the face of the two nations cold war era ideological disparity was seen in the development of health facilities and services along the Ethio-Kenyan international highway. In 1974, for instance, the two countries' cross-border joint plan meeting was held in Nyari, Kenya, to discuss the issue of communicable diseases. Subsequently, based on the 1974 agreement at Nyari, in subsequent year (in 1975) a mass immunization pilot joint project was planned to be undertaken in Sidamo. Depending on the experience gained from the joint pilot project in 1975, a further plan was prepared to extend the joint campaign to cover four more regions namely Gamu-Gofa, Welega, Illuababor, and Kaffa.<sup>63</sup> Perhaps one of the biggest exceptions in the process of the joint cross-border planning policy of the two nations to that general trend of the Horn region was the cross-border joint planning to construct two hospitals at the border towns of Moyale and Meki. The hospital planned at Moyale was completed in 1975/76.<sup>64</sup> Thus, due to the development of shared interest for security and Somalia irredentism, the cross-border joint planning policy approaches essentially helped to manage the possible ideology based rivalry between Ethiopia (a pro-socialist state since 1974) and Kenya (a pro-capitalist and pro-west state from the outset) during the cold war era.

#### **Conclusion**

In the political dynamics of the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia's switch to Marxism-Leninism in 1974 set off many spectators to suppose that the Ethio-Kenyan security partnership would weaken. However, keeping constant the cold war ideological disparity, both Ethiopia and Kenya used to use the challenge from the Somalia Republic as a bargaining tool to watch over their security partnership. Against this background, it is apparent that in the process of the Ethio-Kenya complimentary scenario issues such as, among others, the growing threat of the Somali irredentism, the viable cross-border joint planning, peaceful boundary diplomacy, and geopolitical proximity were the major reasons for the augmentation of the security synergy between the two states. Thereupon, in the inquiry of this study, it appears that the Ethio-Kenya common boundary complication against Somalia had also helped the two nations (i.e. Kenya and Ethiopia) to avoid any kind of belligerence and to take the cold war ideological underpinning too seriously.

Apparently, in the process of the Ethio-Kenya security partnership, Somalia together with its allies- Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S.A attempted to weaken the security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya throughout the 1970s and 1980s using the two nation's ideological disparity as rhetoric fodder. But all attempts were not fruitful in developing a sense of hostility between Ethiopia and Kenya. The decline of all efforts to break down the two countries' security partnership clearly "displayed how regional relations during the cold war often failed to meet the expectations of geopolitically minded analysts due to the role played by local nationalist politics".<sup>65</sup>

On the other side, it is understood that the traditional cross-border raids among

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<sup>63</sup> ENALA, Ethio-Kenya Boundary, A17.03.14.02.

<sup>64</sup> ENALA, Ethio-Kenya Boundary, B17.02.14.02.

<sup>65</sup> Woodwel 2007, 118.

tribal groups from both states were and continued to be a challenge for the amicable and cooperative relationship between the two countries. The cross-border raid complication was a challenge, even, in the post-cold war eras down to the present. In the same vein, it is understood that the traditional cross-border raids were a kind of tradition standing for a long time. It is arguably right that the negative conditions seem partly stemmed from the unproductive and inefficient exercises of accords and promises by the two nations. However, it is essential to note that over time such kind of minor confrontation, if not managed systematically, will grow to a major confrontation that would threaten and halt the long-standing and well-institutionalized security partnership between the two countries.

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