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The Armistice of Mudania in the American Press

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Abstract

This paper discusses the reflection of the Mudania Armistice process in the American press. The armistice decision and invitation of Turkey to the conference were presented by the American press evaluated. The study aims to evaluate the Armistice process based on the news and articles in the American press. The content analysis method was preferred. The relevant press was identified and classified based on objectivity and reality. The news and articles from the American press were examined for impartiality, style, and arguments. All relevant news and articles were included. The main resources of the study are newspapers and magazines that were published in the United States during the Mudania Conference, as well as the memoirs of the conference attendees. These resources were selected for the study because they have not been extensively evaluated in previous research, and the potential contribution of this study to the literature is considered significant. This study aimed to uncover two key findings: first, to determine the attitude of the American press on the subject of the Mudania Armistice, and second, to reveal the extent to which the relevant press adhered to the neutrality policy declared by the American government.

Keywords: Armistice of Mudania, American Press, Turkey, Greece, England, France, Italy

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Amerikan Basınında Mudania Mütarekesi

Öz

Bu çalışmada Mudania Mütareke sürecinin Amerikan basınına yansımaları ele alınmıştır. Mütarekenin kararlaştırılması ve Türkiye'nin konferansa davet edilmesi sürecinin Amerikan basını tarafından okuyucuya sunulması değerlendirilmiştir. Çalışmanın amacı, Mudania Mütarekesi sürecinin Amerikan basınındaki haber ve makalelerden yararlanılarak değerlendirilmesidir. Çalışmada içerik analizi yöntemi tercih edilmiştir. Buna göre öncelikle ilgili basındaki haber ve yazılar tespit edilerek objektiflik ve gerçeklerle uygunluk durumuna göre sınıflandırılmıştır. Ardından Amerikan basınındaki haber ve yazıların üslubu, tarafsızlık ilkesine uyumu ve argümanları analiz edilmiştir. Konuyla ilgili tespit edilebilen tüm haber ve makaleler değerlendirmeye alınmıştır. Çalışmanın temel kaynakları Mudania Konferansı döneminde Amerika'da yayınlanmış olan gazete ve dergiler ile konferansa katılmış olan delegelerin hatıralarıdır. Araştırma için tercih edilmiş olan kaynakların şimdiye dek yeterince değerlendirilmemiş olması ve bu çalışmanın literatüre muhtemel katkısı düşünüldüğünden bu kaynaklar tercih edilmiştir. Amerikan basınının konu ile ilgili tutumunun belirlenmesi ve ilgili basının Amerikan hükümetinin ilan etmiş olduğu tarafsızlık politikasına uygunluğunun ortaya çıkarılmasının hedeflenmiş olması bu çalışmanın en önemli muhtemel bulguları olmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mudania Mütarekesi, Amerikan Basını, Türkiye, Yunanistan, İngiltere, Fransa, İtalya

Introduction

Following the commencement of the Turkish Great Offensive on August 26, 1922, the Greeks experienced a substantial defeat, leading to the complete withdrawal of Greek forces from Anatolia. The Turkish army, having successfully liberated İzmir from Greek occupation on September 9, 1922, received orders from Commander-in-Chief Mustafa Kemal Pasha to advance towards the Dardanelles immediately after the city's liberation. Consequently, tens of thousands of Turkish soldiers swiftly mobilized to the Dardanelles, while a contingent of thousands prepared to engage from the north front of İzmit, poised for potential action

towards Istanbul.¹ The Turks did not hesitate to act decisively to save their capital, İstanbul, from the Greek and Allied occupation. France and Italy found the Turkish claims on İstanbul and Thrace justified and withdrew their troops from around the straits. Britain, on the other hand, showed great resistance to the wishes of the Turks, and instead of withdrawing its troops, it began to supplement a large number of soldiers, war materials and ammunition from the British dominions all around the world. Tensions between Turkish and British forces escalated quickly, and the two sides soon found themselves face to face, and the danger of a large-scale war loomed. In response to these developments, representatives from allied states convened in Paris to discuss the situation. Following the meeting, it was decided to organize a conference with the goal of establishing a ceasefire agreement as soon as possible, and Turkey was invited to attend. The decision to invite Turkey to the conference was communicated to Mustafa Kemal Pasha by French special delegate Franklin Bouillon while he was still in İzmir.²

Mustafa Kemal Pasha held a meeting in İzmir with his army commanders and other Turkish officials, and at the end of the meeting, it was decided to be attended the conference, but it was reported to Bouillon that the validity of that decision depended on the approval of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.³ The acceptance of Turkey to participate in the conference was welcomed by the allies and the final decision to be issued by the Turkish Grand National Assembly began to be awaited. A few days later, the decision to attend the conference was approved by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, thus paving the way for a ceasefire agreement between Turkey and the Allies. As the Allies acknowledged Mustafa Kemal Pasha's authority to determine the conference location, he announced Mudania as the suitable venue for the conference, which was ultimately accepted. The conference was scheduled to begin on October 3, 1922, and it was agreed that only the pressing military issues would be addressed. Accordingly, delegates were required to hold military ranks. The participating countries appointed their representatives, including General İsmet Pasha for Turkey, General Harington for England, General Charpy for France, and General Mombelli for Italy.⁴

Initially planned for October 3, 1922, the conference was postponed due to the delayed arrival of Greek delegates in Mudania, and it officially began on October 4, 1922. The majority of issues were successfully addressed during the initial day of negotiations, paving the way for the potential signing of an

¹ "Turks Take Position Near Dardanelles and Mass More Forces Toward Capital; London Hears Paris will Warn Angora" *The New York Times*, New York, September 23, 1922, p.1.

² "Turks Receive Proposal from Allies, French are Rushing an Envoy to Kemal" *The New York Times*, New York, September 25, 1922, p.1.

³ "Text of the Note of Allies to Kemal Pasha, Stating Their Conditional Offer to Turks" *The New York Times*, New York, September 24, 1922, p.1.

⁴ "Relief in Near East Crisis, Turks Agree to Armistice Parley, Meeting Definitely Fixed for Tomorrow at Mudania" *Olean Evening Herald*, New York, October 02, 1922, p.1.

armistice.⁵ However, on the second day, tensions arose when the Turkish delegation insisted on the immediate withdrawal of Greek troops from Thrace and its handover to Turkey. During the interruption of the Mudania conference, British Prime Minister Lloyd George urgently summoned the British government for a meeting. After hours of cabinet discussions, it was agreed that Foreign Minister Lord Curzon would travel to Paris to meet with Italian and French representatives to draft a joint protocol. Following two days of extensive negotiations in Paris, primarily between the British and French, an agreement was finally reached, and the conference reconvened using the newly proposed protocol. However, negotiations stalled, particularly regarding Thrace, and a resolution that satisfied all parties could not be reached. Consequently, the Allied representatives opted to present the jointly agreed-upon protocol in Paris to the Turkish delegation as the Allies' final offer.⁶

The developments in Western Anatolia from the liberation of İzmir to the signing of the Armistice of Mudania received extensive coverage in the American press. Major newspapers and magazines of the period, based in cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Washington, and California, prominently featured news about the Mudania Conference, usually on their front pages. Rather than simply reporting the news on a single page, many newspapers also included comments and articles that spanned multiple pages. There is important research on the Mudania Armistice that should be mentioned for further readings: Tokça (1959), Şamsutdinov (1999), Karacan (1971), İnönü (1971), Atatürk (1927), Bayur (1995), Cebesoy (2002), Eyyüpoğlu (1998), Yaman (1996), Hülügü (1997) and Kaya (2022). This paper aims to provide a unique perspective on the Mudania Armistice by examining how the process was covered in the American press and the issues that were emphasized during the time. As such, it aims to differentiate itself from the many existing studies on the topic and make a new contribution to the literature.

The Decision to Hold a Conference and Invite Turkey to Attend: Factors Considered and Diplomatic Efforts Made

After the Greeks had been completely expelled from Western Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal Pasha held a meeting with western journalists in İzmir and expressed his thoughts about a possible ceasefire and peace treaty. Kemal Pasha said that İstanbul had to be given to the Turks and that they wanted to take İstanbul through peace. According to Kemal Pasha, if İstanbul could not be taken peacefully, the Turks would not have hesitated to fight for it.⁷ In another interview, Mustafa Kemal Pasha laid out certain conditions that needed to be met for their participation in a ceasefire conference. He emphasized the immediate

⁵ Edwin L. James, "Paris Gets Reports of Accord at Mudania, Believes Agreement Between Allied Generals and Ismet Pasha will be Signed Today" *The New York Times*, New York, October 05, 1922, p.2.

⁶ "Terms of Allies' Handed to Turks; Angora to Decide" *The New York Times*, New York, October 10, 1922, p.1.

⁷ "Must Have Capital, Says Kemal Pasha" *The New York Times*, New York, September 15, 1922, p.2.

handover of Thrace and İstanbul to the Turks, and the prompt evacuation of all Greek troops stationed in Thrace. (Price, 1922). Thus, Turkey's demands had been determined in a possible conference. Important support for Turkey's claims on İstanbul and Thrace had come from the German General Liman von Sanders, who had been given the rank of Marshal by the Ottoman State. According to Sanders, the lands were claimed by the Turks already belonged to them, İstanbul and Thrace would fall under Turkish rule, and England or Europe could not afford a new war with Turkey.⁸

Before the Mudania conference, discussions had taken place in the United States regarding the developments in Turkey, and some predictions had been made on the subject. Henry Morgenthau, one of the former American ambassadors who had served in İstanbul, had expressed the opinion that the Turks should be kept away from Europe. He believed that if the Turks were allowed to enter Europe again, it would have caused a great world war.⁹ Morgenthau had also suggested that Asia Minor could be left to the Turks, but the straits should not be handed over to them, and they must be prevented from crossing into Europe. Morgenthau had claimed that Mustafa Kemal Pasha would not have attended any conference unless he had achieved his goals. He had also predicted that the fate of İstanbul would be similar to that of İzmir. According to Morgenthau, a great war would have broken in İstanbul, and tens of thousands of people would have lost their lives in that war.¹⁰ Another American, Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, had made strong statements about Turks in a speech he had given at a meeting organized to help Near East Charities. He had argued that Turks should be kept away from Europe and that the best time to do so was when the war ended with the Turks. According to Lodge, the Turks needed to be kept out of Europe.¹¹

After long negotiations between the Allies in Paris before the Mudania conference, it was decided not to give the straits to the Turks.¹² The French and British governments urged Mustafa Kemal Pasha to respect the borders of the Neutral Zone through their high commissioners in İstanbul.¹³ The British government went further by declaring that any violation of the Neutral Zones would cause war, and the British army would defend those zones at all costs. The British government stated that its main concern in the negotiations with the Turks

⁸ "Von Sanders Backs Kemal, Upholds Turk Claim to Constantinople, Thrace and Dardanelles" The New York Times, New York, September 16, 1922, p.2.

⁹ "Morgenthau Says Constantinople Will See Tragedy and Destruction" The New York Times, New York, September 16, 1922, p.2.

¹⁰ "Morgenthau Fears War, Points Out Elements of a Balkan Outbreak if Turks are not Curbed" The New York Times, New York, September 14, 1922, p.3.

¹¹ "Lodge Would Drive Turks from Europe, says it Ought to Have Been Done at Close of Great War" The New York Herald, New York, September 30, 1922, p.1.

¹² "Allies Agree to Keep Straits Neutral" The New York Times, New York, September 16, 1922, p.1.

¹³ "French Pro-Turkish Message to London, It Agrees That Straits Must Be Free, But Hints at Concessions to Kemal" The New York Times, New York, September 14, 1922, p.3.

would be the straits and neutral zone. They declared that they would reinforce their troops on the Asian coast of the straits and take precautions in case of any situation. The British government's declaration also called on the governments of Romania, Yugoslavia, and Greece to send reinforcements to defend the neutral zones, and a full combat position was taken.¹⁴ In response to the British government's statement, Mustafa Kemal Pasha conveyed his message through the British İstanbul High Commissioner, Harry Lamb, whom he met in İzmir.¹⁵ He made it clear that if the Greeks were permitted to utilize the neutral zone, they would not acknowledge its existence. Additionally, he emphasized the need for the immediate evacuation of all Greeks in Thrace. However, he assured that British troops would not be attacked if the British recognized Turkish sovereignty over Thrace and İstanbul.¹⁶ Kemal Pasha's assurance was appreciated by British General Harington, who was in charge of the Allied occupation forces in İstanbul. Harington suggested that a new demarcation line could be established and the borders of the neutral zone could be adjusted.¹⁷

The British government, which held successive cabinet meetings, constantly gave instructions to Harington about the straits and declared that Harington could take the necessary decisions on all issues, including the declaration of the war.¹⁸ France opposed the British idea of defending the straits at the expense of fighting, and informed the British government that peaceful relations should be established with Mustafa Kemal Pasha. According to the French, it would not be easy to stop the Turkish army, which had just won a brilliant victory, with threats, and it was not a wise way. Moreover, it had been understood from the negotiations of the French authorities with Kemal Pasha that the Turks had no intention of attacking the neutral zone. In that case, it would be unreasonable to make a warmongering out-of-the-box. For the French, the attitude of the British rather than the Turks was wrong and provocative. The French said that they were sure that an agreement with Mustafa Kemal Pasha could be reached through peace.¹⁹

While these developments were taking place, Soviet Russia's Ankara representative Semion İvanoviç Aralof wished Thrace and İstanbul to be saved from occupation as soon as possible in the congratulatory telegram he sent to Mustafa Kemal Pasha and stated that the straits problem should be resolved in the interests of the countries bordering the Black Sea. In addition, according to an

¹⁴ "Britain Prepares to Fight for Straits, Urges Balkan Allies to Help Keep the Dardanelles Free" The New York Times, New York, September 17, 1922, p.1.

¹⁵ John Clayton, "Briton and Turk Exchange Notes" Chicago Daily Tribune, Chicago, October 10, 1922, p.6.

¹⁶ "Kemal Demands Greeks Quit Thrace, Says He Won't Respect Neutral Zone if Greeks Flee Across It" The New York Times, New York, September 18, 1922, p.1.

¹⁷ "Harington Suggests Provisional Line to Insure Against Conflict" The Philadelphia Inquirer, Pennsylvania, October 01, 1922, p.1.

¹⁸ John Steele, "Order New Ultimatum" Chicago Tribune, Illinois, September 30, 1922, p.2.

¹⁹ "Paris Against Move to Defend Straits, Have Confidence in Kemal" The New York Times, New York, September 18, 1922, p.1.

article in The New York Times, Russian troops in the Caucasus were mobilized to help the Turks to save the straits from the British occupation.²⁰ However, based on the statements made by Russia, although the Russians would provide moral support and military consultancy services to the Turks, Russian soldiers would not be sent to the help of the Turks.²¹ When no solution could be found to the disputes regarding the Straits and Thrace, an ultimatum was given to the allies by Turkey, and it was requested that Thrace be cleared of the Greeks and handed over to the Turks within a few days. Harington sent a warning message to Hamit Bey, the Ankara Government representative in İstanbul, and requested no touch to the neutral zone. Hamit Bey stated that he could not give any guarantee in that regard. While France and Italy declared that they found the Turkish demands justified and withdrew all their troops from the Asian side of the straits, the British government decided to protect the neutral zone alone. Turkish troops entered the neutral zone and began to advance. Meanwhile, the Allied decided to hold a conference and invite Turkey. Ferit Bey, the Paris representative of the Ankara Government, conveyed the peace conference proposal made by the Allied to Ankara and stated that Ankara would respond within a few days.²²

It was expected that Italy and France would soften Britain and convince the British of their thinking that the problems should be settled through negotiations rather than war. It was thought that Italy, as the closest to Turkey among the Allied, wanted to persuade Turkey to peace more than the others. Italy had argued from the very beginning that the Treaty of Sèvres should be revised. According to Italians, some articles of Sevres were not applicable and some other articles were not fair. Moreover, Sevres would keep Muslims far from their capital, İstanbul, and expel them from Europe. In that case, such an agreement could not be enforced.²³

Long negotiations were held in Paris between the governments of France and England, and efforts were made to reach a compromise between the two countries on the problems related to the Straits and Thrace. Although France withdrew its troops from the Asian side of the straits, they agreed to warn Mustafa Kemal Pasha not to attack the British, otherwise, they declared that they would side with the British. While these developments were taking place, the British constantly reinforced their troops in the straits and the neutral zone, directed a significant part of the British naval force to the Sea of Marmara and took a full combat position. Aware of these developments, the Turkish troops under the command of Mustafa Kemal Pasha continued to advance in the

²⁰ "Report Soviet is Massing Its Caucasus Troops to Aid Turks in Retaking the Dardanelles" The New York Times, New York, September 16, 1922, p.1.

²¹ "Russia Will Give Moral Support to the Turks and Also Military Advice, but Won't Send Troops" The New York Times, New York, September 20, 1922, p.1.

²² "Allies Hear Turks Draft an Ultimatum Asking Evacuation of Thrace in 48 Hours" The New York Times, New York, September 22, 1922, p.1.

²³ "Italy Hopes to Modify Britain's Attitude, Wants Dardanelles Question Settled by Negotiation" The New York Herald, New York, September 22, 1922, p.2.

direction of the straits and the neutral zone, forcing the Allied to hold a conference as soon as possible. The most controversial issue in the Anglo-French bilateral meeting was the Thrace issue, while the British claimed that the Turks should be kept away from Europe, the French claimed that Eastern Thrace should be left to the Turks based on the Turkish population majority there.²⁴

The negotiations that continued between England and France resulted in an agreement and was decided to officially invite Turkey to the conference as a joint British, French and Italian note.²⁵ The Allies agreed to give Thrace, including Edirne, up to the Maritza River, to Turkey while maintaining the neutrality of the straits. The peace conference would involve Britain, France, Italy, Turkey, Japan, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Greece. The Ankara Government was requested to send representatives with full power to sign and respond to the joint note promptly. The primary objective of the conference was to reach a definitive peace treaty between Turkey, Greece, and the Allies, with the supporting Turkey's membership in the League of Nations if the borders of the neutral zone were not violated before and during the conference.²⁶ While the decision of the Allied to invite Turkey to the peace conference was delivered to the Turks, Franklin Bouillon, the French special representative, went to İzmir to meet Mustafa Kemal Pasha.²⁷ Bouillon had a long and successful meeting with Mustafa Kemal Pasha, persuaded Kemal Pasha to attend a peace conference with the Allied, and immediately went to İstanbul to inform the Allied High Commissioners about the meeting.²⁸ Mustafa Kemal Pasha had some pre-conditions to meet with the Allied. According to him, the Allied would give official assurances about Thrace, more Allied forces would be placed in the big cities in Thrace, Turkish gendarmerie units would provide to work in Thrace, the Turkish civil administration would be established in Thrace, the Greeks would be expelled from Thrace within a week. According to the British government, those conditions presented by the Turks were unacceptable but were discussable, it would be beneficial to attend the conference.²⁹

In a message sent by British General Harington to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, it was requested that all Turkish troops within the borders of the neutral zone be removed from the neutral zones within forty-eight hours. According to the initial information obtained from the Turks, the Turkish troops would not withdraw

²⁴ Edwin L. James, "Paris Conferees Draft New Proposal, Thrace is Critical Point" The New York Times, New York, September 23, 1922, p.1.

²⁵ Edwin L. James, "Allies Agree on Parley with Turks; Russia Excluded" The New York Times, New York, September 21, 1922, p.1.

²⁶ Edwin L. James, "Allies Promise East Thrace to Turks, Straits to be Free Under the League, Joint Note Sent to Turks" The New York Times, New York, September 24, 1922, p.1.

²⁷ "Turks Receive Proposal from Allies, French are Rushing an Envoy to Kemal" The New York Times, New York, September 25, 1922, p.1.

²⁸ "French Report Envoy to Kemal Succeeds, Franklin-Bouillon on Way to Constantinople" The New York Herald, New York, October 01, 1922, p.1.

²⁹ "Turkish Program Discussable but not Acceptable" The New York Tribune, New York, October 03, 1922, p.1.

from their positions and the Turks would respond to the Allied joint note as soon as possible. On the other hand, the British troops around the straits took a defensive position with all their strength, dug trenches and put up a barbed wire between them and the Turkish troops. According to the information given by Esad Bey, who went to İstanbul from İzmir, the Turks would participate in the conference, but they would not accept the stopping of the Turkish troops at their positions throughout the conference and would continue the operation.³⁰ At a time when these developments were taking place, according to the statements sent from Athens to the press, the Greek government was preparing to send a large army to Thrace and it was reported that Greece had no intention of leaving Thrace.³¹ While the British were preparing for war against the Turks for the straits, demonstrations were held in favour of the Turks at a rally in Ahmadabad, India, attended by many people. The Indians who participated in the rally, the majority of whom were Muslims, declared that if the British declared war on the Turks, they would fight on the side of the Turks against the British.³²

The Turks had some conditions for attending the conference of the Allied. According to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, all strategic points would be occupied by Turkish troops before the conference to execute all the objectives in the Turkish National Pact, all British troops brought for reinforcements would be sent back, and Thrace would be handed over to the Turks before the conference. Russia, Ukraine and other countries bordering the Black Sea would be invited to the conference. If those conditions were accepted by the Allied, a conference would be held in Mudania to reach a ceasefire agreement, and a meeting would be held in İzmir for a peace treaty three days after the Mudania conference.³³ Meanwhile, the advance of Turkish troops in the neutral zone continued. According to a statement published by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the Turkish troops continued to advance in the neutral zone, as the British did not keep their word and allowed the Greeks to escape through the straits. Upon these developments, British General Harington suggested that an urgent meeting be held between the Turks and the British in Mudania or İzmit.³⁴ While the advance of the Turkish troops within the borders of the neutral zone continued, the British continued to place their reinforcements around the straits. On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal Pasha and General Harington threatened each other with mutual ultimatums³⁵ and the

³⁰ "Declare They Will Hold Dardanelles Positions They Have Seized" The New York Times, New York, September 27, 1922, p.1.

³¹ "Greeks Make Ready to Defend Thrace" The New York Times, New York, September 26, 1922, p.2.

³² "Indian Moslems Protest" The New York Times, New York, September 28, 1922, p.3.

³³ "Kemal Says He Seized Positions Because the British Let the Greeks Use Waterway" The New York Times, New York, September 28, 1922, p.1.

³⁴ "Reported Terms of Turks" The New York Times, New York, September 28, 1922, p.3.

³⁵ "Grave Situation at Chanak Drifts Dangerously Near to Hostilities" The New York Herald, European Edition, Paris, October 1, 1922, p.1.

Turkish-British war came to the brink.³⁶ As the tension increased, Franklin Bouillon, the French special representative, went to İzmir again and had a long meeting with Mustafa Kemal Pasha.³⁷ During the meeting, Bouillon demanded that Mustafa Kemal Pasha not violate the borders of the neutral zone during the negotiations for the armistice and the subsequent peace treaty.³⁸ When the expected response from Turkey was delayed for a few days, the concerns of the allies increased, and they were worried that the developments in the Near East would cause a loss of prestige for the Allied.³⁹ Finally, the Allied got the expected news from Mustafa Kemal Pasha and it was decided that the Turks and the Allied would have a conference in Mudania.⁴⁰ According to an article in the New York Tribune newspaper, a meeting was held between the İstanbul high commissioners of the Allied about where the conference would be held, and it was thought that one of the warships belonging to the Allied might be suitable for the conference. However, since there was no consensus on which country's warship would be selected for the conference, it was agreed to hold the conference in Mudania, which was proposed by the Turks.⁴¹

Following the decision of convening a ceasefire conference in Mudania, Mustafa Kemal Pasha directed the Turkish troops stationed south of the Dardanelles not to advance beyond their positions.⁴² Returning from İzmir to Ankara, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was greeted like a conqueror on the streets of Ankara and applauded enthusiastically by the crowd.⁴³ Although Mustafa Kemal Pasha accepted to participate in the peace talks, he kept his military units consisting of seventy thousand men ready in attack position in case of war. Kemal Pasha was not in favour of war, but he continued to keep his troops in a combat-ready position, especially because he did not trust the British. With the morale given by the great victory they recently won against the Greeks, the Turkish troops were undoubtedly ready for action with the attack order to be poured out of Kemal Pasha's mouth. However, Kemal Pasha, who achieved great success despite his very young age, certainly did not want to fight and took a stand for a peaceful solution to existing problems.⁴⁴

³⁶ "Franklin Bouillon Received by Kemal" The New York Times, New York, September 30, 1922, p.2.

³⁷ Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk*, Ankara, 1927, p.487.

³⁸ Edwin L. James, "Uneasiness in Paris in Near East Crisis" The New York Times, New York, September 30, 1922, p.3.

³⁹ "Kemal Defiant, Tells British to Retire, Harington Gives a Counter Ultimatum, and Clash at the Straits Seems Near" The New York Times, New York, September 30, 1922, p.1.

⁴⁰ "Meeting with Kemal Soon" The New York Times, New York, October 01, 1922, p.1.

⁴¹ "Allied Jealousy Revealed" The New York Tribune, New York, October 03, 1922, p.1.

⁴² "Near East War Skies Clear as Turks Quit Stronghold on Straits" Daily News, New York, October 02, 1922, p.2.

⁴³ "Kemal Strives to Lead Turks in Peace Path" Chicago Daily Tribune, Chicago, October 04, 1922, p.1.

⁴⁴ John Clayton, "Kemal Seeking Peace, Masses 70,000 for War, Strives to Avoid of Bayonet" Chicago Daily Tribune, Chicago, October 02, 1922, p.1.

Initial Negotiations and Potential Obstacles Encountered During the Mudania Conference

Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Franklin Bouillon agreed to negotiate in Mudania and stop Turkish military operations. Turkey demanded that the Greeks evacuate Thrace and hand it over to Turkey immediately. The Mudania conference would commence on October 3, 1922, and would solely address military issues, with fully authorized representatives from Turkey, England, France, Italy, and Greece. This decision was accepted by the states which would join the conference.⁴⁵ There were seven people in the Turkish delegation; İsmet Pasha, Asım Pasha, Tevfik Bey, Seyfi Bey, Hamit Bey and two secretaries.⁴⁶ The United States of America has decided not to attend the Mudania conference, where military decisions would be taken, and has declared that it would follow a policy of absolute neutrality throughout the conference.⁴⁷ In the statement made by the British cabinet, which convened after the conference decision was taken, the satisfaction was expressed that the conference would be held, and it was stated that only military issues would be discussed at the conference, and other issues would be resolved in the peace conference to be held later.⁴⁸ In the conference, it was expected that the Thrace issue and the straits would be discussed primarily, and it was predicted that a decision would be taken on these issues in a short period.⁴⁹ The Mudania conference could not start on the scheduled date because the Greek representatives did not reach Mudania, and one day later, on October 4, 1922, official negotiations began. According to the first impressions obtained from the negotiations, the most difficult negotiation issue on the table would be the Thrace issue.⁵⁰

At the end of the first sessions of the meetings, an agreement was reached on almost all issues, and the possibility of an agreement arose within twenty-four hours. While this situation was welcomed by all the countries that participated in the conference, only the Greek representatives left the table unhappy. While the conference continued, Greek men were called to join the army voluntarily by the Greek government, and it was announced that Greece would defend Thrace at any cost. On the other hand, some representatives were sent to America on behalf of the Greek government, which could not find the support they hoped for from England, and American support was tried to be provided against the Turks.⁵¹ In

⁴⁵ "Armistice Meeting Set for Tomorrow" The New York Times, New York, October 02, 1922, p.1.

⁴⁶ Şerafettin Turan, *İsmet İnönü, Yaşamı, Dönemi ve Kişiliği*, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 2000, p.38.

⁴⁷ "Mudania Parley Adjourns in Deadlock when Turks Demand Thrace at Once" The New York Herald, New York, October 06, 1922, p.1.

⁴⁸ "Situation Easier, London Believes" The New York Times, New York, October 02, 1922, p.2.

⁴⁹ "War Clouds Fade as Allies Discuss Parley with Turk" The Evening Star, Washington, October 02, 1922, p.1.

⁵⁰ "Armistice Parley with Turks Opens; Thrace Real Issue" The New York Times, New York, October 04, 1922, p.1.

⁵¹ "Greek Army Shows New War Spirit, Athens Officials are Said to be Considering an Appeal to Washington for American Support" The New York Times, New York, October 06, 1922, p.3.

a telegram sent by Harington to the British government after the first negotiations, it was stated that the negotiations were progressing well, that the Turkish troops were ordered by İsmet Pasha to stay where they were, and that this was a pleasing development.⁵²

On the first day of the conference, it was agreed on the following issues: Turkish and British troops would withdraw from the neutral zone southeast of Çanakkale. While the Turks accepted the Allied forces to stay in İstanbul during the peace conference, the Allied accepted the establishment of a Turkish civil administration in İstanbul. The Greek army would withdraw from Thrace within ten days, if Greece does not accept this decision, the Allied would allow the Turkish army to cross over the straits to Thrace and drive the Greeks out of Thrace.⁵³ According to all the news from Mudania, the negotiations took place in a very positive environment, and everyone's only expectation was to achieve peace.⁵⁴

According to the American press, the Mudania conference had a significant impact on the American market.⁵⁵ Wheat, oat and corn prices increased in response to a possible negative situation that may arise from the conference, and speculative purchases were made regarding these products. Upon the news that the negotiations on the first day were positive and that the agreement was about to be reached, wheat prices in the American market started to decline again.⁵⁶

On the second day of the conference, the situation in Thrace was discussed.⁵⁷ Firstly, the Greek delegate who took the floor and spoke used provocative expressions. According to him, all of Greece was ready to defend Thrace and would not leave, and the Greek army had been prepared to face the Turkish army. The speech of the Greek delegate caused a burst of slight laughter among all the delegates and caused a tense atmosphere in the conference hall.⁵⁸ İsmet Pasha, who took the floor after the Greeks said that the heart of all of Turkey was beating for Thrace and that they wanted to take Thrace through peaceful means. Continued, İsmet Pasha, with a more determined and harsh tone, stated that they would take Thrace, first of all, that they would prefer to take it peacefully and without bloodshed, and if this was not possible, they would do whatever

⁵² "Turkish Army Ordered not to Attack British, Gen. Harington Reports Parley with Angora Envoy is Yielding Results" *The Evening Star*, Washington, October 04, 1922, p.1.

⁵³ "Agreement is Reached, Pact Expected to be Signed at Mudania Today" *The Evening Star*, Washington, October 05, 1922, p.1.

⁵⁴ "Allies and Turks Reach Agreement; Thrace Returned" *The New York Tribune*, New York, October 05, 1922, p.1.

⁵⁵ "Mudania Situation Gives Wheat a Lift" *The New York Herald*, New York, October 04, 1922, p.24.

⁵⁶ "Mudania News is Bearish on Wheat" *The New York Herald*, New York, October 05, 1922, p.23.

⁵⁷ "Foreign News, Constantinople" *Daily News*, New York, October 05, 1922, p.3.

⁵⁸ "Turks Demand Thrace at Once, and Say They will Take it by Force if Necessary, Angry Greeks Defy Them" *The New York Times*, New York, October 06, 1922, p.1.

necessary to take Thrace.⁵⁹ İsmet Pasha's demand deviated slightly from the Allied agreement on Thrace, causing separate opinions among the Allied representatives. Mombelli supported the British view, while Charpy supported the Turks. Bouillon intervened and persuaded the parties to resume negotiations later.⁶⁰

İsmet Pasha declared that if the Mudania conference didn't resume, the Turkish troops would resume their movement towards Dardanelles and İstanbul from two directions after midnight on October 5, 1922. Thereupon, the French special delegate Franklin Bouillon had a long meeting with İsmet Pasha, and he fulfilled a successful mediation duty by ensuring to stop the Turkish army's operations and convincing the Turks of resuming the negotiations.⁶¹ The next day, Ankara's representative Hamit Bey declared to journalists that they were waiting impatiently for the Allied response and demanded immediate transfer of Thrace to Turkey.⁶²

After the interruption of the Mudania conference, the British government held an urgent cabinet meeting. Lord Curzon was sent to Paris to negotiate a joint agreement among the Allies. Curzon had extensive talks with French PM Henry Poincare, resulting in an agreement to resume the conference. The Anglo-French agreement mandated the immediate removal of Greek troops from Thrace and the establishment of Turkish civil administration with a gendarmerie unit for security. A common Allied military administration would be established and Thrace would eventually be transferred to Turkey after a peace treaty.⁶³ Despite efforts, negotiations were again interrupted. İsmet Pasha blamed the British for reinforcing their troops after Turkey had ordered their troops to stop.⁶⁴ When the British reinforcements were sent to the Marmara Sea and Çanakkale region, British Admiral Harington adopted a very harsh and rude attitude and tried to intimidate the Turkish delegation by giving some instructions to restrict the movements of sea vehicles in the straits and the Marmara Sea.⁶⁵

⁵⁹ *İnönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri I, T. B. M. Meclisinde ve C. H. P. Kurultaylarında (1919-1946)*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1946, p.31.

⁶⁰ "America May Enter Conference in East" *The New York Herald*, New York, October 06, 1922, p.1.

⁶¹ "French, British Hold Up Peace on Turk Thrace, Curzon Meets Poincare Again Today" *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Chicago, October 07, 1922, p.1.

⁶² "Allies Hear Turks Draft an Ultimatum Asking Evacuation of Thrace in 48 Hours" *The New York Times*, New York, September 22, 1922, p.1.

⁶³ Floyd Gibbons, "Powers Invite Red Russia to Straits Parley" *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 08, 1922, p.1.

⁶⁴ John Clayton, "British Seek New Delay" *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Chicago, October 09, 1922, p.2.

⁶⁵ "Allies United; Expect Turk to Sign Truce, Mudania Parley is Resumed" *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Chicago, October 09, 1922, p.1.

Developments in Mudania During the Intermission at the Conference

After the Mudania talks were interrupted, Poincaré Curzon met in Paris but could not agree on the solution to the problems in the Near East⁶⁶ particularly whether Thrace should be handed over to the Turks immediately or after the peace treaty was signed. The main subject was hidden from the British government by Harington, who did not mention İsmet Pasha's refusal to discuss anything other than Turkish domination in Thrace.⁶⁷ An agreement was reached between Curzon and Poincare to continue the conference, with the Franco-British agreement stating that Greek soldiers in Thrace would be evacuated and a civilian Turkish administration would be established. Eastern Thrace would not be handed over to the Turks until a peace treaty was signed.⁶⁸

A few days before the signing of the Mudania Armistice, İsmet Pasha realized that the British delegate, Harington, was constantly blocking the negotiations with delaying tactics, preventing progress in the negotiations. Thereupon, İsmet Pasha, who published a statement, declared that if an agreement was not reached as soon as possible, the Turkish army would start an operation in İstanbul. In his statement, İsmet Pasha stated that the Greek and British troops were constantly being reinforced, although the Turkish troops had been waiting at their positions for a long time. İsmet Pasha, who claimed that this situation was a preparation for war and that the British were not honest about peace, warned the British with definite words. İsmet Pasha's statement had great repercussions, and it was featured in the American press in large print and on the front pages of the newspapers.⁶⁹

After the Greek army's defeat in Western Anatolia, a new Greek government was formed and requested Venizelos's help. The Greek army was mobilized and reinforced in Thrace, but Venizelos advised the government to accept that Eastern Thrace would be given to the Turks. The Greek government then stated that it would respect and implement the decisions made in Mudania, instructing its delegates to sign the resolutions. The note estimated that over 500,000 would migrate from Thrace and İstanbul to Greece if Thrace was given to the Turks.⁷⁰ According to the American press, Mustafa Kemal Pasha led the talks in Mudania from Ankara. Long phone calls were made several times per day between İsmet Pasha and Mustafa Kemal Pasha via the renewed telephone line

⁶⁶ Arthur S. Draper, "Soldier Negotiators at the Mudania Conference to Await Action of Curzon and Poincare in Paris" *The New York Tribune*, New York, October 07, 1922, p.2.

⁶⁷ "Ultimatum to Allies" *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Chicago, October 07, 1922, Vol.81, No:240, p.1-6.

⁶⁸ "Powers to Block Taking of Thrace Until Turks Sign" *The Evening Star*, Washington, October 07, 1922, p.1.

⁶⁹ John Clayton, "Turk Army Resumes Advance, Time Limit Expires" *The Los Angeles Times*, Los Angeles, October 09, 1922, p.1.

⁷⁰ "Greece will Bow to Allies' Decisions, Athens Instructs Agents at Mudania to Accept a Unanimous Vote as to Thrace" *The New York Times*, New York, October 09, 1922, p.3.

from Ankara to Mudania, and İsmet Pasha acted entirely in line with the directives of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. According to an article in The New York Times, progress was made in the negotiations thanks to Mustafa Kemal Pasha's calm and constructive attitude, otherwise, İsmet Pasha's harsh and uncompromising attitude would have put the talks at a dead end.⁷¹ It was emphasized that Mustafa Kemal Pasha was the person who had the real power and decision-maker to make the final decision on behalf of the Turks.⁷²

General Harington, in his memoirs, exaggerated his role, had claimed that he was the peacebuilder in Mudania.⁷³ Contrary to Harington's claim, according to İsmet Pasha, the most important reason for not getting any results from the conference was the inconsistent and distracting attitude of British General Harington. It has been seen that İsmet Pasha's claim was correct when compared with the information in the American press. According to the information on the press, while the Mudania conference was continuing, the British carried out one of the largest military build-ups in the straits and the Sea of Marmara, almost all the British navy forces were placed in the straits and the British delegate Harington made heavy provocations for the outbreak of war.⁷⁴ The British government ensured that the differences of opinion between the Allied were eliminated in the negotiations in Paris, thus British, French and Italian unity was ensured against the Turks in Mudania. Moreover, the Greek delegates, encouraged by this union, applied to the British delegate Harington and stated that the entire Greek army was ready to fight and that in case of a war with the Turks, all Greek resources could be placed at the disposal of the British.⁷⁵ The Allied delegates reached an agreement and prepared a protocol to be presented to Turkey. General Harington presented the protocol to İsmet Pasha with a harsh and threatening attitude, stating that it was the last offer from the Allied and expecting a quick response. The American press viewed the Allied unity positively, and the American public was understood to be in favour of the Allied, despite not being present at the conference.⁷⁶

On the day prior to the armistice, British General Harington continued his threats with rude expressions during a meeting he had with İsmet Pasha, in a way that was incompatible with a diplomatic tone. According to Harington, the British had a large number of warships, soldiers and weapons and it was not an easy task to fight against the British. According to him, the British accepted all the wishes of the Turks and if the Turks wanted peace, they must accept the protocol presented to them. British threats were not limited to Harington's words. On the

⁷¹ "Kemal at Angora Directs Mudania Parley by Phone" The New York Times, New York, October 10, 1922, p.1.

⁷² "At Mudania Today" The Evening Star, Washington, October 03, 1922, p.6.

⁷³ Charles Harington, *Tim Harington Looks Back*, Wyman & Sons, London 1940, pp.100-160.

⁷⁴ David Walder, *The Chanak Affair*, Anchor Press, Essex, 1969, p.174.

⁷⁵ "Greek Army Eager to Fight for Thrace" The New York Times, New York, October 10, 1922, p.3.

⁷⁶ "İsmet Nervous at Monday Meeting" The New York Times, New York, October 11, 1922, p.3.

evening of the last day of the conference in Mudania, the gigantic British warship Iron Duke was positioned at a point where it would never normally be kept. Iron Duke, which was kept at a point that could be seen from the seat of İsmet Pasha in the conference hall, was illuminated during the night so that it could be noticed, and İsmet Pasha tried to be intimidated in this way. According to a report from the Associated Press, the talks on the evening of the last day of the conference took place in a tense atmosphere.⁷⁷

When the talks in Mudania were interrupted, the tension in İstanbul reached its peak and the public's reaction against foreigners and especially the citizens of allied states increased. Thereupon, the women, children and elderly citizens of the Allied left İstanbul. Some people from a large group who had travelled from İstanbul to Lausanne on the Orient Express had informed the press about the situation in İstanbul. According to them, the Turks in İstanbul blame the Allied for the failure to reach an armistice due to the prolonged negotiations in Mudania, and it was stated that for this reason, the Turks had a negative attitude towards the citizens of the Allied. According to the statements of the same people, foreigners in İstanbul started to transfer their assets and money in banks to Europe, as they predicted that the city would soon come under Turkish rule.⁷⁸

The Armistice of Mudania

Two days after the talks in Mudania were interrupted, the delegates who attended the conference came back to Mudania and the negotiations continued where they had left off. İsmet Pasha, who took the floor in the first session, brought up the issue of prisoners of war, stated that all civilian Greek prisoners were released by the Turks, and demanded the immediate release of all civilian Turkish prisoners by the Greeks. Allied delegates stated that they were not authorized in such a matter and that they would ask their government's opinion, but they stated that the issue of prisoners of war was a matter of concern to Turkey and Greece. According to allegations, in an instruction sent from Ankara, İsmet Pasha was requested to participate in the negotiations with a softer attitude, and as a result, İsmet Pasha continued the conference in a more positive and calmer atmosphere.⁷⁹ However, the insistence of the Turkish delegation on Thrace continued and Curzon and Poincare met again and discussed the Turkish demands. As a result of the Curzon-Poincare meeting, it was deemed appropriate to make concessions to the Turks on the duration of the Allied administration in Thrace, the Allied administration in Thrace was limited to thirty days and that decision was conveyed to the allied delegates in Mudania. In the Curzon-Poincare meeting, it was also accepted to increase the number of Turkish gendarmerie units

⁷⁷ "British Warning to Nationalists, Warship at Doors of Conference" The New York Times, New York, October 11, 1922, p.3.

⁷⁸ "Quitting Constantinople, Wives and Children of Foreign Officers Crowd the Orient Express" The New York Times, New York, October 11, 1922, p.3.

⁷⁹ "Mudania Displays Optimistic Spirit" The New York Herald, New York, October 08, 1922, p.7.

to be sent to Thrace, and to establish a Turkish civil administration immediately after the evacuation of the Greeks. Those decisions regarding Thrace were accepted by the allies without being subject to the signing of the peace treaty.⁸⁰

While the Mudania conference was continuing, Turkish troops in the İzmit region acted and advanced toward İstanbul.⁸¹ The British, who experienced great anxiety after the acting of the Turkish troops toward İstanbul, blew up all the bridges between İzmit and İstanbul, prohibited the passage of motor vehicles with the train services in that direction, and prepared for a war by digging large trenches near İstanbul.⁸² Harington demanded the withdrawal of Turkish troops around İzmit and threatened to attack from the Çanakkale and İzmit fronts if they did not comply. İsmet Pasha responded by stating that the troops were irregular and did not go beyond their designated points. Diplomats following the conference anticipated a decision on war or peace within twenty-four hours as tension mounted. As Harington made threats, the Greeks sent reinforcements to Thrace, and the British mobilized their air and naval forces to İstanbul via the Sea of Marmara.⁸³

Following instructions from their respective governments, the British, French and Italian delegates convened and drafted an agreement to present to the Turkish delegation. Upon reaching a consensus, the Allied delegates handed over the memorandum to İsmet Pasha as their final decision. However, Harington believed that the Allied had made too many concessions to the Turks and that the Turks' response would determine the outcome of war or peace.⁸⁴ İsmet Pasha informed the Allied delegates that he required the approval of Ankara before making a final decision.⁸⁵

While waiting for Ankara's decision, a long-lasting correspondence took place between İsmet Pasha and Harington. The most important point of the mutual letters was that in his last letter, Harington used the expression *Delegate of the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly* for the first time, addressing İsmet Pasha. According to Turkish circles, that statement of Harington was a clear hint that the Ankara Government would be officially recognized by the British. According to İsmet Pasha, failure to reach an agreement was increasing the danger of war every day, because, while the Turkish troops were stopped behind

⁸⁰ "New Concessions Speed Turks' Return to Europe" The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philadelphia, October 08, 1922, p.1.

⁸¹ "Turks Closing in on Constantinople" Buffalo Evening News, New York, October 09, 1922, p.1.

⁸² John Clayton, "Turk Army Marches on Porte, Pursuit of Greeks, not Clash with British, is Kemal's Aim" Daily News, New York, October 09, 1922, p.2.

⁸³ "British Warn Turk to Leave Zone or Troops will Move" The New York Tribune, New York, October 09, 1922, p.1.

⁸⁴ "Expect Protocol Signing, Question of Peace in Near East Now Rests with Turks" Times Herald, New York, October 10, 1922, p.1.

⁸⁵ "Allies' Truce Terms Sent to Turk Assembly, Mudania Parley Awaits O. K." Chicago Daily Tribune, Chicago, October 10, 1922, p.1.

a certain line, the Greeks and the British were constantly reinforcing their troops, and this was seen as unacceptable by the Turkish government. The expected answer from Ankara arrived at Mudania, İsmet Pasha was given the authority to sign the armistice and he signed the Mudania Armistice.⁸⁶

The Armistice had fourteen articles mainly about the Greek evacuation of Thrace and the lines for the neutral zone in İstanbul and Çanakkale.⁸⁷ In the armistice protocol document,⁸⁸ a space was left for the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Turkey and Greece to sign.⁸⁹ It has been claimed that the Mudania Armistice was a success for Turkey⁹⁰ as well as a success for the allies.⁹¹

Despite the refusal of the Greek delegate Mazarakis to sign the Mudania Armistice protocol, the agreement was still considered valid and came into force in three days. The Turkish military band played music and the people of Mudania celebrated outside the conference building during the signing ceremony. British delegate Harington expressed his satisfaction with the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Turkish coffee was offered to all the delegates during the preparation of the protocol and Harington and İsmet Pasha exchanged congratulations and thanks. Meanwhile, Ankara declared that all treaties signed by the Ottoman Sultan since March 16, 1920, were invalid. French special representative Franklin Bouillon suggested that the peace conference should be held near Ankara, as Mustafa Kemal Pasha was unable to leave Turkish territory due to a special article in the Turkish constitution. One proposed location for the conference was Üsküdar in İstanbul.⁹²

Following the Armistice of Mudania, British General Harington garnered significant recognition as the person who resolved the Near East problem while prior to the conference he was relatively unknown. However, the press covered his actions extensively throughout the conference, and with the signing of the armistice, he became even more of a prominent figure.⁹³ While Harington's role in the conference may have been exaggerated, the American press presented him as if he alone had negotiated the treaty.

⁸⁶ "İsmet Pasha Signs Armistice Protocol at Angora's Orders" The New York Times, New York, October 11, 1922, p.1.

⁸⁷ "Mudanya Konferansında Akdedilmiş Olan Mukavele-i Askeriye Metni" Hâkimiyet-i Milliye, Ankara, 12 Ekim 1922, s.1.

⁸⁸ *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*, Ed. W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1972, pp.1-319.

⁸⁹ "War Averted; Turks Sign, Kemal Accepts Allies' Final Truce Terms" Chicago Daily Tribune, Chicago, October 11, 1922, p.1.

⁹⁰ Harold Armstrong, *Turkey in Travail, The Birth of a New Nation* Butler & Tanner, London 1925, pp.249-261.

⁹¹ "Praises General Harington" The New York Times, New York, October 11, 1922, p.3.

⁹² "Greek Delegate Refused to Sign Mudania Accord, but Allied Representatives Pledged Observance of the Armistice by Greece" The New York Times, New York, October 12, 1922, p.1-3.

⁹³ "Sir Charles Harington" The New York Times, New York, October 13, 1922, p.6.

Conclusion

The Great Turkish Offensive resulted in the complete expulsion of the Greeks from Anatolia, and they suffered a significant defeat, losing over one hundred thousand soldiers. The Allied were stunned by Turkey's success and convened to find a solution to the issue in Western Anatolia. Under the direction of Commander-in-Chief Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the triumphant Turkish army was deployed to the occupied zones with the aim of freeing the Straits, İstanbul and Thrace from occupation. Tens of thousands of Turkish soldiers were deployed to the Çanakkale and İzmit fronts within days. As negotiations in Paris continued, an agreement was reached among the Allies, and Turkey was invited to a peace conference. A military conference was held in Mudania before the peace conference, where only soldiers were allowed to attend as delegates. The ceasefire negotiations began in Mudania between delegates from Turkey, England, France, and Italy to address urgent military problems.

On the inaugural day of the conference, a unanimous agreement was reached on all the topics deliberated, raising the prospects for a consensus within a few hours. However, the impasse arose during the negotiations of the Thrace issue on the following day, stalling the discussions and forcing a pause in the conference. Meanwhile, the Turkish forces were instructed to hold their positions, whereas the British and Greek troops were incessantly reinforced. Particularly, the British government made concerted efforts to initiate a war against the Turks and called upon reinforcements from its dominions worldwide to İstanbul and Marmara. According to the American press, the naval and aerial units amassed by the British in the Sea of Marmara constituted one of the largest fortifications in the world. As the British troops were thoroughly augmented, the British representative, Harington, assumed a belligerent and impolite stance, prioritizing war over peace. In response, İsmet Pasha retorted with the same acerbity, warning that if the treaty was not signed promptly, the Turkish army would be directed to act in İstanbul.

During a critical juncture in the war, the Allied convened another meeting where they agreed to concede on some of the issues with the Turks. A joint protocol was drafted and presented to the Turkish delegation, which showed that most of their demands, particularly concerning Thrace, were accepted. İsmet Pasha relayed the protocol to Ankara and awaited further instructions. Upon receiving authorization to sign the armistice from Ankara, the Mudania Armistice was executed. This event is of utmost significance in Turkish history as it marked the end of the war phase of the National Struggle and ushered in the diplomatic phase. With the Mudania Armistice, the Ankara Government was recognized as the sole representative of Turkey in international diplomacy, effectively eliminating the Ottoman State administration. The armistice also settled the issue of İstanbul without conflict and determined that Eastern Thrace would be taken from Greece and given to Turkey. The Mudania Armistice, which concluded with the most powerful nations in the world, stands as a diplomatic triumph for Turkey.

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