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Sadr al-Sharīʿa's Criticisms of the Māturīdī Tradition in the Context of the Attribute of *Takwīn*

Tekvîn Sıfatı Bağlamında Sadruşşerîa'nın Mâtürîdî Geleneğe Eleştirileri

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Sadr al-Sharī'a's Criticisms of the Māturīdī Tradition in the Context of the Attribute of *Takwīn*

Abstract

The focus of this study is twofold. First, the figures who are highly representative of the Māturīdī tradition's view in the discussions on the attribute of *takwīn* will be analysed. The purpose of this examination is not to reveal what the Māturīdī view of *takwīn* is. Instead, the aim is to trace Sadr al-Sharī'a's (d. 747/1346) criticisms of the Māturīdīs before him. After this, Sadr al-Sharī'a's approach will be presented, and his criticism of the earlier Māturīdīs and his solution will be presented. Since the Ash'arite aspect of the subject is also central, the aspects of differentiation between the Māturīdīs and the Ash'arites in the discussion of the attribute of *takwīn* will be mentioned first. The debate on *takwīn* stems from the disagreement over which attribute is the attribute through which God's creation is realised. While the Māturīdīs accept that God's creation is directly realised through the attribute of *takwīn*, the Ash'arites think that it is realised through the attribute of power (*al-qudra*). The Māturīdīs' belief that the attribute of power is insufficient for creation arises from the fact that they define power differently from the Ash'arites. While the Ash'arites define power as "the power to do something and the one who does it with his power", the Māturīdīs define it as "the power to do something". Hence, for the Ash'arites, the presence of the attribute of power in the agent means realising the thing. In contrast, the Māturīdīs think that the presence of power is not enough, that power is the power to do the act, and that *takwīn*, an attribute other than power, is necessary for the realisation of the thing. The Ash'arites objected that the attribute of *takwīn*, which is eternal according to the Māturīdīs' acceptance, would require the created things to be eternal as well. The Māturīdīs, on the other hand, answered the objection by explaining that the attribute of creation, "*takwīn*, is eternal, and the act is created". Sadr al-Sharī'a, one of the theologians representing the later period of the Māturīdī School, proposed to address the issue through "states" (*aḥwāl*) due to the problems he saw in the tradition mentioned above's explanations of the attribute of *takwīn*. According to him, like the attributes of essence, the attributes of action are also eternal. There is no problem in accepting the attributes of action as *qadīm* because they are the origin of action. While the origin of the act is the attribute of *takwīn*, which is eternal, acts are states that are expressed as "neither existing nor non-existent". Sadr al-Sharī'a's criticism of the tradition he belongs to focuses on the fact that Māturīdī theologians are not aware of the distinction between acts and the attribute that is the origin of acts. "He thinks that the sentence, 'Creation is eternal, and the act is created', does not make sense, and states that God's act in the sense of creation cannot be eternal since He is the *fāil al-mukhtār*. According to him, while there is no problem among the Māturīdīs about the eternity of essential attributes, there is ambiguity about the eternity of attributes of action. Therefore, he proposes that the actional attribute *takwīn* be accepted as the origin of actions. While the attribute of *takwīn*, which is the origin of the act, is eternal, the act in the sense of *īqā'* (*ījāt*) should be regarded as a state (neither existing nor non-existent). According to Sadr al-Sharī'a, the Māturīdīs who do not accept *ījāt* as a state are as mistaken as the Ash'arīs who do not accept that the origin is eternal. Thus, by distinguishing between the origin of the act and the act, he justifies the view of *fāil al-mukhtār* and shows that contrary to the Ash'arites' claim, creation is realised by an attribute other than the attributes of will and power.

Key Words: Kalām, Attributes of God, Attribute of *Takwīn*, Ḥanafī-Māturīdī School, Māturīdī-Ash'arī Disagreements, Sadr al-Sharī'a.

Tekvîn Sıfatı Bağlamında Sadruşşerîa'nın Mâtürîdî Geleneğe Eleştirileri

Öz

Bu çalışmanın odağı iki yönlüdür. İlk olarak Mâtürîdî geleneğin tekvîn sıfatı tartışmalarındaki görüşünü temsil kabiliyeti yüksek isimler üzerinden incelenecektir. Bu incelemedeki amaç Mâtürîdîlerin tekvîn görüşünün ne olduğunu açığa çıkarmak değildir. Asıl amaçlanan şey, Sadruşşerîa'nın (ö. 747/1346) kendisinden önceki Mâtürîdîlere yönelik eleştirilerinin izini sürmektir. Bundan sonrasında Sadruşşerîa'nın yaklaşımı sunulacak ve önceki Mâtürîdîleri eleştirisinin ve çözümünün ne olduğu ortaya konulacaktır. Konunun Eş'arîlere bakan yönü de merkezi olduğu için burada Mâtürîdîlerle Eş'arîler arasındaki tekvîn sıfatı tartışmasındaki farklılaşma yönleri de zikredilecektir. Tekvîn tartışmaları Allah'ın yaratmasının gerçekleştiği sıfatın hangisi olduğuna dair ihtilaftan kaynaklanmaktadır. Mâtürîdîler Allah'ın yaratmasının doğrudan tekvîn sıfatı ile gerçekleştiğini kabul ederken, Eş'arîler kudret sıfatı ile gerçekleştiğini düşünmektedir. Mâtürîdîler'in yaratma için kudret sıfatının yeterli olmadığını düşünmeleri, kudret sıfatını Eş'arîler'den farklı bir şekilde tanımlamalarından kaynaklanmaktadır. Eş'arîler kudret sıfatını "bir şeyi yapabilme gücü ve o işi kudretiyle yapan" şeklinde tanımlarken, Mâtürîdîler ise "bir şeyi yapabilme gücü" olarak tanımlamaktadır. Bundan dolayı Eş'arîler için fâilde kudret sıfatının bulunması o şeyin gerçekleştirilmesi anlamına gelirken, Mâtürîdîler ise kudretin bulunmasının yeterli olmadığını, kudretin fiili yapabilme gücü olduğunu ve şeyin gerçekleşmesi için kudret dışında bir sıfat olan tekvînin gerekli olduğunu düşünmektedir. Eş'arîler, Mâtürîdîler'in kabulüne göre ezelî olan tekvîn sıfatının, yaratılmış olanların da ezelî olmasını gerektireceği itirazında bulunmuşlardır. Mâtürîdîler ise yaratma sıfatı olan "tekvînin ezeli, fiilin ise hâdis olduğu" açıklamaları ile itirazı cevaplamışlardır. Mâtürîdî ekolün müteahhir dönemini temsil eden kelâmcılardan biri olan Sadruşşerîa, sözü edilen geleneğin tekvîn sıfatına dair açıklamalarında gördüğü sorunlardan dolayı,

meselenin "haller" üzerinden ele alınmasını teklif etmektedir. Ona göre, zâtî sıfatlar gibi fiilî sıfatlar da kadîmdir. Fiilî sıfatların fiilin menşei olmalarından dolayı kadîm kabul edilmelerinde herhangi bir problem yoktur. Fiilin menşei kadîm olan tekvîn sıfatı olup, fiiller ise "ne mevcut ne madum" şeklinde ifade edilen hallerdir. Sadruşşerîa'nın mensubu bulunduğu geleneğe yönelik eleştirileri Mâtürîdî kelâmcıların fiiller ile fiilerin menşei olan sıfat arasındaki ayrımın farkında olmamaları noktasına yoğunlaşmaktadır. "Yaratma kadîmdir, fiil hâdistir" cümlesinin anlamlı olmadığını düşünen Sadruşşerîa, Allah'ın fâil-i muhtâr olduğundan dolayı yaratma anlamındaki fiilinin kadîm olamayacağını belirtmektedir. Ona göre Mâtürîdîler arasında zâtî sıfatların kadîm olması noktasında bir problem yok iken, fiilî sıfatların kıdeminin sunumunda problem vardır. Bundan dolayı o, fiilî sıfat olan tekvînin, fiillerin menşei olarak kabul edilmesini teklif etmektedir. Fiilin menşei olan tekvîn sıfatının kadîm, îka' anlamındaki fiilin ise (icat) hal (ne mevcut ne madum) kabul edilmesi gerekmektedir. Sadruşşerîa'ya göre kadîm menşein kadîm olduğunu kabul etmeyen Eş'arîler kadar, hal olan icadı kabul etmeyen Mâtürîdîler de hatalıdır. Böylece o, fiilin menşei ile fiil arasını ayırarak fâil-i muhtâr görüşünü temellendirmekte ve yaratmanın Eş'arîlerin iddiasının aksine irade ve kudret sıfatları dışında bir sıfatla gerçekleştiğini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kelâm, Allah'ın Sıfatları, Zâtî-Fiilî Sıfatlar, Tekvîn Sıfatı, Mâtürîdî-Eş'arî İhtilafları, Sadruşşerîa.

Introduction

There are disagreements among the schools of thought about how the attributes of God should be understood. Although there is no dispute on the point that the names or meanings attributed to God express perfection (*kamāl*), the dispute between the representatives of religious thought and the followers of philosophical systems is about the sense in which the attributes of God express perfection. For example, the Peripatetic tradition in general and Avicenna (d. 428/1037) in particular think that all of the attributes used for God should be taken in the *selbī* sense in such a way that they do not require multiplicity (*terkīb*) in Him.[1] This means that the names attributed to God are not His essential meanings and should be regarded as mere identification. On the other hand, the representatives of religious thought who accept the separation of God and the universe and hence do not explain God's actions in the universe in a deterministic way but instead accept the concept of *fāʿil al-mukhtār* think that God's will and intervention should be grounded in attributes. To them, God has attributes for the necessity of the separation of God and the universe and God's intervention in the functioning of the universe. In other words, God's intervention in things has to be explained by referring to attributes unless *ṣudūr* is accepted.

Although theologians agree on God's true attributes and that some are essential (*zātī*) and some are actual (*fiilī*), they disagree on which attributes should be evaluated under this division. The three schools that should be mentioned here are the Muʿtazilites, Ashʿarites, and Māturīdites. Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite thinkers are of the opinion that the actual attribute is the act itself. However, they put forward different criteria for determining the actual attributes. According to the Muʿtazilite theologians, attributes of action can be used with negative and positive forms of sentences. For example, the adjectives that can be used as "Allāh created someone" and "Allāh did not create someone" that are mentioned in the texts in this way are considered actual attributes. This is because this usage does not reveal any impossibility about God.

On the other hand, the Ashʿarites consider the attributes that require deficiency due to the negation of the attribute as essential and the attributes for which this is not the case as actual. The negative use of the attribute of knowledge implies ignorance, which is impossible for God. Similarly, the incapacity that arises when the attribute of power is negated is also impossible for God. Therefore, while these attributes are considered essential, the negation of attributes such as giving life, death, creation, and providing sustenance does not result in any impossibility for Allāh. For this reason, to them, such attributes are considered actual. As mentioned earlier, since the Ashʿarites accept the attributes of action as the act itself, according to them, these attributes

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[1] Avicenna, *Kitāb al-Shifā al-Ilāhiyāt*, trans. Ekrem Demirli - Ömer Türker (İstanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2013), 2/102, 114; Avicenna, *al-Risālat al-Arshiyya fī Ḥaqāʾiki al-Tawḥīd wa Ithbāti al-Nubuwwa*, ed. İbrahim Hilal (Cairo: Jamiat al-Azhar, 1980), 21.

are created (*ḥādith*).[2] In other words, in the Ash'arite and Mu'tazilite schools, it is possible to discuss the difference between the essential and the actual attributes. Among the schools mentioned above, the Ash'arites, in particular, accept the essential attributes as eternal, whereas they argue that the attributes of action are created. The Māturīdīs, on the other hand, do not accept a difference between the essential and the actual in terms of existence. According to them, the actual attributes are referred to as the attribute of *takwīn*, and the attribute of *takwīn* is eternal.

After this general introduction, it would be appropriate to mention that this study will not examine the Mu'tazilite School's approach to attributes. This study aims to show how, in the debate on *takwīn* between the Ash'arites and the Māturīdīs, an explanation offered by the Māturīdīs in response to an objection from the Ash'arites was criticised by Sadr al-Sharī'a (d. 747/1346). Although the Māturīdī tradition has recently received relatively more attention, the theological thought of Sadr al-Sharī'a, one of the theologians representing the later period of the tradition, has not been the subject of attention apart from a few exceptional studies. Hence, presenting his criticisms of the earlier Māturīdīs on a specific topic would be helpful. In a previous study on Sadr al-Shari'a, it was stated that Sadr al-Shari'a criticised the previous Māturīdīs' approaches to the attribute of *takwīn*. However, the study above focused only on the views of Abu al-Mu'īn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) and Nur al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184) and did not address whether the views of other figures in the Māturīdī tradition were subjected to Sadr al-Shari'a's criticisms.[3] In this respect, this article aims to fill the gap in previous studies by focusing on the views of highly representative figures in the tradition and examining whether Sadr al-Shari'a's criticisms should be extended to their views. For this purpose, I will first point out the general debates on the attribute of *takwīn*. I will analyse the objection of the Ash'arites and the Māturīdīs' response to this objection. Finally, I shall explain Sadr al-Sharī'a's reasons for not being pleased with the response from the tradition he belonged to and point out where his solution fit into his ontology.

1. Discussions on the Attribute of *Takwīn*

The issue between the Māturīdīs and the Ash'arites regarding the attribute of *takwīn* is actually a dispute over which attribute is the attribute through which God's creation is realised. While the Māturīdīs believe that God's creation is realised through *takwīn*, the Ash'arites claim that creation is realised through the attribute of power and that no other attribute other than power is necessary for creation.[4] The basis of this disagreement between the Māturīdīs and the Ash'arites lies in the difference in their definitions of power. While the Māturīdīs define power as "the power to do something", the Ash'arīs define it as "the power to do something and the one who realises it with his power".[5] According to their definitions, since the Ash'arites regard the

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[2] Ibn al-Fūrek, *Mujarred al-Maqālat al-Shaykh Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī*, ed. Daniel Gimaret (Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1987), 268; Nur al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī, *al-Kifāya fi al-Hidāya*, ed. Muḥammad Aruci (Beirut-İstanbul: Dar al-Ibn Hazm, 2014), 137.

[3] Güvenç Şensoy, *Sadruşşerîa'nın Kelâmı Ta'dîl Teşebbüsü Varlık ve Ulûhiyyet Merkezli Bir İnceleme* (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2023), 341.

[4] Mehmet Baktır, "Allah'ın Fiili Sıfatlarında Zaman Sorunu", *Kader* 1/2 (2003), 101; Mustafa Aykaç, "Osmanlı Kelâmında Mâtürîdîlik Vurgusu: Şerhu'l-'Aḳâid Haşiyelerindeki Tekvin Tartışmaları Bağlamında Bir İnceleme", *Kader* 18/1 (2020), 7.

[5] Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Bāqillānī, *Temhīd al-Awā'il wa Talkḥīs al-Dalā'il*, ed. Imād al-Dīn Aḥmad Haydar (Beirut: Muassasāt al-Utubi al-Sakāfiyya, 1987), 246; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Muḥaṣṣal*, ed. Eşref Altaş, tr. Eşref Altaş (İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2019), 163; Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī, *al-Tamhīd fī Beyān al-Tawḥīd*, ed. Ömür Türkmen (Ankara-Beyrut: TDV Yayınları and Daru Ibn Hazm, 2017), 124; Abū al-Yusr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Husayn al-Pazdawī, *Usūl al-Din*, ed. Hans Peter Lins (Cairo: Dār Ihya al-Kutub al-Arabiyya, 1963), 80; Abu al-Mu'īn al-Nasafī, *Tabsirat al-Adillah fī Usūli al-Dīn*, ed. Muḥammad Anwar Hamid Isa (al-Mektabat al-Azhariyya li't-turas & al-Jazira li'n-neşri wa't-tevzi', 2011), 1/536; Ala al-Dīn al-Usmandī, *Lubāb al-Kalām*, ed. M. Sait Özervarlı (Ankara: TDV İSAM Publications, 2019), 97; Jalāl al-Dīn 'Umar b. Muḥammad b. 'Umar al-Khabbāzī, *Kitāb al-Hādī fī Usūli al-Dīn*, ed. Adil Bebek (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2006), 112.

one who possesses the attribute of power as the one who performs the work, they think that God does not need any attribute other than the attribute of power for creation. According to them, creation, therefore, is realised through the created relation of God's attribute of power. From this point of view, according to the Ash'arites, the attribute of power is eternal and subsistent with God's essence, whereas creation is created. They think that the attribute of power has two aspects. These aspects are eternal and created. Since the attribute of power has eternal and actual aspects, the eternal aspect functions as the preparation for the creation of contingents, and the actual aspect functions as their creation. Therefore, according to the Ash'arites, the attribute of power is eternal, not creation.[6] In this respect, to them, the attribute of creation belongs to the created being.

In this issue, Māturīdī theologians like Abū Shakūr al-Sālimī (d. after 460/1068), Abū al-Yusr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Husayn al-Pazdawī (d. 493/1100), Abu al-Muʾīn al-Nasafī, Ala al-Dīn al-Usmandī (d. 552/1157 [?]), Abu al-Thenā Maḥmūd b. Zayd al-Lāmīshī (d. 7th/12th century first half), al-Ṣābūnī, Jalāl al-Dīn ʿUmar b. Muḥammad b. ʿUmar al-Khabbāzī (d. 691/1292), Abū Muḥammad Rüknüddīn Ubaydullah b. Muḥammad b. Abdülazīz al-Samarqandī (d. 701/1301), Abu al-Barakāt al-Nasafī (d. 710/1310) first try to emphasise that *takwīn* and created by *takwīn* are different things. Their interlocutors here are the Muʿtazilites, the Karrāmiyya, and the Ashʿarites. Again, unlike the Ashʿarites and Muʿtazilites, the Māturīdīs do not accept the division of attributes into essential and actual.[7] While al-Sālimī thinks that the question is actually about whether God's attributes are created or not, he emphasises the impossibility of the claim that they are created. He presents this claim as "according to the Ahl al-Sunnah".[8] By using the exact phrase, al-Pazdawī emphasises that Abū Mansūr al-Māturīdī was of the same opinion.[9] Al-Nasafī's explanations directly target the Ashʿarites and point out that while *takwīn* is accepted as created, the claim that other essential attributes are eternal is meaningless.[10] In addition to the attributes of knowledge, will, and power, al-Usmandī points at length to the impossibilities that arise if the attribute of eternal creation is not accepted.[11] al-Lāmīshī, al-Ṣābūnī, and al-Khabbāzī present the assumptions of the Ḥanafī-Māturīdī tradition in similar terms.[12] In his objection to al-Rāzī, al-Ruqn al-Dīn al-Samarqandī states that God's creation is not only by power but that the attributes of knowledge, will, and power are the conditions of *takwīn*.[13] Almost all scholars in the tradition discuss the issue in the same terms.

As can be seen, the discussions on *takwīn* in the Māturīdī tradition continue without separating *takwīn* as an attribute from the act of creation as a verb. I will touch on this point, which will be the basis of Sadr al-Sharīʿa's criticism of the Māturīdīs before him, in a later section. Again, it can be noted that the arguments for *takwīn* in the Māturīdī tradition are repeated in almost the same way. They think that even in cases where creation is created, the attribute of "being a creator"

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[6] al-Rāzī, *al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 163; Baktır, "Allah'ın Fiili Sıfatlarında Zaman Sorunu", 102.
[7] al-Sālimī,i*al-Tamhīd*, 136 ff; al-Pazdawī, *Usūl al-Dīn*, 76 ff; al-Nasafī, Tabsira, 1/535 ff; al-Usmandī, *Lubāb al-Kalām*, 96 ff; Abu al-Thenā Maḥmūd b. Zayd al-Lāmīshī, *Kitāb al-Tamhīd li Kavāidi al-Tawḥīd*, ed. ʿAbd al-Majīd Turki (Paris: Dāru al-Garb al-Islamī, 1995), 77 ff; al-Ṣābūnī, *al-Kifāya*, 143 ff; al-Khabbāzī, *al-Hādī*, 111 ff.; Abū Muḥammad Rüknüddīn Ubaydullah b. Muḥammad b. Abdülazīz al-Samarqandī, *al-Aqīdat al-Rükniyye fī Şerhi Lā İlāha İllallāh Muḥammadun Rasūlullāh*, ed. Mustafa Sinanoğlu (İstanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2008), 66 ff; Abu'l-Barakāt al-Nasafī, *Sharḥ al-Umda*, ed. Abdullah Muḥammad Abdullah Ismail (Cairo: al-Mektebet al-Azhariyya li't-Turas, 2012), 197 ff.
[8] al-Sālimī, *al-Tamhīd*, 137.
[9] al-Pazdawī, *Usūl al-Dīn*, 77.
[10] al-Nasafī, *Tabsira*, 1/565.
[11] al-Usmandī, *Lubāb al-Kalā*m, 96.
[12] al-Lāmīshī, *Kitāb al-Tamhīd*, 77; al-Ṣābūnī, al-Kifāya, 144; al-Khabbāzī, *al-Hādī*, 112.
[13] al-Samarqandī, *al-Aqīdet al-Rükniyye*, 71.

is not created but must be eternal. That is to say, *takwīn* is not the attribute of the created but the agent's attribute. The Māturīdīs also base these assumptions on Abū Ḥanīfah. In his work *al-Waṣiyya*, he defends the view that "good deeds are realised by God's *tahlīq*, that is, *takwīn*."[14] Here, as will be pointed out later, the statement "being a creator is eternal even though creation is created" is one of the points subject to Sadr al-Sharī'a's criticism. Sadr al-Sharī'a thinks that the ontological categories of the attribute of being a creator, the thing that is the subject of creation, and the act of creation in this statement should be questioned carefully. So, what is the Ashʿarite objection that compels the Māturīdīs to this statement? The answer is that the Ash'arites claim that the eternity of *takwīn* entails the eternity of created. It will be helpful to examine this objection and answer separately.

2. Does the Eternity of *Takwīn* Necessitate the Eternity of Created (*Mukawwan*)?

We can evaluate the criticisms of the Ash'arites against the Māturīdīs on the attribute of *takwīn* under two headings. The first is the accusation of *bid'ah* and the second is the criticism that if *takwīn* is accepted as eternal, then created must also be eternal. In their encounters with the Māturīdīs, the Ash'arites stated that the claim that the attribute of *takwīn* is eternal was a *bid'ah* that had never been defended by any scholar before. This is a severe accusation for a school that considers itself to adhere to the Sunnah. In response to this accusation, al-Pazdawī mentioned that Imam Māturīdī also held this view, and al-Nasafī listed the names of scholars in Samarkand who held this view.[15] By referring to Imam Māturīdī as the person who best understood Abū Ḥanīfa's system, these two theologians point out that the accusation of *bid'ah* is baseless.

According to the second criticism of the Ash'arites, which is the main focus of this study, the claim that *takwīn* is eternal entails the eternity of *mukawwan*.[16] Therefore, according to them, the attribute of *takwīn* must be created. Because, in fact, according to the Ash'arites, *takwīn* is not a real attribute. The attributes of knowledge, will, and power are real, and creation is realised through the attribute of power. Therefore, in their view, what should be said about God in terms of eternity is not that He is the creator in eternity but that He is capable of creation.[17] According to them, creation, which means *kawn*, is a property that should be attributed to the creature, not the creator, because *kawn* is an accident.[18] Al-Razi expresses this as follows:

> If what is meant by *takwīn* is the effect of the power on the *maqdūr*, this is a relative thing, and what is relative is created because it exists with that to which it is subject. If what is meant by *takwīn* is an effective property that affects the existence of the work, this is the power itself.[19]

al-Rāzī distinguished between effect and attribute in the topic of *takwīn*. He emphasises that the effect is created, whereas the attribute is eternal power. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, in line with the Ash'arites before him, he states that the subject of discussion is the attribute of eternal power through which creation takes place and that there is no need for an attribute other than

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[14] Numan bin Thabit Abū Ḥanīfa, "al-Waṣiyya", tr. Mustafa Öz, *İmâm-ı A'zam'ın Beş Eseri* (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2006), 88.

[15] al-Pazdawī, *Usūl al-Din*, 77; al-Nasafī, *Tabsira*, 1/551-558.

[16] Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Munāzarāt* (İstanbul : Litera Yayıncılık, 2016), 35.

[17] Ibn al-Fūrek, *Mujarred*, 268.

[18] Hikmet Yaman, "Small Theological Differences, Profound Philosophical Implications: Notes on Some of the Chief Differences between the Ash'arīs and Māturīdīs", *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 51/1 (2010), 187.

[19] al-Rāzī, *al-Muḥaṣṣal*, 163.

the attribute of power because of its definition. In other words, while the effect is an attribute of creation, it is an eternal attribute of power, which is subsistent with God.

The Māturīdīs answer the objection that if *takwīn* is eternal, then created must also be eternal by pointing out that *takwīn* and created are different things. According to them, the attribute of knowledge refers to the cognisance of things, the attribute of will refers to allocation, and the attribute of power refers to the possessor's power over contingents. Since these three attributes do not have the meaning of creation, the attribute of *takwīn*, through which creation is realised, must be considered as a separate attribute.[20] While the attribute of *takwīn* is eternal, the creature is created, and *takwīn* should be considered the attribute of the creator, not the creature. Then, how can one respond to the Ash'arites' objection that "if *takwīn* is accepted as eternal, then the created must also be accepted as eternal?" At this point, the Māturīdīs offer another answer by pointing to the Ash'arites' assumptions. Just as, according to the Ash'arites, the eternity of the attribute of power and the existence of its relation does not necessitate the eternity of the created thing, the eternity of the attribute of *takwīn* does not necessitate the eternity of creation.[21] For this answer to be valid, it must be clarified that *takwīn* is an attribute of the creator, not of the created. The Māturīdīs tried to show this by pointing to their assumption that *takwīn* is eternal and the creation is *ḥādith*.

I find it useful to mention Abu al-Barakāt al-Nasafī here for the reason that he differs from the previous scholars by referring to the view of *fāʿil al-mukhtār* after the general discussions. Abu al-Barakāt, who thinks there would be no need for creation since power encompasses all subject to power, points out that God would have two powers if *ījāt* is also realised through power. According to him, the existence of a thing is not realised by power but by îqāʾ. The existence is realised by invention and power, so Allāh is the *fāʿil al-mukhtār*.[22] Although it is not clear here, Abu al-Barakāt's distinction can be regarded as the first form of Sadr al-Sharī'a's distinction between *īqāʾ* and *ījāt*, which I will examine later. Notably, this distinction presented prominently and perfectly in Sadr al-Sharī'a, was also attempted to be expressed in an ambiguous way before him.

To summarise, according to the Māturīdīs, while *takwīn* is eternal, the act is created. They stated that the attribute of creation is eternal, and the act of creation is created in order to avoid the criticism of the Ash'arites that if *takwīn* is eternal, the created will also be eternal. According to Sadr al-Sharī'a, this approach, which is common to almost all Māturīdīs, stems from the inability to distinguish between the attribute of *takwīn*, which is the origin of the act, and the act itself. We can now move on to Sadr al-Sharī'a's criticisms.

3. Sadr Al-Sharī'A's Approach to the Attribute of *Takwīn* and His Criticism of the Māturīdī Tradition

As one of the thinkers representing the later period of the Māturīdī tradition in terms of changing conceptual schema and content, Sadr al-Sha'rī'a presents his explanations on the attribute of *takwīn* together with his objections to al-Rāzī from the Ash'arite school and al-Sālimī, al-Pazdawī, al-Nasafī, al-Ṣābūnī, al-Lāmishī, and al-Khabbāzī from the Māturīdī school. In fact, the objection Sadr al-Sha'rī'a presents here is an objection that covers all of the Māturīdīs before him in terms of meaning. Still, it is understood that he refers to the names explicitly mentioned

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[20] al-Nasafī, *Tabsira*, 1/307-308; al-Rāzī, *Munazarat*, 37. Also cf. n: 6.
[21] al-Nasafī, *Tabsira*, 1/349; al-Ṣābūnī, *al-Kifāya*, 143-144.
[22] al-Nasafī, *Sharḥ al-Umda*, 203.

in the words he uses in his objection. Other scholars say the same thing in terms of meaning; according to all of them, the creation is eternal while the one created is created.

In order to understand Sadr al-Sharī'a's explanations, it is necessary to mention the distinction he makes between *īqā'* and *ījāt*. According to him, the act has two meanings. The first of the meanings is the external form of the action. This is the meaning that occurs with *masdar* (*ḥāsıl bi al-maṣdar*). The second meaning of the verb is the *īqā'* of the external form observed with the senses.[23] Furthermore, Sadr al-Sharī'a has also dealt with this issue in his *Tawzīḥ*. Sadr al-Sharī'a uses the same binary division to explain the meanings of the act.[24] Based on this distinction, Sadr al-Sharī'a states that the acts observed with the senses exist, whereas the origin of these acts, *īqā'*, is neither existing nor non-existent. This is because if this *īqā'* is considered to exist, the problem of infinite regress arises. If it is considered to be non-existent, the problem of non-actualisation of actions arises. The only way to avoid these two problems is to accept a means that is neither existing nor non-existent. Therefore, his proposal here is basically based on the expansion of ontological categories, i.e., the category of neither existing nor non-existent should be added to the categories of existent and non-existent. Since our aim in this study is not to present Sadr al-Sharī'a's criticisms of the Ash'arite theologians but to show his criticisms of the explanations of the theologians in the Māturīdī tradition before him, we can leave aside how Sadr al-Sharī'a would respond to the Ash'arite approach and move on to the impact of his approach on the attribute of taqwīn.

He makes a clear distinction between attribute and act in the discussions of *takwīn* and bases his explanations on this distinction. According to him, the attribute of *takwīn* is not the same as actions but the origin of actions. In this respect, the attribute is the ground of the act. He explains what he means by action with the following phrase: "Allāh brought Zayd into existence at such and such a time", where "'bring into existence' means to bring something into existence when it does not exist. This must be regarded as an act which differs from *takwīn*. While *takwīn* is the eternal origin of this act, the act is not eternal.[25] This points to a distinction that Sadr al-Sharī'a presented that is not in the tradition before him. I have already mentioned above that only Abu al-Barakāt presents a similar, albeit somewhat vague, distinction. However, there is no point in his taxonomy from which we can infer that *takwīn* is the ground of the actual attributes in terms of meaning. Then, according to Sadr al-Sharī'a, is this act existent? As mentioned earlier, the answer given by the Māturīdīs before him to this question is that the act is created. Since this is the point that Sadr al-Sharī'a criticises, it would be useful to first look at the part where he presents the views of the previous Māturīdīs.

> Even though the leaders of the school (*mashāyīkh*) accept the attribute of *takwīn* since they are concerned about Allāh's being the subject of created (*ḥawādīth*), they accept that the attribute of *takwīn*, which means creation, is eternal (*qadīm*) and the created is *ḥādith*.[26]

According to Sadr al-Sharī'a's presentation, the Māturīdī theologians, whom he calls "mashāyīkh", accept the attribute of *takwīn* but think that the attribute is eternal, and the act is created. In other words, they say that *takwīn* (i.e., *ījāt*), accepted as creation, is eternal, whereas the act of creation is created. For Sadr al-Sharī'a, this is a problematic point of view. This is

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[23] Ubaydullah Ibn Mas'ūd Sadr al-Sharī'a, Sharḥ *Ta'dīl al-'Ulūm* (Süleymaniye Library, Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 188b.
[24] Ubaydullah Ibn Mas'ūd Sadr al-Sharī'a, *al-Tawzīḥ Sharḥ al-Tanqīḥ*, ed. Muḥammad Adnan Darwish (Beirut: Dāru al-Arqam, 1998), 1/382.
[25] Sadr al-Sharī'a, *Ta'dīl* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 185a.
[26] Sadr al-Sharī'a, *Ta'dīl* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 187b.

because the fact that what is called *takwīn*, creation, or invention is *qadīm* is incompatible with the conception of a God who is fā'il al-mukhtār. Since God is fā'il al-mukhtār, His creation can't be eternal. Or, to put it differently, to say that creation is eternal means accepting that God is the *mūjib* himself because it is impossible to claim that the created thing is not eternal after saying that the attribute of creation is eternal (*qadīm*). In this respect, claiming that God's existent attribute is eternal after accepting that He is fā'il al-mukhtār causes a contradiction. Therefore, to say that the attribute of creation is eternal means accepting that God is the creator in eternity by necessity from His essence (*mūjib bi al-dhāt*). This is a position that all theologians should reject. This assumption of *mūjib bi al-dhāt* is directly one of the assumptions of the theory of emanation. Samarqandī also addresses the issue in this way. According to him, the *mūjib* is not the one who performs the act when he wishes and does not perform it when he wishes. This is because the one accepted to be *mūjib* is from whom the action must necessarily emanate. Therefore, it is impossible to say that an agent has a will after it is accepted that he is *mūjib*.[27] Sadr al-Sharī'a also draws attention to this when he says that the eternity of power contradicts the understanding of a God with the will.

So, how should Māturīdī theologians avoid this problem? According to Sadr al-Sharī'a, the point where the Māturīdī theologians fall into error is not being aware of the distinction between the act and the attribute that is the origin of the act. While it is clear that the essential attributes of God are eternal since He is not subject to *ḥawādīth*, there is ambiguity in the case of the attributes of action. To eliminate this ambiguity, it is necessary to accept that actions have an eternal origin. Returning to the question posed above, what is the problem with this act being created? To clarify this, to say that the act of creation, i.e., *ījāt*, is created entails accepting that this creation exists. The problem here is that it is necessary to investigate precisely what "the existing *ījāt* exists" means. When we ask the same question for the second and subsequent creations, the way to avoid infinite regress would be to say that it was the same one that brought that act into existence. However, this is an impossibility expressed as a *dawr*.

Due to the possibilities of infinite regress and *dawr* that arise when it is assumed to exist, Sadr al-Sharī'a argues that while the attribute of *takwīn*, which is the origin of the act, is eternal, the act (*ījāt*) is neither existent nor non-existent.[28]

> The acception of the attribute that is the origin of the action, the assertion of the eternity of that attribute, and the assertion that the action is neither existent nor non-existent, are the elimination of errors, the details of which have already been mentioned.[29]

Sadr al-Sharī'a proposes a solution to the issue that the previous Māturīdīs thought to be erroneous with the theory of state (*ḥāl*). For Sadr al-Sharī'a, the use of the theory of state is not limited to this issue. Due to the errors he encountered while questioning the ontological categories of concepts such as *ījāt*, *takwīn*, and *ikhtiyār*, such as infinite regress, ijāb, and *dawr*, he proposes the acceptance of things that have external relations but are neither existent nor non-existent.[30]

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[27] Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ashraf al-Ḥusaynī al-Samarqandī, *al-Saḥāif al-İlāhiyya*, ed. Aḥmad 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Sharif (Kuwait: Mektebat al-Falaḥ, 1985), 2/1118 ff.
[28] Sadr al-Sharī'a, *Ta'dīl* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 188a.
[29] Sadr al-Sharī'a, *Ta'dīl* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 188a.
[30] Sadr al-Sharī'a, *al-Tawzīḥ*, 1/194-198. On the issues that led al-Sadr al-Sharī'a to accept states, see. *Şensoy, Sadruşşerîa'nın Kelâmı Ta'dîl Teşebbüsü*, 159-177.

> The correct view regarding the relative things is that they are considered mediators [between existence and non-existence]. Because when someone kills someone, it means that he has created (*ījāt*) the act of killing. It is not correct to say 'he did not (*ījāt*)', which would mean 'he did not kill'. Therefore, his *ījāt* of killing is not non-existent in this sense.[31]

Sadr al-Sharī'a points to the problems that arise when concepts such as *ījāt* and *ikhtiyār* are regarded as existing or non-existent. Realising an act means making that act exist externally. For example, when the act of killing is realised, it is not possible to accept this act as non-existent. Because, as it was said at the beginning, the act of killing has taken place. So, what is the problem with saying that it exists? For the external *ījāt*, which is to perform the act of killing, to exist, there must be another *ījāt*, and since the same issue would apply to the second *ījāt*, it would lead to infinite regress. In this case, because of the problems that arise in the case of accepting the non-existent and the existing, it is necessary to accept that the *ījāt* is neither existing nor non-existent.[32]

Sadr al-Sharī'a, who continues his analysis here in the same way on the issue of *takwīn*, considers the attribute of *takwīn*, which is the origin of the act, as *qadīm* and the act (i.e., *ījāt*) as neither existent nor non-existent. Considering the act as non-existent, in terms of the example of the creation of the universe, means that no creation actually took place. On the other hand, accepting the act as existent would require infinite regress, which, as pointed out above, is impossible to defend.

The Māturīdīs present the view that "creation is eternal and its creation is created" in terms of meaning, though not entirely in terms of expression. Sadr al-Sharī'a's main criticism is directed at this sentence. The expression "creation is eternal while the created is created" means "the act of *ījāt* is eternal while the effect of the act is created". God can't create someone at a specific time to be eternal. However, accepting *takwīn*, the origin of the act, as eternal and the act of creation itself as neither existent nor non-existent eliminates the aforementioned problems.

Conclusion

The debate on *takwīn* stems from the disagreement over the attribute through which God's creation is realised. While the Māturīdīs accept that God's creation is directly realised through the attribute of *takwīn*, the Ash'arites think that it is realised through the attribute of power. The Māturīdīs' belief that the attribute of power is not sufficient for creation stems from their definition of the attribute of power differently from the Ash'arites. While the Ash'arites define the attribute of power as "the power to do something and the one who does it with his power", the Māturīdīs define it as "the power to do something". Therefore, for the Ash'arites, the presence of the attribute of power in the agent means the realisation of the thing. In contrast, the Māturīdīs think that the presence of power is not sufficient, that power is the ability to do the act, and that *takwīn* an attribute other than power, is necessary for the realisation of the thing. The Ash'arites objected that the attribute of *takwīn*, which is eternal according to the Māturīdīs' acceptance, would require the created things to be eternal as well. The Māturīdīs, on the other hand, answered the objection by explaining that the attribute of creation, "*takwīn*, is eternal, and the act is created".

[31] Sadr al-Sharī'a, *Ta'dīl* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 150a, 194b.
[32] Sadr al-Sharī'a, *Ta'dīl* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 150a.

Sadr al-Sharī'a, one of the theologians representing the later period of the Māturīdī school, proposes to deal with the issue through "states" (*aḥwāl*) due to the problems he sees in the aforementioned tradition's explanations of the attribute of *takwīn*. According to him, the actual attributes are also eternal, like the essential attributes. There is no problem in accepting the attributes of action as *qadīm* because they are the origin of action. While the origin of the act is the attribute of *takwīn*, which is *qadīm*, acts are states that are expressed as "neither existent nor non-existent". His criticism of the tradition focuses on the fact that the Māturīdī theologians were not aware of the distinction between acts and the attribute that is the origin of acts. "He thinks that the sentence, 'Creation is eternal and the act is created', does not make sense, and states that God's act in the sense of creation cannot be eternal since He is the *fāʿil al-mukhtār*. According to him, while there is no problem among the Māturīdīs about the eternity of essential attributes, there is ambiguity about the eternity of attributes of action. Therefore, he proposes that the actional attribute *takwīn* be accepted as the origin of actions. While the attribute of *takwīn*, which is the origin of the act, is eternal, the act in the sense of īqaʿ (*ījāt*) should be considered a state (neither existent nor non-existent). Therefore, according to Sadr al-Sharī'a, the Māturīdīs who do not accept *ījāt* as a state are as much at fault as the Ashʿarites who do not accept that the origin of the act is *qadīm*. Thus, by distinguishing between the origin of the act and the act, he justifies the view of *fāil al-mukhtār* and shows that contrary to the Ashʿarites' claim, creation is realised by an attribute other than the attributes of will and power. Since this study focuses only on the analysis of Sadr al-Sharī'a's criticisms of his tradition, the extent to which his criticisms were taken seriously by later theologians, and especially the extent to which theologians within the Māturīdī tradition applied them, remains to be studied.

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